The Persian War Machine: Organization and Command – Part I

The Persian war machine made empires beforehand look miniature. The Persians were able to take the best from all over the Near East and turn it into a force that could not be defeated for many centuries to come. The article you are about to read just skims the surface of a fascinating story that largely goes unnoticed.

Organization and Command

The Persian military organization was much like that of the provinces, wherein the provinces had a degree of autonomy that filtered down to local rule, and provinces provided troops to the king when needed. Because of this, it makes it difficult to identify what is distinctively Persian when it comes to their military system.

When it comes to command, it is headed by the “king of kings” or shahanshah in Persian. On the surface, the heart of command is with the king, like Darius leading his army into Scythia, Xerxes into Greece, like Artaxerxes II fought his brother Cyrus, and Artaxerxes lead his forces against both the Phoenicians and Egypt. However, the king could not always be on campaign. The reason for this is that if the king should be away for a certain period he risks much. A king cannot rule effectively if he is absent for a long period. In doing so, he leaves the art of governance in hands of officials who cannot always be trusted and in a worst case scenario, may attempt a coup d’etat, like Darius the Great who seized the throne of Persia after the death of Cambyses II.

As demonstrated, some Persian monarchs went on campaigns, but in many cases, the trust was placed in the hands of the men trained to do so—the commanders who were specifically sent from the royal court. One such example was Mardonios, who took command of the Persian military operations in Greece after Xerxes withdrew in 479 BCE. However, if the conflict was a local affair, the provincial satrap could conduct military operations against the aggressor both foreign and domestic.

King Xerxes I of Persia from his tomb at Naqshe Rustam

King Xerxes I of Persia from his tomb at Naqshe Rustam (CC BY-SA 2.0)

With generals leading armies, comes military emblems. The use of standards was key in informing the troops who was in command and where to find him. The Persian standard was primarily displayed on the tent. The emblem of the Achaemenid’s was a golden eagle with its wings outspread. However, the image of the eagle was of less importance due to the ever present images of the sun-disc found in Achaemenid art.

Standard of Cyrus the Great

Standard of Cyrus the Great (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Faravahar, one of the best-known symbols of ancient Iran (Persia). Relief in Persepolis.

Faravahar, one of the best-known symbols of ancient Iran (Persia). Relief in Persepolis. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Recruitment

When it comes to recruiting, most were not full-time soldiers. Darius, king of Persia, calls them kara, which can mean “people-army or host.” In other words, they were the “people’s army.” In any case, they were not entirely militia nor considered levy but a reserve allowed holding land so long as they provided military service. The person in charge of the recruiting process was the satrap. Once orders filtered down from the Persian king, the satrap would pass the order down to his subordinate, which the Greeks called hyparchoi, “lieutenant-governors.” It was the duty of the lieutenant-governors to issue orders to the lower officials to seek out eligible men to fill the ranks. This was not always an easy task and one can see why when it’s understood that many of the Persian provinces were not ethnically universal. The Satrap would give such a job to lower officials who were native to the province.

For example, take the province of Parthia; it may have had four different ethnic groups. A satrap who was Median would be representing these four ethnic groups. Because of this, it was crucial that the satrap had officials of every ethnic background within his court to help orchestrate the day-to-day affairs of governance, including military recruitment and in a worst-case scenario, mustering for times of war. However, as mentioned earlier, depending on the nature of the conflict, particularly provincial, it did not require the mustering of the entire army of Persia.

When the King of Persia did give the call to war the mustering of the Persian army can be summed up in four headings. First, a body of Persian cavalry often accompanied Satraps. Second were men who provided military service for land-holdings. Third, garrisons; Garrison troops were predominantly mercenaries recruited outside the empire, think Greek. Fourth were the provincial levies and native troops, the bulk of the Persian army when on the move.

Relief of Persian soldiers, Persepolis.

Relief of Persian soldiers, Persepolis. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Training

Historical details of the military training of the ancient Persian army seem nonexistent. However, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia describes the military training process a Persian youth went through. According to Xenophon 1.2.9, a Persian male at age seventeen would undergo combat training for a length of ten years.

Now the young men in their turn would live as follows: for ten years after they are promoted from the class of boys they passed the nights, as we said before, about the government buildings. This they did for the sake of guarding the city and to develop their powers of self-control; for this time of life, it seems, demands the most watchful care. And during the day, too, they put themselves at the disposal of the authorities, if they were needed for any service to the state. Whenever it was necessary, they all remained around the public buildings. But when the king went out hunting, he took out half the garrison; and this he did many times a month. Those who went must take bow and arrows and, in addition to the quiver, a sabre or bill in its scabbard; they carried along also a light shield and two spears, one to throw, the other to use in case of necessity in a hand-to-hand encounter.

The Greek historian Herodotus in his book “The Histories 1.135,” states that they “educate their boys from five to twenty years old, and teach them only three things: riding and archery and honesty.” Strabo 15.3.18 states:

From five years of age to twenty-four they are trained to use the bow, to throw the javelin, to ride horseback, and to speak the truth; and they use as teachers of science their wisest men, who also interweave their teachings with the mythical element, thus reducing that element to a useful purpose, and rehearse both with song and without song the deeds both of the gods and of the noblest men. And these teachers wake the boys up before dawn by the sound of brazen instruments, and assemble them in one place, as though for arming themselves or for a hunt; and then they divide the boys into companies of fifty, appoint one of the sons of the king or of a satrap as leader of each company, and order them to follow their leader in a race, having marked off a distance of thirty or forty stadia.

 Furthermore in 15.3.19:

They serve in the army and hold commands from twenty to fifty years of age, both as foot-soldiers and as horsemen; and they do not approach a market-place, for they neither sell nor buy. They arm themselves with a rhomboidal wicker-shield; and besides quivers they have swords and knives; and on their heads they wear a tower-like hat; and their breastplates are made of scales of iron. The garb of the commanders consists of three-ply trousers, and of a double tunic, with sleeves, that reaches to the knees, the under garment being white and the upper vari-coloured. In summer they wear a purple or vari-coloured cloak, in winter a vari-coloured one only; and their turbans are similar to those of the Magi; and they wear a deep double shoe.

