The Iron Army: Assyria – Terrifying Military of the Ancient World – Part I

 

 

Before the famed Persian Empire, whose borders spanned from India to Thrace, there was another empire—the Assyrians. The Assyrian Empire, while much smaller than the future Persian Empire to come, made up for its lack of territorial mass with a well-greased, organized fighting machine.

In the book of Nahum 3:1, the prophet Nahum made it clear that Assyria was a “city of blood, full of lies, full of plunder, never without victims! The crack of whips, the clatter of wheels, galloping horses and jolting chariots! Charging cavalry, flashing swords and glittering spears!”

What made the Assyrian Empire one of the most terrifying militaries in the ancient world was that they were organized, well led, well fed, well supplied, and had the tools to crack into just about any city they so desired. When it comes to warfare, sieges dominate the vast array of Assyrian reliefs. The siege we will focus on is that of Lachish in 701 BCE.

In order to understand how the Neo-Assyrian military organization functioned one must first focus on the head of the army, the king. From there, we can gather the role of the nobility in military affairs and finally those who formed the bulk of the army.

King: Despotic Commander in Chief

Sargon II and dignitary. Palace of Sargon II at Dur Sharrukin in Assyria (now Khorsabad in Iraq), c. 716–713 BC. (Public Domain)

The Assyrian king wasn’t just directly involved with state affairs on all levels; he was the state. Every aspect of state affairs, whether international, political, military, and religious, was directly linked to him. The king was absolute, but even he had limitations. The Assyrian king, unlike the pharaoh of Egypt, was not divine but despotic. He was a mediator between the gods and his subjects through his ritual purification by both divine and human attendants. Besides the day-to-day domestic and foreign affairs dealt with by the king, he was commander and chief of the Assyrian army. Middle Assyrian inscriptions attest to this, as the Assyrian king on his coronation would swear an oath that they would lead their armies, in person, on annual campaigns of conquest to extend their borders. Even though he was the head of his army, he was a figurehead to a certain degree, for his military duties were diffused and delegated to lesser officials.

Turtānu: Leader of Armies

This lesser official, who would lead armies, was the turtanu. The turtanu was second in military command right under the king. While the king was in fact the commander in chief of the army, the real responsibility executing his majesty’s orders lay in the hands of the turtanu. Assyrian kings did participate in campaigns but when unable, the turtanu was firmly in charge. Eventually either Tiglath-Pileser III or Sargon II reorganized the office of the turtanu. In the past, one man held the position. However, this changed. Instead of having one man take charge of the military forces there was be two. One man was in charge “of the left” and the other “of the right.” While not definitive in all cases, the post of the turtanu were assigned to eunuchs. The reason for this was to limit power by ensuring that the man in charge could not pass his office down to his son through inheritance, which in turn limited the power of the office and avoided the possibility of a coup.

Army Organization and Officers

Information on the military organization of the Assyrian army is fragmented and murky. But a word of caution before proceeding: what is about to be presented is based on what is known and what can be considered from what information survives.

The Assyrians do provide some history concerning the framework of their military apparatus. During the eighth century BCE the Assyrian king could mobilize a force of between 150,000-200,000 men and in extreme cases, 1,000,000. This seems a bit farfetched but was not impossible. In times of war, the Assyrians could field between 20,000-50,000 troops, which would be the equivalent of two or five modern American divisions. Each division consisted of 120 officers. Therefore, two divisions would consist of 240 officers while five divisions consisted roughly of 416 officers. When further broken down, a squad of ten men was under the control of a noncommissioned officer. Five or twenty squads were formed into a “company” (kirsu) under the command of a “captain” (rab kisri or rab hanle). The amount of men in an Assyrian company probably was made up of five squads totaling 250 men and would take at least four of them to form a battalion. A regiment possibly consisted of and three battalions totaling 3,000 men, which seems possible based on the Urartian system, similar to that of Assyria, and it was under the command of a prefect, or what would be today the equivalent of a modern colonel. As for the size of an Assyrian division, it would seem possible that one division consisted of three if not more regiments.

By the time of Sargon, they had become a truly iron army. Sargon reorganized and integrated the fighting force, starting with the conventional units such as infantry, chariots, cavalry, and siege machinery. Next were specialized units to aid support to the conventional, such as scouts, engineers, intelligence officers, and sappers (soldiers for building, demolitions, general construction). To support and supply such an army with the amount of iron needed, Sargon constructed a single weapons room called Dur-Sharrukin (Fort Sargon) which contained 200 tons of weapons and body armor.

Plan of Dur-Sharrukin, 1867.  Victor Place excavated Khorsabad (Iraq) from 1852 to 1855. The Palace of Sargon is represented at North East. (Public Domain)

Reconstructed model of Palace of Sargon at Khorsabad, 1905. (Public Domain)

Soldiers and Engines of War

The Assyrian military consisted of four main units: cavalry, charioteers, infantry, and archers.

When it came to mobility, the Assyrians relied on charioteers like most Near Eastern nations. However, during the reign of Ashurbanipal II in the ninth century BCE, reliefs depict the Assyrians as already having cavalry but in small numbers; they were light by standard and their only function was to ward off other horse archer units during an engagement. What the Assyrians did to combat this was to take regular foot archers and place them on horseback. The Assyrians now had their own version of a horse archer, but the problem was they wore little or no armor. This made the Assyrian horse archer vulnerable to attacks from other horse archers better armored and trained in the rudiments of archery from horseback.

Ashurbanipal II meets a high official after a successful battle.

Ashurbanipal II meets a high official after a successful battle. (Public Domain)

Tiglath-pileser III took note of what is already in use pertaining to his own force and admired what could be adopted and improved upon into his own cavalry units. Tiglath-pileser invested in developing better cavalry units whereas their enemies later on (such as the Cimmerians and Scythians) continued to evolve into much better fighting forces that adapted to the natural conditions and to the conduct of their enemies— in other words, to improvise, adapt, overcome.

After conquering a portion of western Media, Tiglath-pileser incorporated Median cavalry into his own army and from then on, effectively changed the nature of the Assyrian cavalry from charioteer teams to mounted warriors armed with bow and spear. The days of the chariot as master of the battlefield were nearing an end but were not yet over. Over time, the Assyrian army had three types of cavalry. The first type was light cavalry, which consisted of Medes and other nomads who were quick and who primarily used the bow and javelin. Next were the Assyrian heavy archers. This unit consisted of men in heavy scale body armor. Finally, the heavy cavalrymen were fully armored and designed for fighting heavy infantry. However, the Assyrian use of heavy cavalry for shock is uncertain. Cavalry under Tiglath-pileser III on through to Sargon II seem to be primarily skirmishers. There is, however, cavalry depicted during the time of Sargon II on reliefs which are shown to be carrying spears and charging into battle, which may suggest the evolution of the Assyrian shock cavalry was well underway. Tiglath-pileser III and his successors loved the new cavalry so much that they replaced most of the chariot units with elite cavalry units over time. To put this into perspective, the king, his nobles, and the warrior elite were the only ones permitted to use the chariot.

Assyrian artwork from ninth century BC at British Museum. (CC BY 2.0)

Assyrian infantry can be divided into three types: spearmen, archers, and slingers. Spearmen were well armored and are the foundation of the Assyrian army. Their primary function was to provide defense and offense. When on the defensive it was the spearmen’s job to support the skirmishing and cavalry units, to maneuver around them and find targets that could be softened up, which would take pressure off the lines and allow the infantry to go on the offensive. These Spearmen were armed with a shield, spear, and a dagger or short sword.

