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The Hunnic War Machine: Horsemen of the Steppe – Part II

The fifth century politician and bishop Sidonius Apollinaris, wrote an interesting description on the horsemanship of the Huns, stating, “You would think the limbs of man and beast were born together, so firmly does the rider always stick to the horse.” Such were the abilities of the horsemen of the steppe – an integral part of the success of the Hunnic Invasion and the creation of an empire.

[Read Part 1: The Hunnic War Machine]

Hunnic Horsemen

Being that the majority of the Hunnic cavalry consisted of light horse archers led by petty nobles and their followers, their attire would have been light. The sixth century scholar Procopius states that the Hunnic warrior/herdsman wore “loosely woven” garments. Ammianus, much earlier, describes the dress of the Huns stating:

“They dress in linen cloth or in the skins of field-mice sewn together, and they wear the same clothing indoors and out. But when they have once put their necks into a faded tunic, it is not taken off or changed until by long wear and tear it has been reduced to rags and fallen from them bit by bit. They cover their heads with round caps and protect their hairy legs with goatskins; their shoes are formed upon no lasts, and so prevent their walking with free step.”

Being that the vast majority of Huns wore meager garments, their armor was not much better. In other words, do not expect the poorer Huns to be decked out in armor like the nobles or the wealthy. The type of armor worn would have been scale (sewn on) or lamellar (linked plates) armor reaching to the waist or knee. Hunnic armor also appears to have been sleeveless in some accounts. According to Procopius, he states:

“He came to be surrounded by twelve of the enemy, who carried spears. And they all struck him at once with their spears. But his thorax with-stood the other blows, which therefore did not hurt him much; but one of the Goths succeeded in hitting him from behind, at a place where his body was uncovered, above the armpit, right close to the shoulder, and smote the youth, though not with a mortal blow.”

While the Hunnic warrior could withstand a series of hits to the chest, his armpits were exposed, which indicates that his armor was sleeveless. Another interesting aspect is that the word thorax is used. This may suggest that the armor was not a breastplate but a metal shirt or scale-mail jacket, which protects all sides of the body and is sleeveless. The fourth century panegyric, Pacatus, Sidonius, and Procopius, all mention that the Hunnic horse archers wore iron cuirasses. While most Hunnic horsemen wore meager armor, those lucky enough to serve alongside Rome were decked out. Fifth century Latin poet, Flavius Merobaudes, mentions that Huns serving the Roman general Aetius wore “belts, quivers, horse, bits, helmets, and the armor, studded with precious stones, were gilded.

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse's head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse's owner.’

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse’s head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse’s owner.’  (Public Domain)

However, some of the Hunnic armor worn may have been Roman. Other Huns, not associated with Aetius, may have donned gilt Persian armor. Understand that the vast majority of Huns were not emblazoned in armor from head to toe, most wore meager amounts while the few nobles and wealthy Huns could afford the luxury of armor.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

One such luxury was the helmet. Huns serving under the Romans were provided helmets. The majority of Huns not serving Rome donned felt or soft leather caps. Reason for this is that many of the so-called Hunnic graves are absent of such an item. Hunnic noblemen and the wealthy could afford a helmet, which could be passed down from generation to generation. The type of helmet the Huns would have worn under the Romans is called a spangenhelm. The spangenhelm is a conical helmet consisting of four to six sections, reinforced by bands over the joins. Most had large cheek pieces, neck guard and a nose piece. The origin of the helmets is said to be of Sassanid origin, which was later adopted by the Romans during the late third early fourth century.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns also used a shield. Unfortunately, like most items pertaining to the Huns, it remains elusive. The Hunnic shield would have been small, as a large shield would have been cumbersome to utilize on horseback. The type of small shield used would have been as the ones used by other steppe nomads, and since no shield has been discovered, it is suggested that the shield was made of wicker covered in leather.

As for swords, it is disputed whether the vast majority of Huns carried them. The Hunnic swords likely varied, as some were like that of the Sarmatians and Goths, which was long, straight, and designed for slashing. However, in the 10th century, Latin Germanic epic poem founded on German popular tradition called Waltharius, the hero Walther “arms himself in the Hunnish fashion… with a double-edge long sword belted to his left hip … and a single-edged half-sword at his right.” While the poem is fictional, it provides and indicates that some Huns wore a long sword, spatha, and a single-edged half-sword, semispatha, like that of the Sassanid noblemen who are regularly depicted wearing the same type of swords in this fashion.

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha (CC BY 2.0)

Another side arm the Huns used was the lasso. The lasso was widely used by many steppe nomads like the Scythians and Sarmatians to name a few. Ammianus speaks of the Hun lasso and states “while the enemy are guarding against wounds from the sabre-thrusts, they throw strips of cloth plaited into nooses over their opponents and so entangle them that they fetter their limbs and take from them the power of riding or walking.”

As for heavy horsemen, the Huns had few and mostly relied on those they conquered and incorporated into their own military apparatus. The tribes that aided heavy cavalry to the Huns were the Sarmatians, Alans, and Goths. With heavy cavalry, accompanying the Hunnic horse archers, the Huns had a well-defined military capable of delivering mobility and shock to the enemy on the field of battle.

Bow and Arrow

The primary weapon of the Hunnic horse archer was the composite bow. The Hunnic reflex bow was made of wood, horn, and sinew. The ears of the bow had seven bone plaques, while the handle had three, two on the side one on its top.

The foundation of the bow was made of wood. The type of wood used could have been maple, yew, poplar or ash. When the tree of choice had been selected, the bowyer would choose to use the heartwood of the tree instead of the growing outer layer or sapwood.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

After the selecting and fashioning the wood into shape, a layer of sinew is applied. Sinew gives the bow its penetrating power. Once the sinew is applied, the bow would be bellied with horn, which provides compressive strength and on release of the arrow, the bone brings the bow back to original position like a coil. To keep this complex weapon together, glue made from boiled animal hide was used. These multiple layers of bone made the bow quite stiff and powerful upon release.