Exhibit of Achaemenid Archers

Exhibit of Achaemenid Archers (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The military machine of Cyrus the Great was not as one would think—it was not professional by any means, at least not first. Understand that the professional Persian military force would come but the nucleus of the Persian military, particularly the guardsmen, were the true professionals. This is not to say that those inhabitants of the non-Persian ethnic provinces (satrapies) like Bactria, Maka, and Sogdia, to name a few, did not have professional soldiers. Like many provinces, including Pars or Persia, they too had troops of a lesser standard and because of this, they were not seasoned and unused to command and control. Herodotus 7.223 mentions that at the battle of Thermopylae 480 BCE, the Persian officers pushed the “men to go forward against their opponents, who are lashed towards the Spartans by their officers.” Now, one can take this to mean as I had previously stated or that it was custom for officers to whip their men forward, professional or not, like the Roman centurions who carried vine-staffs.

A cenotaph to Marcus Caelius, a centurion of Legio XVIII, killed at the Battle of Teutoburger Wald. Note the prominent display of the vine staff, his sign of office.

A cenotaph to Marcus Caelius, a centurion of Legio XVIII, killed at the Battle of Teutoburger Wald. Note the prominent display of the vine staff, his sign of office. (Public Domain)

Brief Evolution

When Cyrus set out against Media he relied more on friends and kinsmen from local tribes. You could say it was the uniting of the clans and tribes only when times of trouble presented itself and when it was over, they returned to their homes and pastures. This type of force consisted of a few professionals with the vast majority being militias. The professional army that Cyrus pieced together did not come until he conquered Media and even then it would have taken some time to build a truly professional fighting force. But what one can gather from the early Persian military history is that it resembled the military structure of the once mighty Empire of Assyria. Like the Assyrians, the Persians set apart land for the professional soldiers and estates for their elite cavalrymen and even archers. Moreover, the Persians seemed to have been influenced by the Assyrians and most likely their Babylonian counterparts in the technology of siege equipment. Such examples are the battering ram, and the use of ladders to scale walls, as well as siege towers, in which they could place slingers or archers to fire upon the defenders on the wall in order to divert them, while allowing the combat engineers below to unearth the wall.

A large wheeled Assyrian battering ram with an observation turret attacks the collapsing walls of a besieged city, while archers on both sides exchange arrows. From the North-West Palace at Nimrud, about 865-860 BC.

A large wheeled Assyrian battering ram with an observation turret attacks the collapsing walls of a besieged city, while archers on both sides exchange arrows. From the North-West Palace at Nimrud, about 865-860 BC. (Public Domain)

Overall, Cyrus had a great army after the fall of Media, which would continue down through his successors. But the question is what made them great? In order to gain a full understanding of this we must take a deeper look into the military apparatus of the Persian army to see how they were able to conquer such a vast and diverse territory.

Cam Rea is an author and military historian. He has written numerous articles for Ancient Origins Premium and Classical Wisdom Weekly as well as several books.

Top Image: Deriv; Faravahar carved in stone at Persepolis, Iran, (Public Domain)and Persian archers (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Briant, Pierre. ‘From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire’. Publisher: Eisenbrauns; 1st English Edition edition (January 1, 2002)

Farrokh, Kaveh. ‘Shadows in the Desert : Ancient Persia at War’. Publisher: Osprey Publishing (2007)

Head, Duncan. ‘The Achaemenid Persian Army’. Publisher: Montvert (1992)

Herodotus, Histories

Strabo, The geography of Strabo.

Xenophon, Cyropaedia

 

 

Cyrus the Great’s Last Campaign: Who Killed Cyrus? – Part II

According to the popular Greek historian Herodotus, Cyrus went on his last campaign to subdue the Massagetae, a tribe located in the southernmost portion of the steppe regions of modern-day Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan around 530 BCE, where he would die in battle. But did he?

The reason to question the narrative surrounding Cyrus’ death is that there are conflicting reports. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the sources of Herodotus, Ctesias, Xenophon, and Berossus to find if Cyrus really died in battle against the Massagetae.

[Read Cyrus the Great: Conquests and Death! – Part I]

Herodotus’ Account

Ten years after subduing the Babylonians in 539 BCE, Cyrus turned his attention towards the northeastern part of the empire to bring “the Massagetae under his dominion. Now the Massagetae are said to be a great and warlike nation, dwelling eastward, toward the rising of the sun, beyond the river Araxes, and opposite the Issedonians. By many they are regarded as a Scythian race.” The Araxes Herodotus mentions is not the Araxes River that runs along the countries of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran in the Caucasus, but instead the Jaxartes, which is northeast of the Oxus River, east of the Aral Sea.

Sunset over Sir-Darya river, Kazakhstan. In Ancient Greek river is called Yaxartes (Jaxartes)

Sunset over Sir-Darya river, Kazakhstan. In Ancient Greek river is called Yaxartes (Jaxartes) (Petar Milošević /CC BY-SA 3.0)

Sometime after Cyrus had subdued the Babylonians, he decided to secure his northern borders, probably due to Saka raids into the Chorasmia satrapy by building a series of forts. One such fort was called Cyropolis, and established on the Jaxartes River .

However, the raids did not stop, and why would they? Even with a series of forts built, the nomadic element would still find a way to penetrate the border undetected. Cyrus, seeing that had two options to consider, took the diplomatic approach first by sending ambassadors to Queen Tomyris, Massagetean ruler “with instructions to court her on his part, pretending that he wished to take her to wife.”

Tomyris as imagined by Castagno, 15th century.

Tomyris as imagined by Castagno, 15th century. (Public Domain)

As the Persian ambassadors crossed into Massagetae territory and approached Tomyris’ residence, she must have sent envoys of her own out to ask the Persian ambassadors as to why they had come. This was probably to check the men for weapons and question the reason for being there. After telling the Massagetae officials of their mission, it was relayed back to Tomyris. Tomyris, considering what they said, realized that it was “her kingdom, and not herself, that he courted.” Instead of hearing it from the Persian envoys, she “forbade the men to approach.” When the Persian envoys returned and informed Cyrus of her answer, he mustered his forces.

