Get ready for another possible reboot. In 2019, a friend informed me that Gremlins 3 might be coming soon to a local theater/drive-in near you. While I am not a big fan of remakes, the idea of reigniting the Gremlins franchise sparked my interest. The person interested in reviving them is filmmaker Chris Columbus. Columbus, by the way, was the original writer of Gremlins. Columbus made it clear that not only was he “proud of the script,” but that the movie would “not be a sequel, it will be a reboot.” Therefore, Gremlins 3 will not be the third installment but a do-over.

The original Gremlins was released on June 8, 1984, and made $153.1 million on an $11 million budget. While I did not see the film in the theater, my parents rented the VHS tape a year later. After watching the live-action puppeteer version (designed by Chris Walas) of what a gremlin looks like, according to Hollywood, I still had the Looney Tune version ingrained in my head. The Looney Tune episode featuring a gremlin is titled “Falling Hare,” which was released on October 30, 1943. Another Merrie Melody featuring the gremlin came out less than a year later, titled “Russian Rhapsody,” released on May 20, 1944. The original title of this episode was “Gremlins from the Kremlin.” So what is a gremlin, and just as important, what in the hell is a mogwai from which the gremlins spring!?

What is a Gremlin?

The Royal Air Force aviators stationed in Malta, the Middle East, and India first coined the word gremlin in 1923. However, the term was slang to explain that some creature had caused mechanical failures. It was not until April 10, 1929, that the term gremlin first appeared in print as a poem in the journal “Aeroplane.” Nevertheless, the term became popularized during World War II and was picked up by Americans.

The New York Times Magazine, April 11, 1943, states that the term is of unknown origin and “probably formed by analogy with GOBLIN.” Moreover, there is a “possible dialectal survival of Old English gremman “to anger, vex” + the -lin of goblin; or Irish gruaimin “bad-tempered little fellow.” Surfer slang for “young surfer, beach trouble-maker” is from 1961 (short form gremmie by 1962).” While this explains a little about a gremlin, it does not give an exact origin. However, the 1984 film Gremlins does provide a possible origin and suggests that they come from a little furry creature called mogwai. But what is a mogwai?

What is a Mogwai?

In the film Gremlins, an inventor named Randall Peltzer visits a Chinatown antique store looking for a Christmas present for his son Billy. While in the store, he encounters a small, furry creature called a mogwai. Seeing that this might make the perfect gift, the storeowner, Mr. Wing, refuses to sell the creature. As the store goes, the grandson of the storeowner sells the mogwai to Mr. Peltzer and explains the three rules to him.

• Keep him out of the light.
• Keep him away from water.
• Never feed him after midnight.

Sounds easy enough, right? Well, for those who have seen the film, you already know that it goes from good to bad to worse quickly. But the one thing missing is what a mogwai is.

The word mogwai is Cantonese and means “monster,” “evil spirit,” “devil,” or “demon.” While little Gizmo is a cute furry creature, in Chinese tradition, mogwai are certain demons that often inflict harm on humans. Gizmo is the exception since any other mogwai in the Gremlin series has a mean streak. As for reproduction, unlike the movie, where if water gets on one of them, they sprout many, according to tradition, “they reproduce sexually during mating seasons triggered by the coming of rain. Supposedly, they breed at these times because rain signifies rich and full times ahead.” As for the name mogwai, the “mo” is said to derive from the Sanskrit “Mara,” meaning ‘evil beings’ (literally “death”), whereas the “GUI” does not necessarily mean ‘evil’ or demonic spirits. Instead, it means deceased spirits or souls of the dead. But is there a connection between these two creatures? The answer is no. It sounded like a good idea and creative thought to make the two creatures one and the same.

The Gremlins True Origin and Meaning.

Okay. I saved the best for last. The origins of the gremlin do not come from some mythological creature but rather from a beer. Yes, a beer. The gremlin is based on Fremlin beer, brewed in Maidstone, Kent, England, and was a favorite among the R.A.F. pilots. Therefore, the term gremlin comes from Fremlin. Well, hold on. Yes, the term comes from Fremlin, but with a rather funny twist. According to the Observer, on November 8, 1942, John Moore was told that gremlins “were goblins which came out of Fremlin beer bottles.” But it gets funnier, folks.

Less than a year later, Newsweek published an article on September 7, 1943, discussing the term gremlin and its origins. According to Newsweek, they quote the following from a dispatch they received from Merrill Mueller, chief of the magazine’s London bureau:

The great-grandaddy of all “bloody Gremlins” was born in 1923 in a beer bottle belonging to a Fleet Air Arm pilot whose catapult reconnaissance plane was cursed with perpetual engine trouble. This pilot was overloaded with beer the night before a practice maneuver, when the engine failed and he crashed into the waves. Rescued he said the engine failed because little people from a beer bottle had haunted him all night and had got into the plane’s engine and controls during the flight…. “the bloody Gremlins did it.”

Therefore, the 1984 film Gremlins was unknowing (perhaps Chris Columbus did know?).. built off Fremlin booze, which an R.A.F. pilot ingested in mass quantities in 1923 until he could no longer fly. Upon his rescue, he clarified that “the bloody Gremlins (Booze) did it.” So there you have it: Fremlin beer and a bit of drunken creativity started a franchise we enjoy today. Cheers!

Bibliography

https://gremlins.fandom.com/wiki/Gremlins_3

Falling Hare (1943):

Russian Rhapsody (1944)

Benjamin W. McCraw, Robert Arp, Philosophical Approaches to the Devil

American Heritage Dictionaries, Word Histories and Mysteries: From Abracadabra to Zeus

Paul Dickson, War Slang: American Fighting Words & Phrases Since the Civil War, Third Edition

Richard Cavendish, Man, Myth and Magic: The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Mythology, Religion and the Unknown (21 Volume Set)

Acknowledgment

This work is not intended to be an exhaustive overview of Soviet Deep Operations but rather a culmination of three years of interest and study in the subject—an area I intend to continue investigating with the hope of writing a full-length book. I am grateful to Dr. Curtis S. King, Associate Professor at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Although we have never met, his insightful series “Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Soviet Theory, and Operational Warfare” on YouTube was the catalyst that sparked my deep dive into this field. His lecture provided a foundation from which I began exploring the writings of various Soviet military theorists and the invaluable contributions of Colonel David M. Glantz, particularly his book “Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle.” I highly recommend Dr. King’s lectures to anyone interested in the intricate world of Soviet military thought. This journey has been guided by the knowledge shared by these scholars, whose works have been instrumental in shaping my understanding of this complex and fascinating doctrine.

Introduction: A brief overview of the Deep Operations doctrine

The genesis of the Deep Operations doctrine can be traced to the Soviet Union’s interwar period during the 1920s and 1930s. This unique doctrine’s objective is to achieve a decisive victory by neutralizing the enemy’s logistical capabilities, causing the defensive front to collapse under its weight.

Importance of Understanding its Origins and Principles

Understanding Deep Operations, its origins, and principles is crucial because it represents a foundational shift in military thinking developed by Soviet theorists in response to the stalemate of World War I. The doctrine emphasizes deep, coordinated attacks across multiple levels to disrupt and dismantle enemy forces, and it played a crucial role in Soviet successes during World War II. Its principles continued to influence modern military strategies, particularly in America, with the AirLand Battle doctrine developed in 1982 and continued to be in play until the late 90s, which itself was replaced with full-spectrum dominance only to evolve into multi-domain operation gradually by 2018. Even today, the Russian military still incorporates many aspects of the Soviet-era doctrine due to its fluidity and adaptability to the chaotic character of war. The study of Deep Operations provides valuable lessons on the interplay between military doctrine, geography, and broader geopolitical objectives.

Historical Context: The Need for a New Military Doctrine

The development of deep operations, also known as the Soviet deep battle doctrine, was profoundly influenced by the contrasting nature of warfare on the Western and Eastern Fronts during World War I. The Western Front’s static, trench-based warfare with little movement and the Eastern Front’s more fluid and dynamic nature, which proved to be a significant challenge, left a lasting impact. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852–1925) famously remarked, “In the west, the armies were too big for the land; in the east, the land was too big for the armies,” highlighting the fundamental differences in the strategic environments of the two fronts.

A Brief Observation on the Western Front

Soviet military theorists were highly critical of the static nature of trench warfare on the Western Front, seeing the prolonged stalemate and high casualty rates as evidence of strategic and tactical failures. They recognized the limitations of the Western Front’s geography, where the dense network of trenches, fortifications, and obstacles severely restricted large-scale maneuver operations. This concentration of forces in a narrow zone led to logistical challenges and limited opportunities for decisive movements.

Technological innovations, such as artillery bombardments, dominated the Western Front, yet these often failed to achieve strategic breakthroughs. While advancements like tanks and aircraft emerged, their initial deployment was limited and did not immediately transform the nature of warfare. Commanders, many of whom were veterans of previous wars like the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, struggled to adapt to the new realities of modern warfare. Their experience in leadership, logistics, and traditional tactics proved inadequate for the complex demands of World War I, where the effective execution of combined arms theory was still evolving.

Key Observations on Russian Failures on the Eastern Front

Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s identified the vast size of the Eastern Front as both a strategic asset and a significant challenge. The expansive geography of Russia and Eastern Europe created operational and logistical difficulties that deeply influenced Soviet military thought. The immense distances made maintaining supply lines daunting, with armies operating far from their bases and facing delays in receiving essential supplies, equipment, and reinforcements. The underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in remote areas, exacerbated these challenges, with poor roads, limited rail networks, and harsh weather conditions frequently disrupting the flow of resources.

Command and control also posed significant challenges on the Eastern Front. The sheer size of the theater necessitated decentralized command structures, leading to coordination difficulties and slower decision-making. Communication across vast distances was often unreliable, resulting in delays in transmitting orders and intelligence. While necessary due to the front’s scale, this decentralized command structure often led to a lack of cohesion and operational fragmentation. Commanders frequently focused on their immediate areas of responsibility, sometimes prioritizing local objectives over the broader strategic picture. This fragmentation hindered the effectiveness of operations and contributed to the Russian Army’s overall strategic failures in the war.

The decentralized command further complicated the maintenance of supply lines. Competing priorities among semi-independent units led to logistical bottlenecks and shortages. The movement and allocation of reinforcements were often poorly coordinated, leaving critical areas unsupported due to the lack of centralized control and planning.

This fractured command structure was a key reason for the Russian Army’s defeat. The Imperial Russian Army’s inability to execute large-scale, coordinated operations effectively stemmed from its fragmented leadership, nepotism, and overall corruption. Even well-conceived strategic decisions often failed due to poor communication and inadequate coordination across the military’s various components.

Soviet military thinkers later lambasted the Russian Imperial Army for its failure to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. They pointed out that the Army’s leadership had not developed a contemporary military doctrine to meet the evolving battlefield challenges. Instead, outdated tactics, such as mass infantry assaults, persisted, leading to severe casualties and operational failures. The inability to modernize and innovate within its military doctrine was a critical flaw that ultimately contributed to the Army’s decline.

Conclusion

In summary, Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s attributed the defeat of the Imperial Russian Army in World War I to a combination of ineffective command structures, logistical failures, and an inability to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. These factors combined created a situation of strategic exhaustion, a state of depletion that led to the Army’s eventual collapse and the revolutionary discontent that followed. This analysis laid the groundwork for developing the Deep Operations doctrine, which sought to address the shortcomings of earlier military strategies and adapt to the realities of 20th-century warfare.

