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Soviet Deep Operations Doctrine: Origins and Key Theorists

Acknowledgment


This work is not intended to be an exhaustive overview of Soviet Deep Operations but rather a culmination of three years of interest and study in the subject—an area I intend to continue investigating with the hope of writing a full-length book. I am grateful to Dr. Curtis S. King, Associate Professor at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Although we have never met, his insightful series “Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Soviet Theory, and Operational Warfare” on YouTube was the catalyst that sparked my deep dive into this field. His lecture provided a foundation from which I began exploring the writings of various Soviet military theorists and the invaluable contributions of Colonel David M. Glantz, particularly his book “Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle.” I highly recommend Dr. King’s lectures to anyone interested in the intricate world of Soviet military thought. This journey has been guided by the knowledge shared by these scholars, whose works have been instrumental in shaping my understanding of this complex and fascinating doctrine.

Introduction: A brief overview of the Deep Operations doctrine


The genesis of the Deep Operations doctrine can be traced to the Soviet Union’s interwar period during the 1920s and 1930s. This unique doctrine’s objective is to achieve a decisive victory by neutralizing the enemy’s logistical capabilities, causing the defensive front to collapse under its weight.

Importance of Understanding its Origins and Principles

Understanding Deep Operations, its origins, and principles is crucial because it represents a foundational shift in military thinking developed by Soviet theorists in response to the stalemate of World War I. The doctrine emphasizes deep, coordinated attacks across multiple levels to disrupt and dismantle enemy forces, and it played a crucial role in Soviet successes during World War II. Its principles continued to influence modern military strategies, particularly in America, with the AirLand Battle doctrine developed in 1982 and continued to be in play until the late 90s, which itself was replaced with full-spectrum dominance only to evolve into multi-domain operation gradually by 2018. Even today, the Russian military still incorporates many aspects of the Soviet-era doctrine due to its fluidity and adaptability to the chaotic character of war. The study of Deep Operations provides valuable lessons on the interplay between military doctrine, geography, and broader geopolitical objectives.

Historical Context: The Need for a New Military Doctrine

The development of deep operations, also known as the Soviet deep battle doctrine, was profoundly influenced by the contrasting nature of warfare on the Western and Eastern Fronts during World War I. The Western Front’s static, trench-based warfare with little movement and the Eastern Front’s more fluid and dynamic nature, which proved to be a significant challenge, left a lasting impact. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852–1925) famously remarked, “In the west, the armies were too big for the land; in the east, the land was too big for the armies,” highlighting the fundamental differences in the strategic environments of the two fronts.

A Brief Observation on the Western Front

Soviet military theorists were highly critical of the static nature of trench warfare on the Western Front, seeing the prolonged stalemate and high casualty rates as evidence of strategic and tactical failures. They recognized the limitations of the Western Front’s geography, where the dense network of trenches, fortifications, and obstacles severely restricted large-scale maneuver operations. This concentration of forces in a narrow zone led to logistical challenges and limited opportunities for decisive movements.

Technological innovations, such as artillery bombardments, dominated the Western Front, yet these often failed to achieve strategic breakthroughs. While advancements like tanks and aircraft emerged, their initial deployment was limited and did not immediately transform the nature of warfare. Commanders, many of whom were veterans of previous wars like the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, struggled to adapt to the new realities of modern warfare. Their experience in leadership, logistics, and traditional tactics proved inadequate for the complex demands of World War I, where the effective execution of combined arms theory was still evolving.

Key Observations on Russian Failures on the Eastern Front

Brusilov offensive 1916

Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s identified the vast size of the Eastern Front as both a strategic asset and a significant challenge. The expansive geography of Russia and Eastern Europe created operational and logistical difficulties that deeply influenced Soviet military thought. The immense distances made maintaining supply lines daunting, with armies operating far from their bases and facing delays in receiving essential supplies, equipment, and reinforcements. The underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in remote areas, exacerbated these challenges, with poor roads, limited rail networks, and harsh weather conditions frequently disrupting the flow of resources.

Command and control also posed significant challenges on the Eastern Front. The sheer size of the theater necessitated decentralized command structures, leading to coordination difficulties and slower decision-making. Communication across vast distances was often unreliable, resulting in delays in transmitting orders and intelligence. While necessary due to the front’s scale, this decentralized command structure often led to a lack of cohesion and operational fragmentation. Commanders frequently focused on their immediate areas of responsibility, sometimes prioritizing local objectives over the broader strategic picture. This fragmentation hindered the effectiveness of operations and contributed to the Russian Army’s overall strategic failures in the war.

The decentralized command further complicated the maintenance of supply lines. Competing priorities among semi-independent units led to logistical bottlenecks and shortages. The movement and allocation of reinforcements were often poorly coordinated, leaving critical areas unsupported due to the lack of centralized control and planning.

This fractured command structure was a key reason for the Russian Army’s defeat. The Imperial Russian Army’s inability to execute large-scale, coordinated operations effectively stemmed from its fragmented leadership, nepotism, and overall corruption. Even well-conceived strategic decisions often failed due to poor communication and inadequate coordination across the military’s various components.

Soviet military thinkers later lambasted the Russian Imperial Army for its failure to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. They pointed out that the Army’s leadership had not developed a contemporary military doctrine to meet the evolving battlefield challenges. Instead, outdated tactics, such as mass infantry assaults, persisted, leading to severe casualties and operational failures. The inability to modernize and innovate within its military doctrine was a critical flaw that ultimately contributed to the Army’s decline.

Conclusion

In summary, Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s attributed the defeat of the Imperial Russian Army in World War I to a combination of ineffective command structures, logistical failures, and an inability to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. These factors combined created a situation of strategic exhaustion, a state of depletion that led to the Army’s eventual collapse and the revolutionary discontent that followed. This analysis laid the groundwork for developing the Deep Operations doctrine, which sought to address the shortcomings of earlier military strategies and adapt to the realities of 20th-century warfare.

The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1921

After World War I, Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s—like Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Alexander Svechin, and Vladimir Triandafillov—took a hard look at the differences between the Eastern Front of World War I and the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. These two conflicts were worlds apart regarding scale, movement, and strategic challenges. For these military minds, understanding these differences was key to shaping the future of warfare.

Although the Red Army did not officially use what we now know as Deep Operations or Deep Battle during the Polish-Soviet War, the conflict was a crucial testing ground for these ideas. The strategies employed by the Red Army during the war hinted at the early stages of deep operations, showing promising glimpses of their potential—even if they were not fully formed or executed by later standards. In many ways, this war was a proving ground, helping to lay the groundwork for the doctrines that would eventually define Soviet military strategy.

The Eastern Front in World War I was massive and complex, with millions of troops battling across vast territories. Unlike the static trench warfare of the Western Front, the Eastern Front was highly fluid, marked by rapid advances and retreats that demanded enormous logistical and operational coordination over great distances. In contrast, the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 was much smaller. It was a fast-paced series of campaigns involving fewer troops and resources, more about swift maneuvers than a prolonged struggle. Although intense, it lacked the grand scale and industrial might of World War I.

Soviet military thinkers recognized that the lessons from the Polish-Soviet War could not be directly applied to a conflict on the scale of World War I. The smaller size of the war allowed for more flexibility but also exposed glaring weaknesses in Soviet operational planning and execution—flaws that could have been catastrophic in a larger conflict.

In the early stages of the war, the Red Army attempted a bold maneuver, aiming to penetrate Polish territory with a rapid advance toward Warsaw. The plan was to bypass fortified positions and strike directly at Poland’s heart, hoping to force a quick surrender. This approach reflected early ideas that would evolve into the deep battle concept—skipping strong points to disrupt the enemy’s rear and command. However, poor coordination, lack of reserves, and stretched supply lines meant the Red Army could not maintain its momentum, revealing significant flaws in executing complex operations.

The war underscored the critical importance of logistics, driving home that logistical planning couldn’t be an afterthought but had to be integrated into every operational planning level, especially in long-distance, sustained offensives. It also highlighted the need for better coordination and communication among combat units, which later became crucial aspects of the deep operations doctrine.

Ultimately, the Polish-Soviet War was a condensed version of the operational and strategic challenges faced on the Eastern Front during World War I. It served as a wake-up call for Soviet military thinkers, pushing them to refine their understanding of warfare. They saw the need for a new approach to integrate various military actions into a coherent whole, combining strategy and tactics through effective command, control, and logistics. This would eventually lead to developing the deep operations doctrine, focusing on synchronized, multi-layered attacks designed to keep constant pressure on the enemy.

In short, the Polish-Soviet War was a stark reminder of past challenges and a critical learning experience. It drove home the need for a more sophisticated approach to warfare, setting the stage for the deep operations doctrine that would redefine Soviet military strategy in the decades to come.

Soviet Military Theorist: Key Thinkers

Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931)

Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931) coined the term “deep operation” and played a pivotal role in formulating the concepts that defined this military strategy in his book The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (1929). As a key theorist and planner in the Red Army, Triandafillov expanded on the ideas of deep operations. He introduced the concept of glubokiy boy (deep battle or fight), emphasizing the need for multi-echeloned attacks to sustain offensive momentum and penetrate great depths with massed armies to overwhelm and outmaneuver the enemy to obtain victory. However, Triandafillov was a realist. While he was offensive-minded, the Soviet Union’s economy was not ready for the high casualties that future wars would produce due to not being advanced enough for mechanization.

Alexander Svechin (1878–1938)

Alexander Svechin (1878–1938) was a prominent military theorist and historian who played a crucial role in shaping Soviet strategic thought by emphasizing that military strategy should be considered an art rather than a science, as argued in his book Strategy, which remains a crucial text in understanding the evolution of Soviet military doctrine. He argued that no universal strategy fits all situations; instead, the strategy must be adaptive and based on a deep understanding of the specific political, economic, and social contexts. Svechin also introduced the idea of operational art as the bridge between tactics and strategy. He emphasized the need for flexible and coherent operational planning that could adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield. Svechin, like Triandafillov, argued that for deep operations to work, they had to prepare for a protracted conflict and stressed that the Soviet Union must be ready for total war, which would require the mobilization of all national resources.

Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925)

Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925) was a Bolshevik revolutionary who became one of the foremost military leaders in the early Soviet Union and significantly shaped its military doctrine. Regarding theory, Frunze advocated for creating a unique unified military doctrine, separate from the Czarist one, that would align with the political goals of the Soviet state. However, he would concede that his idea of a unique proletarian military was flawed since one would have to return to yesteryear’s military traditions and methods to be effective. He believed that military strategy should not be purely technical but should also serve the ideological aims of the Communist Party. Frunze advocated for the professionalizing and modernizing of the Red Army. He argued for the importance of a standing army, a professional officer corps, and the use of modern technology in warfare. He viewed warfare as an extension of class struggle. He believed that the Soviet military must be prepared to wage revolutionary wars against capitalist states and that this ideological perspective should inform all aspects of military strategy and organization.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937)

Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937) was a prominent Soviet military leader and theorist and is often regarded as the father of the deep operations theory. Tukhachevsky advocated for mobile warfare with large-scale, coordinated operations that would penetrate deep into enemy lines. He believed that massed artillery, mechanized forces, and aviation should work together to achieve deep penetrations that would bypass enemy strongpoints and collapse their defenses from within. His ideas laid the foundation for developing Soviet operational art, emphasizing enemy force’s destruction through depth rather than mere attrition, unlike Svechin, who advocated for a protracted war.

Georgii Isserson (1898–1976)

Georgii Isserson (1898–1976) was another leading Soviet military theorist who contributed to developing deep operations doctrine. While Tukhachevsky is regarded as the father of deep operations, Isserson expanded the idea of deep operations (glubokaya operation), which involved simultaneous strikes at multiple depths within the enemy’s operational depth. He argued that modern warfare required a shift from linear tactics to operations that could achieve strategic effects by dislocating the enemy’s command and control structures and logistical networks. Isserson’s works, particularly “The Evolution of Operational Art” and “Fundamentals of the Deep Operation,” became foundational texts in Soviet military education. His ideas were critical in shaping the Red Army’s approach during World War II.

Birth of the Operational Art

The development of operational art in the Soviet military doctrine was, in part, intended to alleviate the pressure on Soviet forces by improving how military operations were planned and executed at a scale larger than tactics but smaller than grand strategy. Operational art aimed to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics, allowing for more effective management of large-scale, complex operations across vast distances, which was crucial given the Soviet Union’s unique geographical and logistical challenges.

The solution began by embracing and working with the vast Soviet landscape, a valuable strategic asset, and a double-edged sword. Leon Trotsky did not have a hand in developing deep operations but served as the Commissar of War and effective leader of the Red Army. However, in his 1919 article “Proletariat, to Horse!” Trotsky emphasizes the need to bring mobility back to the battlefield, reflecting lessons learned from the aftermath of World War I and the ongoing Russian Civil War at the time, where static, positional warfare often led to stalemates. Trotsky argues that increased mobility, particularly the use of cavalry, could exploit the vast and open Russian terrain to outmaneuver and surprise the enemy, restoring a dynamic element to warfare. Trotsky viewed Russia’s vast steppes and open spaces as a strategic asset that could be leveraged through mobile warfare. By emphasizing mounted troops, the Red Army could capitalize on the terrain in a way that other military forces might struggle with, especially those more reliant on mechanized units or static defenses. His ideas contributed to a broader Soviet military tradition that valued maneuvering and understood the need to take advantage of the terrain by developing deep operations, which was still to come.


It Begins with the Unified Military Doctrine

Mikhail Frunze played a crucial role in shaping Soviet military thought during the early 1920s, particularly through his advocacy for a “Unified Military Doctrine,” which was briefly discussed in his biography. Frunze wanted to create a cohesive and standardized military doctrine that would reflect the unique ideological and strategic needs of the Soviet state.

Frunze believed that the Red Army should not only be a fighting force but also an ideological tool aligned with the goals of the Soviet state. His vision of a Unified Military Doctrine emphasized that military strategy and operations should not be politically neutral or purely technical but deeply intertwined with Marxist-Leninist principles, making the army an extension of the Communist Party’s will and a departure from traditional military doctrines.

Frunze advocated this Unified Military Doctrine, arguing that future wars would be total wars requiring the complete mobilization of society’s resources, both military and civilian. He emphasized the importance of a politically indoctrinated and disciplined army prepared for battle, a huge contrast to the many Western armies at the time.

Drawing from insights gained during the Russian Civil War, Frunze proposed integrating regular military forces with irregular partisan units. He regarded partisan warfare as a pivotal component of Soviet military strategy, particularly for safeguarding against potential invasions and executing offensive operations in hostile terrain.

Frunze pushed for a centralized and unified command structure within the Red Army, seeking to eliminate the fragmentation and inconsistencies that plagued military operations during the Civil War. This included establishing standardized training, command procedures, and organizational reforms to professionalize the Red Army while maintaining its revolutionary character.

Although Frunze did not fully develop the concept of Deep Operations, his ideas laid the groundwork for later Soviet theorists. He stressed the need for flexible and dynamic operational art beyond trench warfare and static defense, envisioning fluid and coordinated maneuvers to achieve strategic breakthroughs.

Overall, Mikhail Frunze conceded that there was no distinct “proletarian military art” at the time, a significant point in his discussions on Soviet military doctrine. Frunze acknowledged the challenges in creating an entirely new military art that was uniquely proletarian, given the Red Army’s reliance on inherited military practices and the limited time it had to develop its doctrines independently. This admission reflected the complexities of merging revolutionary ideology with practical military needs.

While Frunze’s Unified Military Doctrine did not achieve all its lofty goals, it was a necessary and influential step in the evolution of the Soviet military. Its primary value lay in its role as a transitional doctrine that helped stabilize and professionalize the Red Army. It was a vital part of the ongoing development of Soviet military thought.

Strategic Defense Positional Warfare

While Frunze’s ideas called for the professionalization of the Red Army, Alexander Svechin gave it a practical doctrine in his book Strategy. Alexander Svechin was vital in developing Soviet military thought in the interwar period. His theories were highly influential in shaping the Red Army’s strategic approach, particularly in contrast to the more operationally focused ideas of contemporaries like Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Svechin’s theories emphasized the importance of strategic depth, adaptability, and the need for a scientific approach to military planning.

Svechin argued that strategy should be viewed as an art and a science. He emphasized the need for a thorough, scientific analysis of military problems, integrating a broad understanding of political, economic, and social factors into military planning. For Svechin, war was not merely about operational or tactical success but required a comprehensive approach that connected military actions with political objectives.

If and when war broke out, Svechin, like Frunze, recognized the significance of “total war,” where the entire nation, not just the military, was involved in the conflict. He emphasized that modern wars required mobilizing all economic, industrial, and social resources to achieve victory. This holistic approach influenced Soviet planning for potential large-scale wars, integrating civilian and military efforts.