Asia in 323 BC, showing the Massagetae located in modern-day Central Asia.

Asia in 323 BC, showing the Massagetae located in modern-day Central Asia. (CC BY 3.0)

Cyrus lead his forces to the Jaxartes River, “and openly displaying his hostile intentions; set to work to construct a bridge on which his army might cross the river, and began building towers upon the boats which were to be used in the passage.” As the Persians were securing their passageways into Massagetae territory, envoys from Tomyris arrived to present Cyrus with a message which stated:

King of the Medes, cease to press this enterprise, for you cannot know if what you are doing will be of real advantage to you. Be content to rule in peace your own kingdom, and bear to see us reign over the countries that are ours to govern. As, however, I know you will not choose to hearken to this counsel, since there is nothing you less desires than peace and quietness, come now, if you are so mightily desirous of meeting the Massagetae in arms, leave your useless toil of bridge-making; let us retire three days’ march from the river bank, and do you come across with your soldiers; or, if you like better to give us battle on your side the stream, retire yourself an equal distance.

Cyrus considered this offer, called his advisors together, and made the argument before them. They all agreed to let “Tomyris cross the stream, and giving battle on Persian ground.” However not all were game to this idea. Croesus the Lydian, who was present at the meeting of the chiefs, disapproved of this advice, stating:

Now concerning the matter in hand, my judgment runs counter to the judgment of your other counselors. For if you agree to give the enemy entrance into your country, consider what risk is run! Lose the battle, and there with your whole kingdom is lost. For, assuredly, the Massagetae, if they win the fight, will not return to their homes, but will push forward against the states of your empire. Or, if you win the battle, why, then you win far less than if you were across the stream, where you might follow up your victory. For against your loss, if they defeat you on your own ground, must be set theirs in like case. Rout their army on the other side of the river, and you may push at once into the heart of their country. Moreover, were it not disgrace intolerable for Cyrus the son of Cambyses to retire before and yield ground to a woman?

Therefore, Cyrus agreed with Croesus that it would be best to face the Massagetae on their territory. Persian envoys delivered the message to Tomyris, stating “she should retire, and that he would cross the stream.” Tomyris thus moved her forces and awaited the Persian army. While he gathered his forces to cross the river, he named Cambyses II as the next king should Cyrus die.

Tomyris had her son, Spargapises lead a third of the Massagetae towards Cyrus’ forces. Cyrus left a small detachment behind with food and drink to lure the Massagetae, which they took, and then defeated the small Persian detachment and begin to eat and drink. Once the Massagetae became inebriated, the Persian forces fell on the camp and killed many, taking a few prisoners alive, including Tomyris’ son Spargapises. Spargapises, learning of what had happened, committed suicide. Tomyris, upon learning what had happened, considered the tactics of Cyrus as cowardly. Tomyris vowed revenge and Cyrus did not take heed to the warning. Cyrus pushed further into Massagetae territory where he and his forces met up with the Massagetae face to face. There are no details of the battle. One can speculate that the Massagetae won over the Persians using steppe tactics, which one would think Cyrus would have been accustomed to and able to defend against. However, whatever counter tactics Cyrus used, was all for nothing. The Massagetae won the battle, killed Cyrus, and recovered his body from the battlefield.

Queen Tomyris had the head of Cyrus cut from his body, which she dipped in blood as a symbolic act of revenge for her son, but also you could say she was giving Cyrus his fill as well. As to how much of this is truth and how much of this is fiction is up to the reader to decide. Herodotus does seem plausible in his account but he is not the only one.

"Tomyris Plunges the Head of the Dead Cyrus Into a Vessel of Blood" by Rubens.

“Tomyris Plunges the Head of the Dead Cyrus Into a Vessel of Blood” by Rubens. (Public Domain)

Ctesias’ Account

To support Herodotus’ view as to what happened to Cyrus, the fifth century BC Greek physician and historian Ctesias states the story slightly differently in books VII-IX of Persika, stating, “Cyrus marched against the Derbices, whose king was Amoraeus.” The Derbices or Derbikes according Strabo 11.8.8, 9.1, the first century BCE Greek geographer, philosopher, and historian, are said to have been located east of the Caspian Sea. Pliny indicates in his work Natural History 6.18.48 that the Derbices were on both sides of the Oxus River. However, other modern historians suggest that the Derbices were the Dyrbaians. Ctesias describes the Dyrbaians as living “to the south extending all the way to Bactria and India. Its men are blessed, wealthy, and very just, never committing any crime or killing anybody.” While this seems plausible, more is needed before making conclusions, because Ctesias is describes them as two separate tribes. However, the key words here are “Bactria and India.” As Cyrus entered Derbices territory, they attacked.

Painting of Cyrus the Great in battle

Painting of Cyrus the Great in battle (CC BY 3.0)

By placing their elephants in an ambush, the Derbikes repelled the Persian cavalry causing Cyrus himself to fall off his horse at which point an Indian –  for the Indians were fighting alongside the Derbikes and supplied their elephants –  hit Cyrus after he fell with a javelin below the hip to the bone, inflicting a fatal wound; however, Cyrus was taken up before dying and brought back to camp by his servants.  Each side lost 10,000 men in the battle.  After hearing about Cyrus, Amorges (King of Amyrgians, the Scythians (Saka) tribe) came with all speed at the head of 20,000 cavalries from the Saka; however, after hostilities resumed, Amoraeus (Amoraios, king of the Derbikes) was killed along with his two children in a major victory for the Persian and Sakidian contingent in which 30,000 Derbikes and 9,000 Persians perished.

