Scythian Tactics and Strategy: Devastating Guerrilla Archers – Part I

Battle between the Scythians and the Slavs

Featured image: Battle between the Scythians and the Slavs ( Wikimedia Commons ).

The Scythians may not be the original inventors of asymmetrical warfare, but one could argue that they perfected it. Before and during the Scythian arrival, many nations fought by conventional methods. In other words, the established civilizations of Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia, used taxes to feed, equip, and maintain their large armies. Overall, one can see the massive expense it is to arm and defend a nation when war comes a-knocking. Lives and money are lost, doubly so if you go on the offensive at the expense of your nation’s pocket.

The Scythians, on the other hand, needed none of these, for they were tribal based and seemed to come together only in a time of war. Thus, most issues did not hinder them, such as the laws of supply and demand in the military-economic sense, which would affect an established kingdom or empire. The land was their supplier and demand was when they were in need of resources. For Scythians to sustain life, they had to move to new regions in search of ample pastures suited for their horses to graze and abundant with game, while the land they moved from was left to rest. But one has to be cautious as well, for even though the Scythians moved around, many stayed within their tribal territory. In some cases, they ventured into another tribal territory due to the need to sustain life for both tribe and livestock.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC. Public Domain

When one examines the Scythian lifestyle, one can easily gain an understanding of the type of warfare necessarily carried on against more sedentary (non-migratory) people, like those in Mesopotamia. The Scythian took a guerilla approach to warfare as their method, not to be confused with terrorism. The term guerrilla warfare means irregular warfare and its doctrine advocates for the use of small bands to conduct military operations. Herodotus mentions their method of warfare when King Darius of Persia campaigned against them:

“It is thus with me, Persian: I have never fled for fear of any man, nor do I now flee from you; this that I have done is no new thing or other than my practice in peace. But as to the reason why I do not straightway fight with you, this too I will tell you. For we Scythians have no towns or planted lands, that we might meet you the sooner in battle, fearing lest the one be taken or the other wasted. But if nothing will serve you but fighting straightway, we have the graves of our fathers; come, find these and essay to destroy them; then shall you know whether we will fight you for those graves or no. Till then we will not join battle unless we think it good.”

The description indicates that the Scythians against whom Darius is warring have no center of gravity; more on this later.

Swarming

The Scythians are best known for swarming the enemy, like at the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE, where they demonstrated this tactic during the initial stages of the attack. The swarming tactic is the first stage before any other mechanism is executed, like feinting or defense in depth.

To summarize, the definition of swarming would be a battle involving several or more units pouncing on an intended target simultaneously.  The whole premise of swarming in guerrilla warfare, as indicated in the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-8 on the topic of counterguerrilla operations, is to locate, fix, and engage the enemy, but to avoid larger forces unless you possess units capable of countering the other. This would allow other units to take advantage of the enemy, which is rare in most battles involving the Scythians. The key principle of swarming is that it does not matter if you win the battle so long as you do not lose the war. It is designed to disorient the enemy troops.

The swarming tactic comprises many units converging on the intended target; however, the swarm moves with the target in order to fracture it. Thus, the method of swarming is to dislodge the enemy piecemeal, causing rank and file to implode. This is due to longstanding, snail-like movement during battle, meantime being continuously pelted from afar by projectiles; fear takes over, demoralizing an army. Roman soldiers were to have a taste of this, for they had a space of three feet all around them to allow for movement and maneuvering in battle. The Scythians took advantage of their three feet, as Plutarch mentions, at the battle of Carrhae: “Huddled together in a narrow space and getting into each other’s way, they were shot down by arrows.”

The heavy barrage of arrows would cause some to wander off, bit-by-bit, thus allowing horse archers to concentrate fully on the wandering enemy. In this scenario, one can argue that the initial battle tactic is to pelt the enemy with a volley of arrows, keeping the target tight in order to fracture it, which allows the horse archers to go from random pelting to accurately killing the enemy. In other words, they switch from firing up into the air to firing forward at the enemy, as demonstrated at Carrhae in 53 BCE.

Scythians shooting with the Scythian bow, Kerch (ancient Panticapeum), Crimea, 4th century BC.

Scythians shooting with the Scythian bow, Kerch (ancient Panticapeum), Crimea, 4th century BC. (CC BY-SA 3.0 )

Now, before we go any further, let me briefly make the case that swarming has many different methods or tactics, but the Scythian swarm is not like that of others. However, a swarm is a swarm, but the method varies. Case in point, “mass swarming” is the most sought- after method in both the ancient and medieval world, demonstrated by massive conventional armies that would eventually separate or disassemble and perform convergent attacks over a region or province from its initial phase. The “dispersed swarm” is the preferred tactic in guerrilla warfare, where the body separates and converges on the battlefield without forming a single body.

The whole premise of swarming in guerilla warfare is to engage quickly but to avoid larger forces. Pharnuches, one of Alexander’s generals, made the fatal mistake by falling for the Scythian feinting tactic, in which he chased after the Scythians, only to find himself ambushed and swarmed. Pharnuches should have never been given command, because he was a diplomat, not an experienced officer.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon. Public Domain

The Battle of Jaxartes is a fine example of the swarming tactic, but rather small in scale. The Scythians harassing the forces of Alexander did not appear to be a large force. Rather, the Scythians at the battle intended to demoralize the enemy, and if that did not work, they could always lead the enemy farther inland and begin the strategy of defense in depth. Alexander knew better after he defeated the Scythians at Jaxartes in 329 BCE. Alexander understood quite well that if he were to pursue the Scythians further inland, his forces would be open to hit and run attacks, famine, and psychological attrition, none of which is desirable. Even Alexander understood the limits of empire, especially when his worldview did not incorporate the lands to the north.