However, Svechin, contrary to the more aggressive strategies advocated by other Soviet theorists, recognized the value of strategic defense. He argued that defensive strategies could be a viable and necessary component of warfare, especially when dealing with a superior adversary or preparing for a counteroffensive. His emphasis on defense reflected a pragmatic approach to military planning, considering the realities of Soviet military capabilities at the time. The reason for this is the Soviet Union’s economic limitations. Svechin emphasized the need to prepare the nation for war by aligning military plans with economic capabilities and ensuring that military actions were sustainable over the long term. He believed that war could not be left to chance and that strategic foresight was essential.

Svechin advocated for adaptability in military strategy, arguing that no single formula existed for success. He recognized two broad types of war: the war of attrition (positional warfare) and the war of maneuver. Svechin argued that commanders must be prepared to switch between these types depending on the situation, resources, and enemy capabilities. He was critical of an over-reliance on maneuver warfare, highlighting the dangers of being unprepared for prolonged conflicts.

Svechin was one of the first Soviet theorists to distinguish between strategy, operational art, and tactics. He defined strategy as the highest level of military art, concerned with the overall conduct of war and the connection between military means and political ends. Operational art was the link between strategy and tactics, involving the planning and execution of campaigns. Svechin’s ideas helped establish the framework that later Soviet military theorists would refine into the concept of Deep Operations.

Overall, Svechin’s theories concerning Deep Operations were conservative compared to the more revolutionary ideas of his other proponents, who focused on rapid, offensive warfare. However, Svechin’s emphasis on adaptability, strategic planning, and the scientific approach to war provided a foundational theoretical framework that continued to influence Soviet military thought.

Strategic Offensive Maneuver Warfare

While Svechin argued from a defensive position, his counterpart Mikhail Tukhachevsky sought an offensive approach. Mikhail Tukhachevsky was one of the most influential Soviet military theorists and commanders of the interwar period. Often referred to as the “Red Napoleon,” Tukhachevsky was a key architect of Soviet military modernization and played a pivotal role in developing the theory of Deep Operations, which profoundly shaped Soviet military doctrine leading into World War II. His theories emphasized offensive warfare, maneuverability, and the integration of new technologies, such as mechanization and aviation, into military strategy.

Tukhachevsky is best known for developing the concept of Deep Operations, a revolutionary approach to warfare that aimed to break the enemy’s front line and disrupt its rear simultaneously. Unlike traditional warfare, which focused on achieving victory through attrition and positional battles, Deep Operations sought to create multiple breaches in the enemy’s defenses, exploit those breaches with rapid mechanized forces, and cause systemic collapse by attacking command structures, supply lines, and reserves far behind the front.

Tukhachevsky was a staunch advocate of offensive warfare. He believed the defense was inherently passive and could only lead to a prolonged, costly war of attrition, which was unsustainable for the Soviet Union. He argued that decisive, aggressive action was necessary to maintain the initiative, disrupt enemy plans, and achieve rapid victory. This offensive mindset underpinned much of his strategic thinking and was reflected in the Red Army’s doctrinal evolution under his influence.

A forward-looking thinker, Tukhachevsky emphasized the need to modernize the Soviet military by integrating new technologies such as tanks, aircraft, and motorized infantry. He envisioned a highly mobile army that could conduct deep, rapid maneuvers. Tukhachevsky was one of the first Soviet theorists to fully grasp the potential of mechanized and armored forces in creating breakthroughs and exploiting them at an operational depth, which would overwhelm traditional defensive tactics.

To make deep operations work, Tukhachevsky advocated using combined arms, integrating infantry, artillery, tanks, and air power to achieve synergy on the battlefield. He believed that different arms of the military should operate in close coordination to support each other, creating a force multiplier effect. This approach aimed to maximize the strengths of each component and minimize their weaknesses, achieving overwhelming force at decisive points.

Tukhachevsky believed that future wars would be characterized by mass and scale, requiring vast mobilization of men and resources. In other words, total war. He stressed the importance of preparing the Soviet Union for large-scale conflicts involving millions of troops and requiring extensive logistical planning. His theories highlighted the need for the Soviet military to be prepared for protracted and widespread engagements rather than limited or localized conflicts.

To control this juggernaut of a fighting force, Tukhachevsky proposed a command structure that allowed for centralized strategic planning but encouraged decentralized execution at the operational and tactical levels. While high command would set the overall objectives and strategies, field commanders were given flexibility and autonomy to adapt to the evolving battlefield conditions. This approach was intended to make the Soviet military more responsive and adaptable in dynamic combat situations.

Tukhachevsky strongly emphasized the innovative use of artillery and air power to support offensive operations. He advocated massing artillery to create overwhelming firepower at critical points of attack and using air forces for direct support, strategic bombing, reconnaissance, and disrupting enemy communications. His theories anticipated using air and ground forces to achieve tactical and operational breakthroughs. Tukhachevsky also recognized the importance of psychological factors in warfare. He emphasizes speed, surprise, and relentless pressure to demoralize the enemy and force them into disorganized retreats or surrenders.

Tukhachevsky’s theories were groundbreaking and pushed the Soviet military towards a modern, highly mechanized force that sought to dominate through speed, coordination, and deep penetration into enemy territory. However, his ideas were not without controversy; they clashed with more conservative views within the Soviet military, and Tukhachevsky’s career was cut short by Stalin’s Great Purge in 1937, during which he was arrested and executed. Despite his tragic end, Tukhachevsky’s military theories influenced Soviet military doctrine and played a critical role in shaping the Red Army’s approach during World War II.

While Svechin was defensive and positional, Tukhachevsky was offensive and maneuvering, and many of the remaining Soviet theorists agreed with both sides. In the end, both Svechin and Tukhachevsky agreed that to maneuver, one must position, and to maneuver to attack, one must do so from a position of strength.

Brief Overview of Their Theories in a Nutshell

Frunze emphasized political-ideological integration and class warfare, focusing on unified doctrine.

Svechin advocated adaptability, caution, and the balance of offensive and defensive operations, criticizing dogmatic approaches.

Isserson expanded on deep operations, emphasizing continuous and multi-layered attacks to achieve deep penetration.

Tukhachevsky championed aggressive, large-scale, mechanized warfare, emphasizing mobility and technological innovation.

Triandafillov focused on the operational level, highlighting depth, echeloning, and logistics as crucial elements of sustained offensive operations.

The Mechanics of Deep Operation/Battle

“The three basic elements of an operation, strength, time and space, are always combined in a strategy of destruction so that gaining time and space is a means and defeating the mass of the enemy’s army is the end.” —Alexander Svechin p, 239.

Preparation and Planning

Before initiating an offensive action, extensive reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering operations are carried out to pinpoint enemy positions, assess their strengths and weaknesses, and understand their command structures. It is imperative to gain a comprehensive understanding of the depth of the enemy’s defenses. Soviet commanders meticulously develop a multifaceted military operation with well-defined phases, objectives, and coordinated efforts across different branches. Their strategic focus revolves around targeting the enemy’s logistical network, command structures, reserves, and depth rather than solely concentrating on frontline positions.

Initial Assault: Tactical Breakthrough

After thorough preparation and strategic planning, the Soviet forces position themselves for tactical maneuvers. The operation begins with intense artillery and aerial bombardments designed to destroy enemy fortifications, disrupt command and control, and suppress enemy firepower. Precision strikes target key points within the enemy’s tactical depth, such as communication hubs and artillery positions.

Afterward, a combined arms assault consisting of infantry, tanks, engineers, and supporting artillery launches a coordinated attack on the enemy’s frontline defenses. The aim is not just to penetrate but to create multiple breaches in the enemy’s line, allowing for deeper exploitation. These shock units, specially designated with superior firepower and armor, are employed to break through the first line of defense quickly. Engineers clear obstacles and mines, while flamethrowers and other specialized weapons neutralize fortified positions.

Exploitation

Once a breach is achieved, mechanized and tank units exploit the gaps, pushing into the enemy’s rear areas. This phase aims to destabilize the enemy by rapidly advancing and targeting their command centers, artillery positions, and logistics hubs. This causes a cascade of confusion that will disrupt the enemy reserves, which are intercepted and neutralized by the mechanized and airborne units before they can reinforce the front line. Simultaneously, airborne operations may seize critical locations, such as bridges or road junctions, to further complicate enemy movements. Tactical air forces provide continuous support by attacking enemy reinforcements, supply lines, and defensive positions in depth, maintaining pressure and preventing the enemy from regrouping.

Deep Battle: Continuous and Layered Engagements

The operation involves multiple echelons (waves) of forces moving forward. The first echelon focuses on breaching and exploiting the front, while the second echelon reinforces the attack and pushes deeper. The third echelon (often fresh reserves) prepares for new offensives or exploitation in response to the evolving battle. These simultaneous, multiple-layered, continuous attacks are launched on multiple enemy positions simultaneously, overwhelming their ability to respond effectively. This disrupts their defense and command structure, creating confusion and compounding losses. Mobile logistics units rapidly follow the advancing forces, establishing supply points to maintain the momentum of the attack. Supply lines are secured to ensure the continuous flow of ammunition, fuel, and reinforcements.

Destruction of Enemy’s Operational Depth

The primary objective is to completely encircle and cut off large enemy formations, trapping them without access to essential supplies and reinforcements. This move often results in the capture or annihilation of enemy units. Soviet forces strategically advanced into enemy territory to seize vital targets crucial to the enemy’s war efforts. These targets encompassed transportation hubs, industrial areas, and communication centers, which played a pivotal role in maintaining the enemy’s logistical and operational capabilities.

Exploitation and Consolidation

After achieving the operational goals, forces consolidate their gains and prepare for either a transition to defense against potential counterattacks or continued offensive operations. This phase focuses on securing captured territory, reorganizing forces, and setting conditions for future actions. The scale and speed of Deep Operations often have psychological effects on the enemy, potentially leading to loss of morale, panic, and political instability, which can hasten the collapse of enemy resistance.

Success and Conclusion in Deep Operation

Success on the battlefield hinges on the ability to strike effectively at enemy lines while coordinating the combined efforts of different military branches—air, artillery, and mechanized forces. Deep Operations emphasize relentless, continuous offensive actions that deny the enemy the chance to regroup or mount a coherent defense. Commanders must remain adaptable and capable of making swift, decisive moves to exploit emerging weaknesses in real-time. This approach shifts warfare from static, attritional confrontations to dynamic, fluid campaigns that aim to win battles and comprehensively dismantle the enemy’s strategic capacity to fight.

Strategic depth, however, is a double-edged sword. The vast expanses of the Soviet landscape, both then and now, present a complex paradox: they serve as a protective buffer against invasion and pose significant logistical challenges for any military force seeking to defend or advance. This immense scale can absorb and dissipate military strength, complicating even the most sophisticated doctrines, such as the German Bewegungskrieg or Blitzkrieg, which struggled against these geographic constraints during World War II.

This geographic reality fundamentally drove the Soviet Union’s development of Deep Operations. The vast, relatively flat terrain of Eastern Europe and Soviet territories provided the ideal setting for a doctrine prioritizing operational depth and rapid maneuver. Deep Operations were designed not just to repel invaders but to leverage the Soviet Union’s expansive borders as a battlefield advantage, turning space challenges into a powerful tool for defense and offense. This doctrine’s evolution reflects a profound understanding of how geography shapes strategy, offering a tailored solution to the unique demands of the Soviet strategic environment.

References

https://history.army.mil/books/dahsum/1989/CH4.htm

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA546241.pdf

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11409

Dowling, Timothy C. “Eastern Front / 1.0 / Handbook.” 1914-1918-Online (WW1) Encyclopedia, October 8, 2014. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/eastern-front/.

Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London: Frank Cass. C, 1991.

Isserson, G S, and Bruce Menning. The Evolution of Operational Art. Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013.

Kotelnikov, Konstantin . “‘Red Napoleon’ Mikhail Tukhachevsky.” diletant.media, November 5, 2022. https://diletant.media/articles/45310426/.

Lafleur, Thomas M. Mikhail Frunze and the Unified Military Doctrine. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016.

Davies, Norman. White Eagle, Red Star. London: Random House, 2011.

Svechin, Alexander. Strategy. Edited by Kent D. Lee. Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Publications, 1992.

The Dole Institute of Politics. “Ft Leavenworth Series: Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Soviet Theory, and Operational Warfare.” Edited by Dr. Curtis S. King. YouTube, July 29, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUQqwyDPZRw.


Triandafillov, V.K. The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1929)

Trotsky, Leon. “Leon Trotsky: 1919 – How the Revolution Armed/Volume II (Proletarians, to Horse!).” Marxists.org, September 1, 1919. https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1919/military/ch97.htm.

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Bewegungskrieg Doctrine: Success, Limitations, and Downfall

Introduction

Blitzkrieg, the lightning-fast strategy and tactic that once seemed unstoppable on the battlefields of Europe—was it truly invincible, or did its fatal flaws doom it from the start? Germany’s rugged terrain, vast plains, and strategic borders played a crucial role in shaping the military doctrine of Bewegungskrieg, better known in the West as Blitzkrieg. This article delves into the core principles and philosophies behind Bewegungskrieg. We will examine how geographical factors influenced the development and implementation of Bewegungskrieg and analyze its successes and inherent limitations. Additionally, we will uncover why the term Bewegungskrieg is more fitting than Blitzkrieg in a linked video below. This brief exploration will shed light on the intricate military theories and practices that defined Germany’s approach to warfare and ultimately led to its defeat.

Bewegungskrieg over Blitzkrieg

Bewegungskrieg (Blitzkrieg) in a Nutshell

Bewegungskrieg (“war of movement”) is a military doctrine emphasizing rapid, surprise attacks to disrupt enemy forces and command structures. Redeveloped by Germany during the interwar period, it played a critical role in the early successes of World War II. Geography and technology significantly influenced both the redevelopment and execution of Bewegungskrieg, shaping its strategic and tactical elements.

John Delaney, head of the Second World War team at Imperial War Museums, states, “The main principle of Blitzkrieg is to win by not fighting. You identify the weak point in the enemy’s line, break through, and cause disruption in the enemy’s rear areas. So you defeat them by dislocation, not destruction on the battlefield.“

In a Bewegungskrieg operation, the initial step involves careful reconnaissance to identify weak points in the enemy’s defenses, typically less fortified sections of the front line. Schwerpunkt, meaning “focal point” or “center of gravity,” is crucial here, focusing forces at critical points to achieve a breakthrough. Once identified, a concentrated attack utilizing fast-moving tanks and motorized and mechanized infantry, supported by close air support, created a breach. Central to this doctrine are the principles of speed and surprise, achieved through rapid movement and force concentration at decisive points. This requires integrating tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support into combined arms operations for a synergistic effect.

Once the front line is breached, the attacking forces swiftly advance into the enemy’s rear areas. The goal is to avoid prolonged engagements with the main enemy forces and instead focus on capturing command centers, supply depots, communication lines, and other essential infrastructure. The attackers seek to cause maximum disruption and disarray by targeting these crucial points. This strategy severely hampers the enemy’s ability to mount a coordinated defense as their command and control structures are disrupted, and their supply lines are cut off.

The enemy’s dispersion and disarray render them susceptible to further exploitation. Swift-moving units can encircle substantial enemy formations, resulting in their isolation and eventual capitulation. This approach diminishes the necessity for direct, large-scale confrontations.

The fundamental principle behind Bewegungskrieg is to triumph by inducing disarray rather than outright destruction. Through swift advancement and targeting of critical points, attackers aim to immobilize the enemy’s ability to respond, resulting in a strategic collapse. This compels the enemy to retreat or surrender without prolonged confrontations. The speed and surprise of Bewegungskrieg significantly impact the enemy psychologically, creating confusion and panic, further deteriorating organized resistance. By leveraging speed, surprise, and concentrated force, Bewegungskrieg disrupts and paralyzes the enemy, leading to a quick and decisive outcome. The strategy focuses on dislocating the enemy’s forces and infrastructure rather than their physical destruction, embodying the principle of “winning by not fighting.”

Geographic Considerations for Success and Limitations

The Bewegungskrieg doctrine, redeveloped by the Germans in the 1920s to avoid another war of attrition and fit modern military technological needs, was designed for the type of war they sought, whether defensively or offensively. This doctrine was used with great success from 1939 to 1941. However, this highlights a key issue: the problem of doctrine itself. The Bewegungskrieg doctrine represented the war the German command desired, but not necessarily the war they would face. Doctrines often evolve to fit specific scenarios or desires, and Bewegungskrieg was no different. It proved effective against smaller countries like Belgium and the Netherlands and countries nearly or roughly the same size as Germany, such as Poland and France. When the Germans first developed the concept in the late 19th century and later updated it with early 20th-century technology, they did so with the spatiotemporal context of their Western and Central European neighbors in mind.