This inscription seems to suggest that the Derbikes and Dyrbaians may be one in the same. The reason for this is that the Indians were fighting alongside the Derbikes. The Dyrbaians territory extended all the way to Bactria and India, which indicates the plausibility that they had Indian allies who could provide war elephants. If this is the case, Cyrus and his Persian army traveled much further eastward to expand his borders as opposed to Herodotus account. Furthermore, Cyrus does not die but his fell off his horse and was struck with a javelin to the hip. However, he survived only to die later and the battle itself ended up being a Persian victory. Another interesting aspect is where Cyrus fights and dies—fighting the Saka, according to Herodotus, while Ctesias tells us he was aided by them.

The Accounts of Berossus and Xenophon

Herodotus and Ctesias provide the most information concerning Cyrus battle and death. However, two other sources tell a different tale and are short.  According to the Babylonian fourth/third-century priest-chronicler Berossus, Cyrus died fighting the Dahae. According to Xenophon in his work Cyropaedia 8.7.25, Cyrus died peacefully in his own capital with directions for his burial.

Now as to my body, when I am dead, my sons, lay it away neither in gold nor in silver nor in anything else, but commit it to the earth as soon as may be. For what is more blessed than to be united with the earth, which brings forth and nourishes all things beautiful and all things good? I have always been a friend to man, and I think I should gladly now become a part of that which does him so much good.

What can be made from the account provided from Berossus is not much. Yes, Cyrus died against the Dahae or Daai. The Dahae were a Saka tribe much like the Massagetae. However, no details of the reason for war or of the battle survived, thus leaving one to wonder whether the story was similar to Herodotus’ or to that of Ctesias’. As for the account provided by Xenophon, there is no description of being wounded in battle that resulted in his death.

The End of Cyrus

If one takes three out of the four accounts one has a possible connection. Three out of the four speak of war with a Scythian/Saka tribe. Two out of four speak of Cyrus dying in battle. One out of four says he died three days after the battle and the other account of the four speaks of a peaceful death. Only two out of the four accounts mention a name of his adversary. What can be made from this is that Cyrus either sought to expand his empire by attacking the Derbikes/Dyrbaians (if they are truly one and the same) for their riches, or truly fought the Massagetae or Dahae to protect his northeastern borders from further raids. In both cases, he was fighting a Scythian/Saka element. Overall, there is no conclusive way to know how Cyrus died. But given that three of the four accounts speak of a violent death it seems without a doubt that the famous Cyrus the Great, builder of largest empire the ancient world had yet seen, died in battle or shortly after fighting the Scythians/Saka to the northeast of his empire.

Tomb of Cyrus the Great.

Tomb of Cyrus the Great. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Top Image: Deriv; Tomb of Cyrus the Great (CC BY-SA 4.0) and Painting of Cyrus the Great in battle (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Briant, Pierre. From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 2002.

Ctesias, and Nichols, A., (2008) The Complete Fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and Commentary with an Introduction (Diss.) University of Florida http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0022521/nichols_a.pdf

Dandamayev, Muhammad A. “Encyclopædia Iranica.” RSS. November 10, 2011. Accessed August 05, 2016. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cyrus-iii

Herodotus, Histories

Strabo, The geography of Strabo.

Xenophon, Cyropaedia

Cyrus the Great: Conquests and Death! – Part I

 

Cyrus the Great or “Cyrus II” was King of Anshan from 559-530 BCE and known as the King of Four Corners of the world and founder of the Achaemenid Empire. Cyrus was the son of King Cambyses I of Anshan 580 to 559 BCE and his mother Mandane was the daughter of King Astyages of Media.

Illustration of relief of Cyrus the Great

Illustration of relief of Cyrus the Great (Public Domain)

In 559 BCE, Cyrus ascended the throne of Anshan. Cyrus, a vassal to King Astyages of the Umman-manda, rebelled against his grandfather Astyages in 553 BCE. With the support of several Median nobles, he marched on Ecbatana to overthrow Astyages, according to Herodotus.

Detail; Painting of king Astyages

Detail; Painting of king Astyages (Public Domain)

While lines were drawn between those supporting the new power on the block, Cyrus, and those supporting the establishment, Astyages, many of the Umman-manda forces switched sides and joined Cyrus. In a seesaw war that went on for some time, Cyrus gained the upper hand and went on to defeat the Umman-manda and take Astyages prisoner. However, this was Herodotus’ view, and one must consider other sources.

Dream Visions and Conflicting Chronicles

The Neo-Babylonian King Nabonidus, in his first year as ruler (around 556 or 555 BCE), states in his chronicle that he had a dream given to him by the god Marduk:

At the beginning of my lasting kingship they (the great gods) showed me a vision in a dream…. Marduk said to me, ‘The Umman-manda of whom thou speakest, he, his land, and the kings who go at his side, will not exist for much longer. At the beginning of the third year, Cyrus, king of Anshan, his youthful servant, will come forth. With his few forces he will rout the numerous forces of the Umman-manda. He will capture Astyages, the king of the Umman-manda, and will take him prisoner to his country.

Nabonidus, king of Babylonia.

Nabonidus, king of Babylonia. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Nabonidus had obviously received intelligence reports that Cyrus intended to rebel and declare independence from Astyages. Notice that in the inscription Nabonidus speaks of the Umman-manda as a burden to his own kingdom. However, on the flipside, his dreams were hope and fear of the unknown. Nabonidus was familiar with Astyages but Cyrus was still a mystery.

In Nabonidus seventh year, he had this to say about the conflict between Cyrus and Astyages:

[Astyages] mobilized [his army] and he marched against Cyrus, king of Anshan, to conquer…. the army rebelled against Astyages and he was taken prisoner. They handed him over to Cyrus […]. Cyrus marched toward Ecbatana, the royal city. Silver, gold, goods, property, […] which he seized as booty [from] Ecbatana, he conveyed to Ansan. The goods [and] property of the army of […].

This inscription paints a very different story than that of Herodotus. The difference is Astyages was the one who invaded Anshan to put down the rebellion, but in turn, his army rebelled and handed him over to Cyrus. However, this is not to say Herodotus is wrong. It is just the opposite as to what happened, since Herodotus says Cyrus invaded Media which is partially right—but only after the battle and imprisonment of Astyages did Cyrus march on Media to take the Umman-manda capital, Ecbatana.