The Battle of Jaxartes was a loss for the Scythians and a victory for the Macedonians. However, two important demonstrations of the tactics are visible at the battle. The first tactic is swarming, the second is what I like to call the swarm-anti-swarm tactic developed by Alexander, commonly referred to as “anti-swarming.” In fact, Alexander had to swarm in order to achieve victory. The swarm-anti-swarm counters the enemy with a bait-unit. Once the enemy converged from several sides, the remainder of the forces would converge on the area and swarm the enemy. Alexander learned quickly to adopt this tactic of closing in on the enemy and attacking from all directions for future use.

By Cam Rea

References

Ian Morris, Why the West rules–for Now: the Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 277-279.

Herodotus, The Histories, 4. 127.

Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), xii.

U.S. Department of Defense, Counterguerrilla Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, FM 90-8, August 1986), Chapter 4, Section III. 4-10.

Polybius. 18.30.6

Plutarch, Crassus, 25.5

Kaveh Farrokh, Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War (Oxford: Osprey, 2007), 133.

John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, (New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 118-120.

Abraham’s Special Military Operation

Image result for Abraham rescue of Lot

It all started over grazing lands. Both Lot and Abraham had flocks and herds and when they came to a piece of land that could not sustain both their flocks and herds, arguments broke out among the herdsmen working for them. Lot decided to leave and head east into the fertile plain of Siddim and established his tent before Sodom, while Abraham stayed in Canaan and moved to the plain of Mamre, which is in Hebron. After some years had passed, a group of refugees brought news to Abraham that the armies of Mesopotamia had marched on Sodom, a great battle took place, and Lot had been captured afterward.

This brings us to a few questions to ask. What caused the armies of Mesopotamia to occupy the cities of the Jordan River plain? Who were these rulers, and what was their objective?

The Bible is silent concerning the Mesopotamian invasion of the Jordanian land. However, this should not stop us from trying to figure it out. Why would a vast army from a collection of nations invade the region? The answer is instability. With the absence of a foe strong enough to challenge them, the armies of Mesopotamia marched in, almost unopposed, confiscated untapped resources, and expanded their political influence throughout the region.

The leaders involved were Amraphel king of Shinar, Arioch king of Ellasar, Chedorlaomer king of Elam, and Tidal king of nations (Umman Manda). These four made war on the five kings of the plain. These five kings were Bera king of Sodom, and with Birsha king of Gomorrah, Shinab king of Admah, and Shemeber king of Zeboiim, and the king of Bela, which is Zoar. What can be gathered given the timing of the event is that the power in charge of this operation is none other than the Mesopotamian Empire of Ur III. The king responsible for the mobilizing and executing the operation may have been none other than Amraphel of Shinar (Sumer) otherwise known as King Amar-Sin of Ur. Amar-Sin ruled Ur for 9 years from 1834-1826 BCE.

During his reign, Ur achieved the highest economic production, which allowed for the continued construction of public buildings. When it came to controlling his empire, instead of stationing military troops throughout the imperial state, Amar-Sin decided it would be best to use peaceful and constructive socio-economic incentives to extend the revamped Sumerian city-states on the outer edges. Amar-Sin established ensi or governors, who enjoyed almost complete independence, such as in the cities of Alalak, Mari, and Assur. Ensi’s for the most part were natives of the area they controlled. Amar-Sin’s policy not only encouraged local cultural development but also cemented the imperial structure by doing so. With such freedom came economic and social creativity.

Amar-Sin’s treasury was bursting at the seams, so he decided to go on another tour to expand his state. During his nine years, he conducted war in the northeasterly districts, but when it comes to how far he, like his father Shulgi, expanded the state, the extent remains hazy. What can be identified is that Mari and Elam were within the sphere of Ur’s influence by a policy of matrimonial alliances introduced by his grandfather Ur-Nammu at Mari. Such alliances, allowed Amar-Sin to utilize their armies for political and economic expansion by force.

After twelve years had passed, Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, Zeboiim, and Zoar said no more. They grew tired of paying tribute to Amar-Sin and knew that war was inevitable. King Amar-Sin, angered over the news, mobilized the forces. Leading this army to punish the people in eastern Canaan (western part of Jordan) was the king’s extortionist, King Chedorlaomer of Elam, according to the Bible, but also identified as King Kutir-Lagamar, loyal vassal of Amar-Sin.

In the spring of the fourteenth year, the armies of Ur marched out. The number of troops partaking in this military operation may have been around 10,000, perhaps a bit less. As Chedorlaomer’s armies moved from north to south, they would have taken the King’s Highway along the east side of the Jordan River in the hill country to reach their targets that dotted the plateau.

The first phase of Chedorlaomer’s campaign focused not on attacking the kings of the valley because that was too risky. Rather, he focused his attack on those who were their vassals or allies to the east. Chedorlaomer chose this strategy to knock out the eastern allies of the kings, securing his eastern flank with the desert. He could then focus on neutralizing all potential threats to the south.

Chedorlaomer first struck the city of Ashteroth Karnaim in Rephaim, laying waste to the city of Ham in Zuzims and the city of Shaveh Kiriathaim in Emim. Chedorlaomer continued to push into Mount Seir of the Horites and continued until he reached Elparan at the edge of the desert. There are two possibilities as to why Chedorlaomer stopped there. The first reason from a military perspective is obvious; it’s the desert. To proceed any farther spelled disaster. If not the desert, then it has to be political. It could be that Chedorlaomer encountered the important trade route that leads to Egypt, and to cause any upheaval along that commercial route would cause Egypt to take issue. Egypt had commercial interests throughout the Levant.

News of the disasters traveled quickly to each city, causing many citizens and rulers to panic and fear the worst. This was exactly what the invaders wanted, psychological warfare to bend the knees of their enemies. While many of the inhabitants were taken prisoner, many others fled before Chedorlaomer’s arrival and sought refuge behind the walls of Sodom, or behind any walls large enough for that matter, hoping that the armies of Mesopotamia would eventually turn back and head home. However, they were going to be disappointed. Chedorlaomer turned north and sacked the Enmishpat, which is Kadesh, smote the Amalekites and the Amorites that dwelt in Hazezontamar.