The Hunnic bow was between 130-160 centimeters long or between four and five feet in length. Unlike other steppe bows, the length of the Hunnic bow was not ideal for use by a horse archer. The ancient Scythian bow was 80 centimeters or (2.6 feet) in length, making it ideal for horse archery, even though some were found to be 127 centimeters or (4.2 feet) in length. The Huns got around this by making the bow asymmetrical. Its upper half was slightly longer than the lower. The reason for the lower half being shorter was so as not to poke the horse in the neck. Another reason why the Huns extended the length of the bow was to produce more power. Upon release, the Hunnic horse archers could effectively hit an unarmored opponent at 150 to 200 meters or (492-656 feet), and an armored opponent at 75 to 100 meters or (246-328 feet).

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow.

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The type of bowstring used also varied. The string for the bow must not be too heavy or light nor stretch easily. The materials used could have been from twisted gut, sinew, horsehair, vines, and even silk. The Hunnic horse archer probably had a variety of bowstrings on hand for various climate conditions. Horsehair strings were best suited for colder climates, whereas sinew absorbed moisture, making them less desirable due to stretching.

The Huns used a variety of arrowheads. One type was a large leaf-shaped and the other a large three-bladed iron arrowhead. The Huns are also said to have used “sharp bone” according to Ammianus. They are said to have fixed bone balls behind the tips called “whistlers”, which produce a terrifying sound for psychological effect. When placing the arrowhead on the shaft, the Huns and other eastern steppe peoples did not socket it into place like the Scythians and Sarmatians did. Instead, the Hunnic arrowheads had a tang, which was sunk into the arrow shaft. The possible reason for this is that it was easier to produce arrowheads with tangs than socketed. Later on western steppe tribes adopted the eastern tang style.

The type of arrow shafts possibly used was cane, reed, birch, cornel, rose-willow, hornbeam, and ash. Reed may have been the preferred material to use for it would travel further and easier to produce. The feathers used in fletching would generally have been from either ducks or geese. The number of feathers attached to the shaft was between two and four. The feathers provided aerodynamic stabilization for the flight of the arrow.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com / CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns carried a broad shaped bow case, which hung on the left side, and an hour glassed shape quiver or tube-like on the right side, which had a flap. The materials used to construct these cases were made of leather, bark or wood. Upon firing the arrow, the Hun would place the arrow on the right side of the bow. The archer would draw the bowstring with three fingers with the thumb locked under the first three fingers and protected by a ring of bone, horn, ivory or even stone.

An Empire of Conquest

In conclusion, the Hunnic war machine was like that of any other nomadic steppe tribe but with a twist. The twist is the Huns could do it better. Whereas the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans and many others could only do little in terms of conquest and confiscation, their goals to expand beyond the steppe frontier was never considered, even when they were united. This is not to say that they did not take the plunge into the civilized sedentary world. They did, but in small strikes and fast retreats from those who posed a challenge. The Huns, like the others mentioned, became powerful enough to challenge the various steppe tribes and absorbed them through conquest. While the Huns initially were still not united, their appetite for conquest and confiscation could not be quenched and was a shared goal among them. Even when the Huns pushed out the Goths, they still found plunder by joining with the Romans. Once Attila came on the scene with his brother Bleda, the brothers were able to negotiate and coerce the tribes to coalesce as one. Therefore, the Huns were the first true nomadic empire to establish itself before the civilized world.

But their world was not long term, as the Hunnic economy was based on war and extortion with no lasting goal. In the end, the Hunnic war machine that set foot in Europe, before mighty Roman and the fractured Barbarians, would soon disappear, but the carcass of the machine remained to be absorbed by those affected, to be restudied and implemented to make their (Romans and Barbarians) armies much more effective on the battlefield.

Sculpture of Attila the Hun

Sculpture of Attila the Hun (Public Domain)

Top Image: Attila and his Hordes (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

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The Hunnic War Machine: Part I

The steppe has produced many notable horse archers who brought terror and devastation to the known world during ancient times. But of the many steppe peoples who penetrated the civilized world, none brought more destruction then the Huns.

Sometime during the mid-to-late fourth century, the Huns pushed westward. While on the move, they encountered the Alans. The Huns quickly engaged and slaughtered them.  The Huns made an alliance with the survivors. With the Alans riding alongside the Huns, they headed towards the lucrative lands of Goths, particularly that of Greuthungs, led by King Ermanaric, sometime in the 370’s. The attack was so swift and relentless that the Goths could not halt their progress. Ermanaric could do little to thwart the Hun advance, and in despair, he committed suicide. With Ermanaric dead, another took his place by the name of Vithimiris. Vithimiris continued the fight, even hiring Hun mercenaries. However, it was all in vain. Vithimiris could not defeat the Huns and eventually lost his life in 376.

Huns in battle with the Alans. An 1870s engraving after a drawing by Johann Nepomuk Geiger.

Huns in battle with the Alans. An 1870s engraving after a drawing by Johann Nepomuk Geiger. (Public Domain)

A suggested path of Hunnic movement westwards.

A suggested path of Hunnic movement westwards. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

With Vithimiris dead, Alatheus and Saphrax took charge, as Viderichus, the son of Vithimiris, was too young to rule. Rather than to continue fighting the Huns, they led the Greuthungs to the Danube River in 376. Furthermore, the names Alatheus and Saphrax appear Alanic, and may have been of a Sarmatian/Alan origin.