Unlike the smaller and more accessible nations in Western and Central Europe, the limitations of the Bewegungskrieg doctrine became clear when roughly 3.8 million German soldiers, along with their allies, invaded the vast and logistically challenging expanse of the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front on 22 June 1941. The Soviet Union’s vast geographic scale and complex logistics revealed the inadequacies of a doctrine intended for swift, decisive victories in more confined and manageable areas.

Constant Need for Supplies

An army of 3.8 million needed food, fuel, equipment replacements, ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts to function, all of which were in short supply as the war progressed. The doctrinal nature of Bewegungskrieg required a constant and substantial supply, and so did all military doctrines. The consistent supply of essentials was disrupted, hampering German operations due to stretched supply lines and partisan interference. Moreover, it did not help that the Soviet Union’s underdeveloped infrastructure, including roads and railways, compounded the difficulty of transporting supplies to the front lines. Furthermore, the retreating Soviet forces resorted to scorched-earth tactics that exacerbated this lack of infrastructure, and the environment also affected the invaders as the severe Russian winter and the muddy conditions during the rasputitsa (season of impassable roads) significantly hindered German mobility and logistical support.

Doctrine to Bypass Certain Targets

Bewegungskrieg doctrine bypassed specific strong points to maintain momentum and find and crush the enemy’s center of gravity. While this tactic initially succeeded in causing disarray, it left pockets of enemy resistance that could regroup and counterattack. This is what can be considered missed strategic objectives. Bypassing key strategic targets sometimes meant missing opportunities to destroy vital Soviet infrastructure or command centers, which allowed the Soviets to regroup and mount effective counteroffensives. Because of this, Soviet partisans conducted guerrilla operations behind German lines, disrupting supply routes, communications, and railways. This further strained German logistics and hindered their operational capabilities. These were crucial for the German army to push forward, which led us to supplies.

Overstretched Combined Arms Operation

With 3.8 million German forces pressing deep into the Soviet Union, the need to supply grew more crucial daily. The rapid advances of Bewegungskrieg tactics extended supply lines over vast distances, making them vulnerable to disruption and overextension. The longer the supply lines, the more difficult it was to maintain a steady flow of necessary resources. Because of this, coordination issues arose. The complexity of coordinating armor, motorized units, and air support over such extended distances created logistical and operational challenges. Communication and coordination often broke down, reducing the effectiveness of combined arms operations. The threat of attrition, the antithesis of Bewegungskrieg, loomed large as stretched and poorly supplied units risked becoming bogged down in protracted battles, sapping their strength and momentum.

So What Defeated Bewegungskrieg?

As the Germans battled overstretched lines, dwindling supplies, and the harsh Russian seasons of winter and spring, the Soviets quickly adapted to German tactics, implementing deep defensive strategies and conducting effective counteroffensives. None of this would have been possible had the Soviets not relocated over 1,500 military-important plants to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia and received aid through the Lend-Lease Act (1941) from the U.S. Their ability to swiftly mobilize and produce war materials strained German resources, shifting the tide of the battle by 1943.

Remember, the Bewegungskrieg doctrine is about the war of movement. It must stay in motion, seeking the best avenues of attack and avoiding targets that would bog them down. Doing so allowed the means to keep pressing forward to fulfill their objective of destroying the enemy through dislocation. However, no matter how sound Bewegungskrieg was, it was still subject to unforeseen limitations, such as attrition.

Bewegungskrieg’s doctrine was designed to avoid attrition warfare and seek a quick victory, as it did in Poland and France. However, when the German army invaded the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front, the vast Soviet landscape swallowed the German army and its doctrine. The rapid advances that the Germans made deep into the Soviet Union slowly exposed Bewegungskrieg, in which the landmass stretched the manpower and material of the German army to its limits and beyond, causing overstretched combined arms operations, dwindling manpower, and the constant need for supplies coupled with the gradual development of fierce resistance and the deep Soviet landmass exposing the German forces, eventually revealed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg.

So, back to the question, what defeated Bewegungskrieg? There are two answers: fatal conceit and attrition. The term ‘fatal conceit’ comes from Friedrich A. Hayek, who describes the belief that “man is able to shape the world around him according to his wishes.” In the context of Bewegungskrieg, this overconfidence manifested as a belief that rapid and decisive maneuver warfare could overcome any challenge, including the vast and varied terrain of the Eastern Front.

The German military’s adherence to the doctrine reflected a conviction that their strategic innovations and technological superiority would ensure success regardless of the logistical and environmental hurdles. In other words, the German high command assumed that the Soviet Union would collapse as quickly as Poland and France had. This overconfidence led to critical underestimations of the Soviet Union’s capacity to adapt, resist, and endure prolonged conflict. However, attrition gradually took its toll, depleting German manpower and supplies. The prolonged engagements exposed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg, a doctrine not designed for extended conflict.

The tale of two attritions was the other killer of Bewegungskrieg. On one hand, the attrition of manpower and resources stretched the German army thin. On the other hand, industrial attrition, where the Allies outproduced the Germans in war materials, exposed Bewegungskrieg’s vulnerabilities and contributed to its ultimate failure.

In conclusion, Bewegungskrieg was a doctrine built on the principles of rapid movement to achieve decisive victories. However, the fatal conceit of believing it could universally overcome all challenges and the relentless grind of attrition revealed its limitations. The vast Soviet landscape and the Allies’ industrial might turned the tide against the German forces. The initial successes in Poland and France could not be replicated on the Eastern Front, where the realities of war demanded more than Bewegungskrieg could deliver. Ultimately, the interplay of fatal conceit and attrition led to the downfall of this once-dominant doctrine.

References

Imperial War Museum. “The German ‘Lightning War’ Strategy of the Second World War.” Imperial War Museums, 29, 5AD. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-lightning-war-strategy-of-the-second-world-war.

Military History Visualized. “Only Peasants Call It ‘BLITZKRIEG’ – Bewegungskrieg.” YouTube, March 26, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8y-of5WpVA.

Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2022.

Freeze, Gregory L. Russia: A History: Third edition (2009)

Guderian, Heinz. Achtung Panzer! London: Cassell, 1999.

Habeck, Mary R. Storm of Steel the Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2017.

Hayek, F.A. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (1988)

Toeppel, Roman. Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War (Modern Military History) (2021)

Von Clausewitz, Carl and J J Graham. On War. United States: Value Classic Reprints, 2017.

Williamson, Mitch. Early Reichswehr Mobile Force Doctrine, 2019 


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Mastery of Time and Space in Warfare: Origins and Impact

What is Time and Space in Warfare?

Various military theorists have contributed to and shaped the evolving concepts of time and space in warfare for centuries. These crucial ideas play a fundamental role in military strategy, operations, and tactics, significantly influencing maneuver, positioning, and timing. Their profound impact on the outcome of military operations cannot be emphasized enough.

Space in warfare pertains to the physical environment in which military operations occur. This encompasses the geographical area, terrain, and spatial positioning of forces and assets. Time in warfare refers to the chronological aspect of military operations, including the planning, execution, and duration of actions and strategies. It entails considerations of military activities such as speed, timing, and temporal coordination. Therefore, in the art of war, space becomes a tangible representation of time, and time can be seen as the intangible kinetic dimension of space.

Time in Warfare

  • Timing of Engagements: Choosing the optimal moment to initiate or avoid combat.
  • Speed and Efficiency: Rapid movement and quick decision-making to exploit opportunities.
  • Duration: Managing the length of operations to maintain momentum and resources.
  • Synchronization: Coordinating multiple units and operations to maximize effectiveness.

Space in Warfare

  • Geographical Terrain: Utilizing natural features (e.g., mountains, rivers) for strategic advantage.
  • Positioning: Placing forces in advantageous locations relative to the enemy.
  • Movement and Maneuver: Moving forces through space to gain positional advantage.
  • Control of Key Locations: Holding vital areas such as chokepoints, supply routes, and strongholds.

As one can read, mastering time and space elements is essential for success in military operations. However, what are the origins of this theory?

Origins and Theory

Time and space have always been central to military theory, shaping strategies and tactics from ancient to modern times. Even in prehistoric times, the principles of time and space played a critical role in warfare. When it came to time, early human groups would choose the optimal moment to attack or retreat, often based on environmental conditions or the status of their resources. Rapid movement and quick decision-making were vital for surprise attacks or quick escapes. Managing the length of conflicts was essential to ensure resources were not depleted and to avoid prolonged vulnerability. Even with basic communication, coordination among group members was necessary to execute effective hunting strategies or defensive actions.

Regarding space, natural features like hills, caves, and water sources were used for shelter, ambushes, and strategic advantages. Placing groups in advantageous locations, such as high ground or hidden areas, gave early humans an edge over their enemies or prey. Skilled maneuvering through familiar terrain allowed for effective hunting and evasion tactics. Securing vital areas like water sources, fertile land, or resource-rich zones was crucial for survival and dominance.

These aspects of time and space allowed prehistoric humans to enhance their chances of survival and success in their conflicts and daily struggles. From these experiences, humans would continue to develop and refine their strategies, laying the foundation for more sophisticated tactics in future warfare. As societies evolved, these early timing, positioning, and resource management lessons informed the complex military doctrines that would shape human history.

Leveraging time and space became integral to warfare and the broader context of human organization and development, which caused some to theorize on the subject. Therefore, a short introduction to some of these thinkers is imperative, starting with the ancient world and working to the present. We begin with Sun Tzu.

From the ancient period, Sun Tzu’s (c. 544–496 BC)The Art of War emphasizes the importance of timing and spatial advantage. He writes about the need to adapt to changing circumstances and to use the terrain to one’s advantage. He argues that the effective use of time and space can determine the outcome of battles.

Thucydides’ (c. 460–395 BC) History of the Peloponnesian War discussed the strategic use of naval and land forces, highlighting the importance of logistics, troop movement, and attack timing.

Alexander the Great’s (356–323 BC) campaigns showcased the effective use of time and space. He used rapid movements over vast distances and diverse terrains to outmaneuver enemies. His battles, such as Gaugamela, demonstrated the importance of timely and precise deployments.

Julius Caesar’s (100–44 BC) Commentaries on the Gallic War documented the strategic use of time and space in military campaigns, including the rapid construction of fortifications and the use of geographical features to gain tactical advantages.

Vegetius’ (c. 4th century AD) Epitoma Rei Militaris emphasized the importance of logistics, training, and the strategic use of fortifications. Vegetius discussed the significance of preparation and the timing of maneuvers.

During the medieval period, Byzantine Emperor Maurice’s (6th century AD) manual Strategikon outlined the importance of mobility, terrain use, and attack timing. It also highlighted the need for adaptability and the strategic use of cavalry.

Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1469–1527)The Art of War advocated for a military organization based on Roman principles during the Renaissance and early modern period. It emphasized the importance of terrain and the timing of engagements and highlighted the need for flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances.

Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780–1831) On War introduced the “culminating point” concept in warfare, where the balance of time and space would favor one side. Clausewitz emphasized the fog of war, the importance of timing in attacks, and the use of geography to achieve strategic goals.

Antoine-Henri Jomini’s (1779–1869) Summary of the Art of War focused on the principles of interior lines and the importance of time and space in achieving decisive victories. Jomini emphasized the rapid concentration of forces at critical points.

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840–1914) The Influence of Sea Power upon History highlighted the strategic importance of naval power and the control of maritime space. Mahan discussed how naval supremacy could influence the timing and outcome of wars.

World War I and II showcased the significant role of logistics, the strategic use of terrain, and the timing of large-scale operations. The introduction of mechanized warfare and air power revolutionized the concepts of time and space in military theory.

During the modern era, nuclear strategy took precedence. The Cold War introduced the concept of deterrence, where the control of space (through missile deployment) and the timing of potential retaliatory strikes played crucial roles in maintaining the balance of power.

During the information age, military theory incorporates cyber warfare, space warfare, and real-time intelligence, exponentially expanding the concepts of time and space to include the virtual domain, where the speed of information and control of digital spaces are critical.

In summary, the strategic use of time and space remains a cornerstone of military theory, continually evolving with technological advancements and shifting geopolitical landscapes. While the concepts of time and space in warfare are universal, their application of military doctrine varies depending on the territorial size of the nation.

How Geography Shapes Time and Space in Military Doctrine and Theory

The geographic context significantly influences a nation’s military doctrine about spatial and temporal considerations. Essentially, military doctrine is designed to anticipate the preferred mode of warfare, although it may not align with the actual circumstances encountered.

This impacts military tactics, operations, strategy, and the nation’s infrastructure and economy. Larger geographical areas require more resources than smaller ones, including transportation, communication, and supply lines. However, this relationship can be nuanced, and several factors can influence the resource demands, effectively altering the offensive and defensive capabilities in said space.

Terrain and topography can be challenging if the area is mountainous, heavily forested, or a desert. These types of terrain can be more complex and resource-intensive to navigate and control than flat or open terrain for both the host nation and the invader. Because of this, the infrastructure, whether the presence or absence thereof, will significantly impact resource requirements for transportation and logistics. Densely populated areas may require more resources for maintaining order, providing services, and ensuring effective communication. At the same time, a sparsely populated area might need extensive communication networks and longer supply lines to reach dispersed inhabitants.

Weather is essential for those defending and invading, as harsh weather conditions (e.g., cold, heat, or heavy rainfall) can increase the need for specialized equipment, shelter, and additional logistics support. At the same time, seasonal variants and changes can affect an area’s accessibility and resource requirements. Because of this, the economic development of regions with established industries might have better infrastructure and resources in place, reducing the need for additional inputs. Meanwhile, underdeveloped regions may need more critical infrastructure, necessitating more transportation, communication, and supply network investments, which are strategically important.

The importance of infrastructure is another area of strategic value (e.g., ports, airports, crossroads, resource-rich regions), requiring a concentration of resources to secure and maintain control, especially in core areas. Core areas are high-value targets due to their significant infrastructure. Military doctrine often includes detailed plans for defending these areas because their loss could cripple military operations and destabilize the economy. However, the strategic value of core areas to invading armies is significant. Once controlled, these areas offer economic benefits, meet logistical needs, and enable the establishment of forward bases and defensive positions to better position forces strategically.

While core areas are desirable due to their resources and infrastructure, peripheral areas often lack these assets and are found less desirable. Military doctrine typically designates peripheral areas as low-priority. Because of this, peripheral areas tend to take to asymmetric warfare due to the lack of military presence.

Asymmetric warfare significantly alters the dimensions of space and time in war, introducing complexities that traditional warfare often does not encounter. When it comes to space in asymmetric warfare, the fluidity of the battlefield becomes non-linear since asymmetric engagements do not adhere to traditional frontlines. Guerrilla fighters move fluidly across vast territories, making the battlefield unpredictable and widespread. This use of terrain allows the guerrilla fighters to exploit challenging topography—mountains, forests, urban areas—leveraging local knowledge to their advantage, making it difficult for conventional forces to track and engage them.

Guerrillas often operate and blend within civilian populations, complicating conventional force’s task of distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Thus, the operational space expands into urban and populated areas and becomes nuanced. This pressures conventional forces to spread out and cover more ground, diluting their combat effectiveness due to the creation of multiple fronts.

When it comes to time, in asymmetric warfare, protracted conflicts extend the duration of the war, which tends to drag out over more extended periods. Guerrillas avoid confrontation and focus on defeating the enemy over time through persistent, small-scale attacks. This type of war places tremendous psychological pressure on the conventional forces, and the sustained nature of guerrilla tactics aims to exhaust the opponent’s will to fight, eroding morale and political support over time. The operational tempo and the unpredictable nature of guerrilla attacks involve strategic decision-making regarding the timing and location of these actions. The intended goal is to maximize impact while circumventing fortified enemy positions. This irregular tempo disrupts conventional military operations. This operational flexibility allows guerrilla fighters to adapt quickly to changing circumstances, exploiting brief windows of opportunity that conventional forces might not be able to respond to as swiftly.

Overall, the strategic impact of asymmetric warfare on space and time strains resource allocation. Conventional forces must allocate significant resources to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to track guerrilla movements, often stretching their capabilities thin. Guerrilla warfare imposes disproportionate costs on conventional armies, requiring more resources to effectively counter small, mobile units. Conventional forces must adapt their strategies to combat this, incorporating counterinsurgency tactics that emphasize winning hearts and minds, improving intelligence gathering, and building local alliances. This comprehensive approach to guerrilla warfare often requires a multi-faceted approach, integrating military, political, economic, and social efforts to undermine guerrilla support and address the root causes of the conflict.