Assyrian Soldier with Standing Shield, Soldier with Small Shield, Archer. (Public Domain)

Archers were also well armored and used a recurve bow. In some reliefs, Assyrian archers are accompanied by a shield bearer who provided protection as the archer discharged his arrow. Archers in battle were usually placed in front of the heavy infantry ranks to shower arrows down upon the enemy before retreating behind the spearmen once the enemy was too close for comfort. Assyrian archers in the reliefs also appear to be wearing short swords as well.

Another skirmishing unit utilized to harass the enemy was slingers. Slingers, as their name applies, slung well-rounded rocks at the enemy. While the distance was not as great as an archer, the power generated upon release caused tremendous damage as it was meant to crush, unlike the arrow, which was used to pierce. Slingers, like archers, would be out in front of the spearmen harassing the enemy infantry or, engaging the enemy skirmishing detachments.

Sling Stones, Tel Lachish, 701 BCE. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

However, Assyrian horse archers and those carrying javelins could and did act as skirmishing detachments who could, with the right covering fire from the archers, could quickly ride up on the enemy lines, whether infantry or skirmishers, and discharge their projectiles before riding off.

The Siege of Lachish will be our Example

Once they set up camp outside their intended target, the Assyrian military force, when arrayed, occupied roughly an area of 2,500 yards across and 100 yards deep. The supplies for such a force would have been massive. The number of calories and amount of water a single Assyrian soldier would need to function comes to 3,402 calories a day and nine quarts of water. This does not include the amount of food needed to feed the pack animals haul the equipment. Once the Assyrian army was finally in place before the walls of an enemy city, the consuming and waste began and the need to finish the job quickly set in.

Assyrian War Camp Relief.

Assyrian War Camp Relief. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

So how did the Assyrians deploy for a siege? An Assyrian siege begins with a messenger. According to 2 Kings 18:17-37 they would send a messenger to deliver the ultimatum, which was ‘surrender or die’. However, it seems most cities chose to fight than give in to the attacker.

Once the Assyrian army had isolated the city, they would begin to construct siege works on the spot. At the siege of Lachish in 701 BCE, Sennacherib’s siege crew deployed prefabricated battering rams, which required assembly on the spot. While the construction of siege engines was underway, the Assyrian infantry would begin to build earthen ramps leading to the weakest point in the city walls. The men building the ramps were likely under the protection of Assyrian archers and slingers.

Assyrian archers during a siege would push forward, wearing a long coat of mail and carrying a man-sized reed shield with a bent back to protect him from enemy fire. The Archer would carry an Assyrian composite bow, which required two to string. These heavy bowmen could easily get into position and pelt the enemy on the walls, thus negating interference with the men below who were constructing the siege ramps.

The same goes for the Assyrian slingers, who also were good at harassing the enemy with projectiles as the ramp drew closer to the city walls as they could hit high-angled targets who hid behind the parapets.

Assyrian attack on a town with archers and a wheeled battering ram, 865–860 BC. (Public Domain)

Chariots were deployed as light mobile artillery that could aid in hitting targets on the walls. In one sense, they were a great addition to keeping the defenders from firing back too often, for each volley the archers and slingers could fire, the charioteer archers could deliver another volley and quickly get out of harm’s way.

After the earthen ramps were finished, teams of infantry, aided with the protection of archers to cover their approach, began to push the heavy siege machines forward into position. One such siege engine that was very effective against enemy fortification was the Assyrian battering ram. During the siege of Lachish, King Sennacherib (704-681 BCE) deployed several battering rams simultaneously towards the weakest points of the walls. One of the big differences when comparing these rams with those of the past is that Sennacherib had the battering pole extended. This allowed a greater degree of reach and leverage. When looking at the reliefs depicting the siege of Lachish, one will notice archers atop the device as it moves forward. There are two likely reasons for this. First, as the battering ram is moved forward, enemy along the wall could possibly throw an incendiary device, which could cause the ram to catch fire. Placing archers atop the vehicle allows them to pick off those wishing to set the ram a blaze. The second reason is to protect the infantry moving behind the ram.

Assyrian troops attacking a besieged city using a battering ram on a siege ramp. Enemy archers are returning fire. Headless corpses lie at the foot of the city walls. (Public Domain)

While the ram attempted to smash and loosen the rocky walls, Assyrian assault teams with scaling ladders would try to breach walls. The ram, while effective, was also vulnerable to enemy defenders dropping chains to pull the battering pole aside. Because of this issue, the Assyrians deployed men who counter this by hooking the chains with iron grapples. The prophet Joel gives a description of the Assyrian wall scaling:

 They charge like warriors;

    they scale walls like soldiers.

They all march in line,

    not swerving from their course.

They do not jostle each other;

    each marches straight ahead.

They plunge through defenses

    without breaking ranks.

They rush upon the city;

    they run along the wall.

They climb into the houses;

    like thieves they enter through the windows. – Joel 2:7-9.

Top Image: Assyrian relief of horsemen with spears. Bodies fly in their wake. From Nimrud, now in the British Museum (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Archer, Christon I. World History of Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Campbell, Duncan B. Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World. Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2005.

David, Richard, Barnett and Margarete Falkner. The sculptures of Aššur-nasir-apli II, 883-859 B.C., Tiglath-pileser III, 745-727 B.C. [and] Esarhaddon, 681-669 B.C., from the central and south-west palaces at Nimrud. (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1962.

Eadie, John W., “The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1/2 (1967), 161-173.

Fagan, Garrett G., and Matthew Trundle. New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Gabriel, Richard A. Great Captains of Antiquity. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.

Soldiers’ Lives through History – The Ancient World. Westport, Conn:    Greenwood Press, 2006.

Healy, Mark, and Angus McBride. The Ancient Assyrians. London: Osprey, 1991.

Kern, Paul Bentley. Ancient Siege Warfare. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Nosov, K., and V. Golubev. Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons: A Fully Illustrated Guide to Siege Weapons and Tactics. Guilford, Conn: Lyons Press, 2005.

Oded, Bustenay. Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1979.

Rawlinson, George, Ancient Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World Vol I, (New York: Lovell, Coryell & CO, 1881.

Roberts, Janet “Centering the World”: Trees as Tribute in the Ancient Near East.” Transoxiana Journal Libre de Estudios Orientales.http://www.transoxiana.com.ar/11/roberts-near_east_trees.html (accessed August 11, 2016, 2011).

Saggs, H. W. F. The Might That Was Assyria. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.

Vuksic, V. & Z. Grbasic, Cavalry: The History of a Fighting Elite, (London: Cassell, 1993

Soldier of Fortune: Glory Days for Sir John Hawkwood, King of Mercenaries

 

 

Sir John Hawkwood was born into a life on the English countryside that was business and rebellion. From an early age, he sought power and influence outside of England’s borders. He showed off his battle skills in the Hundred Years War and won a knighthood from England’s king.

Hawkwood the man was indeed an interesting character: a brilliant tactician, and an equally brilliant politician, but in his life, he would terrorize Italy with armies and bands of mercenaries, amass a great fortune, and cement his place in history as the most famous Anglo-Italian mercenary.

Engraving representing John Hawkwood.