The Seeds of Destruction

Besides the Greuthungs, the Thervingi Goths, led by Fritigern and Alavivus, also joined them to escape the Huns, and in hopes of seeking asylum in the Eastern Roman Empire. The total number of refugees is disputed. The fourth century Greek sophist and historian Eunapius indicates that 200,000 Goths appeared along the Danube, while Peter Heather suggests roughly 100,000. Whatever the number, the impact was great, not only on the Goths but also the Eastern Roman Empire. Two years after arriving at the Danube, the Goths were allowed to enter into Eastern Roman territory. Once established, the Roman provincial commanders Lupicinus and Maximus took advantage of the refugees, leading the Goths to revolt which ended in a Gothic victory at the Battle of Adrianople in 378.

“Grande Ludovisi” sarcophagus, with battle scene between Roman soldiers and Goths.

“Grande Ludovisi” sarcophagus, with battle scene between Roman soldiers and Goths. (Public Domain)

While the Battle of Adrianople on the surface has nothing to do with the Huns, most important is what lies beneath. The Goths, over a period of years, would not have trickled to the Danube, seeking asylum into the Eastern Roman Empire had it not been for the menace from the east.

What the Goths knew the Romans brushed off. In the words of Ammianus: “The seed-bed and origin of all this destruction and of the various calamities inflicted by the wrath of Mars, which raged everywhere with unusual fury, I find to be this: the people of the Huns.”

The Hunnic Invasion

The Huns were a steppe nomadic confederation that arrived in the area of the Black Sea sometime during the 370’s. These strange invaders were not like other peoples in the area. Everything from their physical appearance to their mode of warfare was new and terrifying to the Barbarians in their path, and to the civilization of Rome who would soon encounter them.

The extent of the Hunnic Empire

The extent of the Hunnic Empire (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The origin of the Huns is disputed. The ancient writers spoke little of origin and more on description and location. The Roman soldier and historian, Ammianus Marcellinus, wrote on the Huns during the fourth century. He states that the Huns dwell “beyond the Maeotic Sea (Sea of Azov) near the ice-bound ocean, exceed every degree of savagery.” As for origins, he states that little is known from “ancient records” about the Huns. The Huns were just as much a mystery to the Romans as the Romans were to the Huns. The theologian and historian, St. Jerome (347–420), equated the Huns with the Scythians of old mentioned by Herodotus. Around the time of Jerome, another theologian and historian by the name of Paulus Orosius wrote, “the Huns, long shut off by inaccessible mountains, broke out in a sudden rage against the Goths and drove them in widespread panic from their old homes.”

Even though the ancient writers had a vague sense of the Huns origins, they knew enough that the Huns originated beyond the Ural Mountains. But who they were for certain east of Ural’s remains disputed. A number of modern historians believe that Xiongnu, a nomadic people who inhabited the eastern steppe according to ancient Chinese sources, from the third century BCE to the late second century CE, were precursors of the Huns. Linking the Huns to the Xiongnu, while possible, still, leaves a large gap of 300 years’ worth of lost history.

HUN Plaques, Xiongnu, fifth century BC.

HUN Plaques, Xiongnu, fifth century BC. (Public Domain)

As Hyun Jin Kim states, “Thus to refer to Hun-Xiongnu links in terms of old racial theories or even ethnic affiliations simply makes a mockery of the actual historical reality of these extensive, multiethnic, polyglot steppe empires.” Therefore, the Huns were nothing more than a group of elite warriors of a ruling class in an alliance with various nomadic tribes seeking plunder, extracting tribute, and expanding their sphere of influence.

Hunnic Military

To understand the Huns mode of warfare one must try to understand their way of life. According to Marcellius, the Huns “are subject to no royal restraint, but they are content with the disorderly government of their important men, and led by them they force their way through every obstacle.” The Huns initially were not a united tribe with a king when they first appeared in the west. Rather, the Huns were a tribe that amalgamated with many other nomadic tribes, like the Alans and non-nomadic tribes, such as the Germanic Suevi, Gepids, and Goths, through conquest. However, this is not always the case. Many nomadic tribes probably joined the Hunnic warbands after noticing their ability to profit from pillaging, and decided they want in on the cut. This is not to say that the Huns did not have a powerful chieftain, just that the chieftain’s power was limited.

The Huns and their tribal allies worked semi-independently under their own chieftains but were loyal to a primary Hun chief. Of course, this would change when Attila took power much later. But even as king, Attila’s power was excessive in the moment and uncertain in the long term. Attila, unlike previous powerful chieftains, strong-armed the lesser chieftains by forcing them to swear loyalty to him or be removed. By doing this, he effectively transformed the Huns from a body in search of plunder or seeking payment to serve as mercenaries, into a single body bent on expanding a sphere of influence through conquest, threats, and extortion. While Attila’s short-term strategy focused on the moment, his long-term strategy for the Hunnic nation was nonexistent. The reason for this is that the Huns were not in the business to create, they were in the business of war. Therefore, one must focus on the Hunnic military machine to gain a better understanding as to why they were so decisive on the battlefield.

Hardy Hunnic Horses

According to Ammianus, the Huns were “glued to their horses, which are hardy, it is true, but ugly.” While Ammianus found the Hunnic horse hardy and ugly, the late fourth century Roman writer Vegetius Renatus also found their horses beautifully unappealing.

The Hunnic horses:

“have a great and crooked head, bulging eyes, narrow nostrils, broad jaws and cheek-bones, strong and stiff necks, manes hanging below the knees, overlarge rib, curved backs, bushy tails, cannon bones of great strength, small pasterns, wide-spreading hooves, hallow loins, their bodies are angular, no fat on the rump or the muscles of the back, their stature inclining to length than to height, the belly drawn, the bones huge. The very thinness of these horses is pleasing, and there is beauty even in their ugliness.”