An Example of How the Size of a Nation Can Influence Military Doctrine

As mentioned, a nation’s geography determines and significantly influences the concepts of time and space in military doctrine. Here is an example of how the size of a nation influences its military doctrine, particularly in terms of time and space, by briefly looking at the Ukraine-Russia conflict:

Strategic Depth and Geographic Considerations:

  • Large Nations:
    • Strategic Depth: Larger nations, such as Russia, enjoy a significant advantage in terms of strategic depth. This advantage allows them to withstand and absorb initial attacks and engage in prolonged conflicts without facing an immediate threat to their essential territories. This depth allows Russia to execute strategic maneuvers, regroup, and launch counterattacks from well-protected positions deep within its territory.
    • Geographic Diversity: A sprawling nation like Russia boasts a rich tapestry of terrain, ranging from dense forests to towering mountains and bustling urban centers. This varied landscape offers abundant opportunities for leveraging strategic defenses and launching tactical offensives.
    • Extended Frontlines: The vast territory also means extended frontlines, which require significant resources to defend and maintain supply lines.
  • Smaller Nations:
    • Limited Depth: Countries with smaller land areas, like Ukraine, have limited strategic depth. This means that they have less distance to fall back on if attacked, making them more susceptible to swift advances by an enemy. As a result, these countries must be more proactive and effective in defending their territory.
    • Concentration of Forces: Smaller countries might strategically position their military resources in vital regions to protect important locations and infrastructure.
    • Territorial Constraints: The limited size of the territory constricts the capacity to employ flexible defense strategies, thereby demanding resourceful utilization of the available space.

Time Considerations

Operational Tempo and Duration:

  • Large Nations:
    • Protracted Engagements: Larger nations can be involved in extended conflicts due to their ability to sustain longer supply lines, rotate troops to maintain troop morale and effectiveness, and maintain high levels of industrial production to support their war efforts. These factors allow larger nations to maintain a sustained military presence and effectively carry out their strategic objectives over a prolonged period.
    • Operational Flexibility: They possess the strategic flexibility to execute extended deep operations, apply delaying tactics to slow down the enemy’s advance, and make strategic withdrawals, all while being able to regroup and launch powerful counterattacks when necessary.
    • War of Attrition: A larger nation may opt for a strategy of attrition, gradually employing tactics to weaken the enemy’s capabilities over an extended period. This approach involves applying sustained pressure and gradually depleting the enemy’s resources to outlast and defeat them through a war of endurance.
  • Smaller Nations:
    • Need for Swift Actions: Smaller nations frequently need rapid and conclusive victories to uphold morale and garner international backing. Prolonged conflicts can deplete their resources and diminish public support over time.
    • Asymmetric Warfare: This type of warfare utilizes guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks to disrupt and impede the advance of the larger opposing force.
    • Defensive Focus: The primary focus is establishing a sturdy and swift defense. This involves using fortified positions, navigating urban warfare scenarios, and leveraging local terrain knowledge to overcome potential shortcomings in depth.

Application to Ukraine-Russia Conflict

Russia’s Approach:

  • Multidomain Deep Battle: Utilizing its expansive geography, Russia implements multidomain deep battle strategies, merging land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains to disrupt and overpower Ukrainian defenses.
  • Strategic Bombardment: Long-range artillery, missile strikes, and air campaigns target Ukrainian infrastructure, military positions, and supply lines far from the front lines.
  • Sustained Pressure: Russia’s capacity to uphold extended military campaigns is readily apparent through its ongoing application of pressure across several strategic fronts. This is made possible by leveraging its extensive strategic depth and abundant resources, enabling sustained operations in various theaters of conflict.

Ukraine’s Approach:

  • Adaptive Defense: Ukraine has had to adapt its strategies to compensate for its smaller size, focusing on agile, mobile defense tactics and leveraging international support.
  • Rapid Response: The Ukrainian military prioritizes rapid response and flexible tactics, using local knowledge and smaller, more mobile units to counter Russian advances early in the war.
  • International Support: Continuous support from NATO and EU countries is crucial for Ukraine, providing advanced weaponry, intelligence, and training to enhance its defense capabilities.

It is evident that a nation’s physical size significantly impacts its military doctrine and approach to warfare. In the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Russia leverages its considerable size and diverse military capabilities to execute multidomain deep battle tactics. In contrast, Ukraine relies on adaptability, international support, and asymmetric tactics to defend against its larger adversary. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for a deeper analysis of the conflict and anticipating future developments.

Conclusion

The integration of time and space forms a fundamental element of military doctrine, influencing the strategic planning and execution of operations, logistics, and tactics by nations. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a prominent example of the profound influence of these principles. Russia’s vast geographical expanse and multifaceted capabilities exemplify a sophisticated utilization of time and space to establish strategic depth and operational adaptability. However, the fluid nature of contemporary warfare is conspicuous as smaller forces, such as Ukraine, have demonstrated their ability to employ time and space to offset a more substantial adversary through rapid adaptation and asymmetric tactics with international backing.


Time and space in war extend into cyberspace, where battles are fought on digital terrain, and timing is critical. Cyber operations can disrupt enemy communications, delay responses, and create strategic advantages, demonstrating that control over cyberspace and timing can be as decisive as traditional physical maneuvers.


Understanding the origins and fundamental principles of time and space in warfare is crucial for analyzing current conflicts and predicting future military developments. By appreciating how time and space influence war and politics, we gain deeper insights into the strategies and outcomes that define tomorrow’s battles.

References

Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander. Penguin UK, 2003.

Caesar, Julius, and Carolyn Hammond. Seven Commentaries on the Gallic War. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Carl Von Clausewitz, and J J Graham. On War. United States: Value Classic Reprints, 2017.

Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, 2022.

Flavius Vegetius. De RE MILITARI by VEGETIUS. Independently Published, 2019.

Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (Soviet (Russian) Military Theory and Practice). Fort Leavenworth, KS: Routledge, 2012.

Griffith, Samuel B. The Art of War. London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Guderian, Heinz. Achtung Panzer! London: Cassell, 1999.

Habeck, Mary R. Storm of Steel the Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2017.

Isserson, G S, and Bruce Menning. The Evolution of Operational Art. Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013.

Jomini, Antoine Henri, and O F Winship. Summary of the Art of War: Or, a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. San Bernardino, Ca: Forgotten Books, 2015.

Mahan, A. T. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 – the Original Classic Edition. Dayboro: Emereo Pub., 2012.

Maurikios, and George T Dennis. Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.

Niccolò Machiavelli, and Christopher Lynch. Art of War. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2008.

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The Gear and Guts of the Mongol Military—Part I

Much is known about the ancient Mongol military and their incredible victories on the battlefield, but little is ever discussed about their arms, armor, horses, and logistics. What gear did they use? How did they deal with their wounded? How did they partner with horses to become masters of the steppe?

Indeed, it’s said there was no separate word for ‘soldier’ in the Middle Mongol language, meaning that the society was so adept at survival and conquering that there was little difference in preparedness between a civilian and a warrior. This may have been one of the keys to their adaptability, and ultimate success.

Here we take a detailed look into the Mongol military apparatus (Arms, Armor, Supplies, Horses, and Medicine): How did they do it?

The Lightning-Quick Light Cavalryman

The attire of the Mongol light cavalryman was no different from his everyday outfit. The Mongol warrior’s attire was practical, in the sense that its main function was to protect him from the harsh conditions of the climate he traversed. His undershirt was long with wide sleeves. His attire consisted of a heavy, double-breasted knee-length coat called deel or degel.

A Mongolian coat, or deel

A Mongolian coat, or deel (CC BY-SA 3.0)

This coat was secured with a button a few inches below the armpit and was fastened by a leather belt at the waist. Furthermore, the Mongols utilized two types of coats. One was a heavy coat for the colder seasons but they also wore a coat to keep them dry from the rains during the warmer seasons. As for material, Flemish Franciscan monk, William of Rubruck (1210-ca. 1270) said that the “poor make their outside (gowns) of dog and kid (skins).” As for pants, Rubruck mentions that they “make also breeches with furs,” and “line their clothes with cotton cloth, or with the fine wool which they are able to pick out of the coarser.”

When it comes to armor, many Mongols did not wear much, particularly lamellar. The reason was that the role of the light cavalryman was to be light, flexible, agile, and above all, fast.

This Japanese lamellar cuirass was typically too heavy for light cavalry

This Japanese lamellar cuirass was typically too heavy for light cavalry (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Other items that a light cavalryman would have used, as well did the heavy cavalryman, were “two or three bows or at least one good one, and three large quivers filled with arrows” along with a sword, which hung from his belt. He may have carried a dagger, axe, or both. His coat pocket possibly consisted of a sharpening stone for weapons and arrowheads, or perishable items, such as dried meat, dried curds, perhaps berries.

Steadfast and Indomitable Heavy Cavalrymen

William of Rubruck describes heavy cavalry as wearing the same clothing as light cavalry underneath their armor when they went on military campaigns. However, most heavy cavalrymen were wealthy and could afford, particularly later on, better clothing to wear.

The voyage of William of Rubruck in 1253–1255. Franciscan missionary and explorer, he documented details of the Mongol Empire

The voyage of William of Rubruck in 1253–1255. Franciscan missionary and explorer, he documented details of the Mongol Empire (Public Domain)

“Of their clothing and customs you must know, that from Cataia [China], and other regions of the east, and also from Persia and other regions of the south, are brought to them silken and golden stuffs and cloth of cotton, which they wear in summer. From Ruscia, Moxel, and from Greater Bulgaria [a region in the middle Volga, not to be confused with minor Bulgaria mentioned above] and Pascatir [a region between the upperl Volga and Ural R.], which is greater Hungary, and Kerkis [Kerghiz], all of which are countries to the north and full of forests, and which obey them, are brought to them costly furs of many kinds, which I never saw in our parts, and which they wear in winter. And they always make in winter at least two fur gowns, one with the fur against the body, the other with the fur outside exposed to the wind and snow; these latter are usually of the skins of wolves or foxes or papions; and while they sit in the dwelling they have another lighter one.”

Mongols cavalry outside Vladimir presumably demanding submission before its sacking

Mongols cavalry outside Vladimir presumably demanding submission before its sacking (Public Domain)

Besides clothes, John of Plano Carpini describes the type of armor the Mongol heavy cavalrymen wore:

“Some have cuirasses and protection for their horses, fashioned out of leather in the following manner: they take strips of ox-hide or the skin of another animal, a hand’s breadth wide and cover three or four together with pitch, and they fasten them with leather thongs or cord; in the upper strip they put the lace at one end, in the next they put it in the middle and so on to the end; consequently, when they bend, the lower strips come up over the upper ones and thus there is a double or triple thickness over the body.”

The cuirass they wore consisted of small scales of iron, leather, or bone known in lamellar armor. As for the description provided by Carpini, it appears that the Mongol warriors he encountered were wearing lamellar armor made of leather scales. Softening leather by boiling and afterwards coating the leather with a lacquer made from pitch made it waterproof. The cuirass weighed roughly 20 lbs (9 kg). To add further protection, the rider might have worn his heavy coat under the cuirass, and reinforced it with metal plates or perhaps leather, depending on what was available at his disposal.

Statue of an armored Mongol warrior with a cheetah

Statue of an armored Mongol warrior with a cheetah (Enerelt/CC BY-SA 3.0)

Mongols who owned lamellar preferred it to mail, even though mail armor was rare. The reason for this was that lamellar armor provided better protection against arrows than mail. According to David Nicolle, “Test have shown that mail can absorb arrows shot from a reasonable distance, but it could not prevent them causing minor wounds. Lamellar armor, however, was much more effective against arrows.” To add further protection, the Mongols learned from the Chinese of the stopping power of silk. Heavy cavalrymen would wear a heavy protective silk undershirt underneath their armor. Even if the arrow penetrated the lamellar or mail armor, it might not penetrate the silk. Instead, the arrow might become twisted in the silk as it entered the body, thus cleaning the wound, or perhaps even treating it with the plant dyes (such as turmeric) used in the dyeing process of the garment. Furthermore, wearing a silk undershirt made it easier to extract the arrow from the body without doing further damage.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel. The arms could be uncovered in hot weather.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel. The arms could be uncovered in hot weather. (Public Domain)

As for horse armor, the Mongol heavy cavalrymen would outfit their horses in five parts:

“they put one piece along each side of the horse which protects it from the tail to the head and is tied to the saddle, behind the saddle on the back, and at the neck. Over the horse’s back they put another piece where the two parts of the harness are joined and they make a hole in this piece through which they expose the tail, while in front of the chest they place a piece that protects every-thing from the knees or the knee joints. On the forehead they put an iron plate which is tied on each side of the neck.”

Boots for Riding

Boots were also crucial to the rider. The Mongol boot was designed for standing in the stirrups, which provided the rider a platform to fire at a quick gallop. Mongol cavalrymen wore sturdy, thick inflexible soled heelless boots, with the rigid toe turned upwards, and was made from leather and felt that provided protection from the bitter cold of the steppes and their legs from chafing due to rubbing against the horses back. The source of the leather comes from horses according to Rubruck in which he states, “With the hind part of the hide of horses they make most beautiful shoes.” Even though heavy, the boots were comfortable enough for the rider to tuck his pants in before tying the laces. To absorb perspiration, the Mongols wore socks made of felt, which kept his feet warm, especially since the boot was lined with fur, making it unlikely that his feet would get cold.

Mongolian boot style, for a child and adult.

Mongolian boot style, for a child and adult. (Public Domain)

Practical Headgear

Headwear of the Mongols came in two types; The majority of horse archers donned the fur cap. The fur cap was conical in shape and made from quality material. It had reversible earflaps and brim for the summer and winter.

Portrait of Ogedei Khan with a fur cap.

Portrait of Ogedei Khan with a fur cap. (Public Domain)

Those who were heavy cavalry also wore a conical helmet made of harden leather or one of iron. According to Carpini, “The Tartar helmet has a crown made of iron or steel, but the part that extends around the neck and throat is of leather,” which had been harden and was composed of various sizes of iron and steel plates, and probably lined with fur. Unlike the fur cap, earflaps on the iron helmet were optional. The heavy cavalryman’s helmet had two slots where the flaps could be attached to better protect his ears. To add further protection, iron plated lamellar neck guard was included.

The helmet of a Mongolian soldier

The helmet of a Mongolian soldier (CC BY-SA 3.0)

While the Mongol helmet was conical in shape, it was thought to be taller and pointier than the traditional Chinese helmets. For a long time, no helmets were known to have survived Mongol China. However, Randall Sasaki in his book The Origins of the Lost Fleet of the Mongol Empire mentions that five “well-preserved iron helmets were discovered” and that the “diameter of these helmets is 22 to 23 cm, and their height is 12 to 15 cm. A few helmets appear to be thicker at one end. All of the helmets seem to have had an attachment at the top where a pointed protrusion was located.”

The Might of the Sword

When it comes to swords, the Mongols had a variety of types. In both of the modern-day nations of Russia and Mongolia, archaeologists have found swords belonging to the Mongols. The swords varied in design as some were broad and straight, like European blades, while others had a slight curve. Both types of swords were single edged, roughly one meter (three feet) in length, and were designed for cutting rather than stabbing.

The sabre [left] and the scimitar [right] were curved swords of a type as used by the Mongol military

The sabre [left] and the scimitar [right] were curved swords of a type as used by the Mongol military (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The majority of Mongol soldiers never carried swords during the early stages of the Empire. It appears that swords were reserved for the elite during that time. Much later, western writers like Carpini and Rubruck described the Mongol warrior as carrying bows, arrows, and axes. Thomas of Spalato describes the Mongols in a similar fashion but that they carried swords as well. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi mentions that the Mongols were using swords during their engagements against the Khwarazm Empire from 1219-1221. Marco Polo also describes their use of swords along with maces and shields during his time among them.

Overall, swords were not a weapon so desired by the Mongols like those in the rest of Eurasia. To the Mongols, the sword was a symbol of power only reserved for the elite. As time passed, people conquered, territory expanded, and the Mongols slowly adopted the sword. They were now in charge of large urban areas which effectively took them off their horse and placed them in the streets.

The Famous Bow

Of all the weapons utilized by the Mongols, the bow stood forefront in their war arsenal. But this should come to no surprise since it was steppe peoples’ weapon of choice throughout their history. The bow used by the Mongols was the composite bow.

Hulagu Khan with the older composite bow used during the time of the Mongol conquest. It is smaller in size and has no string bridges.