Engraving representing John Hawkwood. (Public Domain)

Beginnings of Business

Hawkwood was born around 1320, in the parish of Hinckford, Essex, which is located in the north-central region of the county. Essex County was known for its farming and sheep; it had a thriving business sector that produced cloth and exported raw wool. Essex also produced anti-authoritarianism. In 1381, the people revolted against the crown in a large social uprising. The county of Essex in the 14th century was indeed a business class society that did not take well to authority. This attitude harbored by the locals may have influenced the young Hawkwood early on in his life.

John was the youngest child of Gilbert de Hawkwood, but he shared the same name as his older brother. John’s social situation is contrary to what past historians claimed, said to have come from a low ranking family, and was himself a poor soldier later on in his life. This, however, is not true, for John grew up in a wealthy business family. His father was supposedly a tanner who owned land, and even had a maidservant to take care of the day-to-day chores around the house.

In 1340, John’s father died. The will Gilbert left behind divided the share each child of his received. The elder John got the largest of the share and stayed at home to run the business, while the younger John left home with his share.

Hawkwood The Military Man

The younger John Hawkwood took his share and moved to London. Once Hawkwood made it to London, he worked as a tailor or a tailor in training, an apprentice. However true this story is about Hawkwood working and training to be a tailor remains in dispute. It is also said that tailors during this period were looked down upon in terms of serving in the military. However, it did not stop Hawkwood, for when Edward III began to recruit men for his army (which he planned on taking to France in order to claim the French throne), Hawkwood tossed the needle for the sword and joined the army along with his neighbors back home – one of whom happened to be John de Vere, his lord back in Essex, and wealthy families such as the Listons, Coggeshales and Bourchiers.

John de Vere assembled an army of 40 men-at-arms, 10 knights, 29 esquires and 30 mounted archers to serve Edward III.  Wool was provided to the men as pay; a total 56 sacks of wool was to be brought with them. As for Hawkwood’s role in John de Vere’s army, this remains uncertain. However, it is said that he may have started in 1342 as an archer.

Hawkwood and the Hundred Years War

He may have had humble beginnings in the army, but Hawkwood’s ambitious goal was to one day retire to these lands and that goal would start with the battle of Crecy in 1346.

Battle of Crécy between the English and French in the Hundred Years' War. 15th century.

Battle of Crécy between the English and French in the Hundred Years’ War. 15th century. (Public Domain)

Hawkwood’s archery skills are said to have started when Edward banned games such as football, cricket, hockey, cockfighting and so on. King Edward wanted his men to focus on archery, particularly using the English longbow. Hawkwood must have been a good pupil when it came to master the bow, for at the battle of Crecy in 1346, he held the rank of captain on the battlefield and commanded a company of 250 archers led by de Vere. After the battle of Crecy in 1346, Hawkwood seems to have disappeared.

Village sign at Crécy-en-Ponthieu, Picardy commemorating the Battle of Crécy, 26 August 1346.

Village sign at Crécy-en-Ponthieu, Picardy commemorating the Battle of Crécy, 26 August 1346. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Between Crecy and the battle of Poitiers, Hawkwood appears to be only mentioned twice, but in a negative light, so it seems. The first known record tells us he and another beat a man almost to death in a place called Finchingfield in 1350, and then he committed theft a year later. Hawkwood’s life outside the military seemed to be like that on the battlefield. In other words, Hawkwood was broke and in need of booty.

These two unflattering events are all that is known about Hawkwood outside the military, for he again disappears in the historical record and it is speculated that he returned to France and rejoined de Vere’s forces and maybe even married one of de Vere’s daughters. Nevertheless, Hawkwood’s case will always have speculation, but one can gather that he did return to France, was married, did have a daughter, and is recorded to have been at the battle of Poitiers in 1356.

In 1356, at the Battle of Poitiers, Hawkwood is said to have distinguished himself in the field of battle by winning his spurs. In other words, John Hawkwood was not just John Hawkwood anymore; he was Sir John Hawkwood, for the spurs he won made him a knight. The recommendation of knighthood that be awarded to Hawkwood was by the Earl of Oxford. After Poitiers, Hawkwood was involved in the raids on Gascony province, particularly raiding the city of Pau. Nevertheless, all well ends well or so we think, for in 1360, the treaty of Brétigny was signed between England and France, thus ending the Hundred Years War in theory.

A few historians mention Hawkwood’s status by the end of the war. The historian Philip Morant from Essex says that Hawkwood was “the poorest of knight,” while Froissart calls him “a poor knight.” Overall, Hawkwood was rich in title, but lacked the wealth to be noble. This is where his life as a mercenary was about to begin.

Hawkwood the Mercenary

John Hawkwood had only two options in his life; return home as a commoner, or stay in France and become a mercenary. This second option was preferred, as he could make money that would help him climb the ladder of nobility and service.

In 1360, Hawkwood joined up as a freebooter or mercenary group that was called “Les Tart-Venus”, which means ‘Late-Comers’. Men in positions like John Hawkwood were allowed to stay in France and conduct war. The reason is that once Edward III signed the Brétigny Treaty, he gave the order for his men to pull out of France and return to English soil. However, Edward III allowed raids to take place in France unofficially. The reason Edward allowed this was to see if he could gain a much greater deal from the French king. So how did the English soldiers stay? According to medieval author Jean Froissart, King Edward had high-ranking men encourage those seeking to return home to stay in France and continue on their destructive path—and why not? If the English soldiers returned home, they returned to nothing, for they were at the moment unemployed. However, if they turned to face the French countryside, they would soon notice that money was abundant and opportunity for warfare never-ending. All these men had to do was claim no country, as was the case of Hawkwood.

The Great Company and Heaven over Money

In December 1360, Hawkwood and his men arrived at, and captured the French town of Pont-Saint-Esprit, along with the help of other mercenaries, and together they became known as “The Great Company.”

Hawkwood had a much bigger prize in mind, however: the town of Avignon. Avignon was the capital where the Pope, himself lived.  Hawkwood saw Avignon as prime pickings, for if the Pope lived there then money was there, for the money that flowed to and from the Papacy was linked with all the major kingdoms of Christendom. Hawkwood and many others saw a great investment in harassing Pope Innocent.

The city of Avignon was surrounded and cut off by the various bands of mercenaries, including Hawkwood’s men. The city had no way of getting food, and the population was slowly beginning to starve, not to mention that the plague was back in France again. The Pope was all but powerless. He ordered the mercenaries to disperse and go home, but the mercenaries said no, so the Pope excommunicated them, but the mercenaries could care less. This left Pope Innocent with one last option. He announced a crusade to come and defeat the mercenaries that surround Avignon.

The Pope was able to summon seven thousand men to go and besiege Pont-Saint-Esprit in early February 1361. However, it failed, and Froissart mentions that the reason why the crusaders lifted the siege on Pont-Saint-Esprit was due to not being paid. The Pope had promised Heaven over money.

Despite the ‘heavenly’ offer, many of the crusaders packed up and returned home while others went over to the “Free or Great Company Side.” Because of this, the Pope and the cardinals debated as to what to do with the mercenaries. In the end, they summoned for a man by the name of Marquis of Monferrato. Monferrato was the Imperial Vicar of Piedmont as well as Lord of Turin. It was his job to hire the mercenaries and to take them back to Northern Italy to fight against Milan. Thus, the Pope paid Monferrato a huge sum of money to decontaminate the land around Avignon of plague, but also to fight Milan. Hawkwood signed up.