While the physical appearance of the Hunnic horse did not always sit well in the eyes of the beholder, its characteristics did. Vegetius states that for “the purposes of war, the Huns’ horses are by far the most suitable, on account of their endurance, working capacity and their resistance to cold and hunger.” He further adds that “one forgets the ugly appearance of these horses as this is set off by their fine qualities: their sober nature, cleverness and their ability to endure any injuries very well.”

Mongolian horses.

Mongolian horses. (CC BY 2.0)

The breed of horse the Huns rode is uncertain. They may have been the ancestors of the modern Mongolian horse. The Huns likely rode mares as opposed to Stallions. If so, the Hunnic mares, like that of the Mongols, would have stood at 127cm (50 inches) high.

This choice meant that Hunnic riders could use the mares’ milk as an additional food supplement on the steppe, and the mares could be milked four to five times a day. Moreover, mares are easier to control than stallions, especially when the mare is in heat. Stallions can be easily distracted when a mare is in heat or just present. This gave the Huns, among other steppe nomads, a tactical advantage on the battlefield. Therefore, riders of the stallions had to be extra vigilant to restrain the steeds from chasing the mares.

Horse Equipment

The most important item for a rider to function proper in the saddle is the stirrup. Stirrups allow the rider to stay in the saddle comfortably and to control his mount. In others words, horse and rider become one. A bigger question often asked when dealing with the Huns is whether the Huns used stirrups. Unfortunately, Hunnic stirrups are nonexistent. Not even the Roman writers during the period ever mentioned the Huns possessing them. However, this is not to say they never used them. If the Huns did use stirrups, they must have been made from perishable materials, such as wood or leather.

Horse archer presentation in Hungary

Horse archer presentation in Hungary (Public Domain)

The fifth century poet, letter-writer, politician, and bishop Sidonius Apollinaris, wrote an interesting description on the horsemanship of the Huns, stating, “Scarce has the infant learnt to stand without his mother’s aid when a horse takes him on his back. You would think the limbs of man and beast were born together, so firmly does the rider always stick to the horse.” Sidonius description does not mention the use of stirrups but rather their limbs to guide the horse. Overall, whether the Huns used stirrups will go unanswered until a Hunnic grave is discovered bearing such contents that suggest otherwise.

Nomadic Pazyryk horseman in a felt painting from a burial around 300 BC.

Nomadic Pazyryk horseman in a felt painting from a burial around 300 BC.  (Public Domain)

The saddle was another important feature as it was a supportive structure for the rider, which fastened to the horse’s back by a girth. The Hunnic double-horned saddle was a wooden framework covered in leather, sometimes embroidered.  The double-horned saddle proved the rider a stable seat from which he could fire his arrows. A felt sweat cloth was placed under the pack saddle after which a saddle-blanket was laid over it. As for their horse bridles, the cheek pieces were made of iron or horn.

Top Image: Reenactors of Hunnic Warriors of the Steppe (CC BY-SA 2.0)

By Cam Rea

Posted on

Subutai: Dog of War — Silent, Insatiable and Remorseless, Part II

Invasion of Central Europe: Battle of Liegnitz (1241)

Subutai planned the invasion of Central Europe with precision. This military expedition into Europe placed Subutai into the annals of great military leaders.

After beating down many of the Russian principalities, Subutai sent spies into Poland, Hungary, and even as far as to Austria. He was able to put together a dossier after gathering vital intelligence on the various kingdoms throughout Eastern Europe. Even though Subutai made the plans, his was under the command of Batu Khan.

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century).

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century). (Public Domain)

While Batu Khan was the leader of this expedition, Subutai, Kadan Kahn, Orda Kahn, Baidar, and a slew of others were the muscle behind the plans. Subutai’s mission was to attack Central Europe by spearheading into Hungary. Kadan’s forces would punch north into Poland.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing. (Public Domain)

Baidar led two Mongol tumans of soldiers westward into Silesia. The object was to destroy their European opponents before they could unite. Duke Henry II of Silesia on 5 April 1241 at Liegnitz was waiting for a force of 50,000 Bohemians under King Wenceslas. The Mongols were in the right place at the right time before the remaining forces could unite with Duke Henry. The Duke’s army was 25,000 strong consisting of Poles, Germans, Teutonic knights, Hospitallers, and Knights Templars. However, much of Henry’s army consisted of poorly trained, inexperienced levies. Can you image Bavarian gold miners fighting a battle for you?

Mongol Heavy Cavalry

Mongol Heavy Cavalry (Public Domain)

Duke Henry’s army assembled themselves in a formation that was typical at the time for European armies. Heavy cavalry was the strike force looking to make the decisive blow to the enemy when the enemy showed weakness, while the infantry played only a supporting role protecting the rear. Henry’s formation is understandable and expected, but what Henry did not understand was the Mongol art of war. The Mongols used a tactic known as mangudai or feigned retreat. They would pretend to flee only to ambush those chasing after them.

The Mongols laid in wait for the Poles to make their move, as they did not want to give away their ruse. The Polish begin by charging the Mongols, hoping to engage them; however, the Mongol cavalry surrounded them and showered them with arrows.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Polish quickly pulled back. They then made a second attempt at the Mongols with two cavalry units charging ahead. The Mongols quickly fled, acting as if they were scared. This fake retreat by the Mongols encouraged the knights to continue, moving deeper and becoming more frustrated while trying to engage the enemy—but the Mongols would not cooperate. Instead, the charging knights realized they were in a trap. It was too late.