Marduk and the Dragon Marduk, chief god of Babylon, with his thunderbolts destroys Tiamat the dragon of primeval chaos. Drawing from relief

Marduk and the Dragon Marduk, chief god of Babylon, with his thunderbolts destroys Tiamat the dragon of primeval chaos. Drawing from relief (Public Domain)

One must not forget that this was not the end of the war. Even though Astyages was now a prisoner, there were still three more years of bloodshed in store which would not end until around 550 BCE. During this war, Cyrus would lose three more battles before he finally gained the upper hand on the Umman-manda. The war could have ended much earlier for Cyrus had not so many men changed sides during the conflict, prolonging the war. Once the Umman-manda were defeated and vanquished, Cyrus entered Ecbatana, sat on Astyages’ throne, and proclaimed himself the new master of Asia.

War with the West

With Astyages defeated, Cyrus inherited a new problem — the western front. For it was in 585 BCE that the Umman-manda and Lydian Empire made an agreement that the boundary should be the Halys River, which is (modern day Kızılırmak River or Red River) in central Turkey. The king of Lydia at the time was Croesus.

Croesus on the pyre, Attic red-figure amphora.

Croesus on the pyre, Attic red-figure amphora. (Public Domain)

Croesus was famous for his wealth and power throughout Greece and the Near East. With his brother-in-law Astyages now defeated, Croesus saw opportunity to expand his borders in the name of avenging his brother-in-law’s death. However, before Croesus mobilized his forces, he sent an envoy bearing gifts to the oracle of Delphi.

Priestess of the Oracle at ancient Delphi, Greece.

Priestess of the Oracle at ancient Delphi, Greece. (Public Domain)

The envoy asked the oracle a question concerning what Croesus should do, and it is said the oracle turned to the men and declared:

“If Croesus attacked the Persians, he would destroy a great empire.”

The oracle suggested that Croesus should seek allies that were powerful to assist him in his war against Persia. Croesus visited the oracle again, and asked how long the Lydian empire would last. The oracle said to Croesus:

“Wait till the time shall come when a mule is monarch of Media: Then, thou delicate Lydian, away to the pebbles of Hermus: Haste, oh! Haste thee away, nor blush to behave like a coward.”

The mule that is mentioned was none other than Cyrus, for Cyrus was part royalty due to his mother being an Umman-manda princess, while his father Cambyses I was a petty vassal king.

Ultimatum

In 547/46 BCE, once Croesus got answers that he thought were in his favor, he mobilized his forces and moved beyond the Halys River and entered into the province of Cappadocia. Cyrus likely had detachments scouting the border and once the large army of Croesus came in sight, they would have quickly dispatched a messenger to Cyrus. Once Cyrus arrived with his army, he sent envoys to Croesus’ camp with a message ordering Croesus to hand Lydia over to him. If agreed, Croesus would be allowed to rule Lydia but would have to remove his crown as king and accept the title Satrap. Croesus turned down the invitation and the two armies did battle at a place called Pteria in Cappadocia. The battle took place in the month of November and Croesus was defeated. Croesus and his forces retreated across the Halys River and back into Lydian territory.

Croesus then made a terrible mistake; he decided to disperse his army for the winter, thinking Cyrus would not attack until spring. Then without warning or thought, Cyrus did the unexpected. Cyrus and his forces fell upon the Lydian men that were in the process of demobilization. They were surprised, routed, and defeated. This was a risky move for Cyrus, due to the stories of Lydia’s army being superior, and the fact that they attacked during the winter, which can be rough. Cyrus probably sent spies throughout Lydia and received vital intelligence that the Lydian forces were demobilizing for the winter, thus making them easy targets. Cyrus understood the risk of waiting for spring to challenge them on their home turf.

Once the Lydian forces were routed, Croesus fled to Sardis where he took refuge. His supposed allies sent no troops and instead many of the provinces in Lydia defected over to Cyrus. Cyrus knew that there was no time to waste, and he pursed Croesus to Sardis, besieged the city, and on the fourteenth day, the city fell. It was during this time that Sparta sent forces to help Croesus, but on hearing that Sardis had fallen, turned back. Word that Sardis fell sent a shock wave through the Near East and is said to have been as great a shock as when the news of Nineveh fell in 612 BCE. In addition, the Chronicle of Nabonidus also mentions the fall of Lydia:

In the month of Nisan, King Cyrus of Persia mustered his army and crossed the Tigris downstream from Arbela and, in the month of Iyyar, [march]ed on Ly[dia]. He put its king to death, seized its possessions, [and] set up his own garrison [there]. After that, the king and his garrison resided there.

The conquest of Lydia as a whole was far from over, for there were still many Greek city-states angered about the situation and wanted the same terms that Cyrus gave to Croesus before the battle of Pteria. Cyrus said no, for he had other issues on his mind, and the revolts began once he had left for Ecbatana.

To suppress the revolts in Asia Minor, Cyrus sent a man by the name Mazares back with some troops to squash the rebellions and enslave those involved. Mazares did just that for some time until he died of unknown causes. The next person to take his place and keep the rebellions down was Harpagus. Harpagus put the final stamp on the rebellious situation in Asia-minor and placed Persian garrisons in the areas affected to secure the peace. However, it was not easy, for it took four years before Persian rule could be established among the populace.

Cyrus’ Eastern and Babylonian Campaigns

As the pacification of Anatolia continued, Cyrus turned his attention to the east. Herodotus tells us Cyrus had the Bactrians and Sacae on his mind and does speak of many minor campaigns but decided that they were not worth mentioning in detail due to their insignificant nature. Even though Herodotus is vague using terms such as Sacae and Bactrians, it is possible to piece together what may have happened in speculative detail. The reason could be that the various Saka and Bactrian tribes may have been a part of the Umman-manda Empire but were quite possibly just tributary states with no direct ties; and when the Umman-manda Empire fell to Cyrus, they stopped paying tribute and became more or less hostile to the new rule.