The five kings of the plain knew that they would be picked off individually if they stayed behind their walls. However, if they united, it would give them a fighting chance. Both armies would meet for battle on the southern end of the Dead Sea just south of Sodom in the Valley of Siddim. The battle, even though not recorded in any detail, was no doubt prolonged, bloody, and downright messy. The kings of the Plain were defeated. There is no way of knowing for sure if any of the kings died in battle as the Bible is silent on the matter. However, the Dead Sea Scrolls do mention that King Birsha of Gomorrah fell into the slime pits. The remaining kings, Shinab, Bera, Shemeber, and Bela fled into the hills. But not only did the surviving kings flee, but many others seeking safety from the marauding armies of Mesopotamia also fled.

There is no doubt that Abraham and the inhabitants living to the west of the Dead Sea knew of the events taking place east of the Jordan. They received news from refugees, trade caravans, and possibly their spies sent out to investigate, keeping a close eye on a potential threat, carefully preparing for the worst, but taking no action until war arrives at their doorstep. Abraham was concerned, but he knew that Lot was a capable adult able to make his own decisions. Unfortunately, Lot, for whatever reason, did not pack up and move out of harm’s way. No reason is given as to why Lot stayed. Perhaps he thought that the power vacuum sweeping throughout the Jordan River plain would bypass him. Whatever the case was, Lot’s clan and belongings were captured. While Abraham was going about his business, a refugee, perhaps one of Lot’s kinfolk, told Abraham what had happened, that Lot had been taken captive, and if he didn’t do something soon, Lot would be sold into slavery.

Abraham did not hesitate and sent messengers to his confederate Amorite allies, Mamre, Eshcol, and Aner informing them of the situation and asking for assistance. While the messengers were on their way, Abraham informed his household of what just happened. Abraham quickly mustered his forces of three hundred and eighteen men.

Abraham and his forces traveled north for five days, possibly taking the King’s Highway for a time, gathering intelligence and keeping an eye on the enemy’s movements. Eventually, the enemy encamped near the town of Laish (Dan). While the armies of Mesopotamia continued their victorious celebration, Abraham kept a watchful eye on the festivities, keeping track of the guards, their movements, and perhaps collecting information on the exact location of where the prisoners and loot were held from people not aligned with the army who were able to come in and out of the encampment. Abraham waited for many hours, allowing the alcohol drunk by the enemy to take full effect before storming in. Once the army began to succumb to intoxication, Abraham divided his men, into two groups of 159. While the enemy slept and their fires flickered, casting shadows, Abraham and his men infiltrated the camp in silence and smote many. Once Lot and the loot were found, they quickly packed up and moved out before any alarm could be made. The Bible does mention that they pursued them as far as “unto Hobah, which is on the left hand of Damascus,” which could suggest that Abraham was still making hit and run raids. One can assume that Abraham and his men were the only ones making these raids or perhaps they were now receiving help from their Amorite allies. Whatever the case, Abraham was successful in his special operations mission.

Abraham along with his men camped at the Valley of Shaveh. The new king of Sodom, who was in hiding, along with the other kings, came out after he received word that Abraham defeated the Mesopotamian kings and retrieved the property of the people and that of the five kings. Before the Kings of the Plain arrived, Melchizedek, the priest-king of Salem (Jerusalem) visited Abraham. Melchizedek, who had no part in the war, recognized kindness when he saw it and came out to Abraham and his men, bringing food and drink. Melchizedek thanked Abraham and blessed him for his good deed. Abraham, seeing the sincerity of Melchizedek, responded to the priest-king by giving him a tithe.

While Melchizedek responded with hospitality, wanting nothing but to say thank you, the king of Sodom was rather political in his approach. He didn’t say thank you or offer food and drink. Instead, the king of Sodom wanted to strike a deal. He offered all the loot to Abraham, as long as he returns the people to the king. The problem with this is that the Mesopotamian kings captured the people and looted the cities of the plains. Abraham had not taken anything from them, thus technically he owed the king’s of the Plain nothing legally or morally. It was legally Abraham’s by the fair fortunes of war. But Abraham was not like that. Instead of making a deal with the king and his royal entourage, Abraham’s response surprised the king by refusing to keep loot or people, for Abraham was entitled,

I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, That I will not take from a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take any thing that is thine, lest thou shouldest say, I have made Abram rich.

In other words, Abraham’s riches will come from God, not from some politician seeking to strike a deal. Besides, saving the lives and their property and not taking a single item is far more rewarding. Abraham’s rescue of Lot is technically the first recorded special operations mission.

By Cam Rea

References 

Genesis

Garcia, Juan Carlos Moreno. Ancient Egyptian Administration. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013.

Rohl, David. From Eden to Exile: The Epic History of the People of the Bible. London: Arrow, 2003.

Rohl, David. From Eden to Exile: The Epic History of the People of the Bible. London: Arrow, 2003.

Roux, Georges. Ancient Iraq. 3rd ed., New ed. London: Penguin Books, 1992.

Thomson, Gary Arthur. First Market: The Genesis of Wall Street in Ancient Iraq. New York: IUniverse, 2010.

Schwartz, Matthew B. Politics in the Hebrew Bible: God, Man, and Government. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc, 2013.

Vermès, Géza. The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English. London: Penguin, 2004.

 Abraham Makes the Enemies Flee Who Hold His Nephew (Public Domian)

The Mysterious Shamgar

 

Image result for Shamgar

When it comes to guerrilla warfare, the first person mentioned in the Bible who fits the narrative was a man by the name of Shamgar. But who was Shamgar? The Bible mentions little about him. What is known is that he was the son of Anath. However, the name Shamgar is not exactly Hebrew. Anath is possibly his mother’s name; another possibility is that he worshipped the Canaanite war goddess known as Anath. This would explain his being a professional soldier. Another clue that provides further support is his weapon of choice, an ox goad. Historian Raphael Patai mentions that the “ox-goad Shamgar used as a weapon reminds us of the two bludgeons, Ayamur (“Driver”) and Yagrush (“Chaser”), which Baal, Anath’s brother and lover, used to defeat his arch-enemy Yamm.” With his weapon measuring roughly eight feet in length with a metal tip, he took the Philistines head on and slew “six hundred men.” But a question remains. Why did Shamgar attack the Philistines?