The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1921

After World War I, Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s—like Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Alexander Svechin, and Vladimir Triandafillov—took a hard look at the differences between the Eastern Front of World War I and the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. These two conflicts were worlds apart regarding scale, movement, and strategic challenges. For these military minds, understanding these differences was key to shaping the future of warfare.

Although the Red Army did not officially use what we now know as Deep Operations or Deep Battle during the Polish-Soviet War, the conflict was a crucial testing ground for these ideas. The strategies employed by the Red Army during the war hinted at the early stages of deep operations, showing promising glimpses of their potential—even if they were not fully formed or executed by later standards. In many ways, this war was a proving ground, helping to lay the groundwork for the doctrines that would eventually define Soviet military strategy.

The Eastern Front in World War I was massive and complex, with millions of troops battling across vast territories. Unlike the static trench warfare of the Western Front, the Eastern Front was highly fluid, marked by rapid advances and retreats that demanded enormous logistical and operational coordination over great distances. In contrast, the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 was much smaller. It was a fast-paced series of campaigns involving fewer troops and resources, more about swift maneuvers than a prolonged struggle. Although intense, it lacked the grand scale and industrial might of World War I.

Soviet military thinkers recognized that the lessons from the Polish-Soviet War could not be directly applied to a conflict on the scale of World War I. The smaller size of the war allowed for more flexibility but also exposed glaring weaknesses in Soviet operational planning and execution—flaws that could have been catastrophic in a larger conflict.

In the early stages of the war, the Red Army attempted a bold maneuver, aiming to penetrate Polish territory with a rapid advance toward Warsaw. The plan was to bypass fortified positions and strike directly at Poland’s heart, hoping to force a quick surrender. This approach reflected early ideas that would evolve into the deep battle concept—skipping strong points to disrupt the enemy’s rear and command. However, poor coordination, lack of reserves, and stretched supply lines meant the Red Army could not maintain its momentum, revealing significant flaws in executing complex operations.

The war underscored the critical importance of logistics, driving home that logistical planning couldn’t be an afterthought but had to be integrated into every operational planning level, especially in long-distance, sustained offensives. It also highlighted the need for better coordination and communication among combat units, which later became crucial aspects of the deep operations doctrine.

Ultimately, the Polish-Soviet War was a condensed version of the operational and strategic challenges faced on the Eastern Front during World War I. It served as a wake-up call for Soviet military thinkers, pushing them to refine their understanding of warfare. They saw the need for a new approach to integrate various military actions into a coherent whole, combining strategy and tactics through effective command, control, and logistics. This would eventually lead to developing the deep operations doctrine, focusing on synchronized, multi-layered attacks designed to keep constant pressure on the enemy.

In short, the Polish-Soviet War was a stark reminder of past challenges and a critical learning experience. It drove home the need for a more sophisticated approach to warfare, setting the stage for the deep operations doctrine that would redefine Soviet military strategy in the decades to come.

Soviet Military Theorist: Key Thinkers

Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931) coined the term “deep operation” and played a pivotal role in formulating the concepts that defined this military strategy in his book The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (1929). As a key theorist and planner in the Red Army, Triandafillov expanded on the ideas of deep operations. He introduced the concept of glubokiy boy (deep battle or fight), emphasizing the need for multi-echeloned attacks to sustain offensive momentum and penetrate great depths with massed armies to overwhelm and outmaneuver the enemy to obtain victory. However, Triandafillov was a realist. While he was offensive-minded, the Soviet Union’s economy was not ready for the high casualties that future wars would produce due to not being advanced enough for mechanization.

Alexander Svechin (1878–1938) was a prominent military theorist and historian who played a crucial role in shaping Soviet strategic thought by emphasizing that military strategy should be considered an art rather than a science, as argued in his book Strategy, which remains a crucial text in understanding the evolution of Soviet military doctrine. He argued that no universal strategy fits all situations; instead, the strategy must be adaptive and based on a deep understanding of the specific political, economic, and social contexts. Svechin also introduced the idea of operational art as the bridge between tactics and strategy. He emphasized the need for flexible and coherent operational planning that could adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield. Svechin, like Triandafillov, argued that for deep operations to work, they had to prepare for a protracted conflict and stressed that the Soviet Union must be ready for total war, which would require the mobilization of all national resources.

Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925) was a Bolshevik revolutionary who became one of the foremost military leaders in the early Soviet Union and significantly shaped its military doctrine. Regarding theory, Frunze advocated for creating a unique unified military doctrine, separate from the Czarist one, that would align with the political goals of the Soviet state. However, he would concede that his idea of a unique proletarian military was flawed since one would have to return to yesteryear’s military traditions and methods to be effective. He believed that military strategy should not be purely technical but should also serve the ideological aims of the Communist Party. Frunze advocated for the professionalizing and modernizing of the Red Army. He argued for the importance of a standing army, a professional officer corps, and the use of modern technology in warfare. He viewed warfare as an extension of class struggle. He believed that the Soviet military must be prepared to wage revolutionary wars against capitalist states and that this ideological perspective should inform all aspects of military strategy and organization.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937) was a prominent Soviet military leader and theorist and is often regarded as the father of the deep operations theory. Tukhachevsky advocated for mobile warfare with large-scale, coordinated operations that would penetrate deep into enemy lines. He believed that massed artillery, mechanized forces, and aviation should work together to achieve deep penetrations that would bypass enemy strongpoints and collapse their defenses from within. His ideas laid the foundation for developing Soviet operational art, emphasizing enemy force’s destruction through depth rather than mere attrition, unlike Svechin, who advocated for a protracted war.

Georgii Isserson (1898–1976) was another leading Soviet military theorist who contributed to developing deep operations doctrine. While Tukhachevsky is regarded as the father of deep operations, Isserson expanded the idea of deep operations (glubokaya operation), which involved simultaneous strikes at multiple depths within the enemy’s operational depth. He argued that modern warfare required a shift from linear tactics to operations that could achieve strategic effects by dislocating the enemy’s command and control structures and logistical networks. Isserson’s works, particularly “The Evolution of Operational Art” and “Fundamentals of the Deep Operation,” became foundational texts in Soviet military education. His ideas were critical in shaping the Red Army’s approach during World War II.

Birth of the Operational Art

The development of operational art in the Soviet military doctrine was, in part, intended to alleviate the pressure on Soviet forces by improving how military operations were planned and executed at a scale larger than tactics but smaller than grand strategy. Operational art aimed to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics, allowing for more effective management of large-scale, complex operations across vast distances, which was crucial given the Soviet Union’s unique geographical and logistical challenges.

The solution began by embracing and working with the vast Soviet landscape, a valuable strategic asset, and a double-edged sword. Leon Trotsky did not have a hand in developing deep operations but served as the Commissar of War and effective leader of the Red Army. However, in his 1919 article “Proletariat, to Horse!” Trotsky emphasizes the need to bring mobility back to the battlefield, reflecting lessons learned from the aftermath of World War I and the ongoing Russian Civil War at the time, where static, positional warfare often led to stalemates. Trotsky argues that increased mobility, particularly the use of cavalry, could exploit the vast and open Russian terrain to outmaneuver and surprise the enemy, restoring a dynamic element to warfare. Trotsky viewed Russia’s vast steppes and open spaces as a strategic asset that could be leveraged through mobile warfare. By emphasizing mounted troops, the Red Army could capitalize on the terrain in a way that other military forces might struggle with, especially those more reliant on mechanized units or static defenses. His ideas contributed to a broader Soviet military tradition that valued maneuvering and understood the need to take advantage of the terrain by developing deep operations, which was still to come.

It Begins with the Unified Military Doctrine

Mikhail Frunze played a crucial role in shaping Soviet military thought during the early 1920s, particularly through his advocacy for a “Unified Military Doctrine,” which was briefly discussed in his biography. Frunze wanted to create a cohesive and standardized military doctrine that would reflect the unique ideological and strategic needs of the Soviet state.

Frunze believed that the Red Army should not only be a fighting force but also an ideological tool aligned with the goals of the Soviet state. His vision of a Unified Military Doctrine emphasized that military strategy and operations should not be politically neutral or purely technical but deeply intertwined with Marxist-Leninist principles, making the army an extension of the Communist Party’s will and a departure from traditional military doctrines.

Frunze advocated this Unified Military Doctrine, arguing that future wars would be total wars requiring the complete mobilization of society’s resources, both military and civilian. He emphasized the importance of a politically indoctrinated and disciplined army prepared for battle, a huge contrast to the many Western armies at the time.

Drawing from insights gained during the Russian Civil War, Frunze proposed integrating regular military forces with irregular partisan units. He regarded partisan warfare as a pivotal component of Soviet military strategy, particularly for safeguarding against potential invasions and executing offensive operations in hostile terrain.

Frunze pushed for a centralized and unified command structure within the Red Army, seeking to eliminate the fragmentation and inconsistencies that plagued military operations during the Civil War. This included establishing standardized training, command procedures, and organizational reforms to professionalize the Red Army while maintaining its revolutionary character.

Although Frunze did not fully develop the concept of Deep Operations, his ideas laid the groundwork for later Soviet theorists. He stressed the need for flexible and dynamic operational art beyond trench warfare and static defense, envisioning fluid and coordinated maneuvers to achieve strategic breakthroughs.

Overall, Mikhail Frunze conceded that there was no distinct “proletarian military art” at the time, a significant point in his discussions on Soviet military doctrine. Frunze acknowledged the challenges in creating an entirely new military art that was uniquely proletarian, given the Red Army’s reliance on inherited military practices and the limited time it had to develop its doctrines independently. This admission reflected the complexities of merging revolutionary ideology with practical military needs.

While Frunze’s Unified Military Doctrine did not achieve all its lofty goals, it was a necessary and influential step in the evolution of the Soviet military. Its primary value lay in its role as a transitional doctrine that helped stabilize and professionalize the Red Army. It was a vital part of the ongoing development of Soviet military thought.

Strategic Defense Positional Warfare

While Frunze’s ideas called for the professionalization of the Red Army, Alexander Svechin gave it a practical doctrine in his book Strategy. Alexander Svechin was vital in developing Soviet military thought in the interwar period. His theories were highly influential in shaping the Red Army’s strategic approach, particularly in contrast to the more operationally focused ideas of contemporaries like Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Svechin’s theories emphasized the importance of strategic depth, adaptability, and the need for a scientific approach to military planning.

Svechin argued that strategy should be viewed as an art and a science. He emphasized the need for a thorough, scientific analysis of military problems, integrating a broad understanding of political, economic, and social factors into military planning. For Svechin, war was not merely about operational or tactical success but required a comprehensive approach that connected military actions with political objectives.

If and when war broke out, Svechin, like Frunze, recognized the significance of “total war,” where the entire nation, not just the military, was involved in the conflict. He emphasized that modern wars required mobilizing all economic, industrial, and social resources to achieve victory. This holistic approach influenced Soviet planning for potential large-scale wars, integrating civilian and military efforts.