However, one must not overlook the Behistun Inscription, for Darius in 520 BCE mentions Parthia, Drangiana, Aria, Chrorasmia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Gandara, Scythia, Sattagydia, Arachosia, and Maka as having been areas conquered by Cyrus between 546-540 BCE. If so, then the Behistun Inscription helps us piece together the information Herodotus is reluctant to give in detail.

Behistun Inscription, describing conquests of Darius the Great in Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian languages. These reliefs and texts are engraved in a cliff on Mount Behistun (present Kermanshah Province, Iran).

Behistun Inscription, describing conquests of Darius the Great in Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian languages. These reliefs and texts are engraved in a cliff on Mount Behistun (present Kermanshah Province, Iran). (Public Domain)

Cyrus’ next campaign was directed towards the Kingdom of Babylon around 539 BCE, but it has also been suggested to have taken place a few years before. His reason for invading Babylonia may have been the ineffectiveness of its ruler Nabonidus, who neglected the primary god of Babylonia known as Marduk. Also it did not help that Nabonidus moved to Teima in Arabia quite unexpectedly and decided to stay there for ten years while his son Belshazzar ruled the kingdom. With an ineffective ruler reigning over the Babylonian Kingdom, it became more desirable to Cyrus while the people of Babylonia wanted a new ruler. Nabonidus did return from Teima around 543 BCE due to the Persian threat. However, it seems too late, for the people of Babylonia were more interested in Cyrus as being their king. He and his forces invaded the Babylonian Kingdom:

In the month of Tesrit, Cyrus having joined battle with the army of Akkad at Upu on the [bank] of the Tigris, the people of Akkad fell back. He pillaged and massacred the population. The fourteenth, Sippar was taken without struggle. Nabonidus fled. The sixteenth, Governor Ugbaru of Gutium and the army of Cyrus made their entrance into Babylon without fighting. Later, having returned, Nabonidus was taken in Babylon. Until the end of the month, the shield-(carriers) of Gutium encircled the gates of the Esagila, but there was no interruption (of rites) of any kind in the Esagila or in any other temple and no (festival) date was missed. In the month of Arahsamnu, the third day, Cyrus entered Babylon. (Drinking) straws (?) were filled up before him. Peace reigned in the city; Cyrus decreed peace for all Babylon. He installed Gubaru as governor of (all) the governors in Babylon.

Cyrus’ first battle against the Babylonians at Upu/Opis was of great significance, for the city of Opis was on the banks of the Tigris River, and by taking Opis/Upu Cyrus had flanked the Median wall that stretched to Sippar, which was on the banks of the Euphrates River but also controlled part of the wall. It was not until the next day that Cyrus took the city of Sippar without a fight and thus was now in full control of the Median wall. The very wall that was intended to keep out the Cimmerians, Scythians, and any other undesirable barbarians was now in their hands.

Mosaic depicting Persian archers. (Pre 4th Century BC)

Mosaic depicting Persian archers. (Pre 4th Century BC) (CC BY 2.0)

With the Median/Umman-manda wall now out of the way, Cyrus then began his march towards Babylon. On October 12, Ugbaru, Governor of Gutium, entered Babylonia without a fight and arrested King Nabonidus of Babylonia who had earlier fled Sippar. Nabonidus was exiled to the region of Carmania. According to Xenophon, this Ugbaru, also known as Gobryas, was in charge of a vast amount of territory for the Babylonians. When Cyrus invaded, Ugbaru/Gobryas reconsidered and switched sides, joining Cyrus’ army, which he most likely guided during the invasion and battle at Opis/Upu. Now Cyrus himself would have entered the city on October 29 to restore the festivals and proclaim peace to all Babylon. But was this what truly happened?

It’s been speculated that the city may have put up a temporary fight. In 1970, Paul-Richard Berger identified a fragment as being a part of the Cyrus Cylinder, which was a part of the Yale Babylonian Collection. This fragment mentions Cyrus restoring the city’s inner walls and moats among other things within Babylon. It becomes possible that the Persian forces may have conducted siege warfare for a short time. Now this is not to say Cyrus was not a peace-loving man. However, one should be careful, for Cyrus also was a propagandist, doing everything he could to restore the gods of the city to gain the respect of the people. An example of this would be his son Cambyses II. Cambyses observed the New Year’s rite on March 24, 538 BCE during which he was humiliated by religious symbolism. In other words, the high priest of Marduk grabbed him by the ear, forcing him to kneel! Cambyses is then to have said:

“I have not sinned, O Lord of the Lands. I have not destroyed Babylon, nor damaged the Esagila, nor neglected the temple rites.”

Then the high priest of Marduk slapped Cambyses’ cheek! As tears flowed down his face, the god was pleased and thus concluded the ritual.

 

Top Image: Deriv; Tomb of Cyrus the Great (CC BY-SA 4.0) and modern recreation of relief of Cyrus II (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Briant, Pierre. From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 2002.

Ctesias, and Nichols, A., (2008) The Complete Fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and Commentary with an Introduction (Diss.) University of Florida http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0022521/nichols_a.pdf

Dandamayev, Muhammad A. “Encyclopædia Iranica.” RSS. November 10, 2011. Accessed August 05, 2016. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cyrus-iii

Herodotus, Histories

Strabo, The geography of Strabo.

Xenophon, Cyropaedia

The Hunnic War Machine: Horsemen of the Steppe – Part II

The fifth century politician and bishop Sidonius Apollinaris, wrote an interesting description on the horsemanship of the Huns, stating, “You would think the limbs of man and beast were born together, so firmly does the rider always stick to the horse.” Such were the abilities of the horsemen of the steppe – an integral part of the success of the Hunnic Invasion and the creation of an empire.