It is recorded that Hawkwood was sending money back home to his older brother John to make the investments for him, which in turn made the family wealthy, even during the plague years, which seemingly did not hinder their economic growth.  This could be true, for the Pope is said to have paid one hundred thousand florins to the companies: thirty thousand went to the men, while Monferrato paid the men sixty thousand more florins to hire them. This would have given each man 15 florins apiece, maybe more, for the men in charge of the bands, like Hawkwood, may have been paid more due to rank, but it is not known for certain.

White Company

Hawkwood returned to France in 1361 to fight the French as a part of the Great Company. Hawkwood finally returned and stayed permanently in Italy with a group of Anglo-German mercenaries called ‘condottieri’, effectively ‘contractors’.

Bartolomeo d'Alviano, a Condottieri.

Bartolomeo d’Alviano, a Condottieri. (Public Domain)

A man named Albert Sterz led the condottieri until December 1363.  Hawkwood took over the condottieri band of Pisa and reorganize them into the famous English mercenaries, called “White Company.” From then on Hawkwood’s fame grew ever-increasingly due to his men’s military professionalism as seasoned veterans.

In 1365, a man named Egidio Albornoz approached Hawkwood with a war chest of 200,000 florins provided by the Pope. The payment was intended for Hawkwood to attack the Visconti who had been molesting church lands in central Italy for some time. He took the battlefield and did well until he began to lose to Visconti, and Hawkwood made the decision to retreat to the castle of San Mariano.

Modern photograph of San Mariano, Perugia, Umbria, Italy.

Modern photograph of San Mariano, Perugia, Umbria, Italy. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Hawkwood and his men held out for some time, but due to thirst, they begged for peace. The besiegers led by Albert Sterz (who was once Hawkwood’s friend), knew that it was better to keep these men alive than to kill them, for they were worth money—not as prisoners, but rather as mercenaries. In the end, 2024 men surrendered and all their belongings they had with them was given over as booty to Albert Sterz.

Sterz had won the day and was showered with glory from the people of Perugia. However, Sterz was about to betray everything he had achieved with the Perugian’s. Hawkwood and his men were now in prison, but that was not going to last long. Hawkwood managed to escape along with many of his knights. How Hawkwood did it remains unknown, but when Sterz had found out, he pursued Hawkwood.  Hawkwood and his men were on the run looking for money to pay for the men locked up in Perugian prisons. Sterz chased Hawkwood relentlessly until he had to give up. The only problem was that Hawkwood not only escaped Sterz’s grasp, he was now in the arms of the city of Genoa, which happened to seat the most powerful rulers in Italy.

Wealth and Prestige: Glory Days!

Sir John Hawkwood arrived in Milan with open arms to a man named Bernabo. He was the leader of Milan, or co-leader with his brother Galeazzo. Bernabo was a military man who led his men with the sword. So why did Bernabo want Hawkwood to lead his army? He needed an insurance policy.

Bernabò Visconti, lord of Milan.

Bernabò Visconti, lord of Milan. (Public Domain)

Bernabo was eyeing some lands to the south and he needed Hawkwood to lead an army as its general, unofficially, and at the same time mentor a person by the name of Telemachus. Both men rode out of Milan with the newly-created “Army of Saint George” numbering ten thousand in October of 1365.

Battle between condottieri.

Battle between condottieri. (Public Domain)

Their destination was the lands of Siena, where they burned and looted for over twenty miles. They also torched Santa Colomba, Marmoraia, Buonconvento, Roccastrada, Berardenga, and the abbey of San Galgano. In addition, Hawkwood defeated a militia raised by Siena, captured its leader, and ransomed him for 10,000 florins. Later Hawkwood changed his mind and brought the ransom down to 500 florins. Hawkwood left the company of Saint George in 1366.

Bernabò and his wife, Beatrice

Bernabò and his wife, Beatrice (Public Domain)

Hawkwood served the duke of Milan again from 1368 to 1372 and then for the Pope from 1372-1377. Hawkwood’s service to the Pope was one of wealth and prestige, for the mercenary extorted a large sum of money from the raids he conducted on Tuscany, which resulted in about 130,000 florins in 1375.

An Ambassador by the name of Peruzzi wanted the people of Florence to rise up against this marauder, but they would not listen and instead gave Hawkwood an annual pension of 1,200 a year with no taxes attached. One can safely say that Hawkwood bled the bank nearly dry in Florence, sparking one of the most famous wars in Italian history, the “War of the Eight Saints.”

Hawkwood not only made more money and gained some lands in Romagna, but he was also unfortunately involved in the atrocity of killing civilian populations of Faenza and Cesena. Overall, the war allowed Hawkwood to take advantage of the Pope’s money. Florence had paid him an enormous amount of money and now the Pope had to pay up to show his support.

After the war, Hawkwood served the Republic of Florence in 1377, but not exclusively. His contract was to command an army of 800 lances and 500 archers for one year. Hawkwood and his men received a double payment each month, making Hawkwood’s share 3,200 florins every month, while each lance got 42 florins, and his archers received anywhere between 16 and 28 florins. Besides his annual pay, Hawkwood sold the entire city of Faenza for 50,000 or 60,000 florins. The mercenary from Essex was making money hand over fist.

Fresco of Italian soldiers from 1467.

Fresco of Italian soldiers from 1467. (Public Domain)

With all the wealth and prestige gained by his mixed bag of adventures, Hawkwood was presented another prize— Donnina Visconti, the illegitimate daughter of Bernabo, Duke of Milan. Bernabo gave Hawkwood even more in estates and money as well as gifts of jewelry. The wedding was just more than the union of two peoples in holy matrimony; it was a political union, in which Bernabo now had the most powerful man in Italy in his hip pocket through marital ties. Hawkwood was beyond rich for he owned lands throughout Italy, received a huge pension, along with the money he made by raiding and extorting the various provinces in Italy, including the Vatican.

Hawkwood continued his bold ways throughout Italy, for after the wedding he extorted money out of the Bolognese. He then attacked Faenze, the city that he had sold two months earlier!

In 1381, Hawkwood got a request to be King Richard II of England’s ambassador to the Roman court. However, one of his biggest victories came at the battle of Castagnaro in 1387, in which he showed why the use of longbow and dismounted knights in English fighting tactics won the day, but more than that, it was a series of battles that made Sir John Hawkwood a name to be remembered. Nevertheless, all good things must end, and for Hawkwood, so did life. At the height of his power and wealth, he died of a stroke in 1394.

Sir John Hawkwood, however you take him, was a king among mercenaries.

Featured image: Detail of Funerary Monument to Sir John Hawkwood by Paolo Uccello (1436). (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Bradbury, Jim. The Routledge companion to medieval warfare. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Caferro, William. John Hawkwood: an English mercenary in fourteenth-century Italy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Froissart, Jean. The Chronicles. London: MacMillian and Co, 1895.

Leader, Temple John. Sir John Hawkwood: Story of a Condottiere. London: Urwin, 1880.

Saunders, Frances Stonor. The Devil’s Broker: Seeking Gold, God, and Glory in Fourteenth-Century Italy. New York: Harper Perennial, 2006.

Villalon, L. J. Andrew, and Donald J Kagay. The Hundred Years War: (Part II) Different Vistas (History of Warfare). Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008.

Wagner, John A. Encyclopedia of the Hundred Years War. New York: Greenwood Press, 2006.