However, Svechin, contrary to the more aggressive strategies advocated by other Soviet theorists, recognized the value of strategic defense. He argued that defensive strategies could be a viable and necessary component of warfare, especially when dealing with a superior adversary or preparing for a counteroffensive. His emphasis on defense reflected a pragmatic approach to military planning, considering the realities of Soviet military capabilities at the time. The reason for this is the Soviet Union’s economic limitations. Svechin emphasized the need to prepare the nation for war by aligning military plans with economic capabilities and ensuring that military actions were sustainable over the long term. He believed that war could not be left to chance and that strategic foresight was essential.

Svechin advocated for adaptability in military strategy, arguing that no single formula existed for success. He recognized two broad types of war: the war of attrition (positional warfare) and the war of maneuver. Svechin argued that commanders must be prepared to switch between these types depending on the situation, resources, and enemy capabilities. He was critical of an over-reliance on maneuver warfare, highlighting the dangers of being unprepared for prolonged conflicts.

Svechin was one of the first Soviet theorists to distinguish between strategy, operational art, and tactics. He defined strategy as the highest level of military art, concerned with the overall conduct of war and the connection between military means and political ends. Operational art was the link between strategy and tactics, involving the planning and execution of campaigns. Svechin’s ideas helped establish the framework that later Soviet military theorists would refine into the concept of Deep Operations.

Overall, Svechin’s theories concerning Deep Operations were conservative compared to the more revolutionary ideas of his other proponents, who focused on rapid, offensive warfare. However, Svechin’s emphasis on adaptability, strategic planning, and the scientific approach to war provided a foundational theoretical framework that continued to influence Soviet military thought.

Strategic Offensive Maneuver Warfare

While Svechin argued from a defensive position, his counterpart Mikhail Tukhachevsky sought an offensive approach. Mikhail Tukhachevsky was one of the most influential Soviet military theorists and commanders of the interwar period. Often referred to as the “Red Napoleon,” Tukhachevsky was a key architect of Soviet military modernization and played a pivotal role in developing the theory of Deep Operations, which profoundly shaped Soviet military doctrine leading into World War II. His theories emphasized offensive warfare, maneuverability, and the integration of new technologies, such as mechanization and aviation, into military strategy.

Tukhachevsky is best known for developing the concept of Deep Operations, a revolutionary approach to warfare that aimed to break the enemy’s front line and disrupt its rear simultaneously. Unlike traditional warfare, which focused on achieving victory through attrition and positional battles, Deep Operations sought to create multiple breaches in the enemy’s defenses, exploit those breaches with rapid mechanized forces, and cause systemic collapse by attacking command structures, supply lines, and reserves far behind the front.

Tukhachevsky was a staunch advocate of offensive warfare. He believed the defense was inherently passive and could only lead to a prolonged, costly war of attrition, which was unsustainable for the Soviet Union. He argued that decisive, aggressive action was necessary to maintain the initiative, disrupt enemy plans, and achieve rapid victory. This offensive mindset underpinned much of his strategic thinking and was reflected in the Red Army’s doctrinal evolution under his influence.

A forward-looking thinker, Tukhachevsky emphasized the need to modernize the Soviet military by integrating new technologies such as tanks, aircraft, and motorized infantry. He envisioned a highly mobile army that could conduct deep, rapid maneuvers. Tukhachevsky was one of the first Soviet theorists to fully grasp the potential of mechanized and armored forces in creating breakthroughs and exploiting them at an operational depth, which would overwhelm traditional defensive tactics.

To make deep operations work, Tukhachevsky advocated using combined arms, integrating infantry, artillery, tanks, and air power to achieve synergy on the battlefield. He believed that different arms of the military should operate in close coordination to support each other, creating a force multiplier effect. This approach aimed to maximize the strengths of each component and minimize their weaknesses, achieving overwhelming force at decisive points.

Tukhachevsky believed that future wars would be characterized by mass and scale, requiring vast mobilization of men and resources. In other words, total war. He stressed the importance of preparing the Soviet Union for large-scale conflicts involving millions of troops and requiring extensive logistical planning. His theories highlighted the need for the Soviet military to be prepared for protracted and widespread engagements rather than limited or localized conflicts.

To control this juggernaut of a fighting force, Tukhachevsky proposed a command structure that allowed for centralized strategic planning but encouraged decentralized execution at the operational and tactical levels. While high command would set the overall objectives and strategies, field commanders were given flexibility and autonomy to adapt to the evolving battlefield conditions. This approach was intended to make the Soviet military more responsive and adaptable in dynamic combat situations.

Tukhachevsky strongly emphasized the innovative use of artillery and air power to support offensive operations. He advocated massing artillery to create overwhelming firepower at critical points of attack and using air forces for direct support, strategic bombing, reconnaissance, and disrupting enemy communications. His theories anticipated using air and ground forces to achieve tactical and operational breakthroughs. Tukhachevsky also recognized the importance of psychological factors in warfare. He emphasizes speed, surprise, and relentless pressure to demoralize the enemy and force them into disorganized retreats or surrenders.

Tukhachevsky’s theories were groundbreaking and pushed the Soviet military towards a modern, highly mechanized force that sought to dominate through speed, coordination, and deep penetration into enemy territory. However, his ideas were not without controversy; they clashed with more conservative views within the Soviet military, and Tukhachevsky’s career was cut short by Stalin’s Great Purge in 1937, during which he was arrested and executed. Despite his tragic end, Tukhachevsky’s military theories influenced Soviet military doctrine and played a critical role in shaping the Red Army’s approach during World War II.

While Svechin was defensive and positional, Tukhachevsky was offensive and maneuvering, and many of the remaining Soviet theorists agreed with both sides. In the end, both Svechin and Tukhachevsky agreed that to maneuver, one must position, and to maneuver to attack, one must do so from a position of strength.

Brief Overview of Their Theories in a Nutshell

Frunze emphasized political-ideological integration and class warfare, focusing on unified doctrine.

Svechin advocated adaptability, caution, and the balance of offensive and defensive operations, criticizing dogmatic approaches.

Isserson expanded on deep operations, emphasizing continuous and multi-layered attacks to achieve deep penetration.

Tukhachevsky championed aggressive, large-scale, mechanized warfare, emphasizing mobility and technological innovation.

Triandafillov focused on the operational level, highlighting depth, echeloning, and logistics as crucial elements of sustained offensive operations.

The Mechanics of Deep Operation/Battle

“The three basic elements of an operation, strength, time and space, are always combined in a strategy of destruction so that gaining time and space is a means and defeating the mass of the enemy’s army is the end.” —Alexander Svechin p, 239.

Preparation and Planning

Before initiating an offensive action, extensive reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering operations are carried out to pinpoint enemy positions, assess their strengths and weaknesses, and understand their command structures. It is imperative to gain a comprehensive understanding of the depth of the enemy’s defenses. Soviet commanders meticulously develop a multifaceted military operation with well-defined phases, objectives, and coordinated efforts across different branches. Their strategic focus revolves around targeting the enemy’s logistical network, command structures, reserves, and depth rather than solely concentrating on frontline positions.

Initial Assault: Tactical Breakthrough

After thorough preparation and strategic planning, the Soviet forces position themselves for tactical maneuvers. The operation begins with intense artillery and aerial bombardments designed to destroy enemy fortifications, disrupt command and control, and suppress enemy firepower. Precision strikes target key points within the enemy’s tactical depth, such as communication hubs and artillery positions.

Afterward, a combined arms assault consisting of infantry, tanks, engineers, and supporting artillery launches a coordinated attack on the enemy’s frontline defenses. The aim is not just to penetrate but to create multiple breaches in the enemy’s line, allowing for deeper exploitation. These shock units, specially designated with superior firepower and armor, are employed to break through the first line of defense quickly. Engineers clear obstacles and mines, while flamethrowers and other specialized weapons neutralize fortified positions.

Exploitation

Once a breach is achieved, mechanized and tank units exploit the gaps, pushing into the enemy’s rear areas. This phase aims to destabilize the enemy by rapidly advancing and targeting their command centers, artillery positions, and logistics hubs. This causes a cascade of confusion that will disrupt the enemy reserves, which are intercepted and neutralized by the mechanized and airborne units before they can reinforce the front line. Simultaneously, airborne operations may seize critical locations, such as bridges or road junctions, to further complicate enemy movements. Tactical air forces provide continuous support by attacking enemy reinforcements, supply lines, and defensive positions in depth, maintaining pressure and preventing the enemy from regrouping.

Deep Battle: Continuous and Layered Engagements

The operation involves multiple echelons (waves) of forces moving forward. The first echelon focuses on breaching and exploiting the front, while the second echelon reinforces the attack and pushes deeper. The third echelon (often fresh reserves) prepares for new offensives or exploitation in response to the evolving battle. These simultaneous, multiple-layered, continuous attacks are launched on multiple enemy positions simultaneously, overwhelming their ability to respond effectively. This disrupts their defense and command structure, creating confusion and compounding losses. Mobile logistics units rapidly follow the advancing forces, establishing supply points to maintain the momentum of the attack. Supply lines are secured to ensure the continuous flow of ammunition, fuel, and reinforcements.

Destruction of Enemy’s Operational Depth

The primary objective is to completely encircle and cut off large enemy formations, trapping them without access to essential supplies and reinforcements. This move often results in the capture or annihilation of enemy units. Soviet forces strategically advanced into enemy territory to seize vital targets crucial to the enemy’s war efforts. These targets encompassed transportation hubs, industrial areas, and communication centers, which played a pivotal role in maintaining the enemy’s logistical and operational capabilities.

Exploitation and Consolidation

After achieving the operational goals, forces consolidate their gains and prepare for either a transition to defense against potential counterattacks or continued offensive operations. This phase focuses on securing captured territory, reorganizing forces, and setting conditions for future actions. The scale and speed of Deep Operations often have psychological effects on the enemy, potentially leading to loss of morale, panic, and political instability, which can hasten the collapse of enemy resistance.

Success and Conclusion in Deep Operation

Success on the battlefield hinges on the ability to strike effectively at enemy lines while coordinating the combined efforts of different military branches—air, artillery, and mechanized forces. Deep Operations emphasize relentless, continuous offensive actions that deny the enemy the chance to regroup or mount a coherent defense. Commanders must remain adaptable and capable of making swift, decisive moves to exploit emerging weaknesses in real-time. This approach shifts warfare from static, attritional confrontations to dynamic, fluid campaigns that aim to win battles and comprehensively dismantle the enemy’s strategic capacity to fight.

Strategic depth, however, is a double-edged sword. The vast expanses of the Soviet landscape, both then and now, present a complex paradox: they serve as a protective buffer against invasion and pose significant logistical challenges for any military force seeking to defend or advance. This immense scale can absorb and dissipate military strength, complicating even the most sophisticated doctrines, such as the German Bewegungskrieg or Blitzkrieg, which struggled against these geographic constraints during World War II.

This geographic reality fundamentally drove the Soviet Union’s development of Deep Operations. The vast, relatively flat terrain of Eastern Europe and Soviet territories provided the ideal setting for a doctrine prioritizing operational depth and rapid maneuver. Deep Operations were designed not just to repel invaders but to leverage the Soviet Union’s expansive borders as a battlefield advantage, turning space challenges into a powerful tool for defense and offense. This doctrine’s evolution reflects a profound understanding of how geography shapes strategy, offering a tailored solution to the unique demands of the Soviet strategic environment.

References

https://history.army.mil/books/dahsum/1989/CH4.htm

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA546241.pdf

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11409

Dowling, Timothy C. “Eastern Front / 1.0 / Handbook.” 1914-1918-Online (WW1) Encyclopedia, October 8, 2014. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/eastern-front/.

Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London: Frank Cass. C, 1991.

Isserson, G S, and Bruce Menning. The Evolution of Operational Art. Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013.

Kotelnikov, Konstantin . “‘Red Napoleon’ Mikhail Tukhachevsky.” diletant.media, November 5, 2022. https://diletant.media/articles/45310426/.

Lafleur, Thomas M. Mikhail Frunze and the Unified Military Doctrine. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016.

Davies, Norman. White Eagle, Red Star. London: Random House, 2011.

Svechin, Alexander. Strategy. Edited by Kent D. Lee. Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Publications, 1992.

The Dole Institute of Politics. “Ft Leavenworth Series: Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Soviet Theory, and Operational Warfare.” Edited by Dr. Curtis S. King. YouTube, July 29, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUQqwyDPZRw.

Triandafillov, V.K. The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1929)

Trotsky, Leon. “Leon Trotsky: 1919 – How the Revolution Armed/Volume II (Proletarians, to Horse!).” Marxists.org, September 1, 1919. https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1919/military/ch97.htm.

Blitzkrieg, the lightning-fast strategy and tactic that once seemed unstoppable on the battlefields of Europe—was it truly invincible, or did its fatal flaws doom it from the start? Germany’s rugged terrain, vast plains, and strategic borders played a crucial role in shaping the military doctrine of Bewegungskrieg, better known in the West as Blitzkrieg. This article delves into the core principles and philosophies behind Bewegungskrieg. We will examine how geographical factors influenced the development and implementation of Bewegungskrieg and analyze its successes and inherent limitations. Additionally, we will uncover why the term Bewegungskrieg is more fitting than Blitzkrieg in a linked video below. This brief exploration will shed light on the intricate military theories and practices that defined Germany’s approach to warfare and ultimately led to its defeat.

Bewegungskrieg over Blitzkrieg

Bewegungskrieg (Blitzkrieg) in a Nutshell

Bewegungskrieg (“war of movement”) is a military doctrine emphasizing rapid, surprise attacks to disrupt enemy forces and command structures. Redeveloped by Germany during the interwar period, it played a critical role in the early successes of World War II. Geography and technology significantly influenced both the redevelopment and execution of Bewegungskrieg, shaping its strategic and tactical elements.

John Delaney, head of the Second World War team at Imperial War Museums, states, “The main principle of Blitzkrieg is to win by not fighting. You identify the weak point in the enemy’s line, break through, and cause disruption in the enemy’s rear areas. So you defeat them by dislocation, not destruction on the battlefield.“

In a Bewegungskrieg operation, the initial step involves careful reconnaissance to identify weak points in the enemy’s defenses, typically less fortified sections of the front line. Schwerpunkt, meaning “focal point” or “center of gravity,” is crucial here, focusing forces at critical points to achieve a breakthrough. Once identified, a concentrated attack utilizing fast-moving tanks and motorized and mechanized infantry, supported by close air support, created a breach. Central to this doctrine are the principles of speed and surprise, achieved through rapid movement and force concentration at decisive points. This requires integrating tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support into combined arms operations for a synergistic effect.

Once the front line is breached, the attacking forces swiftly advance into the enemy’s rear areas. The goal is to avoid prolonged engagements with the main enemy forces and instead focus on capturing command centers, supply depots, communication lines, and other essential infrastructure. The attackers seek to cause maximum disruption and disarray by targeting these crucial points. This strategy severely hampers the enemy’s ability to mount a coordinated defense as their command and control structures are disrupted, and their supply lines are cut off.

The enemy’s dispersion and disarray render them susceptible to further exploitation. Swift-moving units can encircle substantial enemy formations, resulting in their isolation and eventual capitulation. This approach diminishes the necessity for direct, large-scale confrontations.

The fundamental principle behind Bewegungskrieg is to triumph by inducing disarray rather than outright destruction. Through swift advancement and targeting of critical points, attackers aim to immobilize the enemy’s ability to respond, resulting in a strategic collapse. This compels the enemy to retreat or surrender without prolonged confrontations. The speed and surprise of Bewegungskrieg significantly impact the enemy psychologically, creating confusion and panic, further deteriorating organized resistance. By leveraging speed, surprise, and concentrated force, Bewegungskrieg disrupts and paralyzes the enemy, leading to a quick and decisive outcome. The strategy focuses on dislocating the enemy’s forces and infrastructure rather than their physical destruction, embodying the principle of “winning by not fighting.”

Geographic Considerations for Success and Limitations

The Bewegungskrieg doctrine, redeveloped by the Germans in the 1920s to avoid another war of attrition and fit modern military technological needs, was designed for the type of war they sought, whether defensively or offensively. This doctrine was used with great success from 1939 to 1941. However, this highlights a key issue: the problem of doctrine itself. The Bewegungskrieg doctrine represented the war the German command desired, but not necessarily the war they would face. Doctrines often evolve to fit specific scenarios or desires, and Bewegungskrieg was no different. It proved effective against smaller countries like Belgium and the Netherlands and countries nearly or roughly the same size as Germany, such as Poland and France. When the Germans first developed the concept in the late 19th century and later updated it with early 20th-century technology, they did so with the spatiotemporal context of their Western and Central European neighbors in mind.

Unlike the smaller and more accessible nations in Western and Central Europe, the limitations of the Bewegungskrieg doctrine became clear when roughly 3.8 million German soldiers, along with their allies, invaded the vast and logistically challenging expanse of the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front on 22 June 1941. The Soviet Union’s vast geographic scale and complex logistics revealed the inadequacies of a doctrine intended for swift, decisive victories in more confined and manageable areas.

Constant Need for Supplies

An army of 3.8 million needed food, fuel, equipment replacements, ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts to function, all of which were in short supply as the war progressed. The doctrinal nature of Bewegungskrieg required a constant and substantial supply, and so did all military doctrines. The consistent supply of essentials was disrupted, hampering German operations due to stretched supply lines and partisan interference. Moreover, it did not help that the Soviet Union’s underdeveloped infrastructure, including roads and railways, compounded the difficulty of transporting supplies to the front lines. Furthermore, the retreating Soviet forces resorted to scorched-earth tactics that exacerbated this lack of infrastructure, and the environment also affected the invaders as the severe Russian winter and the muddy conditions during the rasputitsa (season of impassable roads) significantly hindered German mobility and logistical support.

Doctrine to Bypass Certain Targets

Bewegungskrieg doctrine bypassed specific strong points to maintain momentum and find and crush the enemy’s center of gravity. While this tactic initially succeeded in causing disarray, it left pockets of enemy resistance that could regroup and counterattack. This is what can be considered missed strategic objectives. Bypassing key strategic targets sometimes meant missing opportunities to destroy vital Soviet infrastructure or command centers, which allowed the Soviets to regroup and mount effective counteroffensives. Because of this, Soviet partisans conducted guerrilla operations behind German lines, disrupting supply routes, communications, and railways. This further strained German logistics and hindered their operational capabilities. These were crucial for the German army to push forward, which led us to supplies.

Overstretched Combined Arms Operation

With 3.8 million German forces pressing deep into the Soviet Union, the need to supply grew more crucial daily. The rapid advances of Bewegungskrieg tactics extended supply lines over vast distances, making them vulnerable to disruption and overextension. The longer the supply lines, the more difficult it was to maintain a steady flow of necessary resources. Because of this, coordination issues arose. The complexity of coordinating armor, motorized units, and air support over such extended distances created logistical and operational challenges. Communication and coordination often broke down, reducing the effectiveness of combined arms operations. The threat of attrition, the antithesis of Bewegungskrieg, loomed large as stretched and poorly supplied units risked becoming bogged down in protracted battles, sapping their strength and momentum.

So What Defeated Bewegungskrieg?

As the Germans battled overstretched lines, dwindling supplies, and the harsh Russian seasons of winter and spring, the Soviets quickly adapted to German tactics, implementing deep defensive strategies and conducting effective counteroffensives. None of this would have been possible had the Soviets not relocated over 1,500 military-important plants to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia and received aid through the Lend-Lease Act (1941) from the U.S. Their ability to swiftly mobilize and produce war materials strained German resources, shifting the tide of the battle by 1943.

Remember, the Bewegungskrieg doctrine is about the war of movement. It must stay in motion, seeking the best avenues of attack and avoiding targets that would bog them down. Doing so allowed the means to keep pressing forward to fulfill their objective of destroying the enemy through dislocation. However, no matter how sound Bewegungskrieg was, it was still subject to unforeseen limitations, such as attrition.

Bewegungskrieg’s doctrine was designed to avoid attrition warfare and seek a quick victory, as it did in Poland and France. However, when the German army invaded the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front, the vast Soviet landscape swallowed the German army and its doctrine. The rapid advances that the Germans made deep into the Soviet Union slowly exposed Bewegungskrieg, in which the landmass stretched the manpower and material of the German army to its limits and beyond, causing overstretched combined arms operations, dwindling manpower, and the constant need for supplies coupled with the gradual development of fierce resistance and the deep Soviet landmass exposing the German forces, eventually revealed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg.

So, back to the question, what defeated Bewegungskrieg? There are two answers: fatal conceit and attrition. The term ‘fatal conceit’ comes from Friedrich A. Hayek, who describes the belief that “man is able to shape the world around him according to his wishes.” In the context of Bewegungskrieg, this overconfidence manifested as a belief that rapid and decisive maneuver warfare could overcome any challenge, including the vast and varied terrain of the Eastern Front.

The German military’s adherence to the doctrine reflected a conviction that their strategic innovations and technological superiority would ensure success regardless of the logistical and environmental hurdles. In other words, the German high command assumed that the Soviet Union would collapse as quickly as Poland and France had. This overconfidence led to critical underestimations of the Soviet Union’s capacity to adapt, resist, and endure prolonged conflict. However, attrition gradually took its toll, depleting German manpower and supplies. The prolonged engagements exposed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg, a doctrine not designed for extended conflict.

The tale of two attritions was the other killer of Bewegungskrieg. On one hand, the attrition of manpower and resources stretched the German army thin. On the other hand, industrial attrition, where the Allies outproduced the Germans in war materials, exposed Bewegungskrieg’s vulnerabilities and contributed to its ultimate failure.

In conclusion, Bewegungskrieg was a doctrine built on the principles of rapid movement to achieve decisive victories. However, the fatal conceit of believing it could universally overcome all challenges and the relentless grind of attrition revealed its limitations. The vast Soviet landscape and the Allies’ industrial might turned the tide against the German forces. The initial successes in Poland and France could not be replicated on the Eastern Front, where the realities of war demanded more than Bewegungskrieg could deliver. Ultimately, the interplay of fatal conceit and attrition led to the downfall of this once-dominant doctrine.

References

Imperial War Museum. “The German ‘Lightning War’ Strategy of the Second World War.” Imperial War Museums, 29, 5AD. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-lightning-war-strategy-of-the-second-world-war.

Military History Visualized. “Only Peasants Call It ‘BLITZKRIEG’ – Bewegungskrieg.” YouTube, March 26, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8y-of5WpVA.

Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2022.

Freeze, Gregory L. Russia: A History: Third edition (2009)

Guderian, Heinz. Achtung Panzer! London: Cassell, 1999.

Habeck, Mary R. Storm of Steel the Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2017.