[Read Part 1: The Hunnic War Machine]

Hunnic Horsemen

Being that the majority of the Hunnic cavalry consisted of light horse archers led by petty nobles and their followers, their attire would have been light. The sixth century scholar Procopius states that the Hunnic warrior/herdsman wore “loosely woven” garments. Ammianus, much earlier, describes the dress of the Huns stating:

“They dress in linen cloth or in the skins of field-mice sewn together, and they wear the same clothing indoors and out. But when they have once put their necks into a faded tunic, it is not taken off or changed until by long wear and tear it has been reduced to rags and fallen from them bit by bit. They cover their heads with round caps and protect their hairy legs with goatskins; their shoes are formed upon no lasts, and so prevent their walking with free step.”

Being that the vast majority of Huns wore meager garments, their armor was not much better. In other words, do not expect the poorer Huns to be decked out in armor like the nobles or the wealthy. The type of armor worn would have been scale (sewn on) or lamellar (linked plates) armor reaching to the waist or knee. Hunnic armor also appears to have been sleeveless in some accounts. According to Procopius, he states:

“He came to be surrounded by twelve of the enemy, who carried spears. And they all struck him at once with their spears. But his thorax with-stood the other blows, which therefore did not hurt him much; but one of the Goths succeeded in hitting him from behind, at a place where his body was uncovered, above the armpit, right close to the shoulder, and smote the youth, though not with a mortal blow.”

While the Hunnic warrior could withstand a series of hits to the chest, his armpits were exposed, which indicates that his armor was sleeveless. Another interesting aspect is that the word thorax is used. This may suggest that the armor was not a breastplate but a metal shirt or scale-mail jacket, which protects all sides of the body and is sleeveless. The fourth century panegyric, Pacatus, Sidonius, and Procopius, all mention that the Hunnic horse archers wore iron cuirasses. While most Hunnic horsemen wore meager armor, those lucky enough to serve alongside Rome were decked out. Fifth century Latin poet, Flavius Merobaudes, mentions that Huns serving the Roman general Aetius wore “belts, quivers, horse, bits, helmets, and the armor, studded with precious stones, were gilded.

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse's head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse's owner.’

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse’s head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse’s owner.’  (Public Domain)

However, some of the Hunnic armor worn may have been Roman. Other Huns, not associated with Aetius, may have donned gilt Persian armor. Understand that the vast majority of Huns were not emblazoned in armor from head to toe, most wore meager amounts while the few nobles and wealthy Huns could afford the luxury of armor.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

One such luxury was the helmet. Huns serving under the Romans were provided helmets. The majority of Huns not serving Rome donned felt or soft leather caps. Reason for this is that many of the so-called Hunnic graves are absent of such an item. Hunnic noblemen and the wealthy could afford a helmet, which could be passed down from generation to generation. The type of helmet the Huns would have worn under the Romans is called a spangenhelm. The spangenhelm is a conical helmet consisting of four to six sections, reinforced by bands over the joins. Most had large cheek pieces, neck guard and a nose piece. The origin of the helmets is said to be of Sassanid origin, which was later adopted by the Romans during the late third early fourth century.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns also used a shield. Unfortunately, like most items pertaining to the Huns, it remains elusive. The Hunnic shield would have been small, as a large shield would have been cumbersome to utilize on horseback. The type of small shield used would have been as the ones used by other steppe nomads, and since no shield has been discovered, it is suggested that the shield was made of wicker covered in leather.

As for swords, it is disputed whether the vast majority of Huns carried them. The Hunnic swords likely varied, as some were like that of the Sarmatians and Goths, which was long, straight, and designed for slashing. However, in the 10th century, Latin Germanic epic poem founded on German popular tradition called Waltharius, the hero Walther “arms himself in the Hunnish fashion… with a double-edge long sword belted to his left hip … and a single-edged half-sword at his right.” While the poem is fictional, it provides and indicates that some Huns wore a long sword, spatha, and a single-edged half-sword, semispatha, like that of the Sassanid noblemen who are regularly depicted wearing the same type of swords in this fashion.

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha (CC BY 2.0)

Another side arm the Huns used was the lasso. The lasso was widely used by many steppe nomads like the Scythians and Sarmatians to name a few. Ammianus speaks of the Hun lasso and states “while the enemy are guarding against wounds from the sabre-thrusts, they throw strips of cloth plaited into nooses over their opponents and so entangle them that they fetter their limbs and take from them the power of riding or walking.”

As for heavy horsemen, the Huns had few and mostly relied on those they conquered and incorporated into their own military apparatus. The tribes that aided heavy cavalry to the Huns were the Sarmatians, Alans, and Goths. With heavy cavalry, accompanying the Hunnic horse archers, the Huns had a well-defined military capable of delivering mobility and shock to the enemy on the field of battle.

Bow and Arrow

The primary weapon of the Hunnic horse archer was the composite bow. The Hunnic reflex bow was made of wood, horn, and sinew. The ears of the bow had seven bone plaques, while the handle had three, two on the side one on its top.

The foundation of the bow was made of wood. The type of wood used could have been maple, yew, poplar or ash. When the tree of choice had been selected, the bowyer would choose to use the heartwood of the tree instead of the growing outer layer or sapwood.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

After the selecting and fashioning the wood into shape, a layer of sinew is applied. Sinew gives the bow its penetrating power. Once the sinew is applied, the bow would be bellied with horn, which provides compressive strength and on release of the arrow, the bone brings the bow back to original position like a coil. To keep this complex weapon together, glue made from boiled animal hide was used. These multiple layers of bone made the bow quite stiff and powerful upon release.

The Hunnic bow was between 130-160 centimeters long or between four and five feet in length. Unlike other steppe bows, the length of the Hunnic bow was not ideal for use by a horse archer. The ancient Scythian bow was 80 centimeters or (2.6 feet) in length, making it ideal for horse archery, even though some were found to be 127 centimeters or (4.2 feet) in length. The Huns got around this by making the bow asymmetrical. Its upper half was slightly longer than the lower. The reason for the lower half being shorter was so as not to poke the horse in the neck. Another reason why the Huns extended the length of the bow was to produce more power. Upon release, the Hunnic horse archers could effectively hit an unarmored opponent at 150 to 200 meters or (492-656 feet), and an armored opponent at 75 to 100 meters or (246-328 feet).