Hulagu Khan with the older composite bow used during the time of the Mongol conquest. It is smaller in size and has no string bridges. (Public Domain)

The composite bow consisted of horn, wood, sinew, and glue. The wood used for constructing the core of the bow was made from a variety, such as larch, birch, and elm. Of the woods considered, bamboo, (which is not a wood but a strong grass), was most desirable for its lack of grain and strength. With grain absent, bamboo reduced the risk of developing twists in the limbs and was desired due to being stronger than wood. Bamboo would have to be imported, however.

Bamboo was preferred in Mongolian bows

Bamboo was preferred in Mongolian bows (Manfred Heyde/CC BY-SA 3.0)

When Genghis Khan conquered northern China, he had direct accesses to the commodity. Once the material for the core had been selected and cured, ibex horn was used, or sometimes bone. In order to apply horn or bone to the core, it had to be softened by boiling. As for the backing, sinew was used (from an animal, possibly ibex), and the Achilles tendon was preferred. To prepare the sinew, the tendons had to be dried and crushed to a mass of loose fiber. Once this was done, the sinew was mixed with an adhesive made from boiled-down animal tendons or fish bones. The bowyer had to be careful when applying the sinew mixed with glue to the core— as to little would be weak and too much made the bow stiff. Once the sides were glued to the core, the bow was set aside to dry. As it dried, it began to harden and form. The total process from beginning to end may have taken up to a year to finish and once complete, the bow was ready to be personalized by its owner with decorations, and then stored in a leather case.

A Timurid depiction of a Mongol archer, 15th century

A Timurid depiction of a Mongol archer, 15th century (Public Domain)

With the quality makeup of the bow came its power.

The shape of the Mongol bow was a flattened and curved shape of an “M”. The general range of the Mongol bow was 300 meters (984 feet) with a tremendous range of 500 meters (1640 feet). Overall, it’s believed a Mongol horse archer could hit his target from point blank to potentially 550 yards. ‘Potentially’, because a thirteenth century report says that one of Genghis Khan’s master archers made a 428-yard shot (1284 feet). Of course, it becomes more difficult to hit the target from a great range unless that target is a moving mass of soldiers.

The size of the bow was roughly 120 centimeters (48 inches) in length. The draw weight of the bow had a tremendous pull between 100-170 pounds (45-77 kg). Of course, this depended on the strength of the archer. However, pulling the bow to its maximum potential was rare. Instead, the Mongol horse archers relied on rapid fire. He would do this by rapidly pulling the bowstring back only a short distance before release, and only did so when the hooves of the horse were off the ground. This allowed the archer to concentrate on his target.

In combat, the Mongol cavalry punished enemy forces with a constant barrage of arrows at 200 paces and penetrated armor at 100 yards (300 feet). Furthermore, the Mongol archer would carry two bows with him on campaign. One bow was used for long range and the other for short distance shots. Some suggest that the use of the bow for short distance shots was utilized when the soldier had dismounted.

To shoot the composite bow, the Mongol archer would wear a thumb ring and draw the string with his ring and forefinger, known as the Mongolian Draw. The thumb ring was developed by Steppe peoples in order to shoot faster and effectively from horseback at full gallop.

7th century Mughal thumb ring made of walrus ivory.

7th century Mughal thumb ring made of walrus ivory. (Public Domain)

The thumb ring was made from a variety of materials such as horn, bone, metal, leather, stone, and ivory. The thumb ring provided two advantages to the archers. The ring eased the pressure of the string on the thumb, which allows the archer to fire arrows faster upon release and with better accuracy since the placement of the arrow was on the same side of the shooting hand. As well, the Mongolian Draw was said to be superior to the three-finger release.

A ‘Mongolian Draw’ [left] versus a ‘Mediterranean Draw’ [right]

A ‘Mongolian Draw’ [left] versus a ‘Mediterranean Draw’ [right] (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Overall, the Mongol cavalryman and his composite bow delivered a devastating punch. Latham and Paterson in their book “Saracen Archery” mention the bow’s tremendous power and elegant design:

“Since such composites can withstand an enormous amount of bend, shortness of length could be achieved in design, and this feature made them very suitable weapons for the mounted archer.”

Mongol cavalrymen during the time of the Mongol conquest used a smaller bow suitable for horse archery.

Mongol cavalrymen during the time of the Mongol conquest used a smaller bow suitable for horse archery. (Public Domain)

“In a well-designed bow the weight should increase quickly during the first few inches of the draw, after which the rate of increase should diminish as the draw progresses. This quality was achieved in the East by fitting of a rigid end-piece (in Arabic, siyah, pl. siyat) to each end of the bow. When they bow was about half-drawn, the siyat began to act as levers so that the draw could be continued with less increase in the weight than would have been the case without them … For a given weight at full draw – this quantity depending on the archer’s strength – the composite bow stores a great amount of energy, which is then available for transfer to the arrow when the string is loosed.
When the siyat project away from the archer before the braced bow is drawn, as in the case with the Manchu and Mongolian bows … a string-bridge is fitted to prevent the string from slipping past the knee of the bow; for should this happen the latter would violently assume its unbraced shape and virtually turn itself inside out.”

Top Image: Painting depicting the Battle of Cheoin (Korea) between Goryeo and Mongol Empire forces in the Korean peninsula in 1232; Deriv. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Thomas J. Craughwell, The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in History: How Genghis Khan’s Mongols Almost Conquered the World (Beverly, Mass: Fair Winds Press, 2010).

Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History (London: Reaktion Books, 2012).

Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System (Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007).

Richard D. McCreight, Mongol Warrior Epic: Masters of Thirteenth Century Maneuver Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College 1983).

Marco Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian: Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East. Volume 2 edited and translated by Henry Yule. 3rdedition (London: J. Murray, 1929).

Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1961).

George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Vol 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University press, 1953).

Tracy, Larissa. Wounds and Wound Repair in Medieval Culture. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

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The Mongol Military – Part II

 

Genghis Khan, founder and emperor of the Mongol Empire rarely needs an introduction, but it is crucial in understanding how he gained his place in history by examining the Mongol military organization he pieced together to become one the world’s greatest fighting machines ever seen. How did he do it?

[Read Part 1]

Military Organization

Mongol military organization based on decimal lines under Genghis Khan was nothing new. Other steppe peoples, like the Khitan and Jurched had been using the same system for many years beforehand. Genghis Khan was introduced to this military system during his time with Ong Khan. The system introduced by Genghis Khan to the Mongols was structured as arban, jagun, minqan, and tumen.

Mongol military leadership started with the arban at the bottom of the chain. Every Mongol warrior belonged to an arban. An arban consisted of 10 men with one being the commander. Ten arbans equaled one jagun (plural jaghut) consisting of 100 men. Ten jagunt consisted of 1000 men and formed a minqan(plural minqat). Ten minqat formed one tumen (plural tumet) consisting of 10,000 men.

10 men = 1 arban

100 men = 1 jagun

1000 men = 1 minqan

10000 men = 1 tumen

100000 men = 1 Tuc

The military organizational structure was divided into three corps that consisted of the baraghun ghar (right flank), je’un ghar (left flank), and tob or gol(center or pivot). To move this large army the command structure of course started with the Great Khan, who issued orders to three commanders in charge of the three tumen. See the figure below.

Chart showing command structure of Mongol leaders.

Chart showing command structure of Mongol leaders.

To break down the chain of command further, Marco Polo provides more detail:

You see, when a Tartar prince goes forth to war, he takes with him, say, one hundred thousand horse. Well, he appoints an officer to every ten men, one to every hundred, one to every thousand, and one to every ten thousand, so that his own orders have to be given to ten persons only, and each of these ten persons has to pass the orders only to other ten, and so on; no one having to give orders to more than ten. And every one in turn is responsible only to the officer immediately over him; and the discipline and order that comes of this method is marvelous, for they are a people very obedient to their chiefs.

Even though Marco Polo wrote this during the time of Kublai Khan, the document indicates that the military organization Genghis Khan had set in place was still in use and relatively unchanged. Furthermore, Marco Polo’s description shows how well organized the Mongol military staff was, and indicates the effectiveness of this system to rapidly relay orders from the top down and information from the bottom up. This allowed swift changes to be made during the thick of battle.

With such a large army on hand, every Mongol preformed certain duties within the camp. Some were in charge of carrying bows and arrows. Others were responsible for the manufacturing of the arrows. Some were responsible for food and drink. Others were responsible for watching over the sheep and horses in the pasturage. Carts were of great importance and men were assigned to prepare, repair, and watch over them. Carrying swords was another duty. Overseeing the domestic staff was another. Lastly, two men would serve as guardians of the assembly. Overall, every Mongol soldier had a duty to perform and most likely rotated out to perform other tasks once or every two weeks. Leaving one Mongol unit for another was unheard of. The Persian historian and bureaucrat Juvayni (1226–1283) noted, “No man may depart to another unit than the hundred, thousand, or ten to which he has been assigned, nor may he seek refuge elsewhere.” The organization of the Mongol support structure looked something like this:

Organization of Mongol support structure.

Organization of Mongol support structure.

Military Training and the Great Hunt

When it came to military training, the Mongols would take part in a great hunt called the Nerge. The Nerge was a way for the Great Khan, starting with Genghis Khan, to see how well his commanders led their men on a hunting expedition and how well the soldiers performed. The Nerge was nothing more than a war game but an important one at that. Genghis Khan and his descendants understood the importance of military exercise.

The Mongols partook in the Nerge every winter. Before winter arrived the Great Khan would send out orders to his commanders to send seven out of ten men with arms to participate in the hunt. Once the men arrived, they would be placed under one of three military wings: the right wing, left wing, or center army. Afterwards the Great Khan would arrive with his huge entourage of ladies, concubines, food and drink.

Genghis Khan.

Genghis Khan. (Public Domain)

Once all was ready, they armies pushed ahead slowly forming a large circle. For two to three months, they would slowly push forward, disrupting the habitat before them and causing millions of creatures to rush away from the oncoming line of cavalry. The goal was to make sure that no animal escaped the ring. If any animal were to escape, the commanders, along with the men were severely punished for being irresponsible. Once the ring was tight enough, it was ten miles in circumference.

Afterwards, the Great Khan would enter the circle, which at that time would be teeming with wild animals, and he would pull back his bowstring and fire an arrow at his prey. After the Great Khan had finished, the princes would take their turn and soon after the commanders and the lower ranks. This carnage would go on for several days before a group of old men would come forth and beg the Great Khan to allow the remaining animals to go free to find food and water. As for the dead animals, the Khan’s men would begin gathering the corpses which were counted and each warrior received his share.

While one would think that the Nerge taught little to the Mongol armies since many were already familiar with such training, as it was a part of their culture. But the training was necessary to sharpen the skills of those commanders and their soldiers. Such drills exercised the army as a whole and taught the individual warrior much. Mass training allowed the Mongols practice, horsemanship, strategy, tactics, and communications at a distance, since they used signals to coordinate precise tactical maneuvers with strategic precision. Such actions during the heat of battle, (or even if in a great hunt), allows commanders and lower ranking officers and soldiers, to react to any situation without waiting for orders from above.

Mongol soldiers using bows

Mongol soldiers using bows (Public Domain)

Genghis Khan and his great commanders, like Subutai, educated the officers and the common soldier in the ability to be flexible. With flexibility came the ability to adapt under any condition and once the army, whether on a macro or micro level, became comfortable with their surroundings, that is when the lethality of the army can be coordinated on the intended target.

War Games

Besides the Nerge was the sham-fight. The sham-fight was what we call today war games, where two armies face in a nonlethal contest. Genghis Khan understood that while hunting, cornering, and engaging the animals was one way to train an army, the idea of actual mock combat was another. During the sham-fight, Genghis Khan would have large forces square off against one another. Large Mongol forces, perhaps two tumen, would engage in a ballet of attacking, retreating, and wheeling as a unit. The men partaking in this fight would be close kin to one another and the side that lost felt disgrace. The goal was to see who could out maneuver the other in a series of circumventive moves. Forces from both sides would continue to probe each other’s lines until one side out-flanked or pierced the enemy’s center.

The Mongols at war.

The Mongols at war. (Public Domain)

The sham-fight sharpened the skills and senses of the Mongol officers and the soldiers under their command. Furthermore, it tested the clarity of the crucial bidirectional flow of information during the organized chaos of mock combat. It allowed commanders to reevaluate how fast their units reacted to orders and how their officers and subordinate military units responded.

Mongol War Academy

While the Nerge taught much to all ranks, those who wished to further their understanding in the art of war attended an academy. The Mongol war academy came about due to Genghis Khan’s keen understanding of the ever-changing nature of warfare. This willingness to learn from setbacks and even victory filled a void in an officer’s education. However, this academy did not come until sometime later.

Any officer who desired to lead a Mongol regiment had to attend this academy. The education primarily focused on the art of siege warfare. The reason for making siege warfare the Mongol focus was due to challenge in dealing with the fortified cities throughout northern China.

The officer in question would be trained by Chinese siege experts in how to best approach the walls of the city. These educators would train the officers in the use of large shields that provided suitable protection to the soldiers advancing towards the walls. Once close enough, the officers would be instructed in the deployment and use of storming-ladders and sandbags. When the officer had completed his training, he would take back the knowledge to his men where they would make the devices needed, train with them and store them in special arsenals for future use under the supervision of the officer appointed to provide such crucial support when needed.

While training in siege warfare was a major focus in the Mongol military, the actual experience the officers underwent in scaling fortress walls was valuable in training future officers. Besides siege warfare, the experience the officers faced in battle was also crucial in preparing future officers. The diverse strategies and tactics utilized by their enemies were taught to younger officers. In this way, those future officers would learn how to approach the enemy, how the enemy might approach them, and the best way to counterattack their efforts to defeat them. Such military exercises cultivated the young officer’s mind to help him perform with near precision on the field of battle.

Reconstruction of a Mongol warrior.

Reconstruction of a Mongol warrior. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

In conclusion, the Mongol military organization was in many ways ahead of its time. It reminds one the old Roman system and of the more modern armies to come many centuries after the Mongol rampage throughout Eurasia. Overall, Genghis Khan did well in creating and establishing a fighting machine the world has never forgotten, but continues to mesmerize us by its sheer ability to innovate, adapt, and overcome nearly all obstacles thrown its way.

Top Image: Deriv; Illustration of Yesugei, Temujin’s father (CC BY-SA 3.0) and a battle between Mongols and Chinese (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Thomas J. Craughwell, The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in History: How Genghis Khan’s Mongols Almost Conquered the World (Beverly, Mass: Fair Winds Press, 2010).

Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History (London: Reaktion Books, 2012).

Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System (Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007).

Richard D. McCreight, Mongol Warrior Epic: Masters of Thirteenth Century Maneuver Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College 1983).

Marco Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian: Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East. Volume 2 edited and translated by Henry Yule. 3rdedition (London: J. Murray, 1929).

Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1961).

George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Vol 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University press, 1953).

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The Mongol Military – Part I

 

Genghis Khan, founder and emperor of the Mongol Empire rarely needs an introduction, but it is crucial in understanding how he gained his place in history by examining the Mongol military organization he pieced together to become one the world’s greatest fighting machines ever seen.

So how did Genghis Khan take the Mongols and turn them into a fighting machine? It starts with abandonment.

The Abandonment of Temujin and Rise of Genghis

It was through his abandonment that Genghis Khan, whose real name was Temujin, learned quickly whom he could trust and whom he could not. Because of this, he sought to rebuild his family’s status through alliances, and he started with Börte of the Onggirat tribe. At age 16, Temujin rode to the Onggirat tribe to take his wife. After much talk, the marriage took place, and Dei-sechen presented Temujin with a valuable sable coat. After much celebration, Temujin took his sable coat as treasure with which to connect with a more powerful alliance.

After his marriage to Borte, Temujin and his brothers traveled to meet with his father’s blood brother, Tooril Khan, known as Ong Khan, leader of the Kereit people. Ong was a powerful chieftain whose territory expanded from the Onon River across the lands of Mongol to the eastern borders of China. When Temujin arrived and approached Ong, he said, “In earlier days you and my father agreed to swear brotherhood, so you are almost as a father to me.” Then he said, “I have acquired a wife and brought you the emüsgel (new clothing).” Temüjin presented Ong with the sable jacket.

Alliances are crucial for they build a political power base from which one, a weaker host, can create an army due to the trust and stability it can provide. So long as the host remains in good favor with those more powerful, this will allow the weaker host, like Temujin, to further strengthen his political and military might through a series of wars and battles. This shows favor not only to the Khan he serves but those weaker tribes also would find favor in him due to his honor to the khan and showmanship on the field of battle. Because of this, Temujin quickly rose through the political ranks of Mongol society and eventually was titled Genghis Khan.

Mongol cavalry archery from using the Mongol bow.

