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The Gear and Guts of the Mongol Military—Part I

Much is known about the ancient Mongol military and their incredible victories on the battlefield, but little is ever discussed about their arms, armor, horses, and logistics. What gear did they use? How did they deal with their wounded? How did they partner with horses to become masters of the steppe?

Indeed, it’s said there was no separate word for ‘soldier’ in the Middle Mongol language, meaning that the society was so adept at survival and conquering that there was little difference in preparedness between a civilian and a warrior. This may have been one of the keys to their adaptability, and ultimate success.

Here we take a detailed look into the Mongol military apparatus (Arms, Armor, Supplies, Horses, and Medicine): How did they do it?

The Lightning-Quick Light Cavalryman

The attire of the Mongol light cavalryman was no different from his everyday outfit. The Mongol warrior’s attire was practical, in the sense that its main function was to protect him from the harsh conditions of the climate he traversed. His undershirt was long with wide sleeves. His attire consisted of a heavy, double-breasted knee-length coat called deel or degel.

A Mongolian coat, or deel

A Mongolian coat, or deel (CC BY-SA 3.0)

This coat was secured with a button a few inches below the armpit and was fastened by a leather belt at the waist. Furthermore, the Mongols utilized two types of coats. One was a heavy coat for the colder seasons but they also wore a coat to keep them dry from the rains during the warmer seasons. As for material, Flemish Franciscan monk, William of Rubruck (1210-ca. 1270) said that the “poor make their outside (gowns) of dog and kid (skins).” As for pants, Rubruck mentions that they “make also breeches with furs,” and “line their clothes with cotton cloth, or with the fine wool which they are able to pick out of the coarser.”

When it comes to armor, many Mongols did not wear much, particularly lamellar. The reason was that the role of the light cavalryman was to be light, flexible, agile, and above all, fast.

This Japanese lamellar cuirass was typically too heavy for light cavalry

This Japanese lamellar cuirass was typically too heavy for light cavalry (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Other items that a light cavalryman would have used, as well did the heavy cavalryman, were “two or three bows or at least one good one, and three large quivers filled with arrows” along with a sword, which hung from his belt. He may have carried a dagger, axe, or both. His coat pocket possibly consisted of a sharpening stone for weapons and arrowheads, or perishable items, such as dried meat, dried curds, perhaps berries.

Steadfast and Indomitable Heavy Cavalrymen

William of Rubruck describes heavy cavalry as wearing the same clothing as light cavalry underneath their armor when they went on military campaigns. However, most heavy cavalrymen were wealthy and could afford, particularly later on, better clothing to wear.

The voyage of William of Rubruck in 1253–1255. Franciscan missionary and explorer, he documented details of the Mongol Empire

The voyage of William of Rubruck in 1253–1255. Franciscan missionary and explorer, he documented details of the Mongol Empire (Public Domain)

“Of their clothing and customs you must know, that from Cataia [China], and other regions of the east, and also from Persia and other regions of the south, are brought to them silken and golden stuffs and cloth of cotton, which they wear in summer. From Ruscia, Moxel, and from Greater Bulgaria [a region in the middle Volga, not to be confused with minor Bulgaria mentioned above] and Pascatir [a region between the upperl Volga and Ural R.], which is greater Hungary, and Kerkis [Kerghiz], all of which are countries to the north and full of forests, and which obey them, are brought to them costly furs of many kinds, which I never saw in our parts, and which they wear in winter. And they always make in winter at least two fur gowns, one with the fur against the body, the other with the fur outside exposed to the wind and snow; these latter are usually of the skins of wolves or foxes or papions; and while they sit in the dwelling they have another lighter one.”

Mongols cavalry outside Vladimir presumably demanding submission before its sacking

Mongols cavalry outside Vladimir presumably demanding submission before its sacking (Public Domain)

Besides clothes, John of Plano Carpini describes the type of armor the Mongol heavy cavalrymen wore:

“Some have cuirasses and protection for their horses, fashioned out of leather in the following manner: they take strips of ox-hide or the skin of another animal, a hand’s breadth wide and cover three or four together with pitch, and they fasten them with leather thongs or cord; in the upper strip they put the lace at one end, in the next they put it in the middle and so on to the end; consequently, when they bend, the lower strips come up over the upper ones and thus there is a double or triple thickness over the body.”

The cuirass they wore consisted of small scales of iron, leather, or bone known in lamellar armor. As for the description provided by Carpini, it appears that the Mongol warriors he encountered were wearing lamellar armor made of leather scales. Softening leather by boiling and afterwards coating the leather with a lacquer made from pitch made it waterproof. The cuirass weighed roughly 20 lbs (9 kg). To add further protection, the rider might have worn his heavy coat under the cuirass, and reinforced it with metal plates or perhaps leather, depending on what was available at his disposal.

Statue of an armored Mongol warrior with a cheetah

Statue of an armored Mongol warrior with a cheetah (Enerelt/CC BY-SA 3.0)

Mongols who owned lamellar preferred it to mail, even though mail armor was rare. The reason for this was that lamellar armor provided better protection against arrows than mail. According to David Nicolle, “Test have shown that mail can absorb arrows shot from a reasonable distance, but it could not prevent them causing minor wounds. Lamellar armor, however, was much more effective against arrows.” To add further protection, the Mongols learned from the Chinese of the stopping power of silk. Heavy cavalrymen would wear a heavy protective silk undershirt underneath their armor. Even if the arrow penetrated the lamellar or mail armor, it might not penetrate the silk. Instead, the arrow might become twisted in the silk as it entered the body, thus cleaning the wound, or perhaps even treating it with the plant dyes (such as turmeric) used in the dyeing process of the garment. Furthermore, wearing a silk undershirt made it easier to extract the arrow from the body without doing further damage.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel. The arms could be uncovered in hot weather.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel. The arms could be uncovered in hot weather. (Public Domain)

As for horse armor, the Mongol heavy cavalrymen would outfit their horses in five parts:

“they put one piece along each side of the horse which protects it from the tail to the head and is tied to the saddle, behind the saddle on the back, and at the neck. Over the horse’s back they put another piece where the two parts of the harness are joined and they make a hole in this piece through which they expose the tail, while in front of the chest they place a piece that protects every-thing from the knees or the knee joints. On the forehead they put an iron plate which is tied on each side of the neck.”

Boots for Riding

Boots were also crucial to the rider. The Mongol boot was designed for standing in the stirrups, which provided the rider a platform to fire at a quick gallop. Mongol cavalrymen wore sturdy, thick inflexible soled heelless boots, with the rigid toe turned upwards, and was made from leather and felt that provided protection from the bitter cold of the steppes and their legs from chafing due to rubbing against the horses back. The source of the leather comes from horses according to Rubruck in which he states, “With the hind part of the hide of horses they make most beautiful shoes.” Even though heavy, the boots were comfortable enough for the rider to tuck his pants in before tying the laces. To absorb perspiration, the Mongols wore socks made of felt, which kept his feet warm, especially since the boot was lined with fur, making it unlikely that his feet would get cold.

Mongolian boot style, for a child and adult.

Mongolian boot style, for a child and adult. (Public Domain)

Practical Headgear

Headwear of the Mongols came in two types; The majority of horse archers donned the fur cap. The fur cap was conical in shape and made from quality material. It had reversible earflaps and brim for the summer and winter.

Portrait of Ogedei Khan with a fur cap.

Portrait of Ogedei Khan with a fur cap. (Public Domain)

Those who were heavy cavalry also wore a conical helmet made of harden leather or one of iron. According to Carpini, “The Tartar helmet has a crown made of iron or steel, but the part that extends around the neck and throat is of leather,” which had been harden and was composed of various sizes of iron and steel plates, and probably lined with fur. Unlike the fur cap, earflaps on the iron helmet were optional. The heavy cavalryman’s helmet had two slots where the flaps could be attached to better protect his ears. To add further protection, iron plated lamellar neck guard was included.

The helmet of a Mongolian soldier

The helmet of a Mongolian soldier (CC BY-SA 3.0)

While the Mongol helmet was conical in shape, it was thought to be taller and pointier than the traditional Chinese helmets. For a long time, no helmets were known to have survived Mongol China. However, Randall Sasaki in his book The Origins of the Lost Fleet of the Mongol Empire mentions that five “well-preserved iron helmets were discovered” and that the “diameter of these helmets is 22 to 23 cm, and their height is 12 to 15 cm. A few helmets appear to be thicker at one end. All of the helmets seem to have had an attachment at the top where a pointed protrusion was located.”

The Might of the Sword

When it comes to swords, the Mongols had a variety of types. In both of the modern-day nations of Russia and Mongolia, archaeologists have found swords belonging to the Mongols. The swords varied in design as some were broad and straight, like European blades, while others had a slight curve. Both types of swords were single edged, roughly one meter (three feet) in length, and were designed for cutting rather than stabbing.

The sabre [left] and the scimitar [right] were curved swords of a type as used by the Mongol military

The sabre [left] and the scimitar [right] were curved swords of a type as used by the Mongol military (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The majority of Mongol soldiers never carried swords during the early stages of the Empire. It appears that swords were reserved for the elite during that time. Much later, western writers like Carpini and Rubruck described the Mongol warrior as carrying bows, arrows, and axes. Thomas of Spalato describes the Mongols in a similar fashion but that they carried swords as well. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi mentions that the Mongols were using swords during their engagements against the Khwarazm Empire from 1219-1221. Marco Polo also describes their use of swords along with maces and shields during his time among them.

Overall, swords were not a weapon so desired by the Mongols like those in the rest of Eurasia. To the Mongols, the sword was a symbol of power only reserved for the elite. As time passed, people conquered, territory expanded, and the Mongols slowly adopted the sword. They were now in charge of large urban areas which effectively took them off their horse and placed them in the streets.

The Famous Bow

Of all the weapons utilized by the Mongols, the bow stood forefront in their war arsenal. But this should come to no surprise since it was steppe peoples’ weapon of choice throughout their history. The bow used by the Mongols was the composite bow.

Hulagu Khan with the older composite bow used during the time of the Mongol conquest. It is smaller in size and has no string bridges.

Hulagu Khan with the older composite bow used during the time of the Mongol conquest. It is smaller in size and has no string bridges. (Public Domain)

The composite bow consisted of horn, wood, sinew, and glue. The wood used for constructing the core of the bow was made from a variety, such as larch, birch, and elm. Of the woods considered, bamboo, (which is not a wood but a strong grass), was most desirable for its lack of grain and strength. With grain absent, bamboo reduced the risk of developing twists in the limbs and was desired due to being stronger than wood. Bamboo would have to be imported, however.

Bamboo was preferred in Mongolian bows

Bamboo was preferred in Mongolian bows (Manfred Heyde/CC BY-SA 3.0)

When Genghis Khan conquered northern China, he had direct accesses to the commodity. Once the material for the core had been selected and cured, ibex horn was used, or sometimes bone. In order to apply horn or bone to the core, it had to be softened by boiling. As for the backing, sinew was used (from an animal, possibly ibex), and the Achilles tendon was preferred. To prepare the sinew, the tendons had to be dried and crushed to a mass of loose fiber. Once this was done, the sinew was mixed with an adhesive made from boiled-down animal tendons or fish bones. The bowyer had to be careful when applying the sinew mixed with glue to the core— as to little would be weak and too much made the bow stiff. Once the sides were glued to the core, the bow was set aside to dry. As it dried, it began to harden and form. The total process from beginning to end may have taken up to a year to finish and once complete, the bow was ready to be personalized by its owner with decorations, and then stored in a leather case.

A Timurid depiction of a Mongol archer, 15th century

A Timurid depiction of a Mongol archer, 15th century (Public Domain)

With the quality makeup of the bow came its power.

The shape of the Mongol bow was a flattened and curved shape of an “M”. The general range of the Mongol bow was 300 meters (984 feet) with a tremendous range of 500 meters (1640 feet). Overall, it’s believed a Mongol horse archer could hit his target from point blank to potentially 550 yards. ‘Potentially’, because a thirteenth century report says that one of Genghis Khan’s master archers made a 428-yard shot (1284 feet). Of course, it becomes more difficult to hit the target from a great range unless that target is a moving mass of soldiers.

The size of the bow was roughly 120 centimeters (48 inches) in length. The draw weight of the bow had a tremendous pull between 100-170 pounds (45-77 kg). Of course, this depended on the strength of the archer. However, pulling the bow to its maximum potential was rare. Instead, the Mongol horse archers relied on rapid fire. He would do this by rapidly pulling the bowstring back only a short distance before release, and only did so when the hooves of the horse were off the ground. This allowed the archer to concentrate on his target.

In combat, the Mongol cavalry punished enemy forces with a constant barrage of arrows at 200 paces and penetrated armor at 100 yards (300 feet). Furthermore, the Mongol archer would carry two bows with him on campaign. One bow was used for long range and the other for short distance shots. Some suggest that the use of the bow for short distance shots was utilized when the soldier had dismounted.

To shoot the composite bow, the Mongol archer would wear a thumb ring and draw the string with his ring and forefinger, known as the Mongolian Draw. The thumb ring was developed by Steppe peoples in order to shoot faster and effectively from horseback at full gallop.

7th century Mughal thumb ring made of walrus ivory.

7th century Mughal thumb ring made of walrus ivory. (Public Domain)

The thumb ring was made from a variety of materials such as horn, bone, metal, leather, stone, and ivory. The thumb ring provided two advantages to the archers. The ring eased the pressure of the string on the thumb, which allows the archer to fire arrows faster upon release and with better accuracy since the placement of the arrow was on the same side of the shooting hand. As well, the Mongolian Draw was said to be superior to the three-finger release.

A ‘Mongolian Draw’ [left] versus a ‘Mediterranean Draw’ [right]

A ‘Mongolian Draw’ [left] versus a ‘Mediterranean Draw’ [right] (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Overall, the Mongol cavalryman and his composite bow delivered a devastating punch. Latham and Paterson in their book “Saracen Archery” mention the bow’s tremendous power and elegant design:

“Since such composites can withstand an enormous amount of bend, shortness of length could be achieved in design, and this feature made them very suitable weapons for the mounted archer.”

Mongol cavalrymen during the time of the Mongol conquest used a smaller bow suitable for horse archery.

Mongol cavalrymen during the time of the Mongol conquest used a smaller bow suitable for horse archery. (Public Domain)

“In a well-designed bow the weight should increase quickly during the first few inches of the draw, after which the rate of increase should diminish as the draw progresses. This quality was achieved in the East by fitting of a rigid end-piece (in Arabic, siyah, pl. siyat) to each end of the bow. When they bow was about half-drawn, the siyat began to act as levers so that the draw could be continued with less increase in the weight than would have been the case without them … For a given weight at full draw – this quantity depending on the archer’s strength – the composite bow stores a great amount of energy, which is then available for transfer to the arrow when the string is loosed.
When the siyat project away from the archer before the braced bow is drawn, as in the case with the Manchu and Mongolian bows … a string-bridge is fitted to prevent the string from slipping past the knee of the bow; for should this happen the latter would violently assume its unbraced shape and virtually turn itself inside out.”

Top Image: Painting depicting the Battle of Cheoin (Korea) between Goryeo and Mongol Empire forces in the Korean peninsula in 1232; Deriv. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Thomas J. Craughwell, The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in History: How Genghis Khan’s Mongols Almost Conquered the World (Beverly, Mass: Fair Winds Press, 2010).

Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History (London: Reaktion Books, 2012).

Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System (Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007).

Richard D. McCreight, Mongol Warrior Epic: Masters of Thirteenth Century Maneuver Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College 1983).

Marco Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian: Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East. Volume 2 edited and translated by Henry Yule. 3rdedition (London: J. Murray, 1929).

Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1961).

George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Vol 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University press, 1953).

Tracy, Larissa. Wounds and Wound Repair in Medieval Culture. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

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The House of Arsacid Falls to the House of Sasan – Part 2

 

Ardashir proclaimed himself king of Persis by 208 CE. His brothers protested this and Ardashir disposed of them. If his brother challenges were not enough, many local petty kings of Persis refused to acknowledge Ardashir rule. Ardashir responded by going to war in which he crushed them. He thus solidified his position as the rightful king of Persis. However, Parthian leadership in Ctesiphon thought otherwise, and sounded the alarm. 