There are many possible explanations to this Biblical figure. When reading the passage in Judges 3:31, one could say Shamgar was nothing more than a disgruntled Canaanite farmer who took on the Philistines alone. While this is possible, the likelihood is that Shamgar was a Canaanite mercenary hired by an Israelite tribe to take care of the Philistine problem. Military Historian Richard Gabriel points this out as “the inability of the Israelite tribes during the period of the Judges to manage their own military affairs effectively.” However, the other possibility is that he was a mercenary leader hired by the Egyptians to lead his band of warriors to combat the Philistine invasion. Another theory is that he was not a mercenary, but a Canaanite captain leading his band of troops in an attempt to take advantage of the aftermath the Sea Peoples left behind in southern Canaan and retake former possessions from the Egyptians.

While it is doubtful that Shamgar fought the Philistines alone, the other theories mentioned make sense from a military perspective. What is important to the story is that he did engage an adversary of Israel, which the Israelites obviously could not engage. Because of his limited success against the Philistines, which physically did little to deter them, the effect it had on the Israelites, at least the author of the book of Judges, saw to it that Shamgar, a non-Israelite, would be listed as a judge of Israel.

 

By Cam Rea

References

Judges 3:31.

Bromiley, Geoffrey W. The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia. Volume 4 – Q-Z . Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1988.

Clendenen, E. Ray and Jeremy Royal Howard. The Holman Illustrated Bible Commentary. Nashville: TN: Holman Reference, 2015.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport: Praeger, 2003.

Keener, Craig S. The IVP Bible Background Commentary: New Testament . Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014.

Patai, Raphael. The Hebrew Goddess . Detroit, MI: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1998.

Sasson, Jack M. Judges 1-12: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.

Smith, William. Smith’s Bible Dictionary. Westwood, NJ: Revell, 1967.

Palms Over Baghdad: Hulagu’s Expedition to Oust the Abbasid Caliph – Part 2

By Cam Rea

[Read Part 1]

The Fall of Bagdad

Hulegu sent messages to his commanders informing them to muster their forces and move on Baghdad.

Baiju moved his forces from Rum via Mosul to cover the western side. Ked-Buka advanced from Luristan, a province of western Iran in the Zagros Mountains. Contingents from the Golden Horde under the command of Batu’s three nephews approached from Kurdistan from the north.

Tode Mongke Khan of the Golden Horde.

Tode Mongke Khan of the Golden Horde. (Public Domain)

Hulegu led the main force from Hulwan, located in Kermanshah Province in western Iran. In other words, the Mongol army was approaching the city in an arc from the north, which allowed them to converge from the east and west. The Mongols, due to the use of pontoon boats, overcame the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which once served as natural barriers against invading armies. As the Mongols advanced down both banks of the Tigris, the Caliph sent out 20,000 cavalries in an attempt to disperse and slow down the Mongol advance. Mongol scouts ahead of the main force found the Caliph’s cavalry and reported. Not long after, the Mongol engineers took advantage of the situation by breaking the dikes of the dams along the Tigris, which flooded the terrain behind the cavalry, downing many of them as they attempted to flee back to the city. With the only threat between Baghdad and the Mongol advance eliminated, Baiju’s forces marched down the west bank of the Tigris and took control of the commercial quarter, while Hulegu entered the Shiite suburbs to a rejoicing crowd beyond the eastern walls. Within twenty-four hours, the Mongols surrounded the city of Baghdad.

Mongols besieging Baghdad in 1258.

Mongols besieging Baghdad in 1258. (Public Domain)

On 30 January 1258, the Hulegu gave the order to commence the bombardment of the city walls. However, there was a problem. The Mongol siege crews had no rocks. The siege train carrying the needed stones was three days’ journey away. While the Mongols looked for suitable projectiles to throw at the city walls, Hulegu ordered his Mongol archers to fire arrows over the walls with messages attached, which informed the citizens that they would be treated with kindness if they surrendered. While Hulegu sought to end this siege peacefully, Mongol engineers, likely accompanied by a detachment of troops, came up empty handed when it came to finding quality rocks. However, not all was lost. Mongol engineers stripped foundation stones from the buildings in the suburbs and uprooted palm trees to batter the walls of Baghdad.

The Caliph quickly sent ambassadors to negotiate peace but Hulegu would not hear the pleas and detained them. Hulegu’s message was clear, surrender was not enough; it must be unconditional surrender. While the Caliph continued to send envoys to Hulegu, the Mongols bombarded the walls, particularly focusing on the Ajami tower, which was reduced to rubble by 1 February.

Persian painting (14th century) of Hulegu’s army besieging a city. Note use of the siege engine.

Persian painting (14th century) of Hulegu’s army besieging a city. Note use of the siege engine. (Public Domain)

The Mongols finally broke into the city the next day and seized a portion of the eastern wall. However, the battle was far from over and the negotiations continued for another four days. On the 6 February, the bombardment ended but the Mongols remained on the wall until the Caliph surrendered.

Hulegu sent another message, this one to the armies of Baghdad. The message told them to lay down their arms and leave their posts. Seeing the situation was unwinnable by use of arms, Izz al-Din and Mujahid al-Din advised the Caliph to flee the city. But one man by the name of Ibn Alqami proposed that the best way to end this was for the Caliph to go before Hulegu. Hulegu’s terms to the Caliph were simple. Hulegu desired that the Caliph turn over his daughter so that he could marry her and that the Caliph recognized Hulegu as the supreme authority. If these terms were accepted, Hulegu would end the siege. The Caliph agreed and his forces marched out thinking they were going to retire to Syria.