The Rise of the Arsacid Dynasty

Arsaces’ historic invasion of Parthia was a process.

Before Arsaces I, King and founder of the Arsacid dynasty, and his brother, Tiridates captured Parthia, they appeared to be residing in the province previous to the appointment of Andragoras as satrap, or governor. Andragoras gained this position due to Arsaces and Tiridates killing the last two previous satraps by the names of Pherekles and Agathokles.

Information concerning the death of Pherekles by Arsaces is scant. Greek historian Arrian of Nicomedia states it was “to avenge an insult offered to one of them.” This insult provoked a rebellion, which led to the death of the satrap. While nothing more is provided, this small amount of info says much.

Roman, Seleucid, and Parthian Empires in 200 BC.

Roman, Seleucid, and Parthian Empires in 200 BC. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

During this period, Arsaces probably controlled the Kopet Dagh mountain range running east-west across the northern edge of the Iranian plateau that bordered the Seleucid province of Parthia. Being in such close proximity, it would not be unreasonable to think that Arsaces’ sphere of influence extended somewhat into the province of Parthia. If so, Arsaces possibly held a considerable amount of influence among the locals, who may have provided him with tribute for his protection services.

Furthermore, in both attacks on the province of Parthia, it would not be unreasonable to assume that Arsaces confiscated some territory within the Parthian satrapy.

View on the Kopetdag mountains from the Ahal plain, Turkmenistan.

View on the Kopetdag mountains from the Ahal plain, Turkmenistan. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

As mentioned, an insult caused Arsaces to strike, but the type of insult is unknown, leaving one to speculate.

Afterwards, Arsaces and his military wing fled back to the Kopet Dagh mountain range. While Arsaces traversed his holdings, the Seleucid king, Antiochus II Theos, appointed a new satrap to the province by the name of Agathokles.

Seeing that the situation on the ground in Parthia was still unstable, Arsaces decided to invade again and violently remove the satrap from power. One could suggest that this attack on Parthia was nothing more than a raid. However, there is no mention of a raid. Instead, Arsaces went straight for the satrap.

With the sudden death of Agathokles, Antiochus II appointed a new satrap by the name of Andragoras.

Coin of Andragoras, a Seleucid satrap of Parthia and later independent ruler of the region. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc.

Coin of Andragoras, a Seleucid satrap of Parthia and later independent ruler of the region. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com /CC BY-SA 3.0)

Andragoras is said to possibly be Persian, his original old Persian name being Narisanka. Information regarding Andragoras before his arrival to govern Parthia is limited. What is possible and speculative is that he served as a functionary during the reign of Antiochus I. If so, he would have possibly continued in this role for a period under Antiochus II. Shortly after his appointment, Andragoras found himself defending his seat of power against the same unwanted guests.

WHO WAS ARSACES?

The origins of King Arsaces, the man who would give birth to the ancient Arsacid Dynasty, remain elusive. Information is scant. The oldest known source is Strabo. Strabo, a Greek historian, states, “that Arsaces derives his origin from the Scythians, whereas others say that he was a Bactrian.” Justin, a Latin historian, states that Arsaces was “a man of uncertain origin.” It is evident that Strabo and Justin are unsure of Arsaces origins. While Justin makes no mention of Arsaces ethnicity, Strabo does to a point. In order to uncover precisely who Arsaces was and his possible origins, one must first examine the name Arsaces and the tribe from which he came.

The name Arsaces may or may not have been his real name or, possibly, a throne name, taken by all the descendants who held the same status. Chronicler Syncellus, who relied on the fragments of historian Arrian’s Parthika, mentions that Arsaces was a descendent of the Persian king Artaxerxes II. Syncellus’ information concerning the relationship comes from the fifth century BCE Greek physician and historian Ctesias.

Ctesias was the physician of King Artaxerxes II of Persia, and he compiled a history of Assyria and Persia called Persica during his stay. Ctesias mentions that Artaxerxes’ name before his ascent to the throne was Arsaces, “the king’s son, who afterward changed his name to Artaxerxes.” Moreover, Artaxerxes’ grandfather was king Artaxerxes I, whose name was rendered as Arshak/Arsaces, Babylonian Arshu.

Gold coin with Artaxerxes II, Babylonia, ca. 330–300 BC; obverse: Persian king running holding a bow.

Gold coin with Artaxerxes II, Babylonia, ca. 330–300 BC; obverse: Persian king running holding a bow. (© Marie-Lan Nguyen / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY 2.5)

MEDICAL MYSTERIES AND RIGHTFUL HEIRS

Besides Arrian’s claim that the Arsacids were descendants of the Achaemenid Dynasty, there is a possibility that the two dynasties were medically related due to the presence of a rare disease known as neurofibromatosis. This physical deformity might have been seen as a sign that they were part of a ‘chosen’ few.

The Greek historian Plutarch, speaks of a deformity that King Artaxerxes I “was surnamed Longimanus, because his right hand was longer than his left.” Artaxerxes suffered from a disease called unilateral upper limb gigantism, which is associated with, but not strictly to, neurofibromatosis. Neurofibromatosis is rare and, according to researcher Hutan Ashrafian, “causes include congenital diseases, such as Proteus syndrome, Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber syndrome, neurofibromatosis, and macrodystrophia lipomatosa. They can also be acquired in cancers and lymphoedema.” Ashrafian makes the case that Neurofibromatosis may have been the cause of Artaxerxes’ deformity.

When it comes to the Parthian kings, Don Todman notes, “The nodule is first seen in the coins of Mithridates II (123–88BC) beneath the left eye and in the image of Orodes II (57–38BC) and in succeeding kings, including Phraates IV (38–2BC), the son of Orodes II. They appear on the faces of many but not all of the subsequent kings up to Vologases I (51BC–AD78) and Vardases II (55–AD58).”

Todman rules out the many other possibilities and further adds, “Neurofibromatosis, however, has a high degree of penetrance and autosomal dominant inheritance.” Todman concludes, “The lesions in the Parthian Kings is speculative” and that the “appearance of the nodule is consistent with Neurofibromatosis and the occurrence over multiple generations also accords with this hypothesis.” Therefore, the Arsacid dynasty may have used their genetic defect to strengthen their claim as the rightful heirs of the Persian Empire.

The name Arsaces is a Greek rendering of his Old Persian name Arshak, also rendered as Arsak, Asaac, or Asaak.  The name Arsaces/Arshak suggests that he was of Saka/Scythian origin. This is due to the “Sac” or “Shak” found in his name. The Ar in Arshak quite possibly could mean Aryan in the Scythian language. In the Pahlavi dialect, the language of the Parthians, the word “Aryan” rendered as “Eran.” The “Er” in Pahlavi is said to mean “noble” or “warrior” and the suffix “an” attached to “Er” represents the relation. Thus, the name Eran can mean, “The noble race” or “the warrior race” along those lines.

MONEY TALKS

Another interesting aspect is one coin in particular that bears Arsaces’ image, but on the reverse of the coin, it has the Aramaic inscription of krny, translated as “Karen” or “Quren”. This is where the debate comes in. Either krny means “Commander-in-Chief,” or it is in reference to one of the powerful Parthian clans known as the House of Karen. The coin also bears his name ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ, translating as “Arsaces”. It seems to be the only coin of his minted like this.