Hayek, F.A. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (1988)

Toeppel, Roman. Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War (Modern Military History) (2021)

Von Clausewitz, Carl and J J Graham. On War. United States: Value Classic Reprints, 2017.

Williamson, Mitch. Early Reichswehr Mobile Force Doctrine, 2019 

Various military theorists have contributed to and shaped the evolving concepts of time and space in warfare for centuries. These crucial ideas play a fundamental role in military strategy, operations, and tactics, significantly influencing maneuver, positioning, and timing. Their profound impact on the outcome of military operations cannot be emphasized enough.

Space in warfare pertains to the physical environment in which military operations occur. This encompasses the geographical area, terrain, and spatial positioning of forces and assets. Time in warfare refers to the chronological aspect of military operations, including the planning, execution, and duration of actions and strategies. It entails considerations of military activities such as speed, timing, and temporal coordination. Therefore, in the art of war, space becomes a tangible representation of time, and time can be seen as the intangible kinetic dimension of space.

Time in Warfare

• Timing of Engagements: Choosing the optimal moment to initiate or avoid combat.
• Speed and Efficiency: Rapid movement and quick decision-making to exploit opportunities.
• Duration: Managing the length of operations to maintain momentum and resources.
• Synchronization: Coordinating multiple units and operations to maximize effectiveness.

Space in Warfare

• Geographical Terrain: Utilizing natural features (e.g., mountains, rivers) for strategic advantage.
• Positioning: Placing forces in advantageous locations relative to the enemy.
• Movement and Maneuver: Moving forces through space to gain positional advantage.
• Control of Key Locations: Holding vital areas such as chokepoints, supply routes, and strongholds.

As one can read, mastering time and space elements is essential for success in military operations. However, what are the origins of this theory?

Origins and Theory

Time and space have always been central to military theory, shaping strategies and tactics from ancient to modern times. Even in prehistoric times, the principles of time and space played a critical role in warfare. When it came to time, early human groups would choose the optimal moment to attack or retreat, often based on environmental conditions or the status of their resources. Rapid movement and quick decision-making were vital for surprise attacks or quick escapes. Managing the length of conflicts was essential to ensure resources were not depleted and to avoid prolonged vulnerability. Even with basic communication, coordination among group members was necessary to execute effective hunting strategies or defensive actions.

Regarding space, natural features like hills, caves, and water sources were used for shelter, ambushes, and strategic advantages. Placing groups in advantageous locations, such as high ground or hidden areas, gave early humans an edge over their enemies or prey. Skilled maneuvering through familiar terrain allowed for effective hunting and evasion tactics. Securing vital areas like water sources, fertile land, or resource-rich zones was crucial for survival and dominance.

These aspects of time and space allowed prehistoric humans to enhance their chances of survival and success in their conflicts and daily struggles. From these experiences, humans would continue to develop and refine their strategies, laying the foundation for more sophisticated tactics in future warfare. As societies evolved, these early timing, positioning, and resource management lessons informed the complex military doctrines that would shape human history.

Leveraging time and space became integral to warfare and the broader context of human organization and development, which caused some to theorize on the subject. Therefore, a short introduction to some of these thinkers is imperative, starting with the ancient world and working to the present. We begin with Sun Tzu.

From the ancient period, Sun Tzu’s (c. 544–496 BC)The Art of War emphasizes the importance of timing and spatial advantage. He writes about the need to adapt to changing circumstances and to use the terrain to one’s advantage. He argues that the effective use of time and space can determine the outcome of battles.

Thucydides’ (c. 460–395 BC) History of the Peloponnesian War discussed the strategic use of naval and land forces, highlighting the importance of logistics, troop movement, and attack timing.

Alexander the Great’s (356–323 BC) campaigns showcased the effective use of time and space. He used rapid movements over vast distances and diverse terrains to outmaneuver enemies. His battles, such as Gaugamela, demonstrated the importance of timely and precise deployments.

Julius Caesar’s (100–44 BC) Commentaries on the Gallic War documented the strategic use of time and space in military campaigns, including the rapid construction of fortifications and the use of geographical features to gain tactical advantages.

Vegetius’ (c. 4th century AD) Epitoma Rei Militaris emphasized the importance of logistics, training, and the strategic use of fortifications. Vegetius discussed the significance of preparation and the timing of maneuvers.

During the medieval period, Byzantine Emperor Maurice’s (6th century AD) manual Strategikon outlined the importance of mobility, terrain use, and attack timing. It also highlighted the need for adaptability and the strategic use of cavalry.

Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1469–1527)The Art of War advocated for a military organization based on Roman principles during the Renaissance and early modern period. It emphasized the importance of terrain and the timing of engagements and highlighted the need for flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances.

Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780–1831) On War introduced the “culminating point” concept in warfare, where the balance of time and space would favor one side. Clausewitz emphasized the fog of war, the importance of timing in attacks, and the use of geography to achieve strategic goals.

Antoine-Henri Jomini’s (1779–1869) Summary of the Art of War focused on the principles of interior lines and the importance of time and space in achieving decisive victories. Jomini emphasized the rapid concentration of forces at critical points.

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840–1914) The Influence of Sea Power upon History highlighted the strategic importance of naval power and the control of maritime space. Mahan discussed how naval supremacy could influence the timing and outcome of wars.

World War I and II showcased the significant role of logistics, the strategic use of terrain, and the timing of large-scale operations. The introduction of mechanized warfare and air power revolutionized the concepts of time and space in military theory.

During the modern era, nuclear strategy took precedence. The Cold War introduced the concept of deterrence, where the control of space (through missile deployment) and the timing of potential retaliatory strikes played crucial roles in maintaining the balance of power.

During the information age, military theory incorporates cyber warfare, space warfare, and real-time intelligence, exponentially expanding the concepts of time and space to include the virtual domain, where the speed of information and control of digital spaces are critical.

In summary, the strategic use of time and space remains a cornerstone of military theory, continually evolving with technological advancements and shifting geopolitical landscapes. While the concepts of time and space in warfare are universal, their application of military doctrine varies depending on the territorial size of the nation.

How Geography Shapes Time and Space in Military Doctrine and Theory

The geographic context significantly influences a nation’s military doctrine about spatial and temporal considerations. Essentially, military doctrine is designed to anticipate the preferred mode of warfare, although it may not align with the actual circumstances encountered.

This impacts military tactics, operations, strategy, and the nation’s infrastructure and economy. Larger geographical areas require more resources than smaller ones, including transportation, communication, and supply lines. However, this relationship can be nuanced, and several factors can influence the resource demands, effectively altering the offensive and defensive capabilities in said space.

Terrain and topography can be challenging if the area is mountainous, heavily forested, or a desert. These types of terrain can be more complex and resource-intensive to navigate and control than flat or open terrain for both the host nation and the invader. Because of this, the infrastructure, whether the presence or absence thereof, will significantly impact resource requirements for transportation and logistics. Densely populated areas may require more resources for maintaining order, providing services, and ensuring effective communication. At the same time, a sparsely populated area might need extensive communication networks and longer supply lines to reach dispersed inhabitants.

Weather is essential for those defending and invading, as harsh weather conditions (e.g., cold, heat, or heavy rainfall) can increase the need for specialized equipment, shelter, and additional logistics support. At the same time, seasonal variants and changes can affect an area’s accessibility and resource requirements. Because of this, the economic development of regions with established industries might have better infrastructure and resources in place, reducing the need for additional inputs. Meanwhile, underdeveloped regions may need more critical infrastructure, necessitating more transportation, communication, and supply network investments, which are strategically important.

The importance of infrastructure is another area of strategic value (e.g., ports, airports, crossroads, resource-rich regions), requiring a concentration of resources to secure and maintain control, especially in core areas. Core areas are high-value targets due to their significant infrastructure. Military doctrine often includes detailed plans for defending these areas because their loss could cripple military operations and destabilize the economy. However, the strategic value of core areas to invading armies is significant. Once controlled, these areas offer economic benefits, meet logistical needs, and enable the establishment of forward bases and defensive positions to better position forces strategically.

While core areas are desirable due to their resources and infrastructure, peripheral areas often lack these assets and are found less desirable. Military doctrine typically designates peripheral areas as low-priority. Because of this, peripheral areas tend to take to asymmetric warfare due to the lack of military presence.

Asymmetric warfare significantly alters the dimensions of space and time in war, introducing complexities that traditional warfare often does not encounter. When it comes to space in asymmetric warfare, the fluidity of the battlefield becomes non-linear since asymmetric engagements do not adhere to traditional frontlines. Guerrilla fighters move fluidly across vast territories, making the battlefield unpredictable and widespread. This use of terrain allows the guerrilla fighters to exploit challenging topography—mountains, forests, urban areas—leveraging local knowledge to their advantage, making it difficult for conventional forces to track and engage them.

Guerrillas often operate and blend within civilian populations, complicating conventional force’s task of distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Thus, the operational space expands into urban and populated areas and becomes nuanced. This pressures conventional forces to spread out and cover more ground, diluting their combat effectiveness due to the creation of multiple fronts.

When it comes to time, in asymmetric warfare, protracted conflicts extend the duration of the war, which tends to drag out over more extended periods. Guerrillas avoid confrontation and focus on defeating the enemy over time through persistent, small-scale attacks. This type of war places tremendous psychological pressure on the conventional forces, and the sustained nature of guerrilla tactics aims to exhaust the opponent’s will to fight, eroding morale and political support over time. The operational tempo and the unpredictable nature of guerrilla attacks involve strategic decision-making regarding the timing and location of these actions. The intended goal is to maximize impact while circumventing fortified enemy positions. This irregular tempo disrupts conventional military operations. This operational flexibility allows guerrilla fighters to adapt quickly to changing circumstances, exploiting brief windows of opportunity that conventional forces might not be able to respond to as swiftly.

Overall, the strategic impact of asymmetric warfare on space and time strains resource allocation. Conventional forces must allocate significant resources to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to track guerrilla movements, often stretching their capabilities thin. Guerrilla warfare imposes disproportionate costs on conventional armies, requiring more resources to effectively counter small, mobile units. Conventional forces must adapt their strategies to combat this, incorporating counterinsurgency tactics that emphasize winning hearts and minds, improving intelligence gathering, and building local alliances. This comprehensive approach to guerrilla warfare often requires a multi-faceted approach, integrating military, political, economic, and social efforts to undermine guerrilla support and address the root causes of the conflict.

An Example of How the Size of a Nation Can Influence Military Doctrine

As mentioned, a nation’s geography determines and significantly influences the concepts of time and space in military doctrine. Here is an example of how the size of a nation influences its military doctrine, particularly in terms of time and space, by briefly looking at the Ukraine-Russia conflict:

Strategic Depth and Geographic Considerations:

• Large Nations:
  • Strategic Depth: Larger nations, such as Russia, enjoy a significant advantage in terms of strategic depth. This advantage allows them to withstand and absorb initial attacks and engage in prolonged conflicts without facing an immediate threat to their essential territories. This depth allows Russia to execute strategic maneuvers, regroup, and launch counterattacks from well-protected positions deep within its territory.
  • Geographic Diversity: A sprawling nation like Russia boasts a rich tapestry of terrain, ranging from dense forests to towering mountains and bustling urban centers. This varied landscape offers abundant opportunities for leveraging strategic defenses and launching tactical offensives.
  • Extended Frontlines: The vast territory also means extended frontlines, which require significant resources to defend and maintain supply lines.