Mongol cavalry archery from using the Mongol bow. (Public Domain)

With politics comes war. Unlike today, while most politicians talk of war but may not have experienced it or seen one up close and personal, Temujin was baptized in both fields. It during Temujin’s time with Jamuqa from which he learned much. Before Temujin joined and co-ruled with Jamuqa, he understood little in the art of steppe warfare. This is not to say he had no knowledge, but his understanding was rudimentary. Under Jamuqa, Temujin learned much in the art of command and control, tactics and strategy. But more importantly, he was a great organizational leader, unlike Jamuqa. Temujin was not seeking to build his military and political organization based on tribal status but rather on merit (meritocracy). This allowed Temujin to tap into the vast resources of the people who were tired of their overlords on the steppe. One such example was a commoner from the Uriankhai clan by the name of Subutai. It was these qualities from which Temujin would achieve victory, but before that happened he would have to suffer defeat first— as he did at the Battle of Dalan-baljut.

Statue of Boorchi, one of the first and most loyal of Genghis Khan's friends and allies.

Statue of Boorchi, one of the first and most loyal of Genghis Khan’s friends and allies. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

If one wishes to be a master, he has to have lost first. Temujin understood that defeat could result in victory so long as the loser learned from his mistakes. Moreover, Temujin learned to fight smarter, not harder, to achieve victory. His defeat at Dalan-baljut taught him much, and once Jamuqa, his last great adversary, was dead, he then truly focused without hindrance in turning the united Mongol tribes into a war machine.

A Brief Look at the Mongol Soldier

Before he could even walk, a Mongol boy became one with the horse. As he grew in the saddle, he learned to herd, hunt, and become a warrior. His environment would further harden him as he traversed a complex landscape of mountains, rolling plateaus, deserts, and endured a climate of long, cold winters and short, hot summers. Besides the physical environment, he grew up in a system where individual combat took place to defend one’s honor or to aid his tribe in times of war. A Mongol warrior loved and respected his tribe and family but also lived by the principle of ‘might makes right’.

Once Genghis Khan united these fierce warriors, he organized them into the world’s deadliest fighting force. The Mongol army of the 13th century was highly mobile, capable of traveling thousands of miles, and of living off the land, and they were not hampered by supply trains. The armies of the Khan seemed nearly invincible to their enemies, as neither terrain nor climate appeared to stop their progress. To understand how the Mongols did this one must first look at recruitment.

Recruitment

Not every Mongol male rode off into war, nor did the leadership require the enlistment of every able-bodied male from among the conquered. However, the Mongols had to have a system from which they could acquire the much-needed manpower to refill the empty spots and to add additional troops if need be for larger campaigns. In order to do this the Mongols took a census. What the census provided was the ability to calculate how many people lived within their borders, how much in taxes they could obtain to pay for future military campaigns, the amount of resources available, and the total number of skilled craftsman and technicians on hand.

Information as to the size of the Mongol army in 1209, and before Genghis Khan expanded his borders, is uncertain. The problem stems from how large the Mongol population was during that time. Some have estimated that the population was between 4-500,000, 700,000, and 2.5 million. However, according to a census taken in 1241, the estimated population was 723,910 in Mongolia. The size of the Mongol army according to the Secret History indicates that when Genghis Khan was crowned in 1206, there were 95,000 troops. This may be the only creditable figure for Mongol troop strength according to Timothy May. However, Leo de Hartog suggests that the troop number was roughly 70-80,000 strong, but even he says that, “this is a liberal estimate.”

To fill the ranks, Genghis Khan relied on a registry. This registry kept records on the people, particularly males, assigned to the various Mongol princes and military leaders. When it came to recruitment, the admissible ages were between 15 and 70. A census taken in 1241, 97,575 says troops were ethnic Mongols out of a population of 723,910. This indicates that each Mongol household had 7.4 family members on average.

The recreated interior of an ancient Mongolian ger (also known as a yurt), from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

The recreated interior of an ancient Mongolian ger (also known as a yurt), from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

Besides the recruitment of ethnic Mongols, Genghis Khan and future leaders also incorporated conquered armies as their borders expanded. As R.A. Skelton states in Tartar Relation, “Chingis (Genghis) conquered and incorporated his beaten followers in his own army. For he had acquired the invariable habit of conscripting the soldiers of a conquered army into his own, with the object of subduing other countries by virtue of his increased strength, as is clearly evident in his successors, who imitate his wicked cunning.” Those armies brought into the Mongol fold either would fight under their own commanders, like the 10,000 Uighur’s under Baurchuk Art Tekin during Genghis Khan’s conquest of Khwarezmia, or were divided among the Mongol army to serve under Mongol-appointed officers. With new territories under Mongol control, the Khans realized the additional manpower they could draw from.

After Genghis Khan’s death in 1227, his son Ogodei Khan expanded Mongol military service by conducting a systematic registration of the non-nomadic population. However, this focused only on Northern China between 1234-1236. Another such census was taken again during the reign of Mongke Khan. Unlike the previous one that focused on a specific region, the Mongke Khan census covered the whole empire starting in 1252. Because of this, the number of men the Mongols could acquire from in 1267 differed, as a household consisting of two or three males provided one soldier, four or five males per household provided two men, while households with six or seven males would provide three men for military service.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. (Public Domain)

While the Mongols could recruit many from their large population, not all were fit for certain military duties. Take Iran for instance where only one out of ten adult males were drafted for military service. However, they were not assigned to a cavalry unit. This is not to say that Middle Eastern equestrians drafted for service were not suited to serve among the Mongol cavalry ranks. Instead, this focus is primarily on the commoner who was not accustomed to riding. These men were assigned to serve in other military capacities such as garrison duty and as corvée labor. Once they joined their assigned unit, they were disciplined, trained in infantry tactics, and subject to military reviews. Those who were of nomadic stock were absorbed in the Mongol cavalry. Many of the new cavalry recruits were placed in existing units or were added to newly created units with veteran oversight, particularly those units that consisted of men between the ages of 20-30 in 1229. Once assimilated, they would begin military drilling in the arts of horsemanship, archery, unit tactics, strategy, and formations. Such training disciplined the rider in order to mold his physical and mental training.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel, traditional clothing.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel, traditional clothing. (Public Domain)

The newly acquired men would also get a haircut to distinguish them from the rest of the population. The Flemish Franciscan missionary and explorer William of Rubruck describes the haircut of the Mongol soldier:

The men shave the square on the top of their heads and from the front corners of this square they continue the shaving to the temples, passing along both sides of the head. They shave also the temples and the back of the neck to the top of the cervical cavity, and the forehead as far as the crown of the head, on which they leave a tuft of hair which falls down to the eyebrows. They leave the hair on the sides of the head, and with it they make tresses which they plait together to the ear.

Besides hairstyle came benefits for some Mongol and non-Mongols through the registration process. This process ensured that males from the same household would always be enlisted, which in turn created a long line of hereditary military families among the nomadic and sedentary populations. As for the death of soldier on duty, whether it was by accident or disease, it would take up to 100 days until the next able-bodied soldier from the same household was ready to replace the dead soldier. If a soldier died in combat, his family would be exempt for a year from providing another male to the Mongol ranks.

In addition to soldiers, the Mongols also drafted those with expertise to serve in other capacities among the Mongol ranks. Those with skills were often the artisans, engineers, and artillerists who provided the Mongols with abilities they lacked, like the construction and utilization of siege equipment. Artisans also had tasks that were desired outside the court in the military, as in the manufacturing of weapons, arms repair, armor, cooking pots, and other miscellaneous metal items.

With the conscription of many men came desertion. Any man failing to report to their assigned duty station would be executed. The same consequence was upheld for those who deserted their unit. Such penalties kept the draftees in check and kept the ranks of the Mongols satiated.

—

Top Image: Deriv; Illustration of Yesugei, Temujin’s father (CC BY-SA 3.0) and a painting depicting the Battle of Cheoin (Korea) between Goryeo and Mongol Empire forces in the Korean peninsula in 1232. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Thomas J. Craughwell, The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in History: How Genghis Khan’s Mongols Almost Conquered the World (Beverly, Mass: Fair Winds Press, 2010).

Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History (London: Reaktion Books, 2012).

Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System (Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007).

Richard D. McCreight, Mongol Warrior Epic: Masters of Thirteenth Century Maneuver Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College 1983).

Marco Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian: Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East. Volume 2 edited and translated by Henry Yule. 3rdedition (London: J. Murray, 1929).

Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1961).

George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Vol 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University press, 1953).

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The Persian War Machine: The Immortals – Part II

 

The Persian war machine made empires beforehand look miniature. The Persians were able to take the best from all over the Near East and turn it into a force that could not be defeated for many centuries to come.

[Read Part I here]

Many Guard Units

Herodotus states in 7.40 that “For before him (King) went first a thousand horsemen, chosen out of all the Persians; and after them a thousand spearmen chosen also from all the Persians, having the points of their spears turned down to the ground; and then ten sacred horses, called “Nesaian,” with the fairest possible trappings.” The thousand spearmen marched with their spears reversed, and the spear butts, which would normally have a point, were replaced with “golden pomegranates.” Herodotus refers to these men as “spear-bearers.” These men were the king’s own spear-bearers.

Furthermore, Herodotus 7.41 mentions that once the thousand horsemen passed by, they were followed by ten thousand men who “went on foot; and of these a thousand had upon their spears pomegranates of gold instead of the spikes at the butt-end, and these enclosed the others round, while the remaining nine thousand were within these and had silver pomegranates. And those also had golden pomegranates who had their spear-points turned towards the earth, while those who followed next after Xerxes had golden apples.” While the passage provided describes what appears to the famous “immortal” it appears not. A thousand had upon their spears butts ‘pomegranates of gold’, while the remaining nine thousand had ‘silver pomegranates’. Behind the ten thousand came another thousand had ‘golden apples.’ While it appears that this is not the ten thousand as some suggest, perhaps it is. In other words, the thousand spearmen who’s spear-butts had a golden pomegranate were perhaps the captains in charge of the nine thousand. But who were the “Immortals”?

The Immortals

Herodotus makes the first mention of them in Histories 7.83 stating, “these ten thousand chosen Persians the general was Hydarnes the son of Hydarnes; and these Persians were called “Immortals,” because, if any one of them made the number incomplete, being overcome either by death or disease, another man was chosen to his place, and they were never either more or fewer than ten thousand.” While Herodotus calls them by this title, they are not mentioned during the reign of Xerxes. Xenophon, who came later, does mention that Cyrus established a personal guard of ten thousand spearmen and mentioned they the guard of ten thousand was still existent when he wrote this in the 360s BCE.

Modern reenactors of the Immortals in their ceremonial dress at the 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire.

Modern reenactors of the Immortals in their ceremonial dress at the 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire. (Public Domain)

The Immortals were a fearsome army of ten thousand men that was created by Cyrus the Great to guard him, and were recruited from the lower classes of Persia to serve as the king’s personal bodyguard day and night, and wherever the king went so did they. The name Immortals comes from that whenever one of them got ill, wounded, or even died, he was replaced quickly with another man to ensure that the number stayed at ten thousand.

The Immortals were more than just mere spear-bearing infantry. In times of war, the Immortals surrounded the king while the inner core of Immortals consisted of two royal regiments; The first being infantry that carried a composite bow with a seven-foot-long spear and an akinakes (a dagger or short sword).

The second royal regiment of the Immortals was cavalry archers who carried spears and the majority of the Immortals that surrounded them were infantry. To give you a better picture of the Immortals in terms of battle formation. The front rank consisted of infantry carrying shield and spear, the spear they carried was seven feet in length, and they were the front, rear, and sides of the formation. They provide protection for the archers behind them while the cavalry likely stayed outside of the formation protecting the flanks.

Mosaic depicting Persian archers. (Pre 4th Century BC)

Mosaic depicting Persian archers. (Pre 4th Century BC) (CC BY 2.0)

Besides the Immortals, there was the cavalry. The cavalry only made up 10 percent of Cyrus’s army in the early days of his conquest while the other 90 percent of the army was infantry, or should we say foot soldiers. As time went on, Cyrus noticed the importance and the effectiveness of cavalry forces. He thus added more cavalry to his army and reduced the amount of foot soldiers to get a better ratio that was 20 percent cavalry and 80 percent infantry. The cavalry would have been mostly light and carrying only a bow, and were mainly of non-Persian ethnicity but were commanded for the most part by Persian officers. Their duty was to harass the enemy with a barrage of arrows and draw them into an attack, a hit-and-run you could say that would be annoying to any attacker.

Persian nobles formed the heavy cavalry. They were armed with two javelins, a lance made of wood and sometimes metal, and they carried an akinakes as well as a small oval shield. The armor of a heavy cavalryman was made of leather overlapped with metal disks or scales of bronze, iron, or gold, and was often colored in order to distinguish one unit from another. This must have been an impressive sight on a sunny day—unless you were the enemy.

Persian infantry varied between light and heavy. The light units carried spear and swords while their heavier counter parts carried a longer spear a shorter sword and a battle-axe. These heavier infantries wore black hoods that covered their head and much of their face. In combat, the front rank of the phalanx carried a shield made of wicker and a single spear while the ranks behind them carried no shield but had two spears on hand. Their main function was to toss the first spear over the front rank while keeping the other spear on hand for close combat. The heavier infantry, the elites, otherwise known as the Immortals, were the ones who kept silent when marching en masse. It must have been eerie for those about to receive the sword on the other end of the battlefield, when all you felt was the earth tremble slightly under your feet while an army of silence approached you from the other end. It was common for most warriors to scream and shout when in combat in order to intimidate their opponent. The immortals did the exact opposite. They killed in silence.

Charioteers

Besides the cavalry and infantry units of the Persians, there were the charioteer units. The Persian chariot was slightly higher and heaver then their Assyrian, Egyptian and Babylonian counterparts. Its wheels and axle were heavier and the platform on which the soldiers stood was much wider and carried two men. One man was to drive the heavy, cumbersome vehicle, and the passenger was a soldier, either a spearman or an archer. It took four horses to pull this chariot, which is a considerable amount of power compared to chariots pulled by two horses. To make it even more deadly, Cyrus had scythes installed on the axles, which extended two yards out from the wheel. Overall, it was a deadly machine when the opportunity presented itself on the battlefield since no charioteer, or for that matter horse, would plow into a forest of spear points and shields. It was more effective against light infantry, loose formations, and troops of undisciplined men unwilling to stand their ground in the face of combat.

Persian scythed chariots.

Persian scythed chariots. (Public Domain)

Cyrus also introduced the use of siege weapons into his ranks. Siege towers weighing in at seven tons when fully staffed and were twenty-four feet (7.3 meters) high had to be pulled by sixteen oxen. It is said that each story of the siege tower was about three stories in height, and was manned by twenty archers, giving it a total of 60 archers inside. These siege towers were also used as a command center for the Persian army and were great for surveillance due to its height.

An English siege tower, representational image.

An English siege tower, representational image. (Public Domain)

The Persians also had a special unit that used naphtha during sieges. Naphtha is similar to “Greek fire” a chemical mixture of a thinner consistency than oil. The purpose of naphtha was to burn wooden structures in combat. The Persians would use this during siege warfare by shooting flaming arrows over the enemy’s walls hoping to hit the wooden rooftops in the city thus causing a blaze that could spread throughout. Alternatively, they used it for defensive purposes by burning wooden siege equipment the enemy brought forth to the walls. In addition, the combat engineers of the Persian army were of great importance to the army. For they would move ahead of the army to repair or build roads and bridges, to dig ditches, and used pontoon boats as floats for bridges to get their massive and heavy army across.

To move this huge army was a feat in itself. The Persians, with all the ingenuity and complexity of their military system, had to have a supply line able to provide this juggernaut when on the move. The job of supplying the army was left to the commissariat. When the army was on the move, the commissariat was split into two, with one in front of the army and another in the rear. The commissariat who moved ahead of the army was tasked to look for suitable places to encamp where clean water could be found and the livestock could be grazed for a brief time before they moving on. The rear commissariat was tasked to keep the army supplied with all types of weaponry such as bows, swords, spears, arrows, armor and many other items that would be needed. Now, due to the amount of equipment the commissariat provided they would eventually run low, and in order to solve this problem the Persian king required that each satrap (governor) keep a certain amount on hand for the incoming army when it arrived to restock before the next big move.

While this small piece on the Persian military only skims the surface, understand that what Cyrus created came about with the aid of his many allies and most importantly, the trial and error of battle. Cyrus, once in power, began to formulate an army capable of adopting what was practical and functional when it came to the art of command and control on the battlefield. After his death, the Persian military maintained this, making few adjustments.

Immortals fighting Alexander's troops. Color reconstruction of the original reliefs on the Alexander Sarcophagus, in Istanbul.