[Read Part I here]

The House of Sasan ruled the Sasanian Empire from 224 to 651. Ardashir I named the dynasty in honor of his grandfather, Sasan. The Sassanian Royal Symbol and the Mythology of Persia.

The House of Sasan ruled the Sasanian Empire from 224 to 651. Ardashir I named the dynasty in honor of his grandfather, Sasan. The Sassanian Royal Symbol and the Mythology of Persia. (Public Domain)

Ardashir Challenges the Parthians

Ardashir made his challenge known in 224 CE. While risky, he knew that the Parthian power base at Ctesiphon was impotent and the confederation that supported the Arsacid throne weak and tired of Arsacid rule. Ardashir understood that so long as the Arsacid’s stayed in power, the next Roman invasion of Iranian lands would go roughly unchecked. To avoid this from happening, there was a crucial need for a much stronger central government capable of fielding a tough, well-disciplined army with the ability to meet, engage, discharge, and have the ability to give chase and conquer former territory once under Achaemenid rule.

Ardashir I is receiving the Kingship's ring.

Ardashir I is receiving the Kingship’s ring. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

Ardashir, uncertain, but ready for the challenge, soon gained support beyond the borders of Persis. Many supporters from the provinces of Media, Media Atropatene, Adiabene, and Kurdistan, came to join in the rebellion. But that would not be enough if he was to defeat King Artabanus V. To seal the deal, Ardashir needed the support of the Iranian highlanders in the northwest.

This is mentioned in the Arbela Chronicles which state: “And this was recognized by the Persians and the Medes and they closed a union with  Šahrat,  the  king  of  Hedajjab,  and  Domjtana,  the  king  from  Karek Selok and made a hefty  assault  on  the  Parthians  in  spring.” With many nations now backing Ardashir, particularly the western Iranians, which was extremely important (for the Parthian seat of power was right in the middle), Ardashir made his move to battle.

Artabanus V, like any king during a time of crises, assembled his forces and marched on the province of Persis to crush Ardashir.

Coin of the Parthian king Artabanus IV.

Coin of the Parthian king Artabanus IV. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com /CC BY-SA 3.0)

The fate of the Iranian peoples was decided by three battles. The first battle was won by Ardashir but at a considerable cost for both sides. According to the Book of the Deeds of Ardashir son of Babag, Ardashir “came to battle with Ardavan (Artabanus) but Artabanus was not in command of the Parthian forces. Instead, Bahman, the son of Artabanus, led the forces and was killed along with his entire army. Afterwards, Ardashir “seized their wealth, property, horses; and portable lodges, and settled himself in Stakhar.” Some may view this battle as a draw.

The second battle also was a victory for Ardashir and proved pivotal, for the Parthians suffered a great loss of men. With Parthia wounded, Ardashir took advantage of the situation and pressed on. The final battle between the two powers took place at Hormizdeghan, near the modern city of Bandar Abbas, 28 April 224 CE.

Ardashir chose this area, which gave him access to the water supplies, crucial to quench the thirst of men and horses. As for Artabanus, his force took up a position near an inadequate water supply. In such a hot area and with a lack of water, both man and beast grew weary the longer they waited. This may have been Ardashir’s strategy. Taking advantage of the water supply physically weakened the Parthians, which in turn caused psychological distress.

When both armies formed battle lines, the forces of Ardashir were better equipped, as some of his horsemen were wearing the Roman-style, flexible chain armor. Artabanus fielded a much larger force. However, his forces were hastily assembled, ill equipped, and less prepared for battle, for even the king of the Parthians was wearing the old style lamellar armor considered cumbersome at the time. While details of the final battle are scant, Ardashir was victorious as “He killed Ardavan, whose entire wealth and property fell into the hands of Ardashir, who married Ardavan’s daughter, and went back to Pars.”

Details of this battle can be seen at Firuzabad, Iran. The rock carving shows Ardashir unhorsing and killing Artabanus V from his horse in a joust. This ended the House of Arsaces and established the House of Sasan.

Drawing of French orientalist painter and traveler Eugene Flandin (1840): Sasanian king Ardachir Babakan's rock relief (Firuzabad 1), Scene showing an equestrian victory over Parthian king Artabanus V, province of Fars, Iran.

Drawing of French orientalist painter and traveler Eugene Flandin (1840): Sasanian king Ardachir Babakan’s rock relief (Firuzabad 1), Scene showing an equestrian victory over Parthian king Artabanus V, province of Fars, Iran. (Public Domain)

Ghal'eh Dokhtar (or "The Maiden's Castle") in present-day Fars, Firuzabad, Iran, built by Ardashir in 209, before he was finally able to defeat the Parthian empire.

Ghal’eh Dokhtar (or “The Maiden’s Castle”) in present-day Fars, Firuzabad, Iran, built by Ardashir in 209, before he was finally able to defeat the Parthian empire. (Public Domain)

Ardashir’s Military Reform and Forces

After defeating the Parthians, Ardashir turned his attention towards driving Rome back into the sea and restoring the former glory of Persia when it was under Cyrus the Great. However, Ardashir needed a professional army, an army that was organized, and not only in structure, but also in capability.

Rome was not an easy army to fight, just look at the many battles fought between Rome and Parthia over time. They were equals to one another. However, one was better at going on the offensive while the other excelled at remaining defensive. Ardashir needed an army that could do both, for he could not afford just a defensive army.

Ardashir consolidated and centralized his forces directly under his command. He was absolute, and an absolute monarchy needed a subjective army that would forcefully submit to the nobility without contestation. In order to do this, the command must start at the very top, which was the king himself, Ardashir.

Bust of a Sasanian king, most likely Shapur II (309 to 379 CE) Representative image.

Bust of a Sasanian king, most likely Shapur II (309 to 379 CE) Representative image. (Public Domain)

The Chain of Command

Ardashir was not only King of Persia, but he was the Shahenshah, “King of kings.” Ardashir’s military chain of command started with the Vuzurg-Framander. The Vuzurg-Framander was in charge of state affairs when the Shahenshah was off on a military campaign. The person in charge of the military forces was the Eran-Spahbad. Under the Eran-Spahbad was the Spahbad who was a general and could be a military governor of a province. The Spahbad received help from his assistants, known as the “Padgospan.” The Padgospan, otherwise known as “Padan” were lower officers assisting the Spahbad. Under the Padan was the Framandar, which were the battlefield commanders. This list provides a somewhat clear detail as to the day-to-day duties of the military chain of command whether in peace or in war. However, other titles are mentioned, but many remain unclear as to their job description or role in war.

Artistic rendering of a Sasanian spahbed.

Artistic rendering of a Sasanian spahbed. (Public Domain)

Now that we have a glimpse into the command structure of the Sassanid military, one can see that it was highly organized due to its centralized role. Nevertheless, good command structure needs a good army to function, in order to go on the offensive or stay on the defensive when needed.

The Sassanid military was heavy and built for shock for its sole purpose was to dominate the battlefield and beyond. The Sassanid military force was a mirror image of the Parthian military. In other words, cavalry ruled the day throughout the empire. Cavalry was tradition in these parts and the Sassanids continued in that tradition, but with better organization.

The Sassanids primarily relied on two types of cavalry in combat; the heavy cavalry consisted of cataphracts, the clibanarii, and the lighter horse archer cavalry. In addition to the cavalry, the Sassanids also relied upon infantry and elephants as well as having an effective siege train. However, cavalry was the cornerstone of the Sassanid army.

Historical re-enactment of a Sassanid-era cataphract, complete with a full set of scale armor for the horse.

Historical re-enactment of a Sassanid-era cataphract, complete with a full set of scale armor for the horse. (GFDL)

As mentioned before, the cataphracts and the clibanarii were the cornerstone of the Sassanid army, the reason is that they were heavy. What made them heavy was the use of scale or plate armor. Both horse and rider were covered in an elaborate array of armor. This gave the horse and its rider full protection and provided the Sassanid forces with a shock element that could ride down, fleeing enemy forces or piercing through enemy formations thus breaking enemy cohesion into pieces and exposing them.

Horse archers also were pivotal in regards to mounted combat; they provided the heavy cavalry windows of opportunity. Horse archer’s main role was to not only fix an enemy unit or army but to lead them out in open pasture for annihilation by the heavy cavalry once exposed. Nevertheless, horse archers could also be considered psychological warfare, for once the arrows began to rain down the end never seemed to come and when doubt set in, either the enemy fled or its officers made irrational decisions that ultimately exposed the men, which led to certain death.

Cataphracts fighting Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD.

Cataphracts fighting Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD. (Public Domain)

An example of both heavy and light cavalry elements combined comes from the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE. This battle highlights the effective use of both heavy and light cavalries that the Sassanids were accustomed.

Elephants were also deployed upon the field of battle. The elephants the Sassanids used were from India. Every elephant was mounted with howdahs, which carried the armed men including the driver.

Elephant in Battle, Kota, Rajasthan, India circa 1750-70.

Elephant in Battle, Kota, Rajasthan, India circa 1750-70. (Public Domain)

A medieval Armenian miniature representing the Sasanian War elephants in the Battle of Vartanantz.

A medieval Armenian miniature representing the Sasanian War elephants in the Battle of Vartanantz. (Public Domain)

Another aspect that sometimes is easily forgotten, or overlooked, is the fact that elephants scare horses due to their smell. Horses that were not accustom to the beasts’ smell, became upset and restless with fear, causing panic among the ranks. This also prompted fear among the Roman ranks who had never encountered such an intimidating and powerful beast. In many ways, the Sassanid use of the elephant was a psychological shock weapon for both men and animals on the opposing side.

Infantry was the weak link to the Sassanid military structure and organization throughout their long history. The reason was due to the Sassanids being grounded in a cavalry based culture that was very much pastoral as well as agricultural. However, it is the pastoral way of life that controlled the Sassanid Empire and the way it fought. Nevertheless, we are not at a complete loss concerning the role of infantry in the Sassanid military apparatus.

The infantry, for the most part, was not what one would think as a traditional infantryman; frankly, they resembled nothing of an infantryman. The historian Procopius, describes the Sassanid infantry as being, “nothing more than a crowd of pitiful peasants who come into battle for no other purpose than to dig through walls and despoil the slain and in general to serve the other soldiers.” As for weapons, it seems that many had none at all, for Procopius states that the only thing between them and the enemy was, “enormous shields.” However, the Sassanid military did have an infantry unit that was effective and heavy, but not great in numbers. They were known as the Dailamites.

A Sasanian army helmet. “There were several different types of army helmet worn by Sassanian soldiers. This rare helmet likely resembled the tall headdresses (kulah) depicted on Sassanian portrait seals and dates to the 6th century AD.”

A Sasanian army helmet. “There were several different types of army helmet worn by Sassanian soldiers. This rare helmet likely resembled the tall headdresses (kulah) depicted on Sassanian portrait seals and dates to the 6th century AD.”  (Public Domain)

The Dailamites (or Daylamites) were a different breed of infantry warrior men. The Dailamites came from Northern Persia and were spoken highly about among the Romans. They were known for sword and dagger skills, but also carried a battle-axe, a two-pronged spear, and to top it all off, they also carried a rather large decorative shield. In addition, they were hardy and able to fight with the best of them—whomever or whatever was thrown their way. However, the only problem was they lacked numbers, as it seems that only four thousand were employed as the king’s elite guard.

A Daylamite mounted soldier.

A Daylamite mounted soldier. (Public Domain)

Foot archers were another highly prized infantry force among the Sassanid military. An officer known as a “Tribad” led foot archers. Foot archers could add to the already heavy volume of arrows being delivered by the horse archers. It was raining death on a massive scale, as the quantity of arrows would increase and come closer as the foot archers moved forward, showering the enemy with arrows. This tactic did not always work, but it seems to have been effective overall, offsetting the enemy formation on both the offensive and defensive. Nevertheless, foot archers are used for siege operations, as they were placed in the tops of towers to shower arrows down on the enemy protecting the walls and to protect the towers from any would-be saboteur.

Ardashir I was known as the Adashir the Unifier. It was his intelligence, energy, and talent for organization and strategy that enabled him to overthrow an empire and create another, forming a dynasty that would last four hundred years.

The Sasanian Empire at its greatest extent c. 632 CE (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Top Image: Deriv; Sassanid-era Cataphract Renactor (GFDL), and The Battle of Hormozdgan, April 28, 224 CE. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Al-Tabari. he Conquest of Iran: History of al-Tabari, Volume 14. Edited and translated by G. Rex Smith. Albany, New York: University of New York, 1994.

Bowman, Alan K, Peter Garnsey and Averial Cameron. The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 12: The Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Debevoise, Neilson Carel. A Political History of Parthia. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Dio Cocceianus, Cassius. Dio’s Roman History, trans. E Cary, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Dixon, Karen R., and Pat Southern. The Roman Cavalry: From the First to the Third Century AD. London: Batsford, 1992.

Erdkamp, Paul. A Companion to the Roman Army. Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2007.

Falk, Avner. A Psychoanalytic History of the Jews. Lewisburg, PA: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996.

Farrokh, Kaveh and Angus McBride. Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224-642 . Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005.

Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Herodian. Herodian, History of the Roman Empire since the Death of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Edward C. Echols. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.

Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. London: Duckworth, 2005.

Plutarch. The Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives. London: Penguin Classics, 1984.

Sheldon, Rose Mary. Rome’s Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand . London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010.

Sidnell, Phil. Warhorse: Cavalry in the Ancient World. London: Hambledon & London, 2007.

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Antony’s Parthian War: Politics and Bloodshed between Empires of the Ancient World

 

After the crushing defeat of Marcus Licinius Crassus and the Roman army at the Battle of Carrhae, a campaign was planned by Roman leaders such as statesman Julius Caesar and General Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) to drive east, conquer, and secure the Parthian Empire once and for all.

Mark Antony was a Roman politician and general, who was a member of the Second Triumvirate. Like Crassus, before, Antony was enticed by the riches of the Far East and the potential glory it could bring through military conquest. This became known as Antony’s Parthian War.

In 37 BC, Antony began preparations for war. His first act was a campaign to squash, replace, and consolidate many of the regions in Asia-Minor and along the Levant that was sympathetic to the republican cause or to Parthian rule. He made sweeping changes throughout the regions, establishing Darius in Pontus, Herod in Judea, Polemon in Cilicia, and Amyntas in Pisidia. However, these were just a fraction of the many changes that took place. Once his western flank was secure from possible rebellion, Antony set his eyes on Armenia.

Marcus Antonius (Antony).

Marcus Antonius (Antony). (Public Domain)

Blood and Treasure

Antony secured the various provinces in Asia-Minor under Roman hegemony, but he still had one basic issue stopping him from proceeding with his Parthian campaign: money. Antony was cash-strapped. Even those rulers Antony had established in Asia-Minor that were pro-Roman could offer little funding, for Asia was bankrupt.

In order to acquire the funds needed to pay for his grand expedition against Parthia, Antony turned to the age-old practice of debasement—lowering the value of coin by mixing the silver denarius with iron. But even this was not enough. Since taxation and inflation could not provide the funds Antony needed, his last option was borrowing.

Cleopatra greets Antony. She assists his war against Parthia.

Cleopatra greets Antony. She assists his war against Parthia. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

As he made his way towards Syria, he requested that Cleopatra, his love, and financier of war, to meet him in Antioch. Once Cleopatra reached Antioch, Antony exchanged provinces for money, particularly the provinces of “Phoenicia, Coele Syria, Cyprus, and a large part of Cilicia; and still further, the balsam-producing part of Judaea, and all that part of Arabia Nabataea which slopes toward the outer sea.”

Map of the troop movements during the first two years of the Roman–Parthian War of 58–63 AD over the Kingdom of Armenia, detailing the Roman offensive into Armenia.