Medieval depiction of Hulegu (left) and Caliph Al-Musta'sim.

Medieval depiction of Hulegu (left) and Caliph Al-Musta’sim. (Public Domain)

According to the 13th century Aramean historian Kirakos of Gandzak, the “countless multitudes came through the city gates, climbing over each other to see who would reach him first (Hulegu) divided up among the soldiers those who came out and ordered (the soldiers) to take them far from the city and to kill them secretly so that the others would not known. They killed all of them.”

The Many Versions of the Caliph’s Death

Four days later, Al-Musta’sim, soon to be the last Caliph of Baghdad, surrendered. There are various accounts of his surrender.

Kirakos of Gandzak account:

Al-Musta’sim emerged with his two sons, with all the grandees and much gold, silver, and precious stones as fitting gifts to Hulegu and his nobles. At first (Hulegu) honored him, reproaching him for dallying and not coming to him quickly. But then he asked the caliph: “What are you, God or man?” And the caliph responded: “I am a man, and the servant of God.” Hulegu asked: “Well, did God tell you to insult me and to call me a dog and not to give me food and drink to God’s dog? Now in hunger the dog of God shall devour you.” And he killed him with his own hands. “That, “he said, “is an honor for you, because I killed you.”

The account of 13th century polymath and prolific writer Nasir al-Din al-Tusi:

“When they took the walls, the King commanded the people of the town to join in demolishing them. Envoys passed to and fro…. After this, the Caliph, seeing that all was over, sought leave to come out. He came out…and saw the king, being accompanied by his son and courtiers…. Then (Hulegu) ordered the town to be pillaged.”

He went to examine the Caliph’s residence and walked in every direction. The Caliph was fetched and ordered presents to be offered. Whatever he brought, the king at once distributed amongst his suite and emirs, military leaders and (all) those present. He set a golden try before the Caliph and said: ‘Eat.” “It is not edible,” said the Caliph. “The why didst thou not make these iron doors into arrowheads and come to the bank of the river so that I might not have been able to cross it?” “Such,” replied the Caliph, “was God’s will.” “What will befall thee,” said the King, “is also God’s will.”…

Then he ordered the Caliph to bring out the women who were attached to himself and his sons. They went to the Caliph’s palace: there were 700 women and 1500 eunuchs, and they shared out the rest…. On the 14th Safar (20 February), the king set out from the gates of the town and sent for the Caliph….On that day he met his end in that village (Waqaf) together with his middle son. The next day his eldest son and those accompanied him met their end at the Kalwadh Gate.

The account by 13th century historian Rashid al-Din:

Hulegu Khan… the next morning … ordered Su’unchaq to go into the city, confiscate the caliph’s possessions, and sent them out. The items that had been accumulated over six hundred years were all stacked in mountainous piles…. The caliph was summoned… At the end of the day on Wednesday the 14th of Safar 656 (20 February 1258, the caliph, his eldest son, and five of his attendants were executed in the village of Waqaf … and the reign of the House of Abbas came to an end.

The account of Mustawfi Qazvini based much of his work on the histories of Rashid al-Din:

At Hulegu’s order, the executioner prepared for the killing, and maliciously brought a sack. He bound the Caliph, head, hand and foot and put him in a sack, which became his habitation. He said, “See this descendent from stock that is unequal led, and how the world has placed him in this sack.”

“Then they broke his head as though it were a stone and he died quickly. Fate dealt him a grievous blow, and brought destruction on that beautiful king. When the renowned Musta’sim was killed, a great name tumbled to the dust.”

Besides the Caliph and his sons being put to death, the three thousand courtiers who accompanied the Caliph were also said to be put to the sword.

The Destruction of Baghdad

Kirakos of Gandzak account:

Hulegu then ordered the troops guarding the walls to descend and kill the inhabitants of the city, great and small. (The Mongols) organized as though harvesting a field and cut down countless, numberless multitudes of men, women, and children. For forty days they did not stop. Then they grew weary and stopped killing. Their hands grew tired; they took others for sale. They destroyed mercilessly.

However, Hulegu’s wife, the senior Khantun (lady), named Doquz Khatun was a Christian. She spared the Christians of Baghdad, Nestorians and other denominations and beseeched her husband not to kill them. And he spared them with their goods and property.

Hulegu ordered all his soldiers to take the goods and property of the city. They all loaded up with gold, silver, precious stones, pearls, and costly garments, for it was an extremely rich city, unequalled on earth.

Hulegu himself took his share the caliph’s treasures—three thousand camel loads; and there was no counting the horses, mules and asses.

Grigor of Akanc’s account:

After this they convened a great assembly of old and young horsemen, including the Georgian and Armenian cavalry, and with countless multitudes they moved on the city of Baghdad. When they arrived on the spot they took at once the great and famous city of Baghdad, filled with many people and rare treasures, and countless gold and silver. When they took it they slaughtered mercilessly and made many prisoners.

While various Christian communities were spared the sword, the Muslim population suffered greatly. After the massacre ended, the Mongols and their allies torched the palaces and mosques. The wagon loads of treasure plundered from the city were sent to Mangku Khan in Karakorum or to Hulegu’s fort on the island of Shalia in Lake Urmiya.

Mongol siege.

Mongol siege. (Public Domain)

The number of dead is unknown. Martin Sicker in his book The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna estimates that 90,000 died. Ian Frazier in his article ‘Annals of history: Invaders: Destroying Baghdad’ published by The New Yorker, estimates (depending on the source) that “two hundred thousand, or eight hundred thousand, or more than a million” may have died. According to Andre Wink in his book Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, Vol.2, that perhaps 50,000 troops along with 200,000 to 800,000 civilians. A. Y. Al-Hassan in his book, The different aspects of Islamic culture: Science and technology in Islam, Vol.4, Ed. suggest that perhaps 2,000,000 may have perished.