Coin of Arsaces I of Parthia. The reverse shows a seated archer carrying a bow. A Greek inscription on the right reads ΑΡΣΑΚ[ΟΥ] (from the outside). The inscription below the bow is in Aramaic.

Coin of Arsaces I of Parthia. The reverse shows a seated archer carrying a bow. A Greek inscription on the right reads ΑΡΣΑΚ[ΟΥ] (from the outside). The inscription below the bow is in Aramaic. (Public Domain)

One could read this coin to mean that Arsaces is from the House of Karen. However, other coins of Arsaces do not mention this but mention his name and title in Greek, not Aramaic.

The readings of these other coins say ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ, translating as “Arsaces the Autocrat”. Both are plausible. If one considers Karen or Quren to mean “Commander-in-Chief,” it would be understandable for some coins bear the Greek inscription “Autocrat.” It would be true that an autocrat would be a commander-in-chief, for an autocrat is a ruler who holds unlimited power and is answerable to no other person, even though the possibility of the coin that says Karen and Arsaces may indicate a connection to the House of Karen.

Therefore, it seems plausible that ‘Karen’ found on the reverse of the coin is meant for the Aramaic speaking population at the time, in Parthia proper, indicating his authority rather than the house from which he came.

Other coins minted at the same time or later bear no Aramaic, but Greek instead. This is understandable, since Greek was the business and administrative language of the populace.

WHO WERE THE APARNI?

The name Aparni/Parni is Latin, while the Greeks referred to them as Aparnoi/Parnoi. However, there is a bit of dispute among historians over the names. Some historians believe the names are incorrect due to the Greek and Latin translations. The correct renderings could be Sparnoi, Apartanes, Eparns and Asparians. Since the names and translations are in dispute, we shall call them Aparni for now to avoid confusion.

The Aparni were a branch of the Dahae confederacy (central Asia, modern Turkmenistan), possibly a family clan of the tribe, and were said to have lived along the river Ochus, southeast of the Caspian Sea. What one can gather from the scant information provided is that the name Aparni may be incorrect, but the fact that they lived along the river Ochus and were a part of the Dahae confederacy remains undisputed.

Strabo is the only one who provides both tribe and ethnicity. Strabo states that Arsaces, “with some of the Däae (I mean the Aparnians, as they were called, nomads who lived along the Ochus), invaded Parthia and conquered it.” The Däae Strabo mentions are the Dahae. The first mention of the Dahae is found in Xerxes’ daiva inscription and they are described as a people he subdued during his reign. Nothing more follows. Herodotus was the next to mention the Dahae (Daans) and placed them among the tribes of the Persian nation:

“Now the Persian nation is made up of many tribes. Those which Cyrus assembled and persuaded to revolt from the Medes were the principal ones on which all the others are dependent. […]The rest of the Persian tribes are the following: the Panthialaeans, the Derusiaeans, the Germanians, who are engaged in husbandry; the Daans, the Mardians, the Dropicans, and the Sagartians, who are nomads.”

Relief of Cyrus II of Persia.

Relief of Cyrus II of Persia. (Siamax/CC BY-SA 3.0)

What else one can gather from this passage by Herodotus is that Cyrus was well aware of them before Xerxes. Herodotus account of the Dahae among the tribes of the Persian nation may have been “meant in a political, rather than an ethnic or linguistic sense, their Scythian identity poses no problem” as D. T. Potts mentions. While Herodotus provides little concerning their location, Strabo does.

Strabo provides three geographical accounts:

Those nomads (Dahae, however, who live along the coast on the left as one sails into the Caspian Sea are by the writers of today called Däae, I mean, those who are surnamed Aparni; then, in front of them, intervenes a desert country; and next comes Hyrcania, where the Caspian resembles an open sea to the point where it borders on the Median and Armenian mountains.

The Däae, some of them are called Aparni, some Xanthii, and some Pissuri. Now of these the Aparni are situated closest to Hyrcania and the part of the sea that borders on it, but the remainder extend even as far as the country that stretches parallel to Aria.

The Aparnian Däae were emigrants from the Däae above Lake Maeotis, who are called Xandii or Parii. But the view is not altogether accepted that the Däae are a part of the Scythians who live about Maeotis (Sea of Azov).

Western Asia c. 500–550 BCE; the Dahae lands are upper right.

Western Asia c. 500–550 BCE; the Dahae lands are upper right. (History of Persia at English Wikipedia /CC BY-SA 3.0)

Ptolemy places the Dahae between “the regions of Margiana adjoining the River Oxus.” What Strabo and Ptolemy are indicating is that the Dahae traverse a rather large region that expands from the Black Sea to the Aral Sea and from Central Asia to Northern Iran.

Therefore, from the sources examined, it seems evident, that Arsaces was indeed of Saka/Scythian origin and was associated with the Dahae tribe. Whether Arsaces was a decedent of the ancient kings of Persia seeking to reclaim and restore the once mighty Persian Empire will remain unknown. While the possibility is considerable, the connection remains uncertain.

ARSACES’ INVASION OF BACTRIA AND PARTHIA

It would be naive to suggest that the fundamental cause of the Aparni invasion is clouded in mystery, impossible to answer, or cannot be determined. As mentioned earlier, Arrian states the invasion was “to avenge an insult offered to one of them.” While Arrian is probably correct, Strabo may have the answer. Therefore, in order to understand why Arsaces raided and eventually conquered Parthia, we must first look to Bactria.

Historians tend to agree that the passages of Strabo indicate that the invasion of Parthia was due to Diodotus’ victory over Arsaces, which in turn, caused Arsaces to flee into neighboring Parthia. However, Strabo’s passage is rather silent concerning an actual battle that took place. Some look to Strabo as an indicator of this victory over Arsaces, in which Arsaces was “in flight from the enlarged power of Diodotus.” This passage also does not directly say that Diodotus defeated Arsaces, but it hints at the possibility that there was conflict. But what kind of conflict needs to be answered.

What seems overlooked is what Arsaces did best, raiding. The first clue comes from Justin. Justin speaks of Arsaces as being, “accustomed to live by plunder and depredations.” Strabo also mentions this and states:

“These people agreed to pay a tribute on condition of having permission to overrun the country at stated times, and to carry away the plunder. But when these incursions became more frequent than the agreement allowed, war ensued, afterwards peace was made, and then again war was renewed. Such is the kind of life which the other Nomads also lead, continually attacking their neighbors, and then making peace with them.”

It is no question that Arsaces made his living by pillaging. But, according to Strabo, the pillaging taking place was against those who did not pay tribute.

In order to understand why Arsaces I, King and founder of the Arsacid dynasty raided and eventually conquered Parthia, we must first look to Bactria.

It is no question that Arsaces made his living by pillaging. But, according to Strabo, the pillaging taking place was against those who did not pay tribute.

As mentioned, it seems evident that Arsaces’ “flight from the enlarged power of Diodotus” could indicate two possibilities.

The first proposal is that Arsaces continued pillaging Bactrian villages and caravans along the trade routes. Because of this, Diodotus, who held a considerable amount of power, confronted Arsaces and drove him out.

The second proposal could be that Diodotus either met Arsaces or sent an envoy to make a quasi-peace treaty to receive temporary peace by providing tribute. Remember, Strabo mentions, “Such is the kind of life which the other Nomads also lead, continually attacking their neighbors, and then making peace with them.”