Map of the troop movements during the first two years of the Roman–Parthian War of 58–63 AD over the Kingdom of Armenia, detailing the Roman offensive into Armenia. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

With Cleopatra’s financing and his territorial holdings stabilized, Antony began the process of assembling his massive juggernaut consisting of 60,000 Roman infantry, 10,000 Iberian and Celtic cavalry, and 30,000 troops comprised of other nations. This required a massive amount of resources needed to grease the wheels of the army. There should have been an additional 20,000 legionaries sent to Antony under a deal struck between him and Octavian at Tarentum but they never materialized. In total, Antony had 113,000 troops at his disposal, if not more— twice the size of Crassus’ invasion force of 53 BC—poised for immediate action.

However, this is where Antony got into trouble. The Roman forces that had mobilized for war were tired and needed to rest, especially the main body, the Roman infantry, which had just marched a thousand miles, not to mention that when they arrived it was the winter of 37-36 BC. Antony’s reason for starting the war before spring was his desire to be with Cleopatra. Once Antony and Cleopatra reached the Euphrates, he had to make a decision: take the path Crassus took, or head north and invade Media Atropatene, a Parthian client state, via Armenia.

Pushing into Parthia

Antony chose to head north towards Armenia. Once he made his decision, he sent Cleopatra back to Egypt. The reason for Antony’s choice is obvious. Phraates IV, ruler of the Parthian Empire had beefed up his defenses along the Euphrates and was watching Antony closely.

A coin face depicting King Phraates IV of Parthia. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. www.cngcoins.com

A coin face depicting King Phraates IV of Parthia. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. www.cngcoins.com /CC BY-SA 3.0)

With Cleopatra heading back to Egypt, Antony headed northward from Zeugma on the advice of King Artavasdes of Armenia.  The king’s forces of the ancient kingdom of Media Atropatene were with the Parthian forces guarding the Euphrates. Thus, if one desired to enter Parthia, then Media Atropatene was their brief blind spot—and it should be taken advantage of quickly. Moreover, Media Atropatene was rugged terrain, which would negate the use of cavalry, thus forcing the horse-proud Parthians and their allies into hand-to-hand combat with the Roman legionaries.

The coin of Artavasdes II, King of Media Atropatene.

The coin of Artavasdes II, King of Media Atropatene. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

As Antony made his way into Armenia, Artavasdes proudly displayed and offered Antony “6,000 thousand horses drawn up in battle array in full armor and 7,000 foot.”

Antony amassed a Roman juggernaut of thousands of Roman infantry, Iberian and Celtic cavalry, and tens of thousands of troops comprised of other nations.

Antony amassed a Roman juggernaut of thousands of Roman infantry, Iberian and Celtic cavalry, and tens of thousands of troops comprised of other nations. (CC BY-ND 2.0)

Informants among the Romans and those nearby watching the progress of their movements relayed the information to Phraates. Knowing that the Romans soon would enter the Parthian client state of Media Atropatene, Phraates sent a message to four hundred Parthian nobles to assemble their cavalry forces, which totaled 50,000, and prepare to forestall, frustrate, and divert, if not ultimately destroy, the Roman forces.

It’s a Trap

As the Roman forces moved towards Praaspa, the capital of Media Atropatene, they did so without hindrance. One would think Antony would grow suspicious, since he had not encountered the enemy during the long journey deep into enemy territory. But then again, he trusted his guides without question and never once considered that maybe he was walking into a trap. This is where Antony committed his second blunder. Growing impatient with the speed of his forces, he decided to divide his army.

Antony was growing tired of the sluggish pace. It was not his infantry or cavalry causing the slow movement, but the siege engines and baggage train. The reason for their slow movement went beyond being weighted down with supplies. Antony had led his army through the dense forests of Media Atropatene; it was easy for infantry and cavalry to maneuver through, but the large cumbersome wagons and siege engines on narrow roads required tree removal, which was a task unto itself.

Siege engines were large and cumbersome, and built heavily. They slowed the pace of an advancing army.

Siege engines were large and cumbersome, and built heavily. They slowed the pace of an advancing army. (Public Domain)

Antony had three hundred wagons to carry the siege engines, one of which was a battering ram eighty feet long. If the siege weapons were captured or destroyed, they could not be replaced in time, and even if they had time, the wood in the region was not sufficiently long or strong enough. On top of all that, the baggage train carried valuable supplies, such as food, weapons, clothes, officer’s tentage, and medical supplies. Overall, the baggage train was the lifeblood of the army.

Siege engines were employed by the Roman army during

Siege engines were employed by the Roman army during invasions. (Public Domain)

Antony decided to split his army in two; he took the bulk of the force, and placed the baggage and siege engines under the command of Brigadier General Oppius Statianus with a security force consisting of two legions. Once Antony detached himself from his burden, it was full steam ahead.

Seige on Praaspa

Antony was confident that he could take the city of Praaspa with ease. Once outside the city walls, the Romans quickly began the grueling task of building earth mounds in preparation for the arrival of siege equipment, particularly the towers. As the earth ramps moved closer to the walls, one can only imagine the carnage suffered by the Romans below. But as time passed, there was no sign of the siege equipment. With no siege equipment in sight, Antony gave the order to assault the walls; one can speculate that the Roman infantry was using makeshift ladders or other ineffective climbing devices. But the numbers of men participating in the assault were ineffective since the walls were strong and heavily defended. With no success in gaining a foothold on the walls, nor any siege engines in sight, Antony grew weary, impatient, and wanted to know why the delay.

Then Antony received terrible news: the baggage train under the command of Statianus had been attacked, the two legions assigned to escort the train had been slaughtered, and the siege equipment destroyed. Many men were taken prisoner including King Polemon of Pontus, who was later released on ransom. The person responsible for this was none other than King Phraates himself.

While Antony busied himself with the siege of Praaspa, the Parthians kept a close eye from afar on both the besiegers and the vital baggage train.  Once Antony’s forces were dug in, Phraates took advantage of the situation by sending in a large number of cavalry for a surprise attack. But when considering the dense forests of Media Atropatene, it is possible that the cavalry were aided by Median infantry. In some ways, the attack of Antony’s baggage train was similar to the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD, in which the Romans were moving through a dense German forest and not marching in combat formation, making them subject to devastating attack.

The Roman army was massacred in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD.

The Roman army was massacred in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD. (Public Domain)

The legions assigned to protect the baggage train under Statianus were not marching in combat formation since, in addition to providing security, they had to move wagons, and clear trees, dead brush, and the occasional rocks along the way. Also, notice there was no cavalry assigned to Statianus to scout ahead and keep a close eye on their surroundings nearby. It seems plausible that the Romans were attacked with a barrage of arrows, after which Median infantry charged in and cut the Romans to pieces.

Meantime, where was King Artavasdes of Armenia? Evidently, Artavasdes’ mission was to support the rear with Statianus. Plutarch mentions that Artavades left due to “despairing of the Roman cause.” Cassius Dio says that he responded to the “message sent to him by Statianus, to go to his assistance, was nevertheless too late, for he found nothing but corpses.” Both sources seem to be correct when placed in context.

Artavades did respond, and when he saw the number of corpses, burnt wagons, and the smell of death in the air, became distressed at all he had witnessed. Suspecting Antony’s forces had been annihilated, he reversed course and headed for home before his forces ended up the same way.

But even this account is lacking. Considering that Antony did not provide Statianus cavalry to scout out the area, one would think that it would have been Artavasdes’ duty to send out cavalry scouts and inform the legions escorting the baggage train of any oncoming enemy attacks, and to take part in the defense, if not a counterattack. It becomes evident that Artavasdes was nowhere near the legions escorting the baggage train and his retreat to Armenia looked as if he had betrayed Antony. If there was one person who could speak on behalf of this disaster, it would have been Polemon, king of Pontus; but his testimony remained silent.

Overextended and Undersupplied

With the siege engines destroyed, two legions massacred, and the food running low, Antony had to make quick decisions. Food was his top priority, but as if matters could not get any worse, the Parthians presently arrived in full battle array and challenged the Romans by first shouting insults. Antony understood that if he were to sit still, the Parthians would increase in number and harry his men with hit and run attacks. Antony quickly made a decision to go forage for food. He took “ten legions and three praetorian cohorts of men-at‑arms, together with all his cavalry.” But he had another motive, to get the Parthians to engage in a pitched battle.

After a day’s march, Antony set up camp, but soon he had to take it down, for scouts brought information that the Parthians were on the move. They knew where the camp was and were quickly moving in to envelop him. Once the Roman forces assembled, Antony gave the order to move out.

Antony sought to avoid battle, but made it clear that if the enemy came within range, the cavalry should charge out against them. The Parthians did come within range and the Roman cavalry quickly scattered them. After seeing the success of the cavalry, the Roman infantry joined the charge and frightened the Parthian horses by yelling and clashing their weapons against their shields, causing them to flee.

Antony quickly took advantage of the situation and pursued the enemy. However, it was all for nothing. The infantry and cavalry were exhausted, they could not keep up with Parthian cavalry, and, to make matters worse, they had nothing of substance to show they had been victorious. Their great efforts produced 80 dead and 30 captured. The Romans were beside themselves after losing 10,000 men along with their baggage train and siege engines, when compared to this measly victory, if one could call it that. But in fact, it was not a battle or a victory. Rather, the Parthians were testing the waters by conducting guerilla hit and run attacks, tactics that the Romans had a hard time understanding when facing the Parthians.

The next day, Antony gave the order to head back to Praaspa. While on the move, the Romans encountered a few enemy forces, but as they continued on, their encounters with the Parthians increased until the whole body showed up, challenging them, and attacking from all directions. Antony kept moving to avoid disaster. Eventually the Romans made it safely back to Praaspa. The Parthian forces that attacked Antony were conducting hit and run attacks, for their goal was not to destroy the Roman forces, but rather to demoralize them. In other words, they were tenderizing the Roman forces before commitment to full-scale attack later.

Relief of Parthian horseman, a highly skilled warrior, performing a Parthian shot.

Relief of Parthian horseman, a highly skilled warrior, performing a Parthian shot. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Once Antony made it back to the siege at Praaspa, he received startling news. While he was away, the Median defenders were able to successfully attack the Roman besiegers, dislodging them from their positions and safely returning behind the walls of the city. This went on for some time. Antony, enraged by the lack of discipline due to his men not standing their ground, decided to take a disciplinary measure known as “decimation,” in which one of every ten soldiers were executed. As for the rest of the besiegers, their punishment was that they would receive rations of barley instead of wheat. But with food running low and Roman foraging parties bringing back more dead and wounded than food, Antony had to do something quick if he wanted his army to survive.

The situation was desperate for the Roman army.

The situation was desperate for the Romn army. (CC BY 2.0)

Phraates felt the same way about his own forces. Summer was gone, the air was getting colder, and he, like Antony, did not want to encamp for the winter. Unlike Antony, he was afraid that many of his men would desert due to the winter distress.

As the siege continued, some Parthians who admired the Romans for their bravery and strong will, were able to ride up next to the Roman cavalry, where they would talk of peace and explain to them that Antony was a fool if he were to stay.

Phraates offered to escort them out of Parthian territory peacefully. The king wanted to end this stagnated war before winter arrived.

The Beginning of the End

Antony received the news and considered their proposal: that if the Romans agreed to Phraates’ kind gesture of escorting them out of Parthian lands peacefully, the king would hold his word. Antony agreed and sent an envoy to meet with Phraates.

When they arrived, the king was “seated upon a golden chair and twanging his bowstring.” The Romans agreed to peace, but delivered their own terms. Phraates must return the Roman standards they had in their possession if he desired peace. Of course, Phraates objected to this and assured Antony of a safe escort home. Antony thought long and hard over this, but he had no other option. The walls of Praaspa were too strong, he had no siege equipment, food was running extremely low, and any attempt to search for a meal resulted in death. If starvation did not kill you, the winter surely would. The Roman general made the decision to leave. This was not easy for Antony and it was hard for him to explain this to the men, so he had Domitius Ahenobarbus deliver the speech. Antony felt like a failure in this great endeavor, but even he understood that it was best to fail while alive and the majority of his men intact than end up like Crassus at Carrhae.

If the debacle at Praaspa was not enough, the retreat was far worse. Antony lost many thousands more men on the long retreat home due to enemy harassment, cold weather, toxic plants, and poisonous water. Antony, like many of his men, could not wait to see the Araxes River, which served as the border between Roman friendly Armenia and the Parthian client state of Media Atropatene. The nightmare was over once they crossed, but the war between the two powers would continue.

Featured image: Deriv; face mask for Roman cavalry helmet, first century AD (CC BY-SA 2.0) and battle scene featuring Parthian horsemen in armor, and Roman riders. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Appian. Appian’s Roman History, trans. Horace White, 4 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Debevoise, Neilson Carel. A Political History of Parthia. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Dio Cocceianus, Cassius. Dio’s Roman History, trans. E Cary, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Graham, Daryn. Rome and Parthia: Power, Politics, and Profit . North Charleston, South Carolina: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013.

Josephus, Flavius. The Complete Works of Josephus, trans. William Whiston. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 1990.

Justinus, Marcus Janianus. Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Trans. John Selby Watson. London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Convent Garden, 1853.

Paterculus, Velleius. The Roman History, trans. Frederick W. Shipley. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press , 1961.

Pliny, H. Rackham, W. H. S. Jones, and D.E. Eichholz. The Natural History. London: Folio Society, 2011.

Plutarch. Moralia. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Scott, Beth F. James C. Rainey, and Andrew W. Hunt. The Logistics of War . Maxwell AFB, Gunter Annex, Ala: AF Logistics Management Agency, 2000.

Velleius Paterculus, Roman History, 2.82.

Dio 49, 25; Neilson Carel Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 126.

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The Battle of Jaxartes (329 BCE)

 

 

In what is said to be Alexander the Great’s most spectacular battle, the Macedonian king tested their most daring tactics against the fierce Central-Asian mounted Scythian nomads on the banks of the Jaxartes River.

Before charging into the battle, a little geography would not hurt. The Jaxartes River, what is known today as the Syr Darya, originates in the Tian Shan Mountains in Kyrgyzstan and eastern Uzbekistan. The river flows for 2,212 kilometers (1,374 miles) west and northwest through Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan to the remains of the Aral Sea.

Sunset over Sir-Darya river, Kazakhstan.

Sunset over Sir-Darya river, Kazakhstan. In Ancient Greek river is called Yaxartes (Ἰαξάρτης). (Petar Milošević /CC BY-SA 3.0)

Map of the Syr Darya Basin watershed, of the Syr Darya and Chu Rivers in Central Asia.

Map of the Syr Darya Basin watershed, of the Syr Darya and Chu Rivers in Central Asia. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

The battle of Jaxartes was a result of an earlier rebellion between the Scythians and the Macedonians.

A man named Spitamenes instigated the cause that would lead up to the battle. Spitamenes was famous for his capture of Bessus, in which he put him in chains and left him for Alexander, resulting in Spitamenes becoming the invisible tribal leader among the Sogdiana, an ancient civilization of Iranian people.

The Punishment of Bessus, by Andre Castaigne

The Punishment of Bessus, by Andre Castaigne (Public Domain)

Alexander had targeted Cyropolis in 329 BC in his conquest of Sogdiana.

Beginning with Cyropolis

Spitamenes, now Sogdian warlord, skillfully planned a rebellion of which not even Alexander had a clue. Spitamenes attacked Alexander’s rear, disabling the fortification system on the frontier starting with Cyropolis.

Silk road figure head, thought to be Sogdian.

Silk road figure head, thought to be Sogdian. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Sogdians, depicted on a Chinese Sogdian sarcophagus of the Northern Qi era.

Sogdians, depicted on a Chinese Sogdian sarcophagus of the Northern Qi era. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Spitamenes’ men caught them by surprise, storming the fort and taking no mercy. Spitamenes also garrisoned these fortresses with his own men afterwards. Once word reached Alexander, it must have been a total shock to him, as he was busy building the new city of Alexandria Eschate.

Sogdiana and Alexandria Eschate, in the north of the map.