• Smaller Nations:
  • Limited Depth: Countries with smaller land areas, like Ukraine, have limited strategic depth. This means that they have less distance to fall back on if attacked, making them more susceptible to swift advances by an enemy. As a result, these countries must be more proactive and effective in defending their territory.
  • Concentration of Forces: Smaller countries might strategically position their military resources in vital regions to protect important locations and infrastructure.
  • Territorial Constraints: The limited size of the territory constricts the capacity to employ flexible defense strategies, thereby demanding resourceful utilization of the available space.

Time Considerations

Operational Tempo and Duration:

• Large Nations:
  • Protracted Engagements: Larger nations can be involved in extended conflicts due to their ability to sustain longer supply lines, rotate troops to maintain troop morale and effectiveness, and maintain high levels of industrial production to support their war efforts. These factors allow larger nations to maintain a sustained military presence and effectively carry out their strategic objectives over a prolonged period.
  • Operational Flexibility: They possess the strategic flexibility to execute extended deep operations, apply delaying tactics to slow down the enemy’s advance, and make strategic withdrawals, all while being able to regroup and launch powerful counterattacks when necessary.
  • War of Attrition: A larger nation may opt for a strategy of attrition, gradually employing tactics to weaken the enemy’s capabilities over an extended period. This approach involves applying sustained pressure and gradually depleting the enemy’s resources to outlast and defeat them through a war of endurance.

• Smaller Nations:
  • Need for Swift Actions: Smaller nations frequently need rapid and conclusive victories to uphold morale and garner international backing. Prolonged conflicts can deplete their resources and diminish public support over time.
  • Asymmetric Warfare: This type of warfare utilizes guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks to disrupt and impede the advance of the larger opposing force.
  • Defensive Focus: The primary focus is establishing a sturdy and swift defense. This involves using fortified positions, navigating urban warfare scenarios, and leveraging local terrain knowledge to overcome potential shortcomings in depth.

Application to Ukraine-Russia Conflict

Russia’s Approach:

• Multidomain Deep Battle: Utilizing its expansive geography, Russia implements multidomain deep battle strategies, merging land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains to disrupt and overpower Ukrainian defenses.
• Strategic Bombardment: Long-range artillery, missile strikes, and air campaigns target Ukrainian infrastructure, military positions, and supply lines far from the front lines.
• Sustained Pressure: Russia’s capacity to uphold extended military campaigns is readily apparent through its ongoing application of pressure across several strategic fronts. This is made possible by leveraging its extensive strategic depth and abundant resources, enabling sustained operations in various theaters of conflict.

Ukraine’s Approach:

• Adaptive Defense: Ukraine has had to adapt its strategies to compensate for its smaller size, focusing on agile, mobile defense tactics and leveraging international support.
• Rapid Response: The Ukrainian military prioritizes rapid response and flexible tactics, using local knowledge and smaller, more mobile units to counter Russian advances early in the war.
• International Support: Continuous support from NATO and EU countries is crucial for Ukraine, providing advanced weaponry, intelligence, and training to enhance its defense capabilities.

It is evident that a nation’s physical size significantly impacts its military doctrine and approach to warfare. In the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Russia leverages its considerable size and diverse military capabilities to execute multidomain deep battle tactics. In contrast, Ukraine relies on adaptability, international support, and asymmetric tactics to defend against its larger adversary. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for a deeper analysis of the conflict and anticipating future developments.

Conclusion

The integration of time and space forms a fundamental element of military doctrine, influencing the strategic planning and execution of operations, logistics, and tactics by nations. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a prominent example of the profound influence of these principles. Russia’s vast geographical expanse and multifaceted capabilities exemplify a sophisticated utilization of time and space to establish strategic depth and operational adaptability. However, the fluid nature of contemporary warfare is conspicuous as smaller forces, such as Ukraine, have demonstrated their ability to employ time and space to offset a more substantial adversary through rapid adaptation and asymmetric tactics with international backing.

Time and space in war extend into cyberspace, where battles are fought on digital terrain, and timing is critical. Cyber operations can disrupt enemy communications, delay responses, and create strategic advantages, demonstrating that control over cyberspace and timing can be as decisive as traditional physical maneuvers.

Understanding the origins and fundamental principles of time and space in warfare is crucial for analyzing current conflicts and predicting future military developments. By appreciating how time and space influence war and politics, we gain deeper insights into the strategies and outcomes that define tomorrow’s battles.

References

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Caesar, Julius, and Carolyn Hammond. Seven Commentaries on the Gallic War. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Carl Von Clausewitz, and J J Graham. On War. United States: Value Classic Reprints, 2017.

Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2022.

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Isserson, G S, and Bruce Menning. The Evolution of Operational Art. Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013.

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Mahan, A. T. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 – the Original Classic Edition. Dayboro: Emereo Pub., 2012.

Maurikios, and George T Dennis. Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.

Niccolò Machiavelli, and Christopher Lynch. Art of War. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

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It comes as no surprise that the Taliban have taken over Afghanistan in just a little over a week. Many, not all, in the administration and pentagon are surprised at how fast they could rapidly move across the country. This should not be a surprise.

When news reached that the Taliban were on the move, the White House made it clear that the Afghans were fully capable of deterring the threat. Our politicians assured the American people that the Afghans had the best training and equipment instead of returning it home. It’s much cheaper to leave the military items behind than bring them back. According to the BBC, the “Americans left behind about 3.5 million items, Gen Kohistani said, including tens of thousands of bottles of water, energy drinks and military ready-made meals, known as MREs. They also left behind thousands of civilian vehicles, without keys, and hundreds of armoured vehicles, the Associated Press reported.” Much of this military equipment will be sent to Iran, China, Russia, Pakistan, and other places to be examined, reverse engineering, and duplicated. According to Politico, the “United States spent more than $88 billion to train and equip Afghanistan’s army and police, nearly two-thirds of all of its foreign aid to the country since 2002.” I’m sure this number is an underestimate. So, with all the aid and training provided to the Afghan people, why did they collapse so quickly? The answer is they didn’t.

The Afgan troops did fight, losing 69,000 troops and perhaps many more. Let us also not forget the civilians caught in the crossfire. Without fuel, intelligence, air support, and much more, the tools to fight a war diminished. While many Afghans did fight, just as many saw no point. Would you want to continue the fight if you witnessed American troops pulling out overnight? While many did fight, just as many are okay with the Taliban. Those Afghanistan troops who did not fight are fine with the Taliban in charge due to their religious beliefs, kinships, clans, and tribal connections. These four alone, and perhaps many more, create a place for many parties within the many districts throughout Afghanistan to put aside their political differences and focus on what connects them. The Afgan landscape is a political kaleidoscope. This is what many in the military have failed to understand. They failed to understand that there are many shades of grey in Afghanistan.

The biggest mistake was thinking that Afghanistan was a country where we could create a state to our liking. Many military and political leaders failed to understand that Afghanistan is not a country but a phantom state where empires go to die.

By Cam Rea

It was a decade of Elvis, Eisenhower, Cold War, atomic bombs, and sci-fi movies! I wasn’t born in the 50s, but I wish I could have been in the theaters and drive-ins during the 50s to view these sci-fi gems. Science fiction movies of the 50s have slowly faded away among younger people. Baby Boomers, Generation X, and the first wave of Millennials are the last to have remembered such movies flickering on the TV. Depending on where you live, channels such as TBS, USA, TNT, and perhaps your local station were known for such movies throughout the 80s and 90s. I miss those days and watching those movies on TV.

I love science fiction films of the 1950s! Of course, this is due to age and family culture. I was born 1977 to a southern family big into science fiction and horror films. According to Job Bob Briggs, it had to have the three B’s (Blood, Breasts, and Beasts) to be watchable.

Like most my age, we were exposed to films playing on the floor, model TV, or something compact. It was during a time when you either saw the movie or you didn’t. Unlike today, where you can buy or rent with a click. It was when you rented the movie or waited for it to air on TV. At some point during the year, they will show the flick on one of the few channels at your disposal. We still have a problem, and that is video rental stores. Most of your mom-and-pop rental stores didn’t carry every film because they were small businesses. Unlike Blockbuster or Family Video, they had a vast video library at their disposal and also had little depending on your taste. The one and perhaps the first video rental store we had in Kendallville during the early to mid-80s was called Genie’s. Genie’s had maybe fifty films at most, possibly more, but I do not recall having much to select. I remember how exciting it was to go there on the weekends. Most of the movies they featured were drama or action. But they had a nice shelf dedicated to horror! The problem is sci-fi films of the 50s were hard to come by. I could rent Friday the 13th (1980), an OK movie I have watched multiple times with the family, but I can’t rent The Thing (1951)! My only hope was to wait for Mom to buy the weekly TV guide so I could thumb through and circle the movies I wished to view. My Grandpa taught me this art at a young age and was a PRO!

The first time I was exposed to a science fiction horror film, I remember it was Creature from the Black Lagoon (1954). I first saw this film on TV at my aunt and uncle’s house in Michigan between 1980-81, so I was roughly 3-4. The film captivated and frightened me. It also didn’t help that it was night and I was watching a movie in the countryside. That night and film sparked my love affair with 1950s science fiction movies. The following year, I came across the American version of Godzilla (1956). I found this film at Genie’s rental. I saw this giant creature on the VHS cover that said, “Godzilla: King of the Monsters!” I had to see this!

As a child, I was in shock and awe and kept looking for it to appear on TV. I tried to rent the movie often, but to my surprise, others liked the film and rented it. It’s kind of like trying to rent the Tecmo Super Bowl at your local grocery store to find that it is missing every Friday and Saturday! But I digress. During this time, I encountered many strange moves, most of which were mentioned by my family. They would talk about movies like The Blob (1958), The Thing from Another World (1951), War of the Worlds (1953), Them (1954), 20 Million Miles to Earth (1957), Forbidden Planet (1956), and The Fly (1958) to name just a few. These movies were just myths that I needed to investigate. 

These films and many more from the 50s not mentioned, I would religiously look for in the TV guide and seek out at the local video store, hoping they would carry it. Eventually, Genie’s would go out of business, and the next rental store was Video Connection, which later became Video Unlimited. It was here that I could rent many of the moves listed. Many films were nothing more than myths and legends for a long time until I found them at the rental store or on TV. Once the 1980s had vanished, these movies were still played on cable. Channels like the USA Network or TBS were known for showing such features, especially on Commander USA’s Groovie Movies and Super Scary Saturday. Every Saturday, both programs would play at the same time but five minutes apart. Commander USA started at noon and Super Scary Saturday at 12:05 pm and would switch back and forth between both programs. But with the 90s, these movies were slowly fading from cable TV. Channels like TBS and TNT still showed them from time to time. Especially on TNT with the birth of Monstervision starting in 1991 during its early stages instead of the mid-late 90s hosted by Joe Bob Briggs. This is understandable, as many people wanted to see more modern movies and still do. When the 2000s came, I rarely saw a 50’s sci-fi flick featured. By the 2010s decade, it had pretty much vanished from cable TV. Of course, TCM and AMC show some of these movies every year on Halloween but not much.

The good news is these movies are back, but mostly streaming, and this is a good thing. For nearly 15 years, it was rare to see anything of the sort on basic or premium cable. With the advent of streaming and Blu-rays, they are more affordable to buy and rent. Not to forget, where I live, two great horror hosts show these types of films. They are Svengoolie on MeTV Fort Wayne at 8 pm and Lord Blood-Rah on MyTV Fort Wayne at 10 pm every Saturday.