The Destruction of Intellectual Wealth

The destruction of Baghdad was one of greatest disasters in human history. While one can elaborate on the great amount of wealth lost, one must not overlook the great amount of intellectual wealth lost, such as art, philosophy and science, all put to torch, along with the library, the learning centers, the hospitals and so forth. But even more precious was the amount of life lost that had no part in the conflict. Some may ask how a group of people could do such a thing. The answer is not simple.

But given what is known about the Mongols, they strongly despised farmers and cities. To them farming was a waste, which is understandable. Mongols had no use for growing crops. They needed lands for their horses and herds to graze. Cities were seen as centers of laziness. This also is understandable, for the Mongols were always on the move and had not time for leisure for their horses and herds needed constant attention. Life on the steppe had not the division of labor found in a city in order for it to function. Lastly, the Mongol record of sacking cities in China, Iran, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, always came with a tremendous loss of life and shows their disregard for human life. They treated people as if they were nothing more than animals, herding them before their great army and preparing them for the slaughter as the army slowly encircles them for the grand kill. While despicable, it is understandable in how the Mongols, such as Genghis Khan, Hulegu, or Tamerlane, treated civilians, like that of Baghdad, for such men saw outsiders as nothing more than vermin, unless that person or group of people had something to offer that could provide the Mongol administration or military machine an advantage.

The Battle of Blue Waters between the armies of Lithuania and the Golden Horde in 1362.

The Battle of Blue Waters between the armies of Lithuania and the Golden Horde in 1362. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

When looking at the Mongols from afar, a quote from the French historian René Grousset comes to mind when considering uncivilized and civilized:

“It has been noted that the Jenghiz-Khanite Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century was less cruel, for the Mongols were mere barbarians who killed simply because for centuries this had been the instinctive behavior of nomad herdsmen toward sedentary farmers. To this ferocity Tamerlane added a taste for religious murder. He killed from piety. He represents a synthesis, probably unprecedented in history, of Mongol barbarity and Muslim fanaticism, and symbolizes that advanced form of primitive slaughter which is murder committed for the sake of an abstract ideology, as a duty and a sacred mission.”

The outcome of Hulegu’s sacking of Bagdad was expected, especially coming from a man who grew up on the uncivilized steppe, while Turco-Mongol conqueror Tamerlane’s later sacking of Bagdad in 1401 was not expected, especially coming from a man who grew up surrounded by civilization.

Top Image: Mural of siege warfare, Genghis Khan Exhibit in San Jose, California, US (CC BY 2.0)

References

Bretschneider, E. Mediaeval Researchers from Eastern Asiatic Sources, Vol I. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. LTD, 1910.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. New York: Atheneum, 1979.

Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Gettleman Marvin E. and Stuart Schaar. The Middle East and Islamic World Reader. New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Grousset, René. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Secret Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizari Ismailis Against the Islamic World. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Jackson, Peter and Willem van Ruysbroeck. The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1955. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990.

Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance. London: Routledge, 2003.

Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2004.

Man, John. Kublai Khan: From Xanadu to Superpower. London: Bantam Press, 2006.

Marshall, Robert. Storm from the East: From Genghis Khan to Khubilai Khan London: Penguin, 1994.

May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War. Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007.

Mclynn, Frank. Genghis Khan: His Conquests, His Empire, His Legacy. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2015.

Nicolle, David and Richard Hook. The Mongol Warlords: Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan, Hülegü, Tamerlane. Poole, Dorset: Firebird Books, 1990.

Saunders, J.J. The History of the Mongol Conquests. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1971.

A History of Medieval Islam. London: Routledge, 2007.

Weatherford, J. McIver. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Crown, 2004.

Willey, Peter. The Eagle’s Nest: Ismaili Castles in Iran and Syria. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

Palms Over Baghdad: Hulagu’s Expedition to Oust the Abbasid Caliph – Part I

Palms-Over-Baghdad

By Cam Rea

In 1253 CE, a breeze began to blow into Baghdad from the east. Unbeknownst to Al-Musta’sim, the Abbasid Caliph, this breeze would soon turn into a violent shamal (wind). This shamal was gaining energy from Karakorum, the Mongol capital of the most powerful empire on earth. For in the same year, Mongke Khan, the Great Khan, held a khuriltai (a political and military council meeting) with siblings and close family. It was during this meeting that Mongke expressed his desire to launch a dual military campaign: one led by Khubilai against the Sung Dynasty in China, and another against the Arabs and Persians, this led by Hulegu, grandson of Genghis Khan.

Hulagu Khan, 14th century

Hulagu Khan, 14th century (Public Domain)

An artist’s depiction of ancient Karakorum.

An artist’s depiction of ancient Karakorum. (CC BY 2.0)

Hulegu’s mission was to conquer the Arabs and Persians and to expand further westward by subjugating Muslim nations, particularly bringing the Abbasid Caliphate under the Mongol yoke, and from there to proceed southwards through the Kingdom of Jerusalem to conquer the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. But there was another reason for Mongke’s decision to bring the Muslim nations under Mongol control:  riches and fear.

Riches and Fear

Thirty-six years earlier in 1217, the Mongols under the leadership of Genghis Khan invaded the Khwarazmian Empire, which ruled Persia at the time, and toppled it by 1221. However, the invasion of Persia was not completed. After Genghis Khan died in 1227, his son, Ogodei, inherited the throne. To complete this, Ogodei promoted Chormaqan to act as military governor of Persia with the sole mission to subjugate and control. Chormaqan reigned as military governor of Persia from 1231-1237.  Ogodei replaced Choraqan with Baiju in 1237. Baiju was tasked with the same mission: control the territory and expand the borders—which he did by conquering the Seljuks of Asia-Minor from 1242-1256. However, a Muslim delegation arrived at the court of Mongke in 1252, led by the religious leader, Qadi of Qazvin, which requested Mongke to replace Baiju with a royal Mongol prince.