The Mongols surrounded the Europeans on three sides and began to shower their enemy with arrows and smoke bombs, separating the cavalry force sent in by Duke Henry from his main army. Once the dividing of Henry’s troops had been accomplished, the Mongol heavy cavalry rode down and cut to pieces the European infantry, ultimately winning the battle. Duke Henry was also killed. His head became an ornament on the tip of the spear.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241. (Public Domain)

Battle of Sajo River (or Mohi) (1241)

The Battle of Liegnitz took place a mere few days before the battle of Sajo River.

On the day of the battle, many European men died in the fighting including Duke Henry of Silesia. Once word got out that the Mongols had defeated Duke Henry, King Bela of Hungary was left to confront the Mongols with roughly around 80,000 men.

King Bela’s army was very much similar to Duke Henry’s, which consisted of heavy cavalry, infantry, and a number of mercenaries consisting of nomadic light cavalry. Bela’s army was huge, and one that could, if applied tactically, go toe to toe with just about any fighting force thrown at it. However, this fighting force was Mongols: smart thinkers who looked ahead and planned methodically.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

The Mongols choose a site called Mohi, which was on a plain. The reason for this location choice was to better maneuver their cavalry force while having a forest protecting their flanks. The Mongols quickly crossed over the Sajo River and rode a few miles ahead to make camp at that location. King Bela arrived nearby and set up camp, sending a small unit ahead to guard the far side of the bridge.

The Mongols decided that it would be best to divide their forces, sending 30,000 up north under the command of Subutai. Subutai gave the order for a bridge to be built that crossed over the River Sajo to the Hungarian side.

Batu began his attack early at dawn on 11 April with 40,000 troops at his aid. They attacked the bridge, but this proved dangerous, unless the bridge could be flushed of the European forces stationed there.

Batu gave the order for the catapults to be brought up, which hurled bombs of various sorts and made raucous sounds, which were used against the European forces to cause a panic. Once the European forces fled from the bridge, Batu was able to cross and control the bridge and establish a foothold on Bela’s side.

Nevertheless, Bela gave the order for his cavalry to charge the Mongol cavalry, for the Mongol cavalry had the river to their back, thus walling themselves in somewhat, until Subutai arrived from the north to flank Bela’s army. In doing so, it freed up Batu forces to engage Bela’s forces. The Mongols in turn devastated Bela’s camp.

After several hours of fighting the Mongols allowed a gap in their lines big enough to allow European forces to escape by any means necessary.  It was a bad idea to attempt escape, for the men had become a flood of panic and confusion. Nevertheless, the fate of the men fleeing was a deadly one. The Mongols cut down 60,000 men in a 30-mile (48 km) stretch back to Pest. King Bela escaped the butchery, most likely a changed man.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols. (Public Domain)

Once Hungary was clear of any foe left to challenge them, the Mongols knew that it was time to complete the mission and conquer the rest of Hungary. However, although it seemed the fate was sealed for the Hungarians, chance saved the Hungarians: a significant death. The Mongol Khan Ogotai died in December 1241, and Batu was forced to leave in order to elect a new Khan, as was their custom.

The Nine Principles of War

The Mongols demonstrated the Nine Principles of War at both Liegnitz and Sajo by massing their forces on a concentrated position at the right time and place.

The Mongol objective was clear and decisive as to whom they would hit, like clockwork, in order to gain the advantage.

The Mongol offensive was a strike force that could now exploit the enemy and retain enemies to do their will—all by the use of psychological maneuver.

Surprise in the Mongol offensive was crucial in order to disrupt the enemy to thrown him off balance. This allowed the Mongol economy of force to concentrate all secondary units on primary targets, to achieve a much greater position than his enemy did. This allowed the Mongols to maneuver their enemy into a fixed position for the beating.

Mongol flexibility and cunningness was crucial to this endeavor. Unity of command under the Mongols was by one Batu Khan. However, Batu was flexible in his unity of command in order to gain the best out of his officers, such as with Subutai.

Because of the Mongol effectiveness in chaos and confusion, it allowed for a great sense of security on their behalf. The Mongol army could create an atmosphere of safety to ensure that their troops always had the advantage over the enemy. With security safely applied, the objective of simplicity was greatly understood in order to execute any order without asking twice.

The reason why both Duke Henry and King Bela lost the battles was due to a lack of combined arms or a lack of understanding how to utilize them in a time of war. However, this may be unfair to those who died. Nevertheless, from what we have read, we can see why they lost: a lack of good troops with experience, the feeling of over confidence and superiority, and most important, a lack of understanding of their enemy’s way of warfare.

Béla IV flees from Mohi

Béla IV flees from Mohi (Public Domain)

The End of the European Theater

The Mongol onslaught into Europe would halt when on 11 December 1241 when the great Mongol leader Ogedei Khan died.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong. (Public Domain)

With his death, it was mandatory that all Mongol military expeditions stop and the Mongol princes were required to return to the capital of Karakorum to elect a new Khan. It was during this event that Subutai had been drawing up plans for the invasion of the Holy Roman Empire, but the man in charge of the European theater, Batu Khan, had to rush back since he was a prince.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan. (Public Domain)

It took three years before a new khan was elected and the man elected was Guyuk, and Guyuk had no interest in Batu. With a feud now in the works, any further military operations into Europe had ceased for the time being. With Subutai’s ambitions to advance further into Europe dashed, he received new military operations to conduct, particularly at the Song Dynasty during 1246-47.

The Legacy of Subutai

In 1247, a Franciscan monk by the name of Plano Carpini visited the Mongol court. In his letters, he mentioned that Subutai was still alive and in his early seventies. Carpini also went on to state that Subutai was held in high regards among the court, and referred to him as “Subutai the Unfailing.”