The bad news is that 1950s sci-fi films are an acquired taste. For the Baby Boomers, Generation X, and some Millennials, you either loved or hated these films. I, for one, with many of the same age, perhaps a bit younger or older, do have an appreciation for these films, which were at one time a mystery and a myth until we saw it with our own eyes—kind of like The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (1974). I grew up seeing the film, and it was no myth –it was real! But most of my friends never saw the film, and the rumor persisted until they viewed it in some safe, secret location away from their parents and likely with that one family member who was a bit off. My family was odd since this was a normal viewing for us. Anyways, today’s youth have no idea. Ok, to be fair, some do. Most movies are old and in black and white. If that is not bad enough, the effects are dumb, and the acting is even worse. However, many young people who watch a sci-fi horror film don’t realize an original exists. Take John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982). Many people who saw it did know there was an original made in 1951 by Howard Hawks. In some ways, this is good because it brings back that myth and legendary status to these 50s films that fall in the science fiction horror genre.

While it is terrible that I can’t flip through the channels to find a good sci-fi horror creature feature on the TV throughout the weekdays, I now can buy or stream them for a low price or for free. Thank God for streaming, physical media, Svengoolie, Lord Blood-Rah, The Haunted Hotel by Rob Graves, and The Last Drive-In with Joe Bob Briggs!

O, Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. (Isaiah 10:5)

Assyria may have been the rod of God’s anger. I say this lightly, for the Bible explains that only God knows the heart of humanity as mentioned in Psalms. 17:3; 44:21; 139:1-4. The book is not about spirituality, rather an investigative history, concerning the deportation of the ten northern tribes of Israel. However, it would be wrong not to look into the spiritual issues concerning the fall of the Northern Kingdom of Israel.

The beginning of Israel’s troubles starts in the mid 8th century BCE when the Assyrian armies poured down from the north into Israel. From here, we will look into the political and spiritual issues that are associated with Assyria and Israel, as well as the social aspect concerning the deportation of the Ten Tribes of Israel. From there will shift focus on Assyria’s policy towards captives, look into the place of exile.

Understand that there are many facts in this book and just as many speculations. Not everything in this book is concrete. Remember, we are dealing with a history that at times appears to be silent. Therefore, I will do my best in providing information available in areas that appear to be dim on the matter.

One of history’s most intriguing ancient mysteries remains the elusive and legendary Ark of the Covenant, also known as the Ark of the Testimony. According to Biblical sources, it was constructed after Moses had freed the Israelites from Egypt in the wilderness, and items of spiritual significance were placed in the chest.

After crossing the Jordan with the Ark, Joshua ordered his men to remove the twelve stones holding back the water, indicating no retreat or surrender. To fulfill the promise, you must fight to the death.

The Shout That Made Jericho Fall

According to Joshua 6:1-27, the Israelite army carried the Ark around Jericho once a day for seven days, and on the seventh day, they made a tremendous shout, and the walls came tumbling down. This may be partially true, but with a twist: Understand that Joshua was near Jericho at Gilgal. Joshua would have sent spies out to traverse the land and to gather intelligence from the locals. One such place was the fortified city of Jericho. Once the spies were inside, they went to an inn. Why an inn, you may ask? Because an inn is where you will hear all the gossip from the citizens to the traveling merchant. It was here that the spies are said to have met with a Canaanite prostitute by the name of Rahab. She informed them much about the city and the soldiers that resided within.

Rahab (center) in James Tissot’s The Harlot of Jericho and the Two Spies. Between circa 1896 and circa 1902 (Public Domain)

The city of Jericho was not large, roughly 8.5 square acres or 1,400 meters (370,000 square feet) in circumference, with a population roughly between 2,400-2,600 inhabitants. Given the size of the population, the city of Jericho could muster between 500 and 600 men to defend the city walls, which meant roughly every 2.74 meters (nine feet) a soldier would be stationed.

Dwelling foundations unearthed at Tell es-Sultan in Jericho (Abraham/Public Domain)

Joshua informed the officers that Jericho was shut tight; no one entered or left, which suggested that even the local farmers sought refuge behind the walls. This told Joshua that the king of Jericho could not field an army. While a direct attack will do more harm than good, Joshua takes an indirect approach to overcome the city’s defenses. He explained to his officers that the location of Rahab’s window was on the city wall. Joshua made it clear to his officers that on the day of battle, the army, roughly between 8,000 and 9,000 men, was to concentrate most of its effort on marching in a column around the city for six days in silence.

Carrying the Ark of the Covenant: gilded bas-relief at Auch Cathedral, France (Vassil/Public Domain)

On the seventh day, the Israelites circled the city seven times, and on the seventh circuit, the priests blew their trumpets, the army let out a loud shout, and the walls came tumbling down. However, the walls did not tumble, at least not in the literal sense. Instead, after six days, Rahab’s inn would have had at least 35-40 armed men hiding in her dwelling. Once those men heard the final blast of the trumpets and the loud shout given by the Israelites, those 35-40 men stormed out of Rahab’s inn to the walls near the main gate, slaughtered the guards, and opened Jericho to the onslaught. The Israelite army, roughly 8,000 men, stormed into the city. Some may have used scaling ladders, and once in: “They completely destroyed everything in the city with the sword — men and women, young and old, cattle, sheep and donkeys.” (Josh, 6:21) All breath had been extinguished except for Rahab and her family.

The covered ark and seven priests with rams’ horns, at the Battle of Jericho, in an eighteenth-century artist’s depiction. (Public Domain)

As one can read, the Ark was nothing more than a decoy to keep the people occupied so that the Israelites could acquire the much-needed metals to supply their army.

The Philistines Capture the Ark and Pay the Price

As the Israelite forces gathered at Ebenezer, the better-equipped and organized Philistines, seeing that their opponent was nothing more than a ragtag, unorganized body of men, left the safety of Aphek and marched toward the Israelites who wished to do battle. Once both armies were in battle formation, the slaughter commenced. The Philistines are said to have slaughtered four thousand Israelites that day. The Israelite elders felt they lost the first engagement due to not having the Ark of the Covenant present at the battle. Because of this, the elders sent messengers to Shiloh, located in Ephraim, requesting that Eli’s sons, Hophni and Phinehas, bring forth the ark to the battle. Hophni and Phinehas brought the ark to the Israelite camp, where a great roar of excitement was heard. The Israelite forces, confident that their god was with them, went forth to battle against the Philistines the next day and suffered a terrible loss in which many thousands of men were slaughtered. Hophni and Phinehas were killed, and worst of all, the Ark of the Covenant was now in the possession of the Philistines. When messengers reached Eli to inform him of the dreadful news, he fell off his seat and broke his neck. (1 Samuel 4:1-18)

With the Israelite forces broken, the Ark captured, and Eli dead, the Philistines quickly overran the Jezreel valley, gained access to the northern highlands, and were able to overrun the territory of Ephraim and Benjamin, forcing them into tributary status. While the battle of Aphek-Ebenezer was a major Israelite defeat, it was also an indirect victory.

Death Plagues the City

The Ark fell into the hands of the Philistines, who triumphantly brought it back to Ashdod. While they celebrated, an invisible hand of death fell on them. According to the Bible, the people of Ashdod and its vicinity were afflicted with a mysterious illness. When the Philistines moved the Ark to Gath in hopes of alleviating their ills, death followed. Neither young nor old could escape. (1 Samuel 5:1-9) But what was this plague, and how did it come about?

The Plague of Ashdod. (Public Domain)

The Bible mentions that the plague the Philistines were afflicted with was emerods, better known today as hemorrhoids. However, this seems unlikely. Hemorrhoids do not kill the young and old, for hemorrhoids are not contagious. The Hebrew word is ofalim, which does not mean hemorrhoids but tumors or swellings. This suggests that the Philistines were suffering from bubonic plague, for the Bible gives another clue: vermin.

The Philistines grew tired of the ark and discussed with their holy men how to return the vile object that had been afflicting them for seven months. The Philistine holy men clarified that if you wanted to appease the god of Israel, make a guilt offering to him. “Then you will be healed, and you will know why his hand has not been lifted from you.” The Philistines responded, “What guilt offering should we send to him?” The Philistine holy men advised that they should make “Five gold tumors and five gold rats, according to the number of the Philistine rulers, because the same plague has struck both you and your rulers. Make models of the tumors and of the rats that are destroying the country, and give glory to Israel’s god.” (1 Samuel 6:5) The passages are clear: The Ark produced the plague, and the rats helped in its spread. But how did the Ark produce plague?

It seems probable that the Ark of the Covenant contained more than just a few holy items. Historian Adrienne Mayor mentions that the Ark may have contained sealed containers or cloth “that harbored aerosolized plague germs, or an insect vector that infected the rodents in Philistine territory.” In other words, whoever opened the ark to examine the objects within unknowingly opened Pandora’s Box.

After the Philistines had made the “Five gold tumors and five gold rats,” they placed the objects in a chest next to the ark on the cart drawn by two oxen. The five Philistine rulers escorted them to the border of Beth Shemesh. As the Israelites of Beth Shemesh were harvesting their wheat in the field of Joshua, “they looked up and saw the ark, they rejoiced at the sight.” (1 Samuel 6:13). It was an indirect victory by means of biological warfare. However, the Israelites would also pay the price.

Ark in the land of Philistines and the Temple of Dagon (Public Domain)

After the Levites had taken the chest and Ark down from the cart, they opened the Ark to observe the objects inside and to see if the contents were still there, and in doing so, unknowingly unleashed the same pestilence that afflicted the Philistines. Samuel states that the Lord “smote the men of Bethshemesh, because they had looked into the ark of the Lord, even he smote of the people fifty thousand and threescore and ten men.” (1 Sam 6:15-19) While it’s possible that people wanted to look inside the Ark out of curiosity, the Levites handling the Ark were the first exposed to the pestilence, which quickly spread throughout Beth Shemesh and other parts of Israel. While 50,070 seems a bit much, the likely number of dead was a little more than five thousand.

The aftermath of Aphek-Ebenezer was two-sided. The Philistines won the land battles while the Israelites won biologically, even though the majority of the populace and priests likely had no clue what caused the dangers in the Ark. While the epidemic stopped the advancement of the Philistines temporarily, it also further weakened the Israelites and denied them any hope of attacking the weakened Philistines once the plague had subsided.

The Enduring Enigma

So, what was the Ark of the Covenant? Was it a golden chest that served as the throne for Yahweh and had an unexplainable power, or was it just a beautifully gilded box with some nasty surprises inside? Based on the readings, it seems that the Ark was nothing more than a chest designed for a political purpose: to unite the Israelites and give them an identity. It also served as a religious symbol. Not only was Yahweh their king, but he was also, in fact, their God. Because of this, the Ark served as a place to worship wherever it resided. Thirdly and lastly, it had a military function. One could say the Ark served as Yahweh’s chariot. Yahweh was their commander and God of war. Moreover, like any good weapon, if it were to fall into the hands of the enemy, it could defend itself as it did against the Philistines when it unleashed a nasty plague upon them.

Overall, however, one looks at the Ark; it all comes down to faith.