O illustrious and magnanimous Qa’an we do not speak of a bridge made of stone, or brick, nor a bridge of chains. I want a bridge of justice over the river, for where there is justice, the world is prosperous. He who comes over the river Amu Darya (Oxus) finds the Qa’an’s justice, and on this side of the river there is justice and a path. On that side of the river, the world is evil, and some people become prosperous through injustice.

Audience with Möngke.

Audience with Möngke. (Public Domain)

This message to the Great Khan made it clear that if the Persian people were citizens of the Mongol Empire, then they should act like it and be given a representative from Genghis’ own bloodline. As to how bad the situation in Persia was under the Mongol military governors, it is unclear, but leaves one to speculate that it was not good, and enough to cause a delegation to travel to the Mongol capital of Karakorum to request a change in leadership. Mongke could have turned them away but he was no fool. The Mongols were long familiar with the influential Muslim merchants traversing throughout Asia.

Influential merchants traded goods across Asia.

Influential merchants traded goods across Asia. (Public Domain)

Besides the great flow of wealth, the Mongols also noticed the influential reputation of the renowned Persian scientists, astronomers, astrologers, mathematicians, technologist, painting, carpet making, music and poetry.

Jabir ibn Hayyan, "the father of Chemistry".

Jabir ibn Hayyan, “the father of Chemistry”. (Public Domain)

This level of sophistication was too lucrative for the Mongols not to control, especially if they could conquer southern China and combine their commerce and intellectuals with that of the Muslim world. Therefore, it was imperative to make the citizens of Persia feel equal if the Mongols wished to enjoy the lucrative commercial and intellectual benefits. Thus, the formation of the Ilkhanate was established with Hulegu as its head.

Ilkhanate, part of the Mongol Empire located primarily across modern Iran, as led by Hulegu.

Ilkhanate, part of the Mongol Empire located primarily across modern Iran, as led by Hulegu. (Public Domain)

Besides riches, there was fear. Mongke feared a small group called Assassins, who were a Shiite sect more properly known as the Nizari Ismailis. Mongke’s paranoia, while reasonable, affected those who entered his court. William Rubruck, who traveled to the Mongol court in 1253-1255, describes the atmosphere prior his admission into the court.

This interrogation was being conducted because Mangu Chan had been informed that four hundred Assassins, in various disguises, had made their way in with the aim of killing him.

Assassins had a notorious reputation. Illustration of an agent of the Ismailis (Order of Assassins) (left, in white turban) fatally stabs his target.

Assassins had a notorious reputation. Illustration of an agent of the Ismailis (Order of Assassins) (left, in white turban) fatally stabs his target. (Public Domain)

Preparation

The first Mongol contingents left Mongolia in the spring of 1253. Before the conquest of the Middle East was underway, Mongke and the Mongol princes threw a lavish party for Hulegu and showered him with gifts, such as jewelry, money, fine horses and robes for himself, his wives, and sons.

A Mongol horse archer in the 13th century.

A Mongol horse archer in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

Mongke’s biggest gift to his brother was issuing an order that two out of every ten Mongol armed forces would join the Hulegu army. After the feasting was ended and the hangovers cured, the beginning of what was to become a grand army left on 19 October 1253. Once on the move, the Mongol army lumbered through central Asia and swelled into an enormous force before coming to rest at the outskirts of Samarkand.

Samarkand, (Uzbekistan) is one of the oldest inhabited cities in Central Asia.

Samarkand, (Uzbekistan) is one of the oldest inhabited cities in Central Asia. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

While at Samarkand, Hulegu continued to increase the size of his forces. When Eastern Christian communities received news of Hulegu’s planned campaign, the vassal Kingdoms of Georgia and Armenia provided troops and were enthusiastic in recovering former Christian lands in Mesopotamia.

Further to the north, Batu Khan, Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde, division of the Mongol Empire, provided newly conscripted tumens (an army unit of 10,000 soldiers), mostly Turks and Alans, led by Balaghai, Khuli, and Tutar, Batu’s nephews. Furthermore, Hulegu brought in a “thousand engineers from China [who] had to get themselves ready to serve the catapults, and to be able to cast inflammable substances.”

Ancient Chinese mobile catapult cart.

Ancient Chinese mobile catapult cart. (CC BY 1.0)

The total size of Hulegu’s army was roughly between 100,000-150,000 men, probably closer 120,000 total. However, Hulegu probably gained additional forces along the way as he marched through Persia.

To prepare the way for such a large military force, Hulegu dispatched advanced troops across central Asia with the mission to sweep the path of livestock in order to ensure a good supply of pasture for his horses and pack animals when they passed through the area. Prior to pushing towards their objective, it was important to fatten the horses during the summer before moving out in the winter. While the collection of troops and supplies keep coming in, Hulegu sent his vanguard ahead of the main force to negotiate and procure potential allies before his massive army passed through their territories. Once his army pushed out, a vast army of non-combatants, such as Chinese engineering corps and European craftsmen, were tasked to pave the way by clearing the roads of obstacles, repair or building bridges, have boats ready for the rivers, and construct catapults besides other devices of war. However, this was no ordinary traveling army. In fact, this Mongol force was a traveling city accompanied by their families.

Hulagu Khan leading his army.

Hulagu Khan leading his army. (Public Domain)

Whether Hulegu’s army consisted of 120,000 or 150,000 men, each horseman would have extra horses for the journey. This would indicate that between 240,000 to 300,000 horses, if not more, accompanied the army along with perhaps 1.8 million sheep. To ensure that overgrazing would not occur, the vast amount of horses and sheep were widely dispersed. Besides ensuring the accompanying animals got pastures to feed, the army and their families also needed food. While sheep is one source of food, Hulegu’s agents were sent ahead, tasked to collect stores of flour, wine, and mares for kumiz (fermented horse milk). The big difference between Hulegu’s army when compared to Genghis Khan’s army, is that Genghis Khan’s forces moved like a storm, it was not a traveling city, whereas Hulegu’s army moved a few kilometers a day due to its sheer size.