Carpini wrote, “He was a soldier without weakness.” Carpini is just one of the few sources available that speak of the man’s personality. The Muslims, for instance, saw him as “silent, insatiable, and remorseless.” The Russians said he was “extremely disciplined.” The Chinese had a much more revealing description. They looked upon Subutai in high esteem, and he was a great warrior. When Subutai passed, the Chinese bestowed an honorary title on him, proclaiming Subutai King of Honan (Hunan Province). The reason for this title was that Subutai captured the province from the Chin. He was also awarded the title of “faithful and steady.”

In 1248, Subutai returned to Karkorum after a successful campaign and retired. After Subutai left court, he is said to have removed the badges of rank from his yurt and spent the remainder of his days tending to his herds and watching over his grandchildren, particularly his grandson, Achu, and he sharpened his warrior skills.

Some say he went home near the Tuul River, others say he died alone in a tent, while others say he moved further west near the Danube River to be near his son, Uriangkatai, who was in the service of Batu army, serving as an officer. If so, Subutai would spend the remainder of his days living within the territory of the Golden Horde.

It is said he had grown tired of the court, and rightfully so. Subutai grew nauseous of the political squabbling of the Mongol princes, particularly that of Batu and Kuyuk that went on long after Ogedai’s death. By 1248, the once-great Mongol Empire established by Genghis Khan was still great, but fractures created after the death of Ogedei in 1241 continued to grow and further separate the empire from its foundation.

In the end, the historical records provide little information when it comes to the generalship of Subutai. Furthermore, this piece cannot relate the grand scope of all of the battles and wars he part took in, but instead provide a rare glimpse into the man called Subutai.

If one wants to know how accomplished this man was as a general on his Eurasian tour, then consider the words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, as he states that Subutai from China to the Danube “had conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles.” As military historian Richard Gabriel further comments, and rightfully speaks of Subutai’s achievements, they’re described as “a record of accomplishment literally unsurpassed by any of the great generals who had gone before him.”

Unfortunately, Subutai has long been overlooked, especially in military circles, but now his successes on the battlefield have become known for all to see and decipher.

After he retired, Subutai died two years later at the age of 72. Even though Subutai was dead, his sons and their descendants continued to serve one Khan after another for the next three decades.

Subutai is thus remembered in The Secret History of the Mongols:

“They are the Four Dogs of Temujin. They have foreheads of brass, their jaws are like scissors, their tongues like piercing awls, their heads are iron, their whipping tails swords . . . In the day of battle, they devour enemy flesh. Behold, they are now unleashed, and they slobber at the mouth with glee. These four dogs are Jebe, and Kublai, Jelme, and Subotai.”

Featured image: Deriv; A Mongolian Cavalry recreation, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition (CC BY-SA 2.0) , A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

(Read Part I: Subutai: Dog of War — Sophisticated Military Strategist Behind Genghis Khan’s Conquering Empire)

References

Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.

Carey, Brian Todd, Allfree, Joshua B and Cairns John. Warfare in the Medieval World. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2009.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2003.

Craughwell, Thomas J. The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in the World: How 88 Years of Mongol Domination Reshaped the World from the Pacific to the Mediterranean Sea. Gloucester, Maine: Fair Winds Press, 2010.

Crompton, Samuel Willard. 100 Military Leaders Who Shaped World History. San Mateo, CA: Bluewood Books, 1999.

Cummins, Joseph. History’s Great Untold Stories: The Larger Than Life Characters and Dramatic Events That Changed the World. Washington DC: National Geographic, 2007.

Curtin, Jeremiah. The Mongols A History. Boston: DA CAPO PRESS, 2003.

Dupuy, Trevor N. Johnson, Curt. Bongard, David L. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography.New York: Castle Books, 1995.

Edwards, Sean J. Swarming on the Battlefield” Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica: Rand Coporation, 2000.

Gabriel, Richard A. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Great Captains Unveiled. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Hartog, Leo De. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. London, New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004.

Kennedy, Hugh. Mongols, Huns & Vikings. London: Cassell, 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.

Tzu, Sun, Griffith, B. Samuel (translator). The Art Of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

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Scythian Tactics and Strategy: Scorched Earth Victories – Part II

Detail, decorative comb depicting weapons and dress of Scythian Warriors 5th Century

Feinting

Scythian tactics included feinting or withdrawing from either the battlefield or even the region. An example of feinting comes from a battle mentioned in Part I (Scythian Tactics and Strategy – Part I ), the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE.

The Roman historian Plutarch mentions that the Parthian horse archers would not engage the Roman forces during battle, but would retreat, luring the Roman forces to follow. The trap was set and the Romans thought victory was in hand. However, the fleeing horse archers turned and loosed arrows upon the pursuing Romans. The Romans in the pursuit soon realized they had made a terrible mistake, but it was too late. Nothing could be done but to make a defensive stand. Withdrawal allowed the feinting tactic to be used with proficiency due to Roman ignorance of their enemy. The Romans would try to advance, but with every attempt, the Parthian horse archers’ constant pelting with what seemed to be an endless supply of arrows would keep them in place.

Parthian horseman

Parthian horseman. ( Creative Commons )

Parthian camel units resupplied the horse archers by exchanging empty quivers for full ones, then and returning to their position. During this monotonous, never-ending event, the Romans would try to break the horse archer formations, only to be countered by heavy Parthian cavalry known as cataphract, which acted as the anvil to the Parthian hammer (arrows). The Battle of Carrhae was death by pieces for the Romans.

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan's Column in Rome

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan’s Column in Rome ( Wikimedia Commons ).

Therefore, when it comes to the feinting tactic, do not watch for the visible hand, but rather the invisible one. The Parthians and Scythians were notoriously successful in the feinting technique before the battle of Carrhae. Afterward, the countering measure to this tactic went largely ignored until Alexander the Great demonstrated a reversal.