Replica of the Ark of the Covenant in the Royal Arch Room of the George Washington Masonic National Memorial (CC BY-SA 2.5)

Cam Rea is an author and military historian. He has written numerous articles for Ancient Origins, and Classical Wisdom Weekly and has authored several books, including Hebrew Wars: A Military History of Ancient Israel from Abraham to Judges.

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Top Image: Model of the Ark of the Covenant (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Gabriel, Richard A. The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

—. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport: Praeger, 2003.

Hamilton, Victor P. Handbook on the Historical Books: Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, Ezra-Nehemiah, Esther. Mich: Baker Academic, 2001.

Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. London: Duckworth, 2005.

Orent, Wendy. Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World’s Most Dangerous Disease. New York: Free Press, 2004.

Sicker, Martin. The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.

Sivertsen, Barbara J. The Parting of the Sea: How Volcanoes, Earthquakes, and Plagues Shaped the Story of Exodus. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Stager, Lawrence E. “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research.” JSTOR. Autumn 1985. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1356862

The Ark of the Covenant, also known as the Ark of the Testimony, is one of history’s most fascinating ancient mysteries. According to Biblical sources, it was built after Moses had freed the Israelites from Egypt in the wilderness. The chest was filled with items of spiritual significance and served as a visible sign of Yahweh’s (the Hebrew name of God) presence to the Israelites. However, the Ark went missing after the Babylonian destruction of Jerusalem in 587 BCE.

Why the Ark?

According to Exodus 19:5-6, Yahweh made a covenant with the Israelites: “Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine: And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. These are the words which thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel.” It was believed this covenant brought about the construction of the Ark.

Another reason for the Ark’s construction was political. The Israelites believed Yahweh to be their king, and building it allowed them to transport their monarch wherever they went. This also made the Ark a military weapon. If Yahweh was their king/god, then he was their commander, which made the Ark a weapon. Therefore, the Israelites needed a symbol that they could look to, and it put fear into the minds of their enemies. More on this later.

A 4th century BCE drachm (quarter shekel) coin from the Persian province of Yehud Medinata, possibly representing Yahweh seated on a winged and wheeled throne. An inscription lies on the face of the coin, either a Phoenician inscription on the coin reading “YHW” or an Aramaic inscription reading “YHD” (Public Domain)

The Construction of the Ark

According to the book of Exodus 25:10-22, construction of the Ark began at Mount Sinai:

Have them make an ark of acacia wood—two and a half cubits long, a cubit and a half wide, and a cubit and a half high. Overlay it with pure gold, both inside and out, and make a gold molding around it. Cast four gold rings for it and fasten them to its four feet, with two rings on one side and two rings on the other. Then make poles of acacia wood and overlay them with gold. Insert the poles into the rings on the sides of the ark to carry it. The poles are to remain in the rings of this ark; they are not to be removed. Then put in the ark the tablets of the covenant law, which I will give you.

Make an atonement cover of pure gold—two and a half cubits long and a cubit and a half wide. And make two cherubim out of hammered gold at the ends of the cover. Make one cherub on one end and the second cherub on the other; make the cherubim of one piece with the cover, at the two ends. The cherubim are to have their wings spread upward, overshadowing the cover with them. The cherubim are to face each other, looking toward the cover. Place the cover on top of the ark and put in the ark the tablets of the covenant law that I will give you. There, above the cover between the two cherubim that are over the ark of the covenant law, I will meet with you and give you all my commands for the Israelites.

A model of the Ark of the Covenant from biblical description (Blake Patterson/CC BY 2.0)

What is interesting about this is that the manufacture of not just the Ark but weapons also took place at Mount Sinai. The Israelites had difficulty acquiring the necessary skills to manufacture bronze weapons in the wilderness. Casting bronze was not easy or an ordinary skill. Exodus is silent when it comes to blacksmiths. One could argue that no blacksmiths were available within the camp. Alternatively, there might have been a handful of blacksmiths who either lacked the necessary equipment to produce the urgently needed weapons or were unskilled in weapon forging. So, the question arises: how did the Israelites manage to produce sufficient weapons, not to mention the Ark of Covenant? The solution to this enigma lies in Sinai.

Mount Sinai, also known as Mount Horbe (Mohammed Moussa/CC BY-SA 3.0)

Moses led the Israelites into Sinai and to the base of Mount Horeb due to his relatives, the availability of copper, and the metalworkers who lived there. Moses knew well the area of Sinai and Mount Horeb (an alternative name for Mt. Sinai), for Moses used to lead Jethro’s flock “to the backside of the desert, and came to the mountain of God, even to Horeb.” (Exodus 3:1) Moses’ father-in-law, Jethro, was a Kenite/Midian priest who lived in the lands of Midian. (Judg 1:16; Ex 3:1; Num10:29) Moses led the Hebrews to Mount Sinai/Horeb, for he was familiar with the territory and the resources mined and forged at Sinai.

Moses Breaking the Tablets of the Law (1659) by Rembrandt (Public Domain)

The approach to Mount Sinai, painting by David Roberts (Public Domain)

While Moses and a few others with him were familiar with the sights and sounds at Mount Sinai/Horeb, most of the Israelites and those tagging along were not, especially on the morning of the third day. “And it came to pass on the third day in the morning, that there were thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud; so that all the people that was in the camp trembled.” (Exodus 19:16)

While it is possible that Yahweh did descend in a thunderous roar accompanied by spectacular lightning and smoke atop Mount Sinai/Horeb, perhaps there is another alternative to consider. Perhaps the reported sound of thunder the Israelites heard was none other than the metalsmiths atop the mountain who were smelting and hammering away. The flashes of what appeared to be lightning were nothing more than the flickering of the high flames produced by the furnaces. As for the cloud of smoke caused by the furnaces, it takes twice to four times as much charcoal to smelt copper compared to iron, which would produce a heavy cloud of smoke. The mountain landscape would have sounded and appeared eerie to the people below. The clue that links this possibility all together is the Kenites.

The Kenite name comes from the Hebrew word qayin, which means smith or metalworker. The Kenites lived in oasis towns in Midian and Sinai, where they mined the abundant rich copper ore at various spots in southwestern and southeastern Sinai. Furthermore, their location at the copper mines was not far from the trade routes that passed through Sinai, which allowed them to sell their goods and purchase the expensive tin needed to produce bronze, which was rare in the Middle East.

Because of this, it is possible to suggest that the Ark of the Covenant was designed and the metals collected atop Mount Sinai due to the Kenites who lived and worked within the vicinity. This speculation is because Moses was believed to be atop the Sinai for 40 days. However, the Bible gives two different accounts of who partook in the Ark. According to Exodus 31, Moses instructed Bezalel and Oholiab to construct the Ark, but the book of Deuteronomy 10:1-5 says Moses constructed it. At the same time, Bezalel and Oholiab are not mentioned. Forty days allow plenty of time to help in the design and manufacture of the weapons and the Ark, along with other items of religious significance. Therefore, it seems reasonable that Moses knew what he was doing when he arrived at Sinai to pay for weapons and the Ark with the gold they stripped from Egypt.

Power of the Ark

The power of the Ark is another intriguing matter. In biblical sources, the Ark divided the Jordan River for the Israelites to cross. In another instance, it brought down the walls of Jericho. It is said to have killed the Bethsames when they opened it. The Philistines are said to have acquired “hemorrhoids” (as shall be explained) after capturing the Ark, which caused them to quickly return it to the Israelites. And finally, there is the story of Uzzah, who was stuck down for placing his hands on the Ark as he tried to prevent it from falling. However, how true are these stories, and if they are true, is there another explanation worth considering?

Moses and Joshua bowing before the Ark. (Public Domain)

The Ark and the Jordan River

According to the book of Joshua 3:16, “the waters which came down from above stood and rose up upon an heap very far from the city Adam, that is beside Zaretan: and those that came down toward the sea of the plain, even the salt sea, failed, and were cut off: and the people passed over right against Jericho.” So, did the Jordan River miraculously divide, allowing them to march across a dry riverbed, or is there more to the story?

Earthquakes are common along the Dead Sea depression and might contribute to the Jordan splitting for Joshua. In 1927, an earthquake cut off the river for twenty-two hours. In 1546, an earthquake triggered a landslide, stopping the river from flowing for two days. In 1267, the river stopped again at midnight and would not flow until 10:00 the following morning. While this is plausible, the Book of Joshua provides an overlooked possibility.

As mentioned, they left Shittim (an ancient city in Moab, now Abil-ez-Zeit, Jordan) and encamped on the east bank of the Jordan River. Richard Gabriel points out that there is “no sound military reason for the three-day encampment.” From a military standpoint, it makes no sense to sit and wait for three days before crossing, considering that the king of Jericho easily could have mustered his forces and acquired the aid of local allies to deploy their forces along the west side of the Jordan River, thus using it as a tactical obstacle. However, the king evidently did not have the luxury of allies to assist him in preventing an Israelite crossing of the Jordan. The lack of assistance was apparently due to the disunity between the various Canaanite city-states. This is not to say that they could not unite to attack a common foe, but the military and political disunity shows their true weakness in preventing a foreign invasion. While Joshua’s decision seems a bit risky, he was no fool. So, what were the Israelites doing? The answer is they were taking advantage of a recent earthquake.

That the waters which came down from above stood and rose up upon an heap very far from the city Adam, that is beside Zaretan: and those that came down toward the sea of the plain, even the salt sea, failed, and were cut off. (Joshua 3:16)

With a natural obstacle in place, the flow of water slowed down and slowly receded, thus making the river shallow enough to build a barrier of some sort to hold back the slow, if not standing, waters. Joshua indicates that the “Jordan overfloweth all his banks all the time of harvest.” (Joshua 4:2-3) Knowing that the fords were flooded, Joshua decided that three days was sufficient to construct a barrier made of stone to hold back the waters and to allow the army to move fluidly across. Once the army crossed, Joshua gave the order to remove the stones:

“Take for yourselves from the people twelve men, a man from every tribe; and give them this order: ‘Take twelve stones from the middle of the Yarden riverbed, where the cohanim are standing, carry them over with you and set them down in the place where you will camp tonight.’”

Joshua passing the River Jordan with the Ark of the Covenant. (Public Domain)

Joshua’s order to remove the twelve stones indicates that there is no retreat and no surrender. To fulfill the promise, you must fight to the death. Joshua understood well that a force with its back against a wall would fight more ferociously. Moreover, removing the barrier that held back the waters protected those Israelites on the east side of the Jordan if something went wrong.

Cam Rea is an author and military historian. He has written numerous articles for Ancient Origins Classical Wisdom Weekly and has authored several books, including Hebrew Wars: A Military History of Ancient Israel from Abraham to Judges.

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Top Image: ‘The Ark Passes Over the Jordan’ ( Public Domain )

By Cam Rea

References

Gabriel, Richard A. The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

—. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport: Praeger, 2003.

Hamilton, Victor P. Handbook on the Historical Books: Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, Ezra-Nehemiah, Esther. Mich: Baker Academic, 2001.

Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. London: Duckworth, 2005.

Orent, Wendy. Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World’s Most Dangerous Disease. New York: Free Press, 2004.

Sicker, Martin. The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.

Sivertsen, Barbara J. The Parting of the Sea: How Volcanoes, Earthquakes, and Plagues Shaped the Story of Exodus. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Stager, Lawrence E. “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research.” JSTOR. Autumn 1985. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1356862

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