Either Arsaces’ periodic raiding ended with force or tribute, or perhaps a combination of both. But given the passages of historians Strabo and Justin, it would seem that Arsaces was confronted, did not engage militarily, but realized that the military forces of Bactria were a far stronger. Arsaces turned his forces around and headed back into his lands. While at Kopet Dagh, Arsaces received news that Andragoras, satrap (governor) of Parthia, had broken away.

Leaving the Empire

It would be hard to believe that Andragoras was unaware of the vulnerability he placed himself in by separating from the empire. Andragoras declared independence after receiving news of the unexpected death of Antiochus II, Greek king of the Hellenistic Seleucid Empire, in Ephesus. The satrap knew that the death of his king would lead to succession uncertainty and a potential war for the throne. Therefore, Andragoras detached himself from the empire until he felt comfortable enough to rejoin the fold.

Coin of Andragoras, the last Seleucid satrap of Parthia. He proclaimed independence around 250 BC.

Coin of Andragoras, the last Seleucid satrap of Parthia. He proclaimed independence around 250 BC. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com /CC BY-SA 3.0)

However, Andragoras may have felt secure enough to declare independence knowing that Diodotus had driven out the Aparni. While Andragoras was unaware of what was taking place north of Parthia, Arsaces was well aware after presumably gaining intelligence on the situation from his spies and possibly from merchants. The news Arsaces received was favorable; the military forces under the command of Andragoras was weak and the Seleucid Empire was busy fighting other rivals.

Arsaces mustered his forces and “invaded Parthia with a band of marauders, overthrew Andragoras, the governor, and, after putting him to death, took upon himself the government of the country. Not long after, too, he made himself master of Hyrcania, and thus, invested with authority over two nations.”

After establishing his capital at Nisa or Asaak, Arsaces was fully aware that if he wanted to hold his newly conquered, lucrative provinces, he must build up his military strength and so “raised a large army, through fear of Seleucus and Diodotus, king of the Bactrians.”

Diodotus I Soter, leader of the Bactrians.

Diodotus I Soter, leader of the Bactrians. (PHGCOM /CC BY-SA 3.0)

Arsaces knew that when the king of the Seleucids, Seleucus II, finished fighting in the west, he would make the trip east to recover former lands. Arsaces also feared his eastern neighbor Bactria, for even though Diodotus drove him from his territory, there was a chance Diodotus would invade.

Ancient site at Nisa, Turkmenistan.

Ancient site at Nisa, Turkmenistan. (Ljuba brank  /CC BY-SA 3.0)

Nisa, Turkmenistand

Nisa, Turkmenistand (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Unbeknownst to Arsaces was that Diodotus could do little outside his own satrapy. The reason for this was that if he were to enter the Parthian satrapy, he would be potentially incurring the suspicion of Seleucus II, which could lead to armed conflict. Because of this, Diodotus stayed put. Of course, this would imply that Diodotus was still loyal to the Seleucid crown. Perhaps he still was, at least to point. There is no doubt that Diodotus was slowly separating himself from the Seleucid fold during the reign of Antiochus II. But once Antiochus II died, Diodotus followed the lead of Andragoras of Parthia and declared independence shortly during the reign of Seleucus II.

SHIFTING POLITICS AND MILITARY MANEUVERS

It is possible that Diodotus not only bought off Arsaces, but also used him against Andragoras. However, this is unlikely. The probable reason as to why Diodotus did not left a finger was that not only did he fear the full force of the Seleucid Empire, but also he had not the military forces nor resources to invade, unhinge, confiscate, and hold onto Parthia and Hyrcania. However, one can also presume that Arsaces was just as ignorant of the military strength of Bactria, even after he increased his forces. But it was necessary for Arsaces to increase his military strength as he prepared for the possibility of a two-front war.

Therefore, Diodotus may have viewed Andragoras as a threat rather than an ally, because once Andragoras reunited with the Seleucid Empire, Diodotus feared that Seleucus II would mount a new campaign to recover the province of Bactria. One can assume that Diodotus welcomed the Aparni conquest of Parthia and Hyrcania. In this sense, Arsaces’ conquest of Parthia acted as a buffer between Bactria and the Seleucids, thus creating a potential ally for Diodotus since both kingdoms now had a common enemy.

A Parthian stucco relief of an infantryman, from the walls of Zahhak Castle, East Azarbaijan Province, Iran.

A Parthian stucco relief of an infantryman, from the walls of Zahhak Castle, East Azarbaijan Province, Iran. (CC BY-SA 2.5)

Even though not written, Diodotus may have wanted to establish a peace treaty with Arsaces. However, Diodotus died before the establishment of such a treaty in 238 BCE. With Diodotus dead, his son, Diodotus II, quickly accepted a peace treaty with Arsaces. Justin mentions this and states, “Soon after, relieved by the death of Diodotus, Arsaces made peace and concluded an alliance with his son, also by the name of Diodotus.”

Arsaces reaching out to Diodotus II to agree to a peace treaty was paramount in allowing Arsaces to concentrate the bulk of his military forces in preparation for the Seleucid invasion. Moreover, even though the agreement between the two was a peace treaty, one can presume that the treaty was also an alliance, which would be crucial in assisting in the defense of their territories from King Seleucus II, who would eventually be on his way.

SELEUCUS’ ATTEMPT TO RETAKE FORMER LANDS

Before Seleucus II set out to retake the provinces of Parthia-Hyrcania and Bactria, he had to deal with another situation at home, which involved his brother, Antiochus Hierax. Antiochus Hierax had rebelled against his brother Seleucus in Asia-minor. This war between the two lasted from 239-236 BCE. Hierax’s decisive victory over Seleucus at Ancyra (modern Ankara, Turkey) sometime between 240-237 BCE sealed the deal, but it would not be until 236 BCE when Seleucus surrendered all of Asia-minor north of the Taurus Mountains to Hierax.

Coin of Seleucus II. Reverse shows Apollo leaning on a tripod.

Coin of Seleucus II. Reverse shows Apollo leaning on a tripod. (Public Domain)

Seleucus’ loss of Asia-minor to his brother and the costly loss of territory to Ptolemy III during the Third Syrian War (246-241 BCE) undermined the unity of the empire. One can see why the eastern provinces broke away and declared independence. The continuous conflict, whether within the royal court or on the field of battle, kept the empire in constant uncertainty to the point that one either broke away and survived, or crashed and was left to an uncertain fate.

Seleucus knew that even though he might have been weak he could not afford more territorial losses. Further losses would destabilize the empire and encourage more breakaways, which in turn would entice his neighbors, like Ptolemaic Egypt, to gobble up more territory abundant with resources and the trade routes that passed through them.

With heavy losses in men, resources and territory, Seleucus took a gamble and decided to mobilize his forces for an eastern anabasis in hopes of retaking control of the crucial provinces of Parthia-Hyrcania.

Hyrcania and Parthia, and the section of the Royal Road noted by Herodotus.

Hyrcania and Parthia, and the section of the Royal Road noted by Herodotus. (CC BY-SA 2.5)

The reason for this is that when Arsaces conquered the provinces in question, he also captured the city of Hekatompylos, which lay astride the Royal Road linking Babylon and Seleucia on the Tigris to Bactria, and finally to India. Arsaces’ control over a portion of the Royal Road not only gave Arsaces control over the commercial traffic but also allowed the Parthians to intercept messages go to or coming from between the Seleucid and Bactrian kings.