Sogdiana and Alexandria Eschate, in the north of the map. (Public Domain)

Alexander quickly assembled his men for battle and sent them to the nearest fortress called Gaza. From Gaza, Alexander and his forces captured four fortresses in two days, killing the inhabitants inside. Next, Alexander turned his forces to Cyropolis.

Out of all the forts, Cyropolis was the hardest to take.

Alexander’s plans to march further east were now on hold due to the rebellion. Alexander could not leave with tension existing in his empire. So, Alexander went on a policy of terror as he did at Thebes, but this did not seem to faze the Sogdians, and in doing so, prompted the mighty nomadic confederation of Massagetae to assemble with many horse archers on the right side of Jaxartes River, waiting to invade if the Macedonians failed in stamping out the revolt.

The rebellion became so serious that news came to Alexander that Spitamenes had besieged Maracanda. Alexander quickly sent forces to lift the siege under the command of Pharnuches, who was a diplomat and not a soldier. Once Pharnuches made it to the outskirts of the city, he engaged the enemy and was teased by the Scythians to follow them into the desert.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC. (Public Domain)

Once in the middle of nowhere, Spitamenes and his Sogdiana Scythian nomads enveloped them from all sides. Pharnuches ordered his forces to form a square formation, leaving the center empty during the battle. The Macedonian forces fought well during the battle, but needed to withdraw quickly, and once they spotted the river Polytimetus to cross for safety, they made a mad dash for it. This very act of breaking rank and battle formation is a mistake when fighting the Scythians, for once the Macedonian forces exposed themselves by breaking rank, the heavier Scythian cavalry mowed them down and totally annihilated them.

This would prove to be the worst disaster that any of Alexander forces would ever face in battle. Alexander knew he would have to react quickly in order to put down the rebellion by defeating those responsible with a show of force.

The Men of War

When it came to the size and composition of both military forces, the estimations are relatively unknown. As far as technology, there is no exact information regarding what was used at the battle, but due to the circumstances of the time and what we do know regarding the Macedonian army Alexander led, we have only to look at the main army Alexander brought with him.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon. (Public Domain)

What history books tell us is that Alexander had a mix of Macedonian infantry and cavalry along with Thessalian and Thracian cavalry. In addition, Alexander required the Greek states to provide additional cavalry and infantry alongside his main forces when he invaded Asia. However, we should consider that by the time Alexander’s forces had made it up to this point in history, those men that accompanied him from Macedonia into Persia, and right before the battle of Jaxartes, were not the vast majority, but rather a mix of forces and foreigners in his ranks. Thus, to get an idea of what units partook in the battle is unknown, but assumptions can be made.

The Scythians on the other hand, were pure cavalry, carrying the bow and arrow. They may have had some heavy cavalry among their ranks, but it is doubtful. Rather, we can gather that the Scythians were mainly light cavalry archers since there are no descriptions of heavy cavalry mentioned.

As for military doctrine and training, Alexander the Great learned warfare, tactics, and strategy from his father Philip. Before Alexander became king, he had already experienced battles beforehand as the commander of Philips left wing, such as at the battle of Chaeronea. Alexander was a practitioner of his father’s style of organized warfare, which was called the hammer and anvil tactic. The Macedonian phalanx served as the anvil while the cavalry served as the hammer.

Alexander the Great liked to charge head on with his men but always kept a close eye on the situation. His leadership skills were numerous due to the many detailed battles provided in historical chronicles. Alexander was a leader who led his men into battle, charging in head-first at every chance he got. He led by example and bore the scars to prove it. He desired not to sit in the back of his army and shot out orders like a manager. He was a natural leader, with a natural gift. Not many leaders in the annals of war have ever had such a gift as had by Alexander.

As for the Scythian leader Satraces, there is nothing known about him other than by name for being at the battle. Leadership is crucial under such circumstances, but in this case, there is virtually nothing known about Satraces leadership ability. As for skills, he was a true Scythian tactician, wherein swarming and deception was the game. One only knows this due to the battle description provided.

From the info gathered before the battle, Alexander had no choice but to cross the Jaxartes River and engage the Scythians. If he did not, the situation could have gotten out of hand and the number of Scythians may have started to grow. Alexander only had one choice and that was to attack them and win. If he lost, it might have cost him his empire or at least part of it. These Scythians were most likely paid by Spitamenes to harass and engage Alexander. Alexander had no choice but to deal with the enemy.

Feasts and Fights

The opening moves before the battle were actually feasting. Once Alexander founded a new city-fort named after him, he held an elaborate feast with a sacrifice to the gods and even held a gymnastic contest. Alexander was having a merry ole’ time.

But while feasting and having a luxurious time with his men, Scythians on the far side of the bank of the River Jaxartes began to shout insults at Alexander and his men. Alexander knew that if he ignored this and allowed it to continue, the numbers of these men might swell and become too big to handle. Alexander stopped the party and began planning.

Alexander was in no mood for combat, but rather relaxation and celebration. He was still recovering from a leg wound he received from an earlier battle, and the bone splinters were making their way out of Alexander’s leg. Alexander had no choice but to send in his advance cavalry. However, in order to do this, he needed to establish a beachhead first to protect his forces that would be crossing.

The Hammer and Anvil

He moved his artillery to the bank of the river and began to shower the Scythians with projectiles—one of the projectiles said to have killed the Scythian chief Satraces or their champion warrior, nevertheless, it remains unknown, but the outcome seems to have not rattled the Scythians knees.

The artillery Alexander placed on the bank of river worked well for its intended use, which was to push the Scythians back, allowing the Macedonian forces to cross the river safely. Once the river was safe to cross, Alexander sent in a portion of cavalry first. However, some think that the use of cavalry was a military blunder that turned in his favor.

Battle between the Scythians and their enemies.

Battle between the Scythians and their enemies. (Public Domain)

Stephen Tanner, who wrote the popular book, “Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban Insurgency” argues that the Macedonian element (cavalry) advanced to quickly and was surrounded by the Scythians. However, it seems Alexander may have done this intentionally. The tactician knew better than to just send in an attack force for the slaughter. He knew he had to bait the Scythians, for if he did not, the Scythians would play a cat and mouse game of reverse attrition. In other words, the Scythians would lose few while the bigger forces would lose many!

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander crossing river. Battle movement images by Stephen Smith.

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander crossing river. Battle movement images by Stephen Smith. (Creative Commons)

As the advance Macedonian cavalry came closer into contact with the Scythians, the Scythians broke themselves up into units and quickly moved into position surrounding the enemy from afar. Each unit began to form a circle and rode around like they were in a race, chasing each other’s tails. This was like how a hurricane is perceived; it is a deadly circle that rotates about, spewing forth projectiles. The high winds represent the bow and whatever the winds spit out are the arrows.

With the advanced Macedonian cavalry now surrounded by many Scythian cavalry circles showering them down with arrows, Alexander began to advance with the rest of his force. Alexander knew that by sending in a small cavalry force as bait, the Scythians would quickly go after it. What the Scythians did not expect was what was coming next.

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander luring Scythians to battle.

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander luring Scythians to battle. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Alexander then gave the orders for his light infantry to advance towards the Scythian cavalry in front of Alexander. Now, as the light infantry advanced towards the Scythians, Alexander than gave the order for a second part of his cavalry to block any flanking attempt by the Scythian horse archers. Once the pieces were in place, half of the Scythian cavalry found themselves surrounded. Alexander then gave the order to his heavy cavalry to charge at the surrounded Scythian horse archers. The heavy cavalry shot through the gaps between his light infantry and anti-flanking cavalry and plunged right into the Scythian ranks, thus allowing the advance cavalry unit that was sent in as bait to now focus on the Scythians that found themselves surrounded. This allowed Alexander’s anti-flanking cavalry to ward off the remaining Scythian cavalry, thus allowing the light infantry men to advance in quickly in order to dislodge any enemy combatants on horseback. Overall, it was a brilliant maneuver on Alexander behalf.

The Battle of Jaxartes – Alexander traps the nomadic Scythian cavalry.

The Battle of Jaxartes – Alexander traps the nomadic Scythian cavalry. (Creative Commons)

The outcome of the battle was a Macedonian victory through Alexander’s brilliance. As for deaths, the Macedonians only killed a small number, roughly around 1,000 with another 150 captured. The main part of the Scythian cavalry force escaped capture. It was a small battle that produced a new tactic for consideration when facing the Scythians.

The Economy of Force

Assessing the significance of the actions and the lessons learned from the battle of Jaxartes is one-sided. The Scythians deceived themselves with over confidence. They figured that this foreign element was no different than what they had encountered before, thus making themselves one-dimensional. As for Alexander, he quickly looked at the situation, understood what he was facing, and quickly executed his objective with precision.

In order for Alexander to accomplish this, he had confidence in his men and captains, and his men, in turn, showed faith in him and his battle plan. In other words, when it came to the economy of force, every Macedonian was responsible for the other. Because of this, Alexander placed his men in areas that they would be effective against the enemy and allowed his captains and men to build on their effectiveness.

Alexander won many battles before Jaxartes using the hammer and anvil tactic made so famous by the Macedonians. However, the traditional Macedonian way of war came to a standstill when confronting the Scythians and this demonstrated not only their strength but also their weakness. Nevertheless, the strength and simplicity of these tactics are obvious; adapt to your enemy’s method and incorporate some of your own—innovate!

Alexander knew that if he were stay with the same old tactical method it would kill him in the end. Alexander also felt that he and his men were in an ‘unholy land’ and had to fight in ‘unholy ways’ in order to achieve victory.

As for the Scythians, their form of guerrilla-like warfare has gone unnoticed for thousands of years, but every so often hordes (camps) from the east have pushed successfully west. Nevertheless, the methods of these steppe peoples are very unorthodox, innovative, and asymmetrical. They fight without touching you and deceive you without notice. However, the Scythians could have given Alexander a bigger hassle, but they did not. And in turn, Alexander knew that it was best to beat them and leave them alone. Alexander the Great did not want or need the weight of Central Asia pouring down on him like lava from a volcano; it was not worth it. The Scythians would have loved if Alexander had marched into the open fields of Central Asia—but Alexander knew better.

Featured image: Another of Alexander’s important battles – The battle of Issos between Alexander the Great and Darius of Persia. Representative image only (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Arthur Preston, Richard. Roland, Alex. Wise S. F. Men in Arms: A history of warfare and its interrelationships with Western society. Orlando: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1991.

Edwards, Sean J.A. Swarming On The Battlefield: Past, Present, And Future. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000.

Ferrill, Arther. The Origins of war: From the Stone age to Alexander the Great. Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.

Fuller, John Frederick Charles. The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004.

Heckel, Waldemar. Who’s who in the age of Alexander the Great: prosopography of Alexander’s empire. Maiden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.

Sekunda, Nick, and John Warry. Alexander the Great: His Armies and Campaigns 334-323 BC. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1998.

Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Taliban Insurgency. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2009.

Ward, Steven R. Immortal: a military history of Iran and its armed forces. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.

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The Iron Army: Assyria – Deadly and Effective Siege Machine – Part II

 

 

While the ram attempted to smash and loosen the rocky walls, Assyrian assault teams with scaling ladders would try to breach walls. The ram, while effective, was also vulnerable to enemy defenders dropping chains to pull the battering pole aside. Because of this issue, the Assyrians deployed men who counter this by hooking the chains with iron grapples. The prophet Joel gives a description of the Assyrian wall scaling:

“They rush upon the city;
they run along the wall.
They climb into the houses;
like thieves they enter through the windows.”

[Read Part I]

Joel’s description is quite accurate. Besides reliance on battering rams to bring down the walls, they also looked to sappers.

Undermining Fortifications

Assyrian sappers (soldiers for building, demolitions, general construction) would approach the walls possibly under the cover of shield bears, the same type that protected the archers one could suspect. If they had no such protection, the Assyrian king made sure his specialized troop had the armor needed to get the job done. The sapper, particularly during the rule of Ashurnasirpal (883-859 BCE), were heavily armored and wore long padded mailed coverings along with a conical helmet with mail protecting the face and neck.  Once at the walls, they would aid in helping the battering rams dislodge blocks from the wall with special flat-topped crowbars, pick axes, hoes, and drills. If the sappers could not get near the walls, they tunneled under them and prop it up with wooden supports until the hole was rather large and deep, after which they would set fire to the structure causing the foundation to weaken and collapse.

While the battering ram was effective, the Assyrians had a backup plan usually underway during the siege to aid the army if the rams failed to dislodge the walls, and that was siege towers. As these siege towers are pushed forward, archers would accompany them with the duty to pick off any enemy foe threatening to toss an incendiary weapon at the tower. Furthermore, the Assyrians placed hoses on the tower from which water poured over the leather sheets covering the wooden structure to prevent the tower from catching fire. If the water hoses failed and fire did catch, a man holding a large ladle with would extinguish the flames the best he could.

Siege Tower on the Lachish, Relief in the British Museum.

Siege Tower on the Lachish, Relief in the British Museum. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

If the battering rams breached the walls, the Assyrian infantry behind the rams would pour through the hole under the cover of their archers and slingers. The Assyrian infantry were heavy spearmen armed with long, double-bladed spears, straight swords for close combat and they carried a small shield. The armor worn by the infantryman was a conical helmet, a knee-length coat of iron mail which was lined with wool to absorb the blows from weapons and allowed heat to dissipate. To protect his legs, he wore knee-high leather boots that had iron plates attached to the shins.

Heavy-armed archers in action. Assyrian, about 700-692 BC. From Nineveh, South-West Palace. These archers, the front one of whom is beardless, possibly an enuch, are each accompanied by a soldier whose duty it is to hold the tall shield in position and guard against any enemies who come too close.

Heavy-armed archers in action. Assyrian, about 700-692 BC. From Nineveh, South-West Palace. These archers, the front one of whom is beardless, possibly an enuch, are each accompanied by a soldier whose duty it is to hold the tall shield in position and guard against any enemies who come too close. (Mike Peel www.mikepeel.net/CC BY-SA 4.0)

Plunder and Refugees

Inside the city, the Assyrian infantry would slash and plunder their way through. Once the slaughter and pillaging were over, those still alive (as at Samaria, which was sacked in 721 BCE), would feed the deported refugees during the journey back into Assyria, while also being treated by physicians to keep hygiene up and disease out. Furthermore, the Assyrians provided footwear if needed, along with carts for the longer journeys for women and children. Families were not separated for the most part. The Assyrians wanted to keep the families and communities together, as well as their national identity. Assyria was not a melting pot of nations. The Assyrians wanted to preserve the identity of the deportees for social and military strength and to lessen the possible acts of rebellion.

Judean people being deported into exile after the capture of Lachish. his relief depicts a man, 2 women, and 2 (male and female) children being deported with their household belongings.

Judean people being deported into exile after the capture of Lachish. his relief depicts a man, 2 women, and 2 (male and female) children being deported with their household belongings. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

After the people had been gathered and exported, the Assyrians, like a swarm of army ants, took the captured fortified cities, or even a villages, and would destroy and take everything. Trees that were in or around the city or village were usually cut down and the timber taken back as spoils of war. Trees such as date palms were stripped naked and then cut down, leaving only the stump behind so they could not grow again. Other trees would be uprooted and replanted back in Assyria. Farmlands also did not escape Assyrian plunder, for they too were likely stripped bare leaving the farmland as it was before planting. When Tiglath-pileser conquered most of Syria and Lebanon, he took many of the trees for his palace and as tribute:

With the keen understanding and grasp of intellect with which the Master of the gods, the prince Nudimmut (Ea) endowed me, a palace of cedar… and a portico (bit hilanni) patterned after a Hittite (Syrian) palace, for my enjoyment, I built in Kalal (Kahi).”

A palace of cedar “Their (the palaces) doorways, of ivory, maple box-wood, mulberry, cedar… juniper, tribute of the Hittitte kings of the princes of the Aramaeans and of Chaldea, which I brought in submission to my feet through my valorous heroism. I made and I richly adorned them with tall cedar beams, whose fragrance is as good as that of the cypress tree, products of Amanus, Lebanon, and Ammanana (Anti – Lebanon) … The doorleaves of cedar and cypress, which give unbounded joy to the one entering them (and) whose odor penetrates to the heart, I bound with a sheathing of shining zahalu and (sariru) and hung (them) in the door-(ways).