One could make the argument that the Romans had faulty intelligence before Carrhae, but this would be unfair, although true to a certain extent. The truth of the matter is that the Romans invaded a land they did not know, looking to conquer a people they did not understand. In the end, both Rome and Parthia would continue to bash each other as the years turned into centuries, but neither side truly dominated the other.

Defense in Depth

Defense in Depth is most successful if your nation is rather large and unproductive, as in the case of the Scythians, who valued land and the ability to roam, rather than the luxuries of the cities, like Athens or Nineveh. The Scythians did seem to have cities but mobile villages may be a more accurate description. As for the lazy luxuries of life, some settled, but the majority roamed about.

According to Herodotus: “We Scythians have neither towns nor cultivated lands, which might induce us, through fear of their being taken or ravaged, to be in any hurry to fight with you.” But Herodotus also stated: “Having neither cities nor forts, and carrying their dwellings with them wherever they go; accustomed, moreover, one and all of them, to shoot from horseback; and living not by husbandry but on their cattle, their wagons the only houses that they possess.” The Scythians did have slaves, according to Herodotus, who were blind and whose primary task was being a shepherd. Additionally, Herodotus also mentioned Scythians who grew corn and onions, which indicates that agriculture was common among some of the tribes. Therefore, the notion that the Scythians did not have cities or villages is partially untrue, depending on the Scythic tribe, of course.

The Scythians that Darius the Great attacked did not have cultivated lands or towns that could be beneficial to Darius’ forces. The Scythians conducted a scorched earth policy as Darius’s army marched further inland, following after them. The Scythians understood that an army marches on its belly and so do the animals accompanying them. What Darius could not use would be a weapon against his forces. The strategy would be defense in depth, scorched earth policy the tactic, and the outcome would be starvation. Starvation through burning was the preferred method used to rid of the Persians. The Scythians understood that they could defeat the enemy by allowing the land to swallow them both physically and mentally.

Darius was ignorant of the people he wished to conquer; he showed no knowledge of the people or terrain he was about to invade. Because of this attitude by Darius, his brother, Artabanus, warned that the proposed campaign to conquer the European Scythians was far too risky, and even if it was successful, the economic benefits were limited. Nevertheless, Darius had to learn the hard way. For the Scythians, it was a good way to prevent a possible second invasion.

As mentioned, the Scythians used the land to their advantage, knowing that Darius would follow as long as the bait was present. The Scythians burnt all that grew, causing Darius to follow his enemy across burnt terrain in hopes of finding food for both his men and animals. The Scythians conducted hit and run attacks during mealtime and even at night, preventing the men from eating or even sleeping, irritating them even more. The Scythians knew that as long as Darius followed in pursuit, he would gain nothing, not even an engagement. Psychological and physical attrition would set in by attacking the enemy’s stomach and his need for rest, causing irrationality among the troops and further deteriorating the chain of command.

Scorched earth tactics, or burning anything useful to the enemy while withdrawing, was an effective military strategy.

Scorched earth tactics, or burning anything useful to the enemy while withdrawing, was an effective military strategy. Public Domain

In the end, the Scythians won a great victory by not engaging the enemy in conventional warfare, but beat the Persians through starvation and sleep deprivation, since an army can move only for so long before it needs to fuel up again in both rest and food. By denying both, the Scythians utilized a form of defense in depth that saved them from Persian conquest.

Scythian warriors, drawn after figures on an electrum cup from the Kul'Oba kurgan burial near Kerch. The warrior on the right is stringing his bow, bracing it behind his knee. Hair seems normally to have been worn long and loose, and beards were apparently worn by all adult men. The other two warriors on the left are conversing, both holding spears or javelins. The man on the left is wearing a diadem and therefore is likely to be the Scythian king.

Scythian warriors, drawn after figures on an electrum cup from the Kul’Oba kurgan burial near Kerch. The warrior on the right is stringing his bow, bracing it behind his knee. Hair seems normally to have been worn long and loose, and beards were apparently worn by all adult men. The other two warriors on the left are conversing, both holding spears or javelins. The man on the left is wearing a diadem and therefore is likely to be the Scythian king. Public Domain

Featured image: Detail, decorative comb depicting weapons and dress of Scythian Warriors 5th Century BC. Public Domain

By Cam Rea

References

Ian Morris, Why the West rules–for Now: the Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 277-279.

Herodotus, The Histories, 4. 127.

Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), xii.

U.S. Department of Defense, Counterguerrilla Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, FM 90-8, August 1986), Chapter 4, Section III. 4-10.

Polybius. 18.30.6

Plutarch, Crassus, 25.5

Farrokh,133.

John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, (New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 118-120.

 

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Scythian Tactics and Strategy: Devastating Guerrilla Archers – Part I

Battle between the Scythians and the Slavs

Featured image: Battle between the Scythians and the Slavs ( Wikimedia Commons ).

The Scythians may not be the original inventors of asymmetrical warfare, but one could argue that they perfected it. Before and during the Scythian arrival, many nations fought by conventional methods. In other words, the established civilizations of Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia, used taxes to feed, equip, and maintain their large armies. Overall, one can see the massive expense it is to arm and defend a nation when war comes a-knocking. Lives and money are lost, doubly so if you go on the offensive at the expense of your nation’s pocket.