Seleucus’ undertaking such an endeavor was both reckless and understandable. The reckless aspect of was that he quickly assembled his forces after suffering early defeats by Ptolemy III and Antiochus Hierax. Seleucus’ hasty military operation to recover former lands was a recipe for disaster. Either Seleucus was overconfident, desperate, or a combination of both.

The understandable aspect was his ambition to recover former lands, to exploit vital resources, and retake the trade routes that linked east with west back under the Seleucid umbrella, since most of the valuables enjoyed by the Greeks were coming through the eastern portions of the empire. If those provinces no longer belonged to the empire, the flow of wealth diminished.

The date of Seleucus’ anabasis is uncertain but possibly occurred between 236 and 229 BCE. But understand, there was not one invasion of Parthia but two.

WAR AND PEACE

Arsaces lay in his capital of Nisa, enjoying his newly conquered territory — but he was no fool. He understood that one day the Seleucid king would march east to recover former lands.

When word arrived that Seleucus was on his way, Arsaces quickly assembled his men and fled into the desert, taking up refuge with another nomadic tribe known as the Apasiacae, who were an offshoot of the Massagetae Scythians.

When Seleucus entered Parthia, he met with little resistance, one can presume, and reconquered his former provinces. As for how long he stayed in Parthia, this is unknown but it must not have been long, for shortly after entering Parthia, Seleucus was “recalled into Asia Minor by new disturbances.”

After some years had passed, Seleucus assembled another army and invaded Parthia a second time and was met with force. The outcome was an Arsacid victory. However, no detail of the battle exists. Moreover, it is possible that Diodotus II aided Arsaces in his victory over Seleucus. However, as mentioned already, details of the battle are silent, but there is an interesting passage written by Athenaeus in his Deipnosophists that speaks of Seleucus and “how he came against Media, and warred against Arsaces, and was taken prisoner by the barbarian, and how be remained a long time in captivity to Arsaces, being treated like a king.”

Frontispiece to the 1657 edition of the Deipnosophists, edited by Isaac Casaubon, in Greek and Latin.

Frontispiece to the 1657 edition of the Deipnosophists, edited by Isaac Casaubon, in Greek and Latin. (Public Domain)

Athenaeus’ reference came from Posidonius (135-51 BCE). A further backing of Seleucus’ imprisonment is due to coins. Earlier coins that portray Seleucus before the invasion of Parthia depict a clean-shaven and well-kept Seleucus, while the later coins depict him with a beard like that of the Parthians. According to Polybius, “Seleucus surnamed Callinicus (glorious victory) or Pogon (bearded).” The coins depicting Seleucus and Polybius passage inform that Seleucus adopted the two epithets before and after capture. How long Seleucus remained in Parthia is unknown, but it is evident that he was freed and died sometime around 226/5 BCE.

How long Seleucus II was imprisoned will continue to be disputed, but what is known is that the Parthians, possibly aided by the Bactrians under Diodotus II, defeated Seleucus. He had no other choice but to lick his wounds and sign a treaty that recognized the authority of Arsaces as the rightful ruler of an independent Parthia not subject to Seleucid rule. The historian Justin says, “The Parthians observe the day on which it was gained with great solemnity, as the date of the commencement of their liberty.” How the Parthians observed their independence day is unknown, as well are the remaining years of Arsaces’ reign.

LONG LOST BROTHER

There is one issue, not yet addressed: Arsaces’ brother, Tiridates. Photius and Syncellus provide the only two sources that mention Tiridates.

A depiction of what is believed to be Tiridates I

A depiction of what is believed to be Tiridates I (Public Domain)

However, their accounts of Arsaces and Tiridates are amalgamated with older stories. One being that of King Darius I of Persia, while the other is similar to the founding of Rome. Photius says, “These two brothers, with five accomplices, slew Pherecles.” Seven men partook in the assassination of Pherecles (Andragoras) when you include Arsaces and Tiridates involvement. This is similar to the account of Darius who seized the Persian throne with the help from six others when they slew the imposter named Gaumata.

Syncellus says, “After two years Arsaces was killed, and his brother Teridates succeeded him as king, for 37 years.” Syncellus’ account is similar to the story and Romulus’ murder of Remus. Moreover, even Justin mentions the memory of Romulus as in a memorable comparison to Arsaces’ foundation of the Arsacid Dynasty:

“Thus Arsaces, having at once acquired and established a kingdom, and having become no less memorable among the Parthians than Cyrus among the Persians, Alexander among the Macedonians, or Romulus among the Romans, died at a mature old age”

Unlike Syncellus, Justin is a much older source that does not mention Arsaces dying at an early age.  Moreover, Justin does not mention that Arsaces had a brother. What Justin does indicate is that Arsaces lived to be a ripe old age. If one were to take Syncellus’ account as true, what memory would the Parthian people have of a man who reigned for two years?

The sources that mention Tiridates are not in error, rather Syncellus is more likely in error suggesting that Arsaces reigned for two years and was murdered by his own brother. There is no doubt that Arsaces did have a brother by the name of Tiridates, but proof of that brother remind elusive until 1955, when an interesting Ostracon (pottery or stone piece with script), no. 2638 was found at the former Parthian capital of Nisa. However, the photos taken remained unknown to the world until 1986, when archaeologist S.D. Loginov (Institute of History, Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences) found them among the South-Turkmenistan archive.

Ostrakon of Cimon, an Athenian statesman, showing his name (as "Kimon [son] of Miltiades") Representational image only.

Ostrakon of Cimon, an Athenian statesman, showing his name (as “Kimon [son] of Miltiades”) Representational image only. (CC BY-SA 2.5)

Once the inscriptions were translated, they gave a completely different picture of the Arsacid genealogy: ‘rsk MLK’ BRY BR[Y ZY pryp]tk BRY ‘HY BR[Y ZY] ‘rsk. When translated into English it reads, “Year 157, Arsak king, grandson Friyapatak’a. son of the nephew of Arsak’a.” The year 157 does not mean 157 BCE; rather it means 157 of the Arsacid era, which would be our 91 BCE.

Notice that three names or three kings are mentioned; the first being Arsaces, the next being his son Arsaces II, and the third, Friyapatak’a, who renamed himself Arsaces III once he ascended the throne. Notice as well that there is no mentioning of a Tiridates. This does not mean that Tiridates never existed, but what it does indicate is that Tiridates was never a king. Moreover, Friyapatak’a may in fact be Tiridates’ grandson, which would make him the great-nephew of Arsaces I.

After the imprisonment and release of Seleucus II, Arsaces’ rule over Parthia remained peaceful up until his death in 211 BCE. Afterwards, his son Arsaces II inherited the throne and a new threat as well.

Seleucus II died before Arsaces. He is said to have fallen from his horse around 226/5 BCE. Seleucus III inherited his father’s throne, only to be murdered after a short reign of three years, in 223 BCE. The person next up for the job was Antiochus III, the younger brother of Seleucus III. The future was in his hands.

Coin of Seleucus III.

Coin of Seleucus III. (Public Domain)

Top Image: A rock-carved relief of Mithridates I of Parthia (r. c. 171–138 BC), seen riding on horseback. The Parthian rulers used the ancient Iranian art of Rock relief to mark the foundation of their new empire. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Bottom Image: The silver drachma of Arsaces I of Parthia (r. c. 247–211 BC) (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com / CC BY-SA 3.0) and the Parthian fortress of Nisa (Flickr/CC BY-SA 2.0)

By Cam Rea

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