People’s valuables were taken as well, apart from the things the captives needed in their day-to-day life. Even the temples’ valuables such as gold or silver were stripped. Idols in these temples were transported back to Assyria and paraded as weak gods of the conquered host; they could not compete with the gods that favored Assyria.

Once the refugees made it into the Assyrian homeland, they were sent to deportee camps before being sent to the region assigned to them. This was almost like a debriefing center. To give an example, one could look to Sargon II and the place of Dur-Sharrukin:

Peoples of the four quarters, of strange tongues and different speech, dwelling in mountains and plains…. I took as spoil at the word of Ashur my lord. I made of them one purpose, I made them take up abode therein [i.e., inside Dur-Sharrukin]. I sent natives of Assyria, competent in everything, as overseers and supervisors, to instruct them in custom and to serve the gods and the king.

After the Assyrians settled the captives in their assigned regions, the Assyrian monarch would make them feel welcome and comfortable. This was to keep any attempt of rebellion down. As the Assyrian monarch took the role as spokesman for the gods, it was his duty to accept all nations and to keep the peace within the Assyrian empire. Bustenay Oded writes well when referring to the role of the deported once they had been settled:

“..the exiled communities played a role very similar to that of the Assyrian garrisons stationed in all parts of the Assyrian empire, or to that of Assyrian citizens who were settled in conquered countries either as city dwellers, farmers, or officials. This explains the favorable treatment the deportees generally enjoyed, and the great concern shown by the Assyrian rulers for their welfare.”

After a long siege, the city of Lachish surrendered and the Assyrian army entered the city. King Sennacherib sits on his royal chair, surrounded by attendants and greets a high-ranking official. The king reviews Judean prisoners.

After a long siege, the city of Lachish surrendered and the Assyrian army entered the city. King Sennacherib sits on his royal chair, surrounded by attendants and greets a high-ranking official. The king reviews Judean prisoners. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

In conclusion, the Assyrians were indeed the first iron army but more important than that, was the fact that they were in many ways the first professionalized fighting force that integrated and effectively used command and control along with the combined arms (conventional and specialized) apparatus to their advantage long before anyone else. While this new professional army had its way with its neighbors, they too would succumb to those seeking to make a name in the wild near east. However, unlike those who would come after, only a few could match the Assyrian fighting force in name and merit when it came to war machine known as Assyria.

Top Image: Assyrian relief of a horseman from Nimrud, now in the British Museum (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Archer, Christon I. World History of Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Campbell, Duncan B. Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World. Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2005.

David, Richard, Barnett and Margarete Falkner. The sculptures of Aššur-nasir-apli II, 883-859 B.C., Tiglath-pileser III, 745-727 B.C. [and] Esarhaddon, 681-669 B.C., from the central and south-west palaces at Nimrud. (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1962.

Eadie, John W., “The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1/2 (1967), 161-173.

Fagan, Garrett G., and Matthew Trundle. New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Gabriel, Richard A. Great Captains of Antiquity. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.

Soldiers’ Lives through History – The Ancient World. Westport, Conn:    Greenwood Press, 2006.

Healy, Mark, and Angus McBride. The Ancient Assyrians. London: Osprey, 1991.

Kern, Paul Bentley. Ancient Siege Warfare. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Nosov, K., and V. Golubev. Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons: A Fully Illustrated Guide to Siege Weapons and Tactics. Guilford, Conn: Lyons Press, 2005.

Oded, Bustenay. Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1979.

Rawlinson, George, Ancient Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World Vol I, (New York: Lovell, Coryell & CO, 1881.

Roberts, Janet “Centering the World”: Trees as Tribute in the Ancient Near East.” Transoxiana Journal Libre de Estudios Orientales.http://www.transoxiana.com.ar/11/roberts-near_east_trees.html (accessed August 11, 2016, 2011).

Saggs, H. W. F. The Might That Was Assyria. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.

Vuksic, V. & Z. Grbasic, Cavalry: The History of a Fighting Elite, (London: Cassell, 1993

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The Iron Army: Assyria – Terrifying Military of the Ancient World – Part I

 

 

Before the famed Persian Empire, whose borders spanned from India to Thrace, there was another empire—the Assyrians. The Assyrian Empire, while much smaller than the future Persian Empire to come, made up for its lack of territorial mass with a well-greased, organized fighting machine.

In the book of Nahum 3:1, the prophet Nahum made it clear that Assyria was a “city of blood, full of lies, full of plunder, never without victims! The crack of whips, the clatter of wheels, galloping horses and jolting chariots! Charging cavalry, flashing swords and glittering spears!”

What made the Assyrian Empire one of the most terrifying militaries in the ancient world was that they were organized, well led, well fed, well supplied, and had the tools to crack into just about any city they so desired. When it comes to warfare, sieges dominate the vast array of Assyrian reliefs. The siege we will focus on is that of Lachish in 701 BCE.

In order to understand how the Neo-Assyrian military organization functioned one must first focus on the head of the army, the king. From there, we can gather the role of the nobility in military affairs and finally those who formed the bulk of the army.

King: Despotic Commander in Chief

Sargon II and dignitary. Palace of Sargon II at Dur Sharrukin in Assyria (now Khorsabad in Iraq), c. 716–713 BC. (Public Domain)

The Assyrian king wasn’t just directly involved with state affairs on all levels; he was the state. Every aspect of state affairs, whether international, political, military, and religious, was directly linked to him. The king was absolute, but even he had limitations. The Assyrian king, unlike the pharaoh of Egypt, was not divine but despotic. He was a mediator between the gods and his subjects through his ritual purification by both divine and human attendants. Besides the day-to-day domestic and foreign affairs dealt with by the king, he was commander and chief of the Assyrian army. Middle Assyrian inscriptions attest to this, as the Assyrian king on his coronation would swear an oath that they would lead their armies, in person, on annual campaigns of conquest to extend their borders. Even though he was the head of his army, he was a figurehead to a certain degree, for his military duties were diffused and delegated to lesser officials.

Turtānu: Leader of Armies

This lesser official, who would lead armies, was the turtanu. The turtanu was second in military command right under the king. While the king was in fact the commander in chief of the army, the real responsibility executing his majesty’s orders lay in the hands of the turtanu. Assyrian kings did participate in campaigns but when unable, the turtanu was firmly in charge. Eventually either Tiglath-Pileser III or Sargon II reorganized the office of the turtanu. In the past, one man held the position. However, this changed. Instead of having one man take charge of the military forces there was be two. One man was in charge “of the left” and the other “of the right.” While not definitive in all cases, the post of the turtanu were assigned to eunuchs. The reason for this was to limit power by ensuring that the man in charge could not pass his office down to his son through inheritance, which in turn limited the power of the office and avoided the possibility of a coup.

Army Organization and Officers

Information on the military organization of the Assyrian army is fragmented and murky. But a word of caution before proceeding: what is about to be presented is based on what is known and what can be considered from what information survives.

The Assyrians do provide some history concerning the framework of their military apparatus. During the eighth century BCE the Assyrian king could mobilize a force of between 150,000-200,000 men and in extreme cases, 1,000,000. This seems a bit farfetched but was not impossible. In times of war, the Assyrians could field between 20,000-50,000 troops, which would be the equivalent of two or five modern American divisions. Each division consisted of 120 officers. Therefore, two divisions would consist of 240 officers while five divisions consisted roughly of 416 officers. When further broken down, a squad of ten men was under the control of a noncommissioned officer. Five or twenty squads were formed into a “company” (kirsu) under the command of a “captain” (rab kisri or rab hanle). The amount of men in an Assyrian company probably was made up of five squads totaling 250 men and would take at least four of them to form a battalion. A regiment possibly consisted of and three battalions totaling 3,000 men, which seems possible based on the Urartian system, similar to that of Assyria, and it was under the command of a prefect, or what would be today the equivalent of a modern colonel. As for the size of an Assyrian division, it would seem possible that one division consisted of three if not more regiments.

By the time of Sargon, they had become a truly iron army. Sargon reorganized and integrated the fighting force, starting with the conventional units such as infantry, chariots, cavalry, and siege machinery. Next were specialized units to aid support to the conventional, such as scouts, engineers, intelligence officers, and sappers (soldiers for building, demolitions, general construction). To support and supply such an army with the amount of iron needed, Sargon constructed a single weapons room called Dur-Sharrukin (Fort Sargon) which contained 200 tons of weapons and body armor.

Plan of Dur-Sharrukin, 1867.  Victor Place excavated Khorsabad (Iraq) from 1852 to 1855. The Palace of Sargon is represented at North East. (Public Domain)

Reconstructed model of Palace of Sargon at Khorsabad, 1905. (Public Domain)

Soldiers and Engines of War

The Assyrian military consisted of four main units: cavalry, charioteers, infantry, and archers.

When it came to mobility, the Assyrians relied on charioteers like most Near Eastern nations. However, during the reign of Ashurbanipal II in the ninth century BCE, reliefs depict the Assyrians as already having cavalry but in small numbers; they were light by standard and their only function was to ward off other horse archer units during an engagement. What the Assyrians did to combat this was to take regular foot archers and place them on horseback. The Assyrians now had their own version of a horse archer, but the problem was they wore little or no armor. This made the Assyrian horse archer vulnerable to attacks from other horse archers better armored and trained in the rudiments of archery from horseback.

Ashurbanipal II meets a high official after a successful battle.

Ashurbanipal II meets a high official after a successful battle. (Public Domain)

Tiglath-pileser III took note of what is already in use pertaining to his own force and admired what could be adopted and improved upon into his own cavalry units. Tiglath-pileser invested in developing better cavalry units whereas their enemies later on (such as the Cimmerians and Scythians) continued to evolve into much better fighting forces that adapted to the natural conditions and to the conduct of their enemies— in other words, to improvise, adapt, overcome.

After conquering a portion of western Media, Tiglath-pileser incorporated Median cavalry into his own army and from then on, effectively changed the nature of the Assyrian cavalry from charioteer teams to mounted warriors armed with bow and spear. The days of the chariot as master of the battlefield were nearing an end but were not yet over. Over time, the Assyrian army had three types of cavalry. The first type was light cavalry, which consisted of Medes and other nomads who were quick and who primarily used the bow and javelin. Next were the Assyrian heavy archers. This unit consisted of men in heavy scale body armor. Finally, the heavy cavalrymen were fully armored and designed for fighting heavy infantry. However, the Assyrian use of heavy cavalry for shock is uncertain. Cavalry under Tiglath-pileser III on through to Sargon II seem to be primarily skirmishers. There is, however, cavalry depicted during the time of Sargon II on reliefs which are shown to be carrying spears and charging into battle, which may suggest the evolution of the Assyrian shock cavalry was well underway. Tiglath-pileser III and his successors loved the new cavalry so much that they replaced most of the chariot units with elite cavalry units over time. To put this into perspective, the king, his nobles, and the warrior elite were the only ones permitted to use the chariot.

Assyrian artwork from ninth century BC at British Museum. (CC BY 2.0)

Assyrian infantry can be divided into three types: spearmen, archers, and slingers. Spearmen were well armored and are the foundation of the Assyrian army. Their primary function was to provide defense and offense. When on the defensive it was the spearmen’s job to support the skirmishing and cavalry units, to maneuver around them and find targets that could be softened up, which would take pressure off the lines and allow the infantry to go on the offensive. These Spearmen were armed with a shield, spear, and a dagger or short sword.

Assyrian Soldier with Standing Shield, Soldier with Small Shield, Archer. (Public Domain)

Archers were also well armored and used a recurve bow. In some reliefs, Assyrian archers are accompanied by a shield bearer who provided protection as the archer discharged his arrow. Archers in battle were usually placed in front of the heavy infantry ranks to shower arrows down upon the enemy before retreating behind the spearmen once the enemy was too close for comfort. Assyrian archers in the reliefs also appear to be wearing short swords as well.

Another skirmishing unit utilized to harass the enemy was slingers. Slingers, as their name applies, slung well-rounded rocks at the enemy. While the distance was not as great as an archer, the power generated upon release caused tremendous damage as it was meant to crush, unlike the arrow, which was used to pierce. Slingers, like archers, would be out in front of the spearmen harassing the enemy infantry or, engaging the enemy skirmishing detachments.

Sling Stones, Tel Lachish, 701 BCE. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

However, Assyrian horse archers and those carrying javelins could and did act as skirmishing detachments who could, with the right covering fire from the archers, could quickly ride up on the enemy lines, whether infantry or skirmishers, and discharge their projectiles before riding off.

The Siege of Lachish will be our Example

Once they set up camp outside their intended target, the Assyrian military force, when arrayed, occupied roughly an area of 2,500 yards across and 100 yards deep. The supplies for such a force would have been massive. The number of calories and amount of water a single Assyrian soldier would need to function comes to 3,402 calories a day and nine quarts of water. This does not include the amount of food needed to feed the pack animals haul the equipment. Once the Assyrian army was finally in place before the walls of an enemy city, the consuming and waste began and the need to finish the job quickly set in.

Assyrian War Camp Relief.

Assyrian War Camp Relief. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

So how did the Assyrians deploy for a siege? An Assyrian siege begins with a messenger. According to 2 Kings 18:17-37 they would send a messenger to deliver the ultimatum, which was ‘surrender or die’. However, it seems most cities chose to fight than give in to the attacker.

Once the Assyrian army had isolated the city, they would begin to construct siege works on the spot. At the siege of Lachish in 701 BCE, Sennacherib’s siege crew deployed prefabricated battering rams, which required assembly on the spot. While the construction of siege engines was underway, the Assyrian infantry would begin to build earthen ramps leading to the weakest point in the city walls. The men building the ramps were likely under the protection of Assyrian archers and slingers.

Assyrian archers during a siege would push forward, wearing a long coat of mail and carrying a man-sized reed shield with a bent back to protect him from enemy fire. The Archer would carry an Assyrian composite bow, which required two to string. These heavy bowmen could easily get into position and pelt the enemy on the walls, thus negating interference with the men below who were constructing the siege ramps.

The same goes for the Assyrian slingers, who also were good at harassing the enemy with projectiles as the ramp drew closer to the city walls as they could hit high-angled targets who hid behind the parapets.

Assyrian attack on a town with archers and a wheeled battering ram, 865–860 BC. (Public Domain)

Chariots were deployed as light mobile artillery that could aid in hitting targets on the walls. In one sense, they were a great addition to keeping the defenders from firing back too often, for each volley the archers and slingers could fire, the charioteer archers could deliver another volley and quickly get out of harm’s way.

After the earthen ramps were finished, teams of infantry, aided with the protection of archers to cover their approach, began to push the heavy siege machines forward into position. One such siege engine that was very effective against enemy fortification was the Assyrian battering ram. During the siege of Lachish, King Sennacherib (704-681 BCE) deployed several battering rams simultaneously towards the weakest points of the walls. One of the big differences when comparing these rams with those of the past is that Sennacherib had the battering pole extended. This allowed a greater degree of reach and leverage. When looking at the reliefs depicting the siege of Lachish, one will notice archers atop the device as it moves forward. There are two likely reasons for this. First, as the battering ram is moved forward, enemy along the wall could possibly throw an incendiary device, which could cause the ram to catch fire. Placing archers atop the vehicle allows them to pick off those wishing to set the ram a blaze. The second reason is to protect the infantry moving behind the ram.

Assyrian troops attacking a besieged city using a battering ram on a siege ramp. Enemy archers are returning fire. Headless corpses lie at the foot of the city walls. (Public Domain)

While the ram attempted to smash and loosen the rocky walls, Assyrian assault teams with scaling ladders would try to breach walls. The ram, while effective, was also vulnerable to enemy defenders dropping chains to pull the battering pole aside. Because of this issue, the Assyrians deployed men who counter this by hooking the chains with iron grapples. The prophet Joel gives a description of the Assyrian wall scaling:

 They charge like warriors;

    they scale walls like soldiers.