The Scythians, on the other hand, needed none of these, for they were tribal based and seemed to come together only in a time of war. Thus, most issues did not hinder them, such as the laws of supply and demand in the military-economic sense, which would affect an established kingdom or empire. The land was their supplier and demand was when they were in need of resources. For Scythians to sustain life, they had to move to new regions in search of ample pastures suited for their horses to graze and abundant with game, while the land they moved from was left to rest. But one has to be cautious as well, for even though the Scythians moved around, many stayed within their tribal territory. In some cases, they ventured into another tribal territory due to the need to sustain life for both tribe and livestock.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC. Public Domain

When one examines the Scythian lifestyle, one can easily gain an understanding of the type of warfare necessarily carried on against more sedentary (non-migratory) people, like those in Mesopotamia. The Scythian took a guerilla approach to warfare as their method, not to be confused with terrorism. The term guerrilla warfare means irregular warfare and its doctrine advocates for the use of small bands to conduct military operations. Herodotus mentions their method of warfare when King Darius of Persia campaigned against them:

“It is thus with me, Persian: I have never fled for fear of any man, nor do I now flee from you; this that I have done is no new thing or other than my practice in peace. But as to the reason why I do not straightway fight with you, this too I will tell you. For we Scythians have no towns or planted lands, that we might meet you the sooner in battle, fearing lest the one be taken or the other wasted. But if nothing will serve you but fighting straightway, we have the graves of our fathers; come, find these and essay to destroy them; then shall you know whether we will fight you for those graves or no. Till then we will not join battle unless we think it good.”

The description indicates that the Scythians against whom Darius is warring have no center of gravity; more on this later.

Swarming

The Scythians are best known for swarming the enemy, like at the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE, where they demonstrated this tactic during the initial stages of the attack. The swarming tactic is the first stage before any other mechanism is executed, like feinting or defense in depth.

To summarize, the definition of swarming would be a battle involving several or more units pouncing on an intended target simultaneously.  The whole premise of swarming in guerrilla warfare, as indicated in the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-8 on the topic of counterguerrilla operations, is to locate, fix, and engage the enemy, but to avoid larger forces unless you possess units capable of countering the other. This would allow other units to take advantage of the enemy, which is rare in most battles involving the Scythians. The key principle of swarming is that it does not matter if you win the battle so long as you do not lose the war. It is designed to disorient the enemy troops.

The swarming tactic comprises many units converging on the intended target; however, the swarm moves with the target in order to fracture it. Thus, the method of swarming is to dislodge the enemy piecemeal, causing rank and file to implode. This is due to longstanding, snail-like movement during battle, meantime being continuously pelted from afar by projectiles; fear takes over, demoralizing an army. Roman soldiers were to have a taste of this, for they had a space of three feet all around them to allow for movement and maneuvering in battle. The Scythians took advantage of their three feet, as Plutarch mentions, at the battle of Carrhae: “Huddled together in a narrow space and getting into each other’s way, they were shot down by arrows.”

The heavy barrage of arrows would cause some to wander off, bit-by-bit, thus allowing horse archers to concentrate fully on the wandering enemy. In this scenario, one can argue that the initial battle tactic is to pelt the enemy with a volley of arrows, keeping the target tight in order to fracture it, which allows the horse archers to go from random pelting to accurately killing the enemy. In other words, they switch from firing up into the air to firing forward at the enemy, as demonstrated at Carrhae in 53 BCE.

Scythians shooting with the Scythian bow, Kerch (ancient Panticapeum), Crimea, 4th century BC.

Scythians shooting with the Scythian bow, Kerch (ancient Panticapeum), Crimea, 4th century BC. (CC BY-SA 3.0 )

Now, before we go any further, let me briefly make the case that swarming has many different methods or tactics, but the Scythian swarm is not like that of others. However, a swarm is a swarm, but the method varies. Case in point, “mass swarming” is the most sought- after method in both the ancient and medieval world, demonstrated by massive conventional armies that would eventually separate or disassemble and perform convergent attacks over a region or province from its initial phase. The “dispersed swarm” is the preferred tactic in guerrilla warfare, where the body separates and converges on the battlefield without forming a single body.

The whole premise of swarming in guerilla warfare is to engage quickly but to avoid larger forces. Pharnuches, one of Alexander’s generals, made the fatal mistake by falling for the Scythian feinting tactic, in which he chased after the Scythians, only to find himself ambushed and swarmed. Pharnuches should have never been given command, because he was a diplomat, not an experienced officer.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon. Public Domain

The Battle of Jaxartes is a fine example of the swarming tactic, but rather small in scale. The Scythians harassing the forces of Alexander did not appear to be a large force. Rather, the Scythians at the battle intended to demoralize the enemy, and if that did not work, they could always lead the enemy farther inland and begin the strategy of defense in depth. Alexander knew better after he defeated the Scythians at Jaxartes in 329 BCE. Alexander understood quite well that if he were to pursue the Scythians further inland, his forces would be open to hit and run attacks, famine, and psychological attrition, none of which is desirable. Even Alexander understood the limits of empire, especially when his worldview did not incorporate the lands to the north.

The Battle of Jaxartes was a loss for the Scythians and a victory for the Macedonians. However, two important demonstrations of the tactics are visible at the battle. The first tactic is swarming, the second is what I like to call the swarm-anti-swarm tactic developed by Alexander, commonly referred to as “anti-swarming.” In fact, Alexander had to swarm in order to achieve victory. The swarm-anti-swarm counters the enemy with a bait-unit. Once the enemy converged from several sides, the remainder of the forces would converge on the area and swarm the enemy. Alexander learned quickly to adopt this tactic of closing in on the enemy and attacking from all directions for future use.

By Cam Rea

References

Ian Morris, Why the West rules–for Now: the Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 277-279.

Herodotus, The Histories, 4. 127.

Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), xii.

U.S. Department of Defense, Counterguerrilla Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, FM 90-8, August 1986), Chapter 4, Section III. 4-10.

Polybius. 18.30.6

Plutarch, Crassus, 25.5

Kaveh Farrokh, Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War (Oxford: Osprey, 2007), 133.

John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, (New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 118-120.