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow.

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The type of bowstring used also varied. The string for the bow must not be too heavy or light nor stretch easily. The materials used could have been from twisted gut, sinew, horsehair, vines, and even silk. The Hunnic horse archer probably had a variety of bowstrings on hand for various climate conditions. Horsehair strings were best suited for colder climates, whereas sinew absorbed moisture, making them less desirable due to stretching.

The Huns used a variety of arrowheads. One type was a large leaf-shaped and the other a large three-bladed iron arrowhead. The Huns are also said to have used “sharp bone” according to Ammianus. They are said to have fixed bone balls behind the tips called “whistlers”, which produce a terrifying sound for psychological effect. When placing the arrowhead on the shaft, the Huns and other eastern steppe peoples did not socket it into place like the Scythians and Sarmatians did. Instead, the Hunnic arrowheads had a tang, which was sunk into the arrow shaft. The possible reason for this is that it was easier to produce arrowheads with tangs than socketed. Later on western steppe tribes adopted the eastern tang style.

The type of arrow shafts possibly used was cane, reed, birch, cornel, rose-willow, hornbeam, and ash. Reed may have been the preferred material to use for it would travel further and easier to produce. The feathers used in fletching would generally have been from either ducks or geese. The number of feathers attached to the shaft was between two and four. The feathers provided aerodynamic stabilization for the flight of the arrow.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com / CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns carried a broad shaped bow case, which hung on the left side, and an hour glassed shape quiver or tube-like on the right side, which had a flap. The materials used to construct these cases were made of leather, bark or wood. Upon firing the arrow, the Hun would place the arrow on the right side of the bow. The archer would draw the bowstring with three fingers with the thumb locked under the first three fingers and protected by a ring of bone, horn, ivory or even stone.

An Empire of Conquest

In conclusion, the Hunnic war machine was like that of any other nomadic steppe tribe but with a twist. The twist is the Huns could do it better. Whereas the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans and many others could only do little in terms of conquest and confiscation, their goals to expand beyond the steppe frontier was never considered, even when they were united. This is not to say that they did not take the plunge into the civilized sedentary world. They did, but in small strikes and fast retreats from those who posed a challenge. The Huns, like the others mentioned, became powerful enough to challenge the various steppe tribes and absorbed them through conquest. While the Huns initially were still not united, their appetite for conquest and confiscation could not be quenched and was a shared goal among them. Even when the Huns pushed out the Goths, they still found plunder by joining with the Romans. Once Attila came on the scene with his brother Bleda, the brothers were able to negotiate and coerce the tribes to coalesce as one. Therefore, the Huns were the first true nomadic empire to establish itself before the civilized world.

But their world was not long term, as the Hunnic economy was based on war and extortion with no lasting goal. In the end, the Hunnic war machine that set foot in Europe, before mighty Roman and the fractured Barbarians, would soon disappear, but the carcass of the machine remained to be absorbed by those affected, to be restudied and implemented to make their (Romans and Barbarians) armies much more effective on the battlefield.

Sculpture of Attila the Hun

Sculpture of Attila the Hun (Public Domain)

Top Image: Attila and his Hordes (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

Subutai: Dog of War — Silent, Insatiable and Remorseless, Part II

Invasion of Central Europe: Battle of Liegnitz (1241)

Subutai planned the invasion of Central Europe with precision. This military expedition into Europe placed Subutai into the annals of great military leaders.

After beating down many of the Russian principalities, Subutai sent spies into Poland, Hungary, and even as far as to Austria. He was able to put together a dossier after gathering vital intelligence on the various kingdoms throughout Eastern Europe. Even though Subutai made the plans, his was under the command of Batu Khan.

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century).

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century). (Public Domain)

While Batu Khan was the leader of this expedition, Subutai, Kadan Kahn, Orda Kahn, Baidar, and a slew of others were the muscle behind the plans. Subutai’s mission was to attack Central Europe by spearheading into Hungary. Kadan’s forces would punch north into Poland.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing. (Public Domain)

Baidar led two Mongol tumans of soldiers westward into Silesia. The object was to destroy their European opponents before they could unite. Duke Henry II of Silesia on 5 April 1241 at Liegnitz was waiting for a force of 50,000 Bohemians under King Wenceslas. The Mongols were in the right place at the right time before the remaining forces could unite with Duke Henry. The Duke’s army was 25,000 strong consisting of Poles, Germans, Teutonic knights, Hospitallers, and Knights Templars. However, much of Henry’s army consisted of poorly trained, inexperienced levies. Can you image Bavarian gold miners fighting a battle for you?

Mongol Heavy Cavalry

Mongol Heavy Cavalry (Public Domain)

Duke Henry’s army assembled themselves in a formation that was typical at the time for European armies. Heavy cavalry was the strike force looking to make the decisive blow to the enemy when the enemy showed weakness, while the infantry played only a supporting role protecting the rear. Henry’s formation is understandable and expected, but what Henry did not understand was the Mongol art of war. The Mongols used a tactic known as mangudai or feigned retreat. They would pretend to flee only to ambush those chasing after them.

The Mongols laid in wait for the Poles to make their move, as they did not want to give away their ruse. The Polish begin by charging the Mongols, hoping to engage them; however, the Mongol cavalry surrounded them and showered them with arrows.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Polish quickly pulled back. They then made a second attempt at the Mongols with two cavalry units charging ahead. The Mongols quickly fled, acting as if they were scared. This fake retreat by the Mongols encouraged the knights to continue, moving deeper and becoming more frustrated while trying to engage the enemy—but the Mongols would not cooperate. Instead, the charging knights realized they were in a trap. It was too late.

The Mongols surrounded the Europeans on three sides and began to shower their enemy with arrows and smoke bombs, separating the cavalry force sent in by Duke Henry from his main army. Once the dividing of Henry’s troops had been accomplished, the Mongol heavy cavalry rode down and cut to pieces the European infantry, ultimately winning the battle