They all march in line,

    not swerving from their course.

They do not jostle each other;

    each marches straight ahead.

They plunge through defenses

    without breaking ranks.

They rush upon the city;

    they run along the wall.

They climb into the houses;

    like thieves they enter through the windows. – Joel 2:7-9.

Top Image: Assyrian relief of horsemen with spears. Bodies fly in their wake. From Nimrud, now in the British Museum (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Archer, Christon I. World History of Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Campbell, Duncan B. Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World. Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2005.

David, Richard, Barnett and Margarete Falkner. The sculptures of Aššur-nasir-apli II, 883-859 B.C., Tiglath-pileser III, 745-727 B.C. [and] Esarhaddon, 681-669 B.C., from the central and south-west palaces at Nimrud. (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1962.

Eadie, John W., “The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1/2 (1967), 161-173.

Fagan, Garrett G., and Matthew Trundle. New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Gabriel, Richard A. Great Captains of Antiquity. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.

Soldiers’ Lives through History – The Ancient World. Westport, Conn:    Greenwood Press, 2006.

Healy, Mark, and Angus McBride. The Ancient Assyrians. London: Osprey, 1991.

Kern, Paul Bentley. Ancient Siege Warfare. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Nosov, K., and V. Golubev. Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons: A Fully Illustrated Guide to Siege Weapons and Tactics. Guilford, Conn: Lyons Press, 2005.

Oded, Bustenay. Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1979.

Rawlinson, George, Ancient Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World Vol I, (New York: Lovell, Coryell & CO, 1881.

Roberts, Janet “Centering the World”: Trees as Tribute in the Ancient Near East.” Transoxiana Journal Libre de Estudios Orientales.http://www.transoxiana.com.ar/11/roberts-near_east_trees.html (accessed August 11, 2016, 2011).

Saggs, H. W. F. The Might That Was Assyria. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.

Vuksic, V. & Z. Grbasic, Cavalry: The History of a Fighting Elite, (London: Cassell, 1993

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The Persian War Machine: The Immortals – Part II

 

The Persian war machine made empires beforehand look miniature. The Persians were able to take the best from all over the Near East and turn it into a force that could not be defeated for many centuries to come.

[Read Part I here]

Many Guard Units

Herodotus states in 7.40 that “For before him (King) went first a thousand horsemen, chosen out of all the Persians; and after them a thousand spearmen chosen also from all the Persians, having the points of their spears turned down to the ground; and then ten sacred horses, called “Nesaian,” with the fairest possible trappings.” The thousand spearmen marched with their spears reversed, and the spear butts, which would normally have a point, were replaced with “golden pomegranates.” Herodotus refers to these men as “spear-bearers.” These men were the king’s own spear-bearers.

Furthermore, Herodotus 7.41 mentions that once the thousand horsemen passed by, they were followed by ten thousand men who “went on foot; and of these a thousand had upon their spears pomegranates of gold instead of the spikes at the butt-end, and these enclosed the others round, while the remaining nine thousand were within these and had silver pomegranates. And those also had golden pomegranates who had their spear-points turned towards the earth, while those who followed next after Xerxes had golden apples.” While the passage provided describes what appears to the famous “immortal” it appears not. A thousand had upon their spears butts ‘pomegranates of gold’, while the remaining nine thousand had ‘silver pomegranates’. Behind the ten thousand came another thousand had ‘golden apples.’ While it appears that this is not the ten thousand as some suggest, perhaps it is. In other words, the thousand spearmen who’s spear-butts had a golden pomegranate were perhaps the captains in charge of the nine thousand. But who were the “Immortals”?

The Immortals

Herodotus makes the first mention of them in Histories 7.83 stating, “these ten thousand chosen Persians the general was Hydarnes the son of Hydarnes; and these Persians were called “Immortals,” because, if any one of them made the number incomplete, being overcome either by death or disease, another man was chosen to his place, and they were never either more or fewer than ten thousand.” While Herodotus calls them by this title, they are not mentioned during the reign of Xerxes. Xenophon, who came later, does mention that Cyrus established a personal guard of ten thousand spearmen and mentioned they the guard of ten thousand was still existent when he wrote this in the 360s BCE.

Modern reenactors of the Immortals in their ceremonial dress at the 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire.

Modern reenactors of the Immortals in their ceremonial dress at the 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire. (Public Domain)

The Immortals were a fearsome army of ten thousand men that was created by Cyrus the Great to guard him, and were recruited from the lower classes of Persia to serve as the king’s personal bodyguard day and night, and wherever the king went so did they. The name Immortals comes from that whenever one of them got ill, wounded, or even died, he was replaced quickly with another man to ensure that the number stayed at ten thousand.

The Immortals were more than just mere spear-bearing infantry. In times of war, the Immortals surrounded the king while the inner core of Immortals consisted of two royal regiments; The first being infantry that carried a composite bow with a seven-foot-long spear and an akinakes (a dagger or short sword).

The second royal regiment of the Immortals was cavalry archers who carried spears and the majority of the Immortals that surrounded them were infantry. To give you a better picture of the Immortals in terms of battle formation. The front rank consisted of infantry carrying shield and spear, the spear they carried was seven feet in length, and they were the front, rear, and sides of the formation. They provide protection for the archers behind them while the cavalry likely stayed outside of the formation protecting the flanks.

Mosaic depicting Persian archers. (Pre 4th Century BC)

Mosaic depicting Persian archers. (Pre 4th Century BC) (CC BY 2.0)

Besides the Immortals, there was the cavalry. The cavalry only made up 10 percent of Cyrus’s army in the early days of his conquest while the other 90 percent of the army was infantry, or should we say foot soldiers. As time went on, Cyrus noticed the importance and the effectiveness of cavalry forces. He thus added more cavalry to his army and reduced the amount of foot soldiers to get a better ratio that was 20 percent cavalry and 80 percent infantry. The cavalry would have been mostly light and carrying only a bow, and were mainly of non-Persian ethnicity but were commanded for the most part by Persian officers. Their duty was to harass the enemy with a barrage of arrows and draw them into an attack, a hit-and-run you could say that would be annoying to any attacker.

Persian nobles formed the heavy cavalry. They were armed with two javelins, a lance made of wood and sometimes metal, and they carried an akinakes as well as a small oval shield. The armor of a heavy cavalryman was made of leather overlapped with metal disks or scales of bronze, iron, or gold, and was often colored in order to distinguish one unit from another. This must have been an impressive sight on a sunny day—unless you were the enemy.

Persian infantry varied between light and heavy. The light units carried spear and swords while their heavier counter parts carried a longer spear a shorter sword and a battle-axe. These heavier infantries wore black hoods that covered their head and much of their face. In combat, the front rank of the phalanx carried a shield made of wicker and a single spear while the ranks behind them carried no shield but had two spears on hand. Their main function was to toss the first spear over the front rank while keeping the other spear on hand for close combat. The heavier infantry, the elites, otherwise known as the Immortals, were the ones who kept silent when marching en masse. It must have been eerie for those about to receive the sword on the other end of the battlefield, when all you felt was the earth tremble slightly under your feet while an army of silence approached you from the other end. It was common for most warriors to scream and shout when in combat in order to intimidate their opponent. The immortals did the exact opposite. They killed in silence.

Charioteers

Besides the cavalry and infantry units of the Persians, there were the charioteer units. The Persian chariot was slightly higher and heaver then their Assyrian, Egyptian and Babylonian counterparts. Its wheels and axle were heavier and the platform on which the soldiers stood was much wider and carried two men. One man was to drive the heavy, cumbersome vehicle, and the passenger was a soldier, either a spearman or an archer. It took four horses to pull this chariot, which is a considerable amount of power compared to chariots pulled by two horses. To make it even more deadly, Cyrus had scythes installed on the axles, which extended two yards out from the wheel. Overall, it was a deadly machine when the opportunity presented itself on the battlefield since no charioteer, or for that matter horse, would plow into a forest of spear points and shields. It was more effective against light infantry, loose formations, and troops of undisciplined men unwilling to stand their ground in the face of combat.

Persian scythed chariots.

Persian scythed chariots. (Public Domain)

Cyrus also introduced the use of siege weapons into his ranks. Siege towers weighing in at seven tons when fully staffed and were twenty-four feet (7.3 meters) high had to be pulled by sixteen oxen. It is said that each story of the siege tower was about three stories in height, and was manned by twenty archers, giving it a total of 60 archers inside. These siege towers were also used as a command center for the Persian army and were great for surveillance due to its height.

An English siege tower, representational image.

An English siege tower, representational image. (Public Domain)

The Persians also had a special unit that used naphtha during sieges. Naphtha is similar to “Greek fire” a chemical mixture of a thinner consistency than oil. The purpose of naphtha was to burn wooden structures in combat. The Persians would use this during siege warfare by shooting flaming arrows over the enemy’s walls hoping to hit the wooden rooftops in the city thus causing a blaze that could spread throughout. Alternatively, they used it for defensive purposes by burning wooden siege equipment the enemy brought forth to the walls. In addition, the combat engineers of the Persian army were of great importance to the army. For they would move ahead of the army to repair or build roads and bridges, to dig ditches, and used pontoon boats as floats for bridges to get their massive and heavy army across.

To move this huge army was a feat in itself. The Persians, with all the ingenuity and complexity of their military system, had to have a supply line able to provide this juggernaut when on the move. The job of supplying the army was left to the commissariat. When the army was on the move, the commissariat was split into two, with one in front of the army and another in the rear. The commissariat who moved ahead of the army was tasked to look for suitable places to encamp where clean water could be found and the livestock could be grazed for a brief time before they moving on. The rear commissariat was tasked to keep the army supplied with all types of weaponry such as bows, swords, spears, arrows, armor and many other items that would be needed. Now, due to the amount of equipment the commissariat provided they would eventually run low, and in order to solve this problem the Persian king required that each satrap (governor) keep a certain amount on hand for the incoming army when it arrived to restock before the next big move.

While this small piece on the Persian military only skims the surface, understand that what Cyrus created came about with the aid of his many allies and most importantly, the trial and error of battle. Cyrus, once in power, began to formulate an army capable of adopting what was practical and functional when it came to the art of command and control on the battlefield. After his death, the Persian military maintained this, making few adjustments.

Immortals fighting Alexander's troops. Color reconstruction of the original reliefs on the Alexander Sarcophagus, in Istanbul.

Immortals fighting Alexander’s troops. Color reconstruction of the original reliefs on the Alexander Sarcophagus, in Istanbul. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Overall, the Persian army was a professional fighting force of a complex magnitude that in many ways would not be matched until the Macedonian and Roman Empires. However, with their professionalism, also came their weakness. As stated before, they were complex. The Persians, even though they could field a huge army that was disciplined, they were homogenous nor were all of them skilled in the same weapons. Persia had its own standing army that was professional but too small, while the many regions under Persian control provided a hodgepodge of military units all accustomed to their own fighting style and practice. Many of these units were light infantry such as archers and spearmen with little to no armor what so ever. The Persians relied on quantity over quality in its military ranks. It worked well for the region of the world they were in, but as time went on, they faced armies who were all about amour and standard structure, and who may have been small in comparison but undoubtedly more disciplined.

Cam Rea is an author and military historian. He has written numerous articles for Ancient Origins Premium and Classical Wisdom Weekly as well as several books.

Top Image:  Deriv; Faravahar carved in stone at Persepolis, Iran, (Public Domain) and Achaemenid soldiers.

By Cam Rea

References

Briant, Pierre. ‘From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire’. Publisher: Eisenbrauns; 1st English Edition edition (January 1, 2002)
Farrokh, Kaveh. ‘Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War’. Publisher: Osprey Publishing (2007)
Head, Duncan. ‘The Achaemenid Persian Army’. Publisher: Montvert (1992)
Herodotus, Histories
Strabo, The geography of Strabo.
Xenophon, Cyropaedia

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The Hunnic War Machine: Horsemen of the Steppe – Part II

The fifth century politician and bishop Sidonius Apollinaris, wrote an interesting description on the horsemanship of the Huns, stating, “You would think the limbs of man and beast were born together, so firmly does the rider always stick to the horse.” Such were the abilities of the horsemen of the steppe – an integral part of the success of the Hunnic Invasion and the creation of an empire.

[Read Part 1: The Hunnic War Machine]

Hunnic Horsemen

Being that the majority of the Hunnic cavalry consisted of light horse archers led by petty nobles and their followers, their attire would have been light. The sixth century scholar Procopius states that the Hunnic warrior/herdsman wore “loosely woven” garments. Ammianus, much earlier, describes the dress of the Huns stating:

“They dress in linen cloth or in the skins of field-mice sewn together, and they wear the same clothing indoors and out. But when they have once put their necks into a faded tunic, it is not taken off or changed until by long wear and tear it has been reduced to rags and fallen from them bit by bit. They cover their heads with round caps and protect their hairy legs with goatskins; their shoes are formed upon no lasts, and so prevent their walking with free step.”

Being that the vast majority of Huns wore meager garments, their armor was not much better. In other words, do not expect the poorer Huns to be decked out in armor like the nobles or the wealthy. The type of armor worn would have been scale (sewn on) or lamellar (linked plates) armor reaching to the waist or knee. Hunnic armor also appears to have been sleeveless in some accounts. According to Procopius, he states:

“He came to be surrounded by twelve of the enemy, who carried spears. And they all struck him at once with their spears. But his thorax with-stood the other blows, which therefore did not hurt him much; but one of the Goths succeeded in hitting him from behind, at a place where his body was uncovered, above the armpit, right close to the shoulder, and smote the youth, though not with a mortal blow.”

While the Hunnic warrior could withstand a series of hits to the chest, his armpits were exposed, which indicates that his armor was sleeveless. Another interesting aspect is that the word thorax is used. This may suggest that the armor was not a breastplate but a metal shirt or scale-mail jacket, which protects all sides of the body and is sleeveless. The fourth century panegyric, Pacatus, Sidonius, and Procopius, all mention that the Hunnic horse archers wore iron cuirasses. While most Hunnic horsemen wore meager armor, those lucky enough to serve alongside Rome were decked out. Fifth century Latin poet, Flavius Merobaudes, mentions that Huns serving the Roman general Aetius wore “belts, quivers, horse, bits, helmets, and the armor, studded with precious stones, were gilded.

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse's head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse's owner.’

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse’s head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse’s owner.’  (Public Domain)

However, some of the Hunnic armor worn may have been Roman. Other Huns, not associated with Aetius, may have donned gilt Persian armor. Understand that the vast majority of Huns were not emblazoned in armor from head to toe, most wore meager amounts while the few nobles and wealthy Huns could afford the luxury of armor.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

One such luxury was the helmet. Huns serving under the Romans were provided helmets. The majority of Huns not serving Rome donned felt or soft leather caps. Reason for this is that many of the so-called Hunnic graves are absent of such an item. Hunnic noblemen and the wealthy could afford a helmet, which could be passed down from generation to generation. The type of helmet the Huns would have worn under the Romans is called a spangenhelm. The spangenhelm is a conical helmet consisting of four to six sections, reinforced by bands over the joins. Most had large cheek pieces, neck guard and a nose piece. The origin of the helmets is said to be of Sassanid origin, which was later adopted by the Romans during the late third early fourth century.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns also used a shield. Unfortunately, like most items pertaining to the Huns, it remains elusive. The Hunnic shield would have been small, as a large shield would have been cumbersome to utilize on horseback. The type of small shield used would have been as the ones used by other steppe nomads, and since no shield has been discovered, it is suggested that the shield was made of wicker covered in leather.

As for swords, it is disputed whether the vast majority of Huns carried them. The Hunnic swords likely varied, as some were like that of the Sarmatians and Goths, which was long, straight, and designed for slashing. However, in the 10th century, Latin Germanic epic poem founded on German popular tradition called Waltharius, the hero Walther “arms himself in the Hunnish fashion… with a double-edge long sword belted to his left hip … and a single-edged half-sword at his right.” While the poem is fictional, it provides and indicates that some Huns wore a long sword, spatha, and a single-edged half-sword, semispatha, like that of the Sassanid noblemen who are regularly depicted wearing the same type of swords in this fashion.