Immortals fighting Alexander’s troops. Color reconstruction of the original reliefs on the Alexander Sarcophagus, in Istanbul. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Overall, the Persian army was a professional fighting force of a complex magnitude that in many ways would not be matched until the Macedonian and Roman Empires. However, with their professionalism, also came their weakness. As stated before, they were complex. The Persians, even though they could field a huge army that was disciplined, they were homogenous nor were all of them skilled in the same weapons. Persia had its own standing army that was professional but too small, while the many regions under Persian control provided a hodgepodge of military units all accustomed to their own fighting style and practice. Many of these units were light infantry such as archers and spearmen with little to no armor what so ever. The Persians relied on quantity over quality in its military ranks. It worked well for the region of the world they were in, but as time went on, they faced armies who were all about amour and standard structure, and who may have been small in comparison but undoubtedly more disciplined.

Cam Rea is an author and military historian. He has written numerous articles for Ancient Origins Premium and Classical Wisdom Weekly as well as several books.

Top Image:  Deriv; Faravahar carved in stone at Persepolis, Iran, (Public Domain) and Achaemenid soldiers.

By Cam Rea

References

Briant, Pierre. ‘From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire’. Publisher: Eisenbrauns; 1st English Edition edition (January 1, 2002)
Farrokh, Kaveh. ‘Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War’. Publisher: Osprey Publishing (2007)
Head, Duncan. ‘The Achaemenid Persian Army’. Publisher: Montvert (1992)
Herodotus, Histories
Strabo, The geography of Strabo.
Xenophon, Cyropaedia

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The Persian War Machine: Organization and Command – Part I

The Persian war machine made empires beforehand look miniature. The Persians were able to take the best from all over the Near East and turn it into a force that could not be defeated for many centuries to come. The article you are about to read just skims the surface of a fascinating story that largely goes unnoticed.

Organization and Command

The Persian military organization was much like that of the provinces, wherein the provinces had a degree of autonomy that filtered down to local rule, and provinces provided troops to the king when needed. Because of this, it makes it difficult to identify what is distinctively Persian when it comes to their military system.

When it comes to command, it is headed by the “king of kings” or shahanshah in Persian. On the surface, the heart of command is with the king, like Darius leading his army into Scythia, Xerxes into Greece, like Artaxerxes II fought his brother Cyrus, and Artaxerxes lead his forces against both the Phoenicians and Egypt. However, the king could not always be on campaign. The reason for this is that if the king should be away for a certain period he risks much. A king cannot rule effectively if he is absent for a long period. In doing so, he leaves the art of governance in hands of officials who cannot always be trusted and in a worst case scenario, may attempt a coup d’etat, like Darius the Great who seized the throne of Persia after the death of Cambyses II.

As demonstrated, some Persian monarchs went on campaigns, but in many cases, the trust was placed in the hands of the men trained to do so—the commanders who were specifically sent from the royal court. One such example was Mardonios, who took command of the Persian military operations in Greece after Xerxes withdrew in 479 BCE. However, if the conflict was a local affair, the provincial satrap could conduct military operations against the aggressor both foreign and domestic.

King Xerxes I of Persia from his tomb at Naqshe Rustam

King Xerxes I of Persia from his tomb at Naqshe Rustam (CC BY-SA 2.0)

With generals leading armies, comes military emblems. The use of standards was key in informing the troops who was in command and where to find him. The Persian standard was primarily displayed on the tent. The emblem of the Achaemenid’s was a golden eagle with its wings outspread. However, the image of the eagle was of less importance due to the ever present images of the sun-disc found in Achaemenid art.

Standard of Cyrus the Great

Standard of Cyrus the Great (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Faravahar, one of the best-known symbols of ancient Iran (Persia). Relief in Persepolis.

Faravahar, one of the best-known symbols of ancient Iran (Persia). Relief in Persepolis. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Recruitment

When it comes to recruiting, most were not full-time soldiers. Darius, king of Persia, calls them kara, which can mean “people-army or host.” In other words, they were the “people’s army.” In any case, they were not entirely militia nor considered levy but a reserve allowed holding land so long as they provided military service. The person in charge of the recruiting process was the satrap. Once orders filtered down from the Persian king, the satrap would pass the order down to his subordinate, which the Greeks called hyparchoi, “lieutenant-governors.” It was the duty of the lieutenant-governors to issue orders to the lower officials to seek out eligible men to fill the ranks. This was not always an easy task and one can see why when it’s understood that many of the Persian provinces were not ethnically universal. The Satrap would give such a job to lower officials who were native to the province.

For example, take the province of Parthia; it may have had four different ethnic groups. A satrap who was Median would be representing these four ethnic groups. Because of this, it was crucial that the satrap had officials of every ethnic background within his court to help orchestrate the day-to-day affairs of governance, including military recruitment and in a worst-case scenario, mustering for times of war. However, as mentioned earlier, depending on the nature of the conflict, particularly provincial, it did not require the mustering of the entire army of Persia.

When the King of Persia did give the call to war the mustering of the Persian army can be summed up in four headings. First, a body of Persian cavalry often accompanied Satraps. Second were men who provided military service for land-holdings. Third, garrisons; Garrison troops were predominantly mercenaries recruited outside the empire, think Greek. Fourth were the provincial levies and native troops, the bulk of the Persian army when on the move.

Relief of Persian soldiers, Persepolis.

Relief of Persian soldiers, Persepolis. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Training

Historical details of the military training of the ancient Persian army seem nonexistent. However, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia describes the military training process a Persian youth went through. According to Xenophon 1.2.9, a Persian male at age seventeen would undergo combat training for a length of ten years.

Now the young men in their turn would live as follows: for ten years after they are promoted from the class of boys they passed the nights, as we said before, about the government buildings. This they did for the sake of guarding the city and to develop their powers of self-control; for this time of life, it seems, demands the most watchful care. And during the day, too, they put themselves at the disposal of the authorities, if they were needed for any service to the state. Whenever it was necessary, they all remained around the public buildings. But when the king went out hunting, he took out half the garrison; and this he did many times a month. Those who went must take bow and arrows and, in addition to the quiver, a sabre or bill in its scabbard; they carried along also a light shield and two spears, one to throw, the other to use in case of necessity in a hand-to-hand encounter.

The Greek historian Herodotus in his book “The Histories 1.135,” states that they “educate their boys from five to twenty years old, and teach them only three things: riding and archery and honesty.” Strabo 15.3.18 states:

From five years of age to twenty-four they are trained to use the bow, to throw the javelin, to ride horseback, and to speak the truth; and they use as teachers of science their wisest men, who also interweave their teachings with the mythical element, thus reducing that element to a useful purpose, and rehearse both with song and without song the deeds both of the gods and of the noblest men. And these teachers wake the boys up before dawn by the sound of brazen instruments, and assemble them in one place, as though for arming themselves or for a hunt; and then they divide the boys into companies of fifty, appoint one of the sons of the king or of a satrap as leader of each company, and order them to follow their leader in a race, having marked off a distance of thirty or forty stadia.

 Furthermore in 15.3.19:

They serve in the army and hold commands from twenty to fifty years of age, both as foot-soldiers and as horsemen; and they do not approach a market-place, for they neither sell nor buy. They arm themselves with a rhomboidal wicker-shield; and besides quivers they have swords and knives; and on their heads they wear a tower-like hat; and their breastplates are made of scales of iron. The garb of the commanders consists of three-ply trousers, and of a double tunic, with sleeves, that reaches to the knees, the under garment being white and the upper vari-coloured. In summer they wear a purple or vari-coloured cloak, in winter a vari-coloured one only; and their turbans are similar to those of the Magi; and they wear a deep double shoe.

Exhibit of Achaemenid Archers

Exhibit of Achaemenid Archers (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The military machine of Cyrus the Great was not as one would think—it was not professional by any means, at least not first. Understand that the professional Persian military force would come but the nucleus of the Persian military, particularly the guardsmen, were the true professionals. This is not to say that those inhabitants of the non-Persian ethnic provinces (satrapies) like Bactria, Maka, and Sogdia, to name a few, did not have professional soldiers. Like many provinces, including Pars or Persia, they too had troops of a lesser standard and because of this, they were not seasoned and unused to command and control. Herodotus 7.223 mentions that at the battle of Thermopylae 480 BCE, the Persian officers pushed the “men to go forward against their opponents, who are lashed towards the Spartans by their officers.” Now, one can take this to mean as I had previously stated or that it was custom for officers to whip their men forward, professional or not, like the Roman centurions who carried vine-staffs.

A cenotaph to Marcus Caelius, a centurion of Legio XVIII, killed at the Battle of Teutoburger Wald. Note the prominent display of the vine staff, his sign of office.

A cenotaph to Marcus Caelius, a centurion of Legio XVIII, killed at the Battle of Teutoburger Wald. Note the prominent display of the vine staff, his sign of office. (Public Domain)

Brief Evolution

When Cyrus set out against Media he relied more on friends and kinsmen from local tribes. You could say it was the uniting of the clans and tribes only when times of trouble presented itself and when it was over, they returned to their homes and pastures. This type of force consisted of a few professionals with the vast majority being militias. The professional army that Cyrus pieced together did not come until he conquered Media and even then it would have taken some time to build a truly professional fighting force. But what one can gather from the early Persian military history is that it resembled the military structure of the once mighty Empire of Assyria. Like the Assyrians, the Persians set apart land for the professional soldiers and estates for their elite cavalrymen and even archers. Moreover, the Persians seemed to have been influenced by the Assyrians and most likely their Babylonian counterparts in the technology of siege equipment. Such examples are the battering ram, and the use of ladders to scale walls, as well as siege towers, in which they could place slingers or archers to fire upon the defenders on the wall in order to divert them, while allowing the combat engineers below to unearth the wall.

A large wheeled Assyrian battering ram with an observation turret attacks the collapsing walls of a besieged city, while archers on both sides exchange arrows. From the North-West Palace at Nimrud, about 865-860 BC.

A large wheeled Assyrian battering ram with an observation turret attacks the collapsing walls of a besieged city, while archers on both sides exchange arrows. From the North-West Palace at Nimrud, about 865-860 BC. (Public Domain)

Overall, Cyrus had a great army after the fall of Media, which would continue down through his successors. But the question is what made them great? In order to gain a full understanding of this we must take a deeper look into the military apparatus of the Persian army to see how they were able to conquer such a vast and diverse territory.

Cam Rea is an author and military historian. He has written numerous articles for Ancient Origins Premium and Classical Wisdom Weekly as well as several books.

Top Image: Deriv; Faravahar carved in stone at Persepolis, Iran, (Public Domain)and Persian archers (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Briant, Pierre. ‘From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire’. Publisher: Eisenbrauns; 1st English Edition edition (January 1, 2002)

Farrokh, Kaveh. ‘Shadows in the Desert : Ancient Persia at War’. Publisher: Osprey Publishing (2007)

Head, Duncan. ‘The Achaemenid Persian Army’. Publisher: Montvert (1992)

Herodotus, Histories

Strabo, The geography of Strabo.

Xenophon, Cyropaedia

 

 

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Subutai: Dog of War — Silent, Insatiable and Remorseless, Part II

Invasion of Central Europe: Battle of Liegnitz (1241)

Subutai planned the invasion of Central Europe with precision. This military expedition into Europe placed Subutai into the annals of great military leaders.

After beating down many of the Russian principalities, Subutai sent spies into Poland, Hungary, and even as far as to Austria. He was able to put together a dossier after gathering vital intelligence on the various kingdoms throughout Eastern Europe. Even though Subutai made the plans, his was under the command of Batu Khan.

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century).

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century). (Public Domain)

While Batu Khan was the leader of this expedition, Subutai, Kadan Kahn, Orda Kahn, Baidar, and a slew of others were the muscle behind the plans. Subutai’s mission was to attack Central Europe by spearheading into Hungary. Kadan’s forces would punch north into Poland.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing. (Public Domain)

Baidar led two Mongol tumans of soldiers westward into Silesia. The object was to destroy their European opponents before they could unite. Duke Henry II of Silesia on 5 April 1241 at Liegnitz was waiting for a force of 50,000 Bohemians under King Wenceslas. The Mongols were in the right place at the right time before the remaining forces could unite with Duke Henry. The Duke’s army was 25,000 strong consisting of Poles, Germans, Teutonic knights, Hospitallers, and Knights Templars. However, much of Henry’s army consisted of poorly trained, inexperienced levies. Can you image Bavarian gold miners fighting a battle for you?

Mongol Heavy Cavalry

Mongol Heavy Cavalry (Public Domain)

Duke Henry’s army assembled themselves in a formation that was typical at the time for European armies. Heavy cavalry was the strike force looking to make the decisive blow to the enemy when the enemy showed weakness, while the infantry played only a supporting role protecting the rear. Henry’s formation is understandable and expected, but what Henry did not understand was the Mongol art of war. The Mongols used a tactic known as mangudai or feigned retreat. They would pretend to flee only to ambush those chasing after them.

The Mongols laid in wait for the Poles to make their move, as they did not want to give away their ruse. The Polish begin by charging the Mongols, hoping to engage them; however, the Mongol cavalry surrounded them and showered them with arrows.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Polish quickly pulled back. They then made a second attempt at the Mongols with two cavalry units charging ahead. The Mongols quickly fled, acting as if they were scared. This fake retreat by the Mongols encouraged the knights to continue, moving deeper and becoming more frustrated while trying to engage the enemy—but the Mongols would not cooperate. Instead, the charging knights realized they were in a trap. It was too late.

The Mongols surrounded the Europeans on three sides and began to shower their enemy with arrows and smoke bombs, separating the cavalry force sent in by Duke Henry from his main army. Once the dividing of Henry’s troops had been accomplished, the Mongol heavy cavalry rode down and cut to pieces the European infantry, ultimately winning the battle. Duke Henry was also killed. His head became an ornament on the tip of the spear.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241. (Public Domain)

Battle of Sajo River (or Mohi) (1241)

The Battle of Liegnitz took place a mere few days before the battle of Sajo River.

On the day of the battle, many European men died in the fighting including Duke Henry of Silesia. Once word got out that the Mongols had defeated Duke Henry, King Bela of Hungary was left to confront the Mongols with roughly around 80,000 men.

King Bela’s army was very much similar to Duke Henry’s, which consisted of heavy cavalry, infantry, and a number of mercenaries consisting of nomadic light cavalry. Bela’s army was huge, and one that could, if applied tactically, go toe to toe with just about any fighting force thrown at it. However, this fighting force was Mongols: smart thinkers who looked ahead and planned methodically.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

The Mongols choose a site called Mohi, which was on a plain. The reason for this location choice was to better maneuver their cavalry force while having a forest protecting their flanks. The Mongols quickly crossed over the Sajo River and rode a few miles ahead to make camp at that location. King Bela arrived nearby and set up camp, sending a small unit ahead to guard the far side of the bridge.

The Mongols decided that it would be best to divide their forces, sending 30,000 up north under the command of Subutai. Subutai gave the order for a bridge to be built that crossed over the River Sajo to the Hungarian side.

Batu began his attack early at dawn on 11 April with 40,000 troops at his aid. They attacked the bridge, but this proved dangerous, unless the bridge could be flushed of the European forces stationed there.

Batu gave the order for the catapults to be brought up, which hurled bombs of various sorts and made raucous sounds, which were used against the European forces to cause a panic. Once the European forces fled from the bridge, Batu was able to cross and control the bridge and establish a foothold on Bela’s side.

Nevertheless, Bela gave the order for his cavalry to charge the Mongol cavalry, for the Mongol cavalry had the river to their back, thus walling themselves in somewhat, until Subutai arrived from the north to flank Bela’s army. In doing so, it freed up Batu forces to engage Bela’s forces. The Mongols in turn devastated Bela’s camp.

After several hours of fighting the Mongols allowed a gap in their lines big enough to allow European forces to escape by any means necessary.  It was a bad idea to attempt escape, for the men had become a flood of panic and confusion. Nevertheless, the fate of the men fleeing was a deadly one. The Mongols cut down 60,000 men in a 30-mile (48 km) stretch back to Pest. King Bela escaped the butchery, most likely a changed man.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols. (Public Domain)

Once Hungary was clear of any foe left to challenge them, the Mongols knew that it was time to complete the mission and conquer the rest of Hungary. However, although it seemed the fate was sealed for the Hungarians, chance saved the Hungarians: a significant death. The Mongol Khan Ogotai died in December 1241, and Batu was forced to leave in order to elect a new Khan, as was their custom.

The Nine Principles of War

The Mongols demonstrated the Nine Principles of War at both Liegnitz and Sajo by massing their forces on a concentrated position at the right time and place.