Assassins

On 1 January 1256, Hulegu’s army crossed the river Amu Darya (Oxus). When Hulegu crossed the Amu Darya, he was met with rejoicing, unlike what took place some thirty-nine years earlier. As Hulegu’s army passed through, he and his forces were greeted with great enthusiasm by chiefs and dignitaries.

Amu Darya in Turkmenistan.

Amu Darya in Turkmenistan. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

“There came willingly to his service a large number of the princes and generals. People from every house and by roads to praise him. At every halting place where they stopped they received praise from those along the way.”

Map of the Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent, c. 850.

Map of the Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent, c. 850. (CC BY 3.0)

Before proceeding to the lands of the Abbasid Caliph, Hulegu had some business to conduct in the Elburz Mountains. When the leader of the Assassins, Rukn ad-Din received news that Hulegu was coming for him, he quickly sent letters and by a show of compliance, began to dismantle the castles by removing all battlements and towers. However, he took his time in doing so, which caused Hulegu to lose patience and on 8 November 1256, the Mongols encircled Maymundiz castle.

After four days of battle, the Mongols finally assembled their mangonels, a type of siege engine, and proceeded with bombarding the fortress causing Rukn ad-Din to surrender later that month.

Medieval Mangonel.

Medieval Mangonel. (Public Domain)

Once in Mongol custody, Hulegu ordered him to tell the remaining fortress to surrender and dismantle immediately. Not all surrendered of course. Many had to be taken by storm and in doing so, every man, woman, and child were put to the sword.

Alamut fortification in Iran and Ismailites Assassins stronghold.

Alamut fortification in Iran and Ismailites Assassins stronghold. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Muslim rejoicing over the destruction of the Assassins quickly turned cold. Many seemed unaware that Hulegu now turned his attention towards the grand city of Baghdad, which served as the seat and power of the Muslim faith.

Letters to the Caliph

With the Assassins a distant memory, Hulegu moved his forces to Tabriz in April 1257, and sent an emissary to the Caliph with a message. These messages are provided by Rashid al-Din.

“When the Heretics’ fortresses were conquered we sent emissaries to request assistance from you… In reply you said that you were in submission, but you did not send troops. Now, a token of submissiveness and allegiance is that you assist us with troops when we ride against foes. You have not done so, and you send excuses.

No matter how ancient and grand your family may be, and no matter how fortunate your dynasty has been … is the brightness of the moon such that it can eclipse the brilliance of the sun? Talk of what the Mongol army has done to the world and those in it from the time of Genghis Khan until today may have reached your hearing from common and elite, and you may have heard how, through God’s strength, they have brought low … dynasties … all of whom were families of might and majesty.

Previously we have given you advice, but now we say you should avoid our wrath and vengeance. Do not try to overreach yourself or accomplish the impossible, for you will only succeed in harming yourself. The past year is over. Destroy your ramparts, fill in your moats, turn the kingdom over to your son, and come to us…. If you command is obeyed, it will not be necessary for us to wreak vengeance, and you may retain your lands, army, subjects. If you do not heed our advice and dispute with us, line up your soldiers and get ready for the field of battle, for we have our loins girded for battle with you and are standing at the ready. When I lead my troops in wrath against Baghdad even if you hide in the sky or in the earth … I shall put your city and country to the torch. If you desire to have mercy on your ancient family’s head, heed my advice. If you do not let us see what God’s will is.”

After listening to Hulegu’s message, the Caliph replied:

“Young man, you have just come of age and have expectations of living forever. You have … passed prosperously and auspiciously in dominating the whole world. You think your command is absolute…. Since you are not going to get anything from me, why do you seek? You come with strategy, troops, and lasso, but how are you going to capture a star? Does the prince not know that from the east to the west, from king to beggar, from old to young, all who are God-fearing and God worshipping are servants of this court and soldiers in my army? When I motion for all those who are dispersed to come together, I will deal first with Iran and then turn my attention to Turan, and I will put everyone in his proper place. Of course, the face of the earth will be full of tumult, but I do not seek vengeance or to harm anyone. I do not desire that the tongues of my subjects should either congratulate or curse me because of the movement of armies, espcially since I am of one heart and one tongue with the Qa’an (Mongke) and Hulegu. If, like me, you were to sow seeds of friendship, do you think you would have to deal with my moats and ramparts and those of my servants? Adopt the path of friendship and go back to Khurasan (Central Asia).”

After hearing the Caliph’s response, Hulegu sent back a wrathful reply, stating, “God the eternal elevated Genghis Khan and his progeny and gave us all the face of the earth, from east to west. Anyone whose heart and tongue are straight with us in submission retains his kingdom, property, women, children, and life…. He who contemplates otherwise will not live to enjoy them.”

 

References

Bretschneider, E. Mediaeval Researchers from Eastern Asiatic Sources, Vol I. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. LTD, 1910.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. New York: Atheneum, 1979.

Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Gettleman Marvin E. and Stuart Schaar. The Middle East and Islamic World Reader. New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Grousset, René. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Secret Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizari Ismailis Against the Islamic World. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Jackson, Peter and Willem van Ruysbroeck. The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1955. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990.

Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance. London: Routledge, 2003.

Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2004.

Man, John. Kublai Khan: From Xanadu to Superpower. London: Bantam Press, 2006.

Marshall, Robert. Storm from the East: From Genghis Khan to Khubilai Khan London: Penguin, 1994.

May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War. Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007.

Mclynn, Frank. Genghis Khan: His Conquests, His Empire, His Legacy. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2015.

Nicolle, David and Richard Hook. The Mongol Warlords: Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan, Hülegü, Tamerlane. Poole, Dorset: Firebird Books, 1990.

Saunders, J.J. The History of the Mongol Conquests. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1971.

A History of Medieval Islam. London: Routledge, 2007.

Weatherford, J. McIver. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Crown, 2004.

Willey, Peter. The Eagle’s Nest: Ismaili Castles in Iran and Syria. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005.