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha (CC BY 2.0)

Another side arm the Huns used was the lasso. The lasso was widely used by many steppe nomads like the Scythians and Sarmatians to name a few. Ammianus speaks of the Hun lasso and states “while the enemy are guarding against wounds from the sabre-thrusts, they throw strips of cloth plaited into nooses over their opponents and so entangle them that they fetter their limbs and take from them the power of riding or walking.”

As for heavy horsemen, the Huns had few and mostly relied on those they conquered and incorporated into their own military apparatus. The tribes that aided heavy cavalry to the Huns were the Sarmatians, Alans, and Goths. With heavy cavalry, accompanying the Hunnic horse archers, the Huns had a well-defined military capable of delivering mobility and shock to the enemy on the field of battle.

Bow and Arrow

The primary weapon of the Hunnic horse archer was the composite bow. The Hunnic reflex bow was made of wood, horn, and sinew. The ears of the bow had seven bone plaques, while the handle had three, two on the side one on its top.

The foundation of the bow was made of wood. The type of wood used could have been maple, yew, poplar or ash. When the tree of choice had been selected, the bowyer would choose to use the heartwood of the tree instead of the growing outer layer or sapwood.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

After the selecting and fashioning the wood into shape, a layer of sinew is applied. Sinew gives the bow its penetrating power. Once the sinew is applied, the bow would be bellied with horn, which provides compressive strength and on release of the arrow, the bone brings the bow back to original position like a coil. To keep this complex weapon together, glue made from boiled animal hide was used. These multiple layers of bone made the bow quite stiff and powerful upon release.

The Hunnic bow was between 130-160 centimeters long or between four and five feet in length. Unlike other steppe bows, the length of the Hunnic bow was not ideal for use by a horse archer. The ancient Scythian bow was 80 centimeters or (2.6 feet) in length, making it ideal for horse archery, even though some were found to be 127 centimeters or (4.2 feet) in length. The Huns got around this by making the bow asymmetrical. Its upper half was slightly longer than the lower. The reason for the lower half being shorter was so as not to poke the horse in the neck. Another reason why the Huns extended the length of the bow was to produce more power. Upon release, the Hunnic horse archers could effectively hit an unarmored opponent at 150 to 200 meters or (492-656 feet), and an armored opponent at 75 to 100 meters or (246-328 feet).

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow.

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The type of bowstring used also varied. The string for the bow must not be too heavy or light nor stretch easily. The materials used could have been from twisted gut, sinew, horsehair, vines, and even silk. The Hunnic horse archer probably had a variety of bowstrings on hand for various climate conditions. Horsehair strings were best suited for colder climates, whereas sinew absorbed moisture, making them less desirable due to stretching.

The Huns used a variety of arrowheads. One type was a large leaf-shaped and the other a large three-bladed iron arrowhead. The Huns are also said to have used “sharp bone” according to Ammianus. They are said to have fixed bone balls behind the tips called “whistlers”, which produce a terrifying sound for psychological effect. When placing the arrowhead on the shaft, the Huns and other eastern steppe peoples did not socket it into place like the Scythians and Sarmatians did. Instead, the Hunnic arrowheads had a tang, which was sunk into the arrow shaft. The possible reason for this is that it was easier to produce arrowheads with tangs than socketed. Later on western steppe tribes adopted the eastern tang style.

The type of arrow shafts possibly used was cane, reed, birch, cornel, rose-willow, hornbeam, and ash. Reed may have been the preferred material to use for it would travel further and easier to produce. The feathers used in fletching would generally have been from either ducks or geese. The number of feathers attached to the shaft was between two and four. The feathers provided aerodynamic stabilization for the flight of the arrow.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com / CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns carried a broad shaped bow case, which hung on the left side, and an hour glassed shape quiver or tube-like on the right side, which had a flap. The materials used to construct these cases were made of leather, bark or wood. Upon firing the arrow, the Hun would place the arrow on the right side of the bow. The archer would draw the bowstring with three fingers with the thumb locked under the first three fingers and protected by a ring of bone, horn, ivory or even stone.

An Empire of Conquest

In conclusion, the Hunnic war machine was like that of any other nomadic steppe tribe but with a twist. The twist is the Huns could do it better. Whereas the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans and many others could only do little in terms of conquest and confiscation, their goals to expand beyond the steppe frontier was never considered, even when they were united. This is not to say that they did not take the plunge into the civilized sedentary world. They did, but in small strikes and fast retreats from those who posed a challenge. The Huns, like the others mentioned, became powerful enough to challenge the various steppe tribes and absorbed them through conquest. While the Huns initially were still not united, their appetite for conquest and confiscation could not be quenched and was a shared goal among them. Even when the Huns pushed out the Goths, they still found plunder by joining with the Romans. Once Attila came on the scene with his brother Bleda, the brothers were able to negotiate and coerce the tribes to coalesce as one. Therefore, the Huns were the first true nomadic empire to establish itself before the civilized world.

But their world was not long term, as the Hunnic economy was based on war and extortion with no lasting goal. In the end, the Hunnic war machine that set foot in Europe, before mighty Roman and the fractured Barbarians, would soon disappear, but the carcass of the machine remained to be absorbed by those affected, to be restudied and implemented to make their (Romans and Barbarians) armies much more effective on the battlefield.

Sculpture of Attila the Hun

Sculpture of Attila the Hun (Public Domain)

Top Image: Attila and his Hordes (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

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Subutai: Dog of War — Silent, Insatiable and Remorseless, Part II

Invasion of Central Europe: Battle of Liegnitz (1241)

Subutai planned the invasion of Central Europe with precision. This military expedition into Europe placed Subutai into the annals of great military leaders.

After beating down many of the Russian principalities, Subutai sent spies into Poland, Hungary, and even as far as to Austria. He was able to put together a dossier after gathering vital intelligence on the various kingdoms throughout Eastern Europe. Even though Subutai made the plans, his was under the command of Batu Khan.

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century).

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century). (Public Domain)

While Batu Khan was the leader of this expedition, Subutai, Kadan Kahn, Orda Kahn, Baidar, and a slew of others were the muscle behind the plans. Subutai’s mission was to attack Central Europe by spearheading into Hungary. Kadan’s forces would punch north into Poland.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing. (Public Domain)

Baidar led two Mongol tumans of soldiers westward into Silesia. The object was to destroy their European opponents before they could unite. Duke Henry II of Silesia on 5 April 1241 at Liegnitz was waiting for a force of 50,000 Bohemians under King Wenceslas. The Mongols were in the right place at the right time before the remaining forces could unite with Duke Henry. The Duke’s army was 25,000 strong consisting of Poles, Germans, Teutonic knights, Hospitallers, and Knights Templars. However, much of Henry’s army consisted of poorly trained, inexperienced levies. Can you image Bavarian gold miners fighting a battle for you?

Mongol Heavy Cavalry

Mongol Heavy Cavalry (Public Domain)

Duke Henry’s army assembled themselves in a formation that was typical at the time for European armies. Heavy cavalry was the strike force looking to make the decisive blow to the enemy when the enemy showed weakness, while the infantry played only a supporting role protecting the rear. Henry’s formation is understandable and expected, but what Henry did not understand was the Mongol art of war. The Mongols used a tactic known as mangudai or feigned retreat. They would pretend to flee only to ambush those chasing after them.

The Mongols laid in wait for the Poles to make their move, as they did not want to give away their ruse. The Polish begin by charging the Mongols, hoping to engage them; however, the Mongol cavalry surrounded them and showered them with arrows.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Polish quickly pulled back. They then made a second attempt at the Mongols with two cavalry units charging ahead. The Mongols quickly fled, acting as if they were scared. This fake retreat by the Mongols encouraged the knights to continue, moving deeper and becoming more frustrated while trying to engage the enemy—but the Mongols would not cooperate. Instead, the charging knights realized they were in a trap. It was too late.

The Mongols surrounded the Europeans on three sides and began to shower their enemy with arrows and smoke bombs, separating the cavalry force sent in by Duke Henry from his main army. Once the dividing of Henry’s troops had been accomplished, the Mongol heavy cavalry rode down and cut to pieces the European infantry, ultimately winning the battle. Duke Henry was also killed. His head became an ornament on the tip of the spear.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241. (Public Domain)

Battle of Sajo River (or Mohi) (1241)

The Battle of Liegnitz took place a mere few days before the battle of Sajo River.

On the day of the battle, many European men died in the fighting including Duke Henry of Silesia. Once word got out that the Mongols had defeated Duke Henry, King Bela of Hungary was left to confront the Mongols with roughly around 80,000 men.

King Bela’s army was very much similar to Duke Henry’s, which consisted of heavy cavalry, infantry, and a number of mercenaries consisting of nomadic light cavalry. Bela’s army was huge, and one that could, if applied tactically, go toe to toe with just about any fighting force thrown at it. However, this fighting force was Mongols: smart thinkers who looked ahead and planned methodically.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

The Mongols choose a site called Mohi, which was on a plain. The reason for this location choice was to better maneuver their cavalry force while having a forest protecting their flanks. The Mongols quickly crossed over the Sajo River and rode a few miles ahead to make camp at that location. King Bela arrived nearby and set up camp, sending a small unit ahead to guard the far side of the bridge.

The Mongols decided that it would be best to divide their forces, sending 30,000 up north under the command of Subutai. Subutai gave the order for a bridge to be built that crossed over the River Sajo to the Hungarian side.

Batu began his attack early at dawn on 11 April with 40,000 troops at his aid. They attacked the bridge, but this proved dangerous, unless the bridge could be flushed of the European forces stationed there.

Batu gave the order for the catapults to be brought up, which hurled bombs of various sorts and made raucous sounds, which were used against the European forces to cause a panic. Once the European forces fled from the bridge, Batu was able to cross and control the bridge and establish a foothold on Bela’s side.

Nevertheless, Bela gave the order for his cavalry to charge the Mongol cavalry, for the Mongol cavalry had the river to their back, thus walling themselves in somewhat, until Subutai arrived from the north to flank Bela’s army. In doing so, it freed up Batu forces to engage Bela’s forces. The Mongols in turn devastated Bela’s camp.

After several hours of fighting the Mongols allowed a gap in their lines big enough to allow European forces to escape by any means necessary.  It was a bad idea to attempt escape, for the men had become a flood of panic and confusion. Nevertheless, the fate of the men fleeing was a deadly one. The Mongols cut down 60,000 men in a 30-mile (48 km) stretch back to Pest. King Bela escaped the butchery, most likely a changed man.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols. (Public Domain)

Once Hungary was clear of any foe left to challenge them, the Mongols knew that it was time to complete the mission and conquer the rest of Hungary. However, although it seemed the fate was sealed for the Hungarians, chance saved the Hungarians: a significant death. The Mongol Khan Ogotai died in December 1241, and Batu was forced to leave in order to elect a new Khan, as was their custom.

The Nine Principles of War

The Mongols demonstrated the Nine Principles of War at both Liegnitz and Sajo by massing their forces on a concentrated position at the right time and place.

The Mongol objective was clear and decisive as to whom they would hit, like clockwork, in order to gain the advantage.

The Mongol offensive was a strike force that could now exploit the enemy and retain enemies to do their will—all by the use of psychological maneuver.

Surprise in the Mongol offensive was crucial in order to disrupt the enemy to thrown him off balance. This allowed the Mongol economy of force to concentrate all secondary units on primary targets, to achieve a much greater position than his enemy did. This allowed the Mongols to maneuver their enemy into a fixed position for the beating.

Mongol flexibility and cunningness was crucial to this endeavor. Unity of command under the Mongols was by one Batu Khan. However, Batu was flexible in his unity of command in order to gain the best out of his officers, such as with Subutai.

Because of the Mongol effectiveness in chaos and confusion, it allowed for a great sense of security on their behalf. The Mongol army could create an atmosphere of safety to ensure that their troops always had the advantage over the enemy. With security safely applied, the objective of simplicity was greatly understood in order to execute any order without asking twice.

The reason why both Duke Henry and King Bela lost the battles was due to a lack of combined arms or a lack of understanding how to utilize them in a time of war. However, this may be unfair to those who died. Nevertheless, from what we have read, we can see why they lost: a lack of good troops with experience, the feeling of over confidence and superiority, and most important, a lack of understanding of their enemy’s way of warfare.

Béla IV flees from Mohi

Béla IV flees from Mohi (Public Domain)

The End of the European Theater

The Mongol onslaught into Europe would halt when on 11 December 1241 when the great Mongol leader Ogedei Khan died.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong. (Public Domain)

With his death, it was mandatory that all Mongol military expeditions stop and the Mongol princes were required to return to the capital of Karakorum to elect a new Khan. It was during this event that Subutai had been drawing up plans for the invasion of the Holy Roman Empire, but the man in charge of the European theater, Batu Khan, had to rush back since he was a prince.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan. (Public Domain)

It took three years before a new khan was elected and the man elected was Guyuk, and Guyuk had no interest in Batu. With a feud now in the works, any further military operations into Europe had ceased for the time being. With Subutai’s ambitions to advance further into Europe dashed, he received new military operations to conduct, particularly at the Song Dynasty during 1246-47.

The Legacy of Subutai

In 1247, a Franciscan monk by the name of Plano Carpini visited the Mongol court. In his letters, he mentioned that Subutai was still alive and in his early seventies. Carpini also went on to state that Subutai was held in high regards among the court, and referred to him as “Subutai the Unfailing.”

Carpini wrote, “He was a soldier without weakness.” Carpini is just one of the few sources available that speak of the man’s personality. The Muslims, for instance, saw him as “silent, insatiable, and remorseless.” The Russians said he was “extremely disciplined.” The Chinese had a much more revealing description. They looked upon Subutai in high esteem, and he was a great warrior. When Subutai passed, the Chinese bestowed an honorary title on him, proclaiming Subutai King of Honan (Hunan Province). The reason for this title was that Subutai captured the province from the Chin. He was also awarded the title of “faithful and steady.”

In 1248, Subutai returned to Karkorum after a successful campaign and retired. After Subutai left court, he is said to have removed the badges of rank from his yurt and spent the remainder of his days tending to his herds and watching over his grandchildren, particularly his grandson, Achu, and he sharpened his warrior skills.

Some say he went home near the Tuul River, others say he died alone in a tent, while others say he moved further west near the Danube River to be near his son, Uriangkatai, who was in the service of Batu army, serving as an officer. If so, Subutai would spend the remainder of his days living within the territory of the Golden Horde.

It is said he had grown tired of the court, and rightfully so. Subutai grew nauseous of the political squabbling of the Mongol princes, particularly that of Batu and Kuyuk that went on long after Ogedai’s death. By 1248, the once-great Mongol Empire established by Genghis Khan was still great, but fractures created after the death of Ogedei in 1241 continued to grow and further separate the empire from its foundation.

In the end, the historical records provide little information when it comes to the generalship of Subutai. Furthermore, this piece cannot relate the grand scope of all of the battles and wars he part took in, but instead provide a rare glimpse into the man called Subutai.

If one wants to know how accomplished this man was as a general on his Eurasian tour, then consider the words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, as he states that Subutai from China to the Danube “had conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles.” As military historian Richard Gabriel further comments, and rightfully speaks of Subutai’s achievements, they’re described as “a record of accomplishment literally unsurpassed by any of the great generals who had gone before him.”

Unfortunately, Subutai has long been overlooked, especially in military circles, but now his successes on the battlefield have become known for all to see and decipher.

After he retired, Subutai died two years later at the age of 72. Even though Subutai was dead, his sons and their descendants continued to serve one Khan after another for the next three decades.

Subutai is thus remembered in The Secret History of the Mongols:

“They are the Four Dogs of Temujin. They have foreheads of brass, their jaws are like scissors, their tongues like piercing awls, their heads are iron, their whipping tails swords . . . In the day of battle, they devour enemy flesh. Behold, they are now unleashed, and they slobber at the mouth with glee. These four dogs are Jebe, and Kublai, Jelme, and Subotai.”