The Mongol objective was clear and decisive as to whom they would hit, like clockwork, in order to gain the advantage.

The Mongol offensive was a strike force that could now exploit the enemy and retain enemies to do their will—all by the use of psychological maneuver.

Surprise in the Mongol offensive was crucial in order to disrupt the enemy to thrown him off balance. This allowed the Mongol economy of force to concentrate all secondary units on primary targets, to achieve a much greater position than his enemy did. This allowed the Mongols to maneuver their enemy into a fixed position for the beating.

Mongol flexibility and cunningness was crucial to this endeavor. Unity of command under the Mongols was by one Batu Khan. However, Batu was flexible in his unity of command in order to gain the best out of his officers, such as with Subutai.

Because of the Mongol effectiveness in chaos and confusion, it allowed for a great sense of security on their behalf. The Mongol army could create an atmosphere of safety to ensure that their troops always had the advantage over the enemy. With security safely applied, the objective of simplicity was greatly understood in order to execute any order without asking twice.

The reason why both Duke Henry and King Bela lost the battles was due to a lack of combined arms or a lack of understanding how to utilize them in a time of war. However, this may be unfair to those who died. Nevertheless, from what we have read, we can see why they lost: a lack of good troops with experience, the feeling of over confidence and superiority, and most important, a lack of understanding of their enemy’s way of warfare.

Béla IV flees from Mohi

Béla IV flees from Mohi (Public Domain)

The End of the European Theater

The Mongol onslaught into Europe would halt when on 11 December 1241 when the great Mongol leader Ogedei Khan died.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong. (Public Domain)

With his death, it was mandatory that all Mongol military expeditions stop and the Mongol princes were required to return to the capital of Karakorum to elect a new Khan. It was during this event that Subutai had been drawing up plans for the invasion of the Holy Roman Empire, but the man in charge of the European theater, Batu Khan, had to rush back since he was a prince.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan. (Public Domain)

It took three years before a new khan was elected and the man elected was Guyuk, and Guyuk had no interest in Batu. With a feud now in the works, any further military operations into Europe had ceased for the time being. With Subutai’s ambitions to advance further into Europe dashed, he received new military operations to conduct, particularly at the Song Dynasty during 1246-47.

The Legacy of Subutai

In 1247, a Franciscan monk by the name of Plano Carpini visited the Mongol court. In his letters, he mentioned that Subutai was still alive and in his early seventies. Carpini also went on to state that Subutai was held in high regards among the court, and referred to him as “Subutai the Unfailing.”

Carpini wrote, “He was a soldier without weakness.” Carpini is just one of the few sources available that speak of the man’s personality. The Muslims, for instance, saw him as “silent, insatiable, and remorseless.” The Russians said he was “extremely disciplined.” The Chinese had a much more revealing description. They looked upon Subutai in high esteem, and he was a great warrior. When Subutai passed, the Chinese bestowed an honorary title on him, proclaiming Subutai King of Honan (Hunan Province). The reason for this title was that Subutai captured the province from the Chin. He was also awarded the title of “faithful and steady.”

In 1248, Subutai returned to Karkorum after a successful campaign and retired. After Subutai left court, he is said to have removed the badges of rank from his yurt and spent the remainder of his days tending to his herds and watching over his grandchildren, particularly his grandson, Achu, and he sharpened his warrior skills.

Some say he went home near the Tuul River, others say he died alone in a tent, while others say he moved further west near the Danube River to be near his son, Uriangkatai, who was in the service of Batu army, serving as an officer. If so, Subutai would spend the remainder of his days living within the territory of the Golden Horde.

It is said he had grown tired of the court, and rightfully so. Subutai grew nauseous of the political squabbling of the Mongol princes, particularly that of Batu and Kuyuk that went on long after Ogedai’s death. By 1248, the once-great Mongol Empire established by Genghis Khan was still great, but fractures created after the death of Ogedei in 1241 continued to grow and further separate the empire from its foundation.

In the end, the historical records provide little information when it comes to the generalship of Subutai. Furthermore, this piece cannot relate the grand scope of all of the battles and wars he part took in, but instead provide a rare glimpse into the man called Subutai.

If one wants to know how accomplished this man was as a general on his Eurasian tour, then consider the words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, as he states that Subutai from China to the Danube “had conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles.” As military historian Richard Gabriel further comments, and rightfully speaks of Subutai’s achievements, they’re described as “a record of accomplishment literally unsurpassed by any of the great generals who had gone before him.”

Unfortunately, Subutai has long been overlooked, especially in military circles, but now his successes on the battlefield have become known for all to see and decipher.

After he retired, Subutai died two years later at the age of 72. Even though Subutai was dead, his sons and their descendants continued to serve one Khan after another for the next three decades.

Subutai is thus remembered in The Secret History of the Mongols:

“They are the Four Dogs of Temujin. They have foreheads of brass, their jaws are like scissors, their tongues like piercing awls, their heads are iron, their whipping tails swords . . . In the day of battle, they devour enemy flesh. Behold, they are now unleashed, and they slobber at the mouth with glee. These four dogs are Jebe, and Kublai, Jelme, and Subotai.”

Featured image: Deriv; A Mongolian Cavalry recreation, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition (CC BY-SA 2.0) , A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

(Read Part I: Subutai: Dog of War — Sophisticated Military Strategist Behind Genghis Khan’s Conquering Empire)

References

Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.

Carey, Brian Todd, Allfree, Joshua B and Cairns John. Warfare in the Medieval World. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2009.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2003.

Craughwell, Thomas J. The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in the World: How 88 Years of Mongol Domination Reshaped the World from the Pacific to the Mediterranean Sea. Gloucester, Maine: Fair Winds Press, 2010.

Crompton, Samuel Willard. 100 Military Leaders Who Shaped World History. San Mateo, CA: Bluewood Books, 1999.

Cummins, Joseph. History’s Great Untold Stories: The Larger Than Life Characters and Dramatic Events That Changed the World. Washington DC: National Geographic, 2007.

Curtin, Jeremiah. The Mongols A History. Boston: DA CAPO PRESS, 2003.

Dupuy, Trevor N. Johnson, Curt. Bongard, David L. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography.New York: Castle Books, 1995.

Edwards, Sean J. Swarming on the Battlefield” Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica: Rand Coporation, 2000.

Gabriel, Richard A. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Great Captains Unveiled. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Hartog, Leo De. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. London, New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004.

Kennedy, Hugh. Mongols, Huns & Vikings. London: Cassell, 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.

Tzu, Sun, Griffith, B. Samuel (translator). The Art Of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

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Abraham’s Special Military Operation

Image result for Abraham rescue of Lot

It all started over grazing lands. Both Lot and Abraham had flocks and herds and when they came to a piece of land that could not sustain both their flocks and herds, arguments broke out among the herdsmen working for them. Lot decided to leave and head east into the fertile plain of Siddim and established his tent before Sodom, while Abraham stayed in Canaan and moved to the plain of Mamre, which is in Hebron. After some years had passed, a group of refugees brought news to Abraham that the armies of Mesopotamia had marched on Sodom, a great battle took place, and Lot had been captured afterward.

This brings us to a few questions to ask. What caused the armies of Mesopotamia to occupy the cities of the Jordan River plain? Who were these rulers, and what was their objective?

The Bible is silent concerning the Mesopotamian invasion of the Jordanian land. However, this should not stop us from trying to figure it out. Why would a vast army from a collection of nations invade the region? The answer is instability. With the absence of a foe strong enough to challenge them, the armies of Mesopotamia marched in, almost unopposed, confiscated untapped resources, and expanded their political influence throughout the region.

The leaders involved were Amraphel king of Shinar, Arioch king of Ellasar, Chedorlaomer king of Elam, and Tidal king of nations (Umman Manda). These four made war on the five kings of the plain. These five kings were Bera king of Sodom, and with Birsha king of Gomorrah, Shinab king of Admah, and Shemeber king of Zeboiim, and the king of Bela, which is Zoar. What can be gathered given the timing of the event is that the power in charge of this operation is none other than the Mesopotamian Empire of Ur III. The king responsible for the mobilizing and executing the operation may have been none other than Amraphel of Shinar (Sumer) otherwise known as King Amar-Sin of Ur. Amar-Sin ruled Ur for 9 years from 1834-1826 BCE.

During his reign, Ur achieved the highest economic production, which allowed for the continued construction of public buildings. When it came to controlling his empire, instead of stationing military troops throughout the imperial state, Amar-Sin decided it would be best to use peaceful and constructive socio-economic incentives to extend the revamped Sumerian city-states on the outer edges. Amar-Sin established ensi or governors, who enjoyed almost complete independence, such as in the cities of Alalak, Mari, and Assur. Ensi’s for the most part were natives of the area they controlled. Amar-Sin’s policy not only encouraged local cultural development but also cemented the imperial structure by doing so. With such freedom came economic and social creativity.

Amar-Sin’s treasury was bursting at the seams, so he decided to go on another tour to expand his state. During his nine years, he conducted war in the northeasterly districts, but when it comes to how far he, like his father Shulgi, expanded the state, the extent remains hazy. What can be identified is that Mari and Elam were within the sphere of Ur’s influence by a policy of matrimonial alliances introduced by his grandfather Ur-Nammu at Mari. Such alliances, allowed Amar-Sin to utilize their armies for political and economic expansion by force.

After twelve years had passed, Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, Zeboiim, and Zoar said no more. They grew tired of paying tribute to Amar-Sin and knew that war was inevitable. King Amar-Sin, angered over the news, mobilized the forces. Leading this army to punish the people in eastern Canaan (western part of Jordan) was the king’s extortionist, King Chedorlaomer of Elam, according to the Bible, but also identified as King Kutir-Lagamar, loyal vassal of Amar-Sin.

In the spring of the fourteenth year, the armies of Ur marched out. The number of troops partaking in this military operation may have been around 10,000, perhaps a bit less. As Chedorlaomer’s armies moved from north to south, they would have taken the King’s Highway along the east side of the Jordan River in the hill country to reach their targets that dotted the plateau.

The first phase of Chedorlaomer’s campaign focused not on attacking the kings of the valley because that was too risky. Rather, he focused his attack on those who were their vassals or allies to the east. Chedorlaomer chose this strategy to knock out the eastern allies of the kings, securing his eastern flank with the desert. He could then focus on neutralizing all potential threats to the south.

Chedorlaomer first struck the city of Ashteroth Karnaim in Rephaim, laying waste to the city of Ham in Zuzims and the city of Shaveh Kiriathaim in Emim. Chedorlaomer continued to push into Mount Seir of the Horites and continued until he reached Elparan at the edge of the desert. There are two possibilities as to why Chedorlaomer stopped there. The first reason from a military perspective is obvious; it’s the desert. To proceed any farther spelled disaster. If not the desert, then it has to be political. It could be that Chedorlaomer encountered the important trade route that leads to Egypt, and to cause any upheaval along that commercial route would cause Egypt to take issue. Egypt had commercial interests throughout the Levant.

News of the disasters traveled quickly to each city, causing many citizens and rulers to panic and fear the worst. This was exactly what the invaders wanted, psychological warfare to bend the knees of their enemies. While many of the inhabitants were taken prisoner, many others fled before Chedorlaomer’s arrival and sought refuge behind the walls of Sodom, or behind any walls large enough for that matter, hoping that the armies of Mesopotamia would eventually turn back and head home. However, they were going to be disappointed. Chedorlaomer turned north and sacked the Enmishpat, which is Kadesh, smote the Amalekites and the Amorites that dwelt in Hazezontamar.

The five kings of the plain knew that they would be picked off individually if they stayed behind their walls. However, if they united, it would give them a fighting chance. Both armies would meet for battle on the southern end of the Dead Sea just south of Sodom in the Valley of Siddim. The battle, even though not recorded in any detail, was no doubt prolonged, bloody, and downright messy. The kings of the Plain were defeated. There is no way of knowing for sure if any of the kings died in battle as the Bible is silent on the matter. However, the Dead Sea Scrolls do mention that King Birsha of Gomorrah fell into the slime pits. The remaining kings, Shinab, Bera, Shemeber, and Bela fled into the hills. But not only did the surviving kings flee, but many others seeking safety from the marauding armies of Mesopotamia also fled.

There is no doubt that Abraham and the inhabitants living to the west of the Dead Sea knew of the events taking place east of the Jordan. They received news from refugees, trade caravans, and possibly their spies sent out to investigate, keeping a close eye on a potential threat, carefully preparing for the worst, but taking no action until war arrives at their doorstep. Abraham was concerned, but he knew that Lot was a capable adult able to make his own decisions. Unfortunately, Lot, for whatever reason, did not pack up and move out of harm’s way. No reason is given as to why Lot stayed. Perhaps he thought that the power vacuum sweeping throughout the Jordan River plain would bypass him. Whatever the case was, Lot’s clan and belongings were captured. While Abraham was going about his business, a refugee, perhaps one of Lot’s kinfolk, told Abraham what had happened, that Lot had been taken captive, and if he didn’t do something soon, Lot would be sold into slavery.

Abraham did not hesitate and sent messengers to his confederate Amorite allies, Mamre, Eshcol, and Aner informing them of the situation and asking for assistance. While the messengers were on their way, Abraham informed his household of what just happened. Abraham quickly mustered his forces of three hundred and eighteen men.

Abraham and his forces traveled north for five days, possibly taking the King’s Highway for a time, gathering intelligence and keeping an eye on the enemy’s movements. Eventually, the enemy encamped near the town of Laish (Dan). While the armies of Mesopotamia continued their victorious celebration, Abraham kept a watchful eye on the festivities, keeping track of the guards, their movements, and perhaps collecting information on the exact location of where the prisoners and loot were held from people not aligned with the army who were able to come in and out of the encampment. Abraham waited for many hours, allowing the alcohol drunk by the enemy to take full effect before storming in. Once the army began to succumb to intoxication, Abraham divided his men, into two groups of 159. While the enemy slept and their fires flickered, casting shadows, Abraham and his men infiltrated the camp in silence and smote many. Once Lot and the loot were found, they quickly packed up and moved out before any alarm could be made. The Bible does mention that they pursued them as far as “unto Hobah, which is on the left hand of Damascus,” which could suggest that Abraham was still making hit and run raids. One can assume that Abraham and his men were the only ones making these raids or perhaps they were now receiving help from their Amorite allies. Whatever the case, Abraham was successful in his special operations mission.

Abraham along with his men camped at the Valley of Shaveh. The new king of Sodom, who was in hiding, along with the other kings, came out after he received word that Abraham defeated the Mesopotamian kings and retrieved the property of the people and that of the five kings. Before the Kings of the Plain arrived, Melchizedek, the priest-king of Salem (Jerusalem) visited Abraham. Melchizedek, who had no part in the war, recognized kindness when he saw it and came out to Abraham and his men, bringing food and drink. Melchizedek thanked Abraham and blessed him for his good deed. Abraham, seeing the sincerity of Melchizedek, responded to the priest-king by giving him a tithe.

While Melchizedek responded with hospitality, wanting nothing but to say thank you, the king of Sodom was rather political in his approach. He didn’t say thank you or offer food and drink. Instead, the king of Sodom wanted to strike a deal. He offered all the loot to Abraham, as long as he returns the people to the king. The problem with this is that the Mesopotamian kings captured the people and looted the cities of the plains. Abraham had not taken anything from them, thus technically he owed the king’s of the Plain nothing legally or morally. It was legally Abraham’s by the fair fortunes of war. But Abraham was not like that. Instead of making a deal with the king and his royal entourage, Abraham’s response surprised the king by refusing to keep loot or people, for Abraham was entitled,

I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, That I will not take from a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take any thing that is thine, lest thou shouldest say, I have made Abram rich.

In other words, Abraham’s riches will come from God, not from some politician seeking to strike a deal. Besides, saving the lives and their property and not taking a single item is far more rewarding. Abraham’s rescue of Lot is technically the first recorded special operations mission.

By Cam Rea

References 

Genesis

Garcia, Juan Carlos Moreno. Ancient Egyptian Administration. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013.

Rohl, David. From Eden to Exile: The Epic History of the People of the Bible. London: Arrow, 2003.

Rohl, David. From Eden to Exile: The Epic History of the People of the Bible. London: Arrow, 2003.

Roux, Georges. Ancient Iraq. 3rd ed., New ed. London: Penguin Books, 1992.

Thomson, Gary Arthur. First Market: The Genesis of Wall Street in Ancient Iraq. New York: IUniverse, 2010.

Schwartz, Matthew B. Politics in the Hebrew Bible: God, Man, and Government. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc, 2013.

Vermès, Géza. The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English. London: Penguin, 2004.

 Abraham Makes the Enemies Flee Who Hold His Nephew (Public Domian)