Featured image: Deriv; A Mongolian Cavalry recreation, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition (CC BY-SA 2.0) , A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

(Read Part I: Subutai: Dog of War — Sophisticated Military Strategist Behind Genghis Khan’s Conquering Empire)

References

Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.

Carey, Brian Todd, Allfree, Joshua B and Cairns John. Warfare in the Medieval World. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2009.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2003.

Craughwell, Thomas J. The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in the World: How 88 Years of Mongol Domination Reshaped the World from the Pacific to the Mediterranean Sea. Gloucester, Maine: Fair Winds Press, 2010.

Crompton, Samuel Willard. 100 Military Leaders Who Shaped World History. San Mateo, CA: Bluewood Books, 1999.

Cummins, Joseph. History’s Great Untold Stories: The Larger Than Life Characters and Dramatic Events That Changed the World. Washington DC: National Geographic, 2007.

Curtin, Jeremiah. The Mongols A History. Boston: DA CAPO PRESS, 2003.

Dupuy, Trevor N. Johnson, Curt. Bongard, David L. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography.New York: Castle Books, 1995.

Edwards, Sean J. Swarming on the Battlefield” Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica: Rand Coporation, 2000.

Gabriel, Richard A. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Great Captains Unveiled. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Hartog, Leo De. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. London, New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004.

Kennedy, Hugh. Mongols, Huns & Vikings. London: Cassell, 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.

Tzu, Sun, Griffith, B. Samuel (translator). The Art Of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

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Subutai: Dog of War – Sophisticated Military Strategist Behind Genghis Khan’s Conquering Empire – Part I

There have been many renowned and infamous conquerors and generals such as Sargon of Akkad, Tiglath-Pileser III of Assyria, Cyrus the Great of Persia, Alexander the Great of Macedonia, Hannibal of Carthage, Julius Caesar of Rome, Attila the Hun, and Tamerlane, to name a few throughout history. Every one of them has rightfully earned a spot in the history books as a brilliant strategic tactical genius or an uncompromising, bloodthirsty sociopath. However, for some, names and actions have gone largely unnoticed through the annals of history. One such man of great influence but little renown went by the name of Subutai.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel, traditional clothing.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel, traditional clothing. (Public Domain)

The Powerful Mongol Army

The Mongols were a steppe people who lived mostly to the north of China. They were a conglomeration of various clans and tribes that were not united but rather a loose confederation. Nevertheless, a Mongol by the name of Temujin united the various tribes into a single nation. Temujin would take this nation and turn it into a powerful empire. His name would also change to the name many of us know today— Genghis Khan. This name/title was given to Temujin when he united the Mongols in 1206.

Statue of Genghis Khan

Statue of Genghis Khan (CC BY 2.0)

The Mongols were a cavalry-based system comprised of heavy and light elements. Mongol forces were assembled into arbans, jagun, minghans, and finally tuman. Arbans consisted of seven to 10 troops, jagun consisted of 100 troops while the minghan consisted on 1,000 troops.

10 units of 1,000 troops made one tuman. A tuman was 10,000 troops the second to largest unit in the Mongol army. The largest was three tuman, which would equal 30,000 troops and thus formed an army.

Shock and Awe

Mongol tactics were pure and simple; play a game of cat and mouse and finally when the time is right, switch roles with the enemy.

Mongol warrior on horseback, preparing a mounted archery shot.

Mongol warrior on horseback, preparing a mounted archery shot. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Mongols were masters of deception and ambushing. As for Mongol arms, their primary weapon was the bow. The Mongol bow was larger than normal for a composite bow, but had a pull weight of up to 165 pounds and a range of 350 yards (320 meters). In addition, they also carried a large number of arrows of various types to accompany their bow. The mixture of arrows was due to the types of combat they might encounter, whether close or far range, or for single combat, and psychological combat. Either way, the Mongol arrow system was indeed unique among others.

As for body armor, light Mongol cavalrymen wore padded armor in thick leather, but nothing heavy, while heavy cavalrymen wore leather with metal plates attached, including a metal helmet. His horse was also covered in strong armor. The cavalrymen also carried either a long, 12-foot (3.6 meter) lance, battle-axe, or curved or straight sword.

Mongol cavalry archery from using the Mongol bow.

Mongol cavalry archery from using the Mongol bow. (Public Domain)

The Mongol mix of light and heavy cavalry employing various weapon systems produced a shock-and-awe combination. Missile cavalry provided the shock, while heavy cavalry provided the awe. Overall, the Mongols were all about blitzing; enveloping and swarming the enemy—but only when the enemy showed itself vulnerable.

Subutai, from Humble Beginnings

Subutai, or Subotai “Bagatur” (the Valiant), may have been born sometime around 1176/77 AD. We only know this for it is said that he left home at the age of 14 to join Genghis Khan’s army in 1190 AD. Others suggest that maybe he was born either in 1172 or 1175 AD.

Subutai was the son of a blacksmith who lived in the forest around the western edge of Lake Baikai. He came from a tribe that was not considered Mongol, known as the Uriangkhai tribe. The Uriangkhai were a people who preferred to live in the forest within their mud or wood huts. They were not horsemen and their trade was fur, and they specialized in blacksmithing. Nevertheless, they offered their services to the Mongols, season permitting, to fix anything broken such as weapons, pots, or pans. Subutai most likely encountered the Mongols in his early years while helping his father to fix whatever needed repair. Because of this encounter, Subutai grew to understand them and their way of life by the season-to-season interaction with them.

In 1190 AD, Subutai left home to join the Mongol armies under Genghis Khan. He was just fourteen years old, but he had youth and energy, and the stories he’d heard from his brother Jelme, who rode with Khan, excited the boy. He was very young for a person looking for combat, but his older brother Jelme vouched for him to Genghis and Genghis agreed—but his job was door attendant to the Khan. In other words, Subutai made sure the felt flap kept cool steppe air out and the Khan’s warm words in. But it was also here at the door that Subutai began to learn the Mongol art of war.

Genghis Khan seated in the center in tent and his attendants, sons, and generals surrounding.

Genghis Khan seated in the center in tent and his attendants, sons, and generals surrounding. (Public Domain)

Subutai, as far as we know, knew nothing of horsemanship. In the eyes of the Mongols, he was a mere amateur. Now, besides his duty of guarding the Khan’s doorway, he was duty-bound to a Mongol officer who was in charge of him. Subutai had to learn how to ride a horse. It was felt that any man could ride a horse, but to ride a horse into combat with command precision was a far different mastery, especially when learning to use the bow. Subutai went on to learn how to master the horse and bow. His skills grew, including absorbing strategy and tactics he learned at the Khan’s doorway, and after some years went by, Subotai went from doorkeeper to Khan’s inner circle, discussing the military issues he once overheard.

The recreated interior of an ancient Mongolian ger (also known as a yurt), from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

The recreated interior of an ancient Mongolian ger (also known as a yurt), from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Desperate and Blind Merkits (1197)

Subutai’s first battle came in the year 1197 AD. Genghis offered Subutai a hundred of his finest warriors for the operation against the rival Merkit tribe who had a camp set up that the Khan wished to attack. Instead, Subutai went by himself to the Merkit camp and told them that he had deserted Genghis. The Merkits believed Subutai and made him one of their own. They wanted to know where Genghis forces were and Subutai assured them they are far off. However, this was not true, once the Merkits let their guard and suspicion down, the Mongols attacked. This convincing ruse would become the staple of Subutai’s tactics: that is, to attack the enemy indirectly by whatever means available and necessary.

Subutai understood the situation well, for the Merkits had set up camp and were blind to what was going on around them. Subutai quenched their thirst for knowledge by poisoning their wells of thought. Subutai seemed to know that desperate men like the Merkits would believe in anything thrown their way, just like a man in need of water only to discover a deceptive mirage in front of him.

Breeching the Wall of the Jin (1211)

In March 1211, Genghis Khan had assembled a very large fighting force fixed for conquest. Their goal was to take over the Jin Empire, but an obstacle lay in the way and that obstacle was the Great Wall of China.

Location of Jin dynasty, 1115–1234

Location of Jin dynasty, 1115–1234 (CC BY 3.0)

Word reached the Jin officials that the Mongols were coming. Jin scouts, careful to made sure the Mongol scouts did not see them, reported a large Mongol force of 30,000 led by Subutai. The force was making its way towards eastern end of the Great Wall. By taking this route, one arrives close to the Jin capital having once crossed.

The Jin quickly sent men to reinforce the wall along with secondary defenses, but the attack never came. Subutai and his 30,000 men were nowhere.

Instead, another report surfaced that Genghis Khan was leading a much larger Mongol army towards the western edge of the Great Wall. Garrisoning the western edge of the wall was a people known as the Onguts; the Onguts were Mongols who had been defeated by the Jin earlier and been placed under their command. However, the Onguts were not going to fight when they saw their kin arrive, for Genghis and his Mongols were looking to attack and vanquish the Jin Empire who conquered their very tribe.

Because of the absence of Subutai, the Jin forces had to hurry, for the main Mongol army was well on its way. Genghis learned that the Jin forces were responding, but very slowly; this gave Genghis time to choose the battle site, which was the northern passes in what is now Shanxi province.

Once the Jin arrived they saw the Mongols and quickly assembled themselves into battle formations. The Jin used a typical battle formation that is also used in the west as it was in the east and that was: infantry front and center, cavalry to the sides.

The Mongols were all cavalry, both light and heavy, built for speed and terror. The Mongols made the first move by sending in their horse archers, showering the Jin infantry with armor piercing arrows, and then sending in their heavy cavalry to break the enemy ranks, causing panic and desertion. In the meantime, the Jin cavalry could do little, for they were far heavier and less agile when compared to the Mongol heavy horse. However, the battle was far from over as both armies traded blow for blow until Subutai arrived. No one knows how Subutai did this and what route he took, but he was able to flank the Jin cavalry and attack their rear forces, and as such the Mongols completely collapsed the Jin army on all sides causing a bloody mess.

Deception played a large part in the battle, once again. In fact, the battle contained two deceptions: the first being the report of Subutai’s army approaching the edge of the eastern wall, and the second deception was allowing the enemy to dismiss or forget about Subutai.

Whoever orchestrated this maneuver is unknown, but I would not doubt that it was between Genghis and Subutai, if not Subutai alone. However, the Jin army broke a rule regarding the Art of War, in which Sun Tzu says, “One who sets the entire army in motion to chase an advantage will not attain it.” The Jin were chasing a phantom, only to be conquered by it when they looked away.

Battle of Kalka River (1222/1223?)

In 1222, Jebe, a prominent general of Gehghis Khan, and Subutai took a route that led through a pass called Derbent, on the Caspian Sea in Russia. As the Mongols were riding through, various nomadic tribes such as the Alans, Cherkesses, Lezgians and Cumans were uniting as one against the Mongols who were largely unknown to these alarmed groups. After the nomadic alliance united, a battle soon followed between the nomadic coalition and the Mongols. The results of the battle remain unknown, for some suggest there is not enough evidence to support victory for either side.

Jebe and Subutai licked their wounds and pushed back at the Alans, soundly defeating them. The Mongol armies next attacked the Cumans and defeated them, chasing them to the Crimea. The Cuman khan, named Kotian, was the father-in-law of Prince Mstislav of Galich. Kotian along with Mstislav sent out a call to unite the various Russian principalities to fight off the Mongol invasion. All involved in this operation were against the Mongols, but knew nothing about them, their way of life, language, or what god they worshipped—all they knew is that this army was strange and serious.

Detail from the Millennium of Russia Monument: Mstislav Mstislavich, left, and Daniel of Galicia, his son-in-law.

Detail from the Millennium of Russia Monument: Mstislav Mstislavich, left, and Daniel of Galicia, his son-in-law.  (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Mongols soon realized that the Cumans had gained Russian support. Jebe and Subutai wanted nothing to do with the various Russian forces. Therefore, they sent ten ambassadors in to parlay and none came out alive. The subsequent message from the Mongols to the Russians was simple: go home, this is not your fight. The Mongols showed no interest in Russian lands, but had issue with the Cumans. However, as you have read, the Russians had every intention of defending the Cumans. Jebe and Subotai saw the Russian and Cuman forces and decided to retreat.

Battle of Kernek was between Volga Bulgaria and the Mongols, 1223.

Battle of Kernek was between Volga Bulgaria and the Mongols, 1223. Representational image. (Public Domain)

The Mongols fell back from the Russian and Cuman forces for nine days before the Mongols sent ambassadors to the Russians. These ambassadors brought the same message as the previous, but the Russians sent them back with a message that they would only be happy once the Mongols returned to their own land and were out of sight. This reasoning is also understandable, who is to say that once the Cumans were defeated, the Mongols will not set their sights on Russia?

Daniel of Galicia: King of Galicia and Volhynia (King of Rus')

Daniel of Galicia: King of Galicia and Volhynia (King of Rus’) (Public Domain)

The first battle between the two resulted in a victory for the Russians, as they soundly attacked the rear guard and defeated the Mongols. Once this was accomplished, the Russian Prince Mstislav of Galich, along with the Cumans, crossed the little Kalka River. Prince Mstislav made a terrible mistake for not communicating his intensions and falling right into a Mongol trap. The main Russian army under the Prince of Kiev were a distances always from Prince Mstislav and if something were to go wrong, they could not help them.

Daniil Romanovich and Mstislav Mstislavich (Daniel of Galicia and Mstislav of Galich) with their troops.

Daniil Romanovich and Mstislav Mstislavich (Daniel of Galicia and Mstislav of Galich) with their troops. (Public Domain)

Jebe and Subotai took advantage of the situation; their retreat had paid off. The Russians split, and Prince Mstislav, along with the Cumans, became too confident. The Mongols quickly enveloped the enemy causing the Cumans to panic and Prince Mstislav of Galich to retreat home. The Mongols followed through by attacking the main Russian force, causing them to retreat to a hilltop where they tried to prepare defenses against the Mongols, but Prince Mstislav of Kiev could not, and after three days of fight, surrendered. He asked if he and his forces could return to Kiev, but Jebe and Subotai had a better idea.

Instead of letting them go, they killed the prisoners and built wooden planks to cover Prince Mstislav as they dined on top of him, hearing him scream, as the weight of the party slowly crushed him.

Jebe and Subutai then pursued the Prince Mstislav of Galich, but with no real gain. The Mongols did plunder some towns, but Mstislav of Galich had every boat burned in order to hinder the Mongols’ movement.

Jebe and Subutai finally relented, and return back home to prepare for the future – an ambitious and dangerous future which would lead to Genghis Khan naming Subutai one of his fierce ‘dogs of war’.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing. (Public Domain)

Featured image: A Mongolian Cavalry recreation, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition (CC BY-SA 2.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.

Carey, Brian Todd, Allfree, Joshua B and Cairns John. Warfare in the Medieval World. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2009.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2003.

Craughwell, Thomas J. The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in the World: How 88 Years of Mongol Domination Reshaped the World from the Pacific to the Mediterranean Sea. Gloucester, Maine: Fair Winds Press, 2010.

Crompton, Samuel Willard. 100 Military Leaders Who Shaped World History. San Mateo, CA: Bluewood Books, 1999.

Cummins, Joseph. History’s Great Untold Stories: The Larger Than Life Characters and Dramatic Events That Changed the World. Washington DC: National Geographic, 2007.

Curtin, Jeremiah. The Mongols A History. Boston: DA CAPO PRESS, 2003.

Dupuy, Trevor N. Johnson, Curt. Bongard, David L. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography. New York: Castle Books, 1995.

Edwards, Sean J. Swarming on the Battlefield” Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica: Rand Coporation, 2000.

Gabriel, Richard A. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Great Captains Unveiled. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Hartog, Leo De. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. London, New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004.

Kennedy, Hugh. Mongols, Huns & Vikings. London: Cassell, 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.

Tzu, Sun, Griffith, B. Samuel (translator). The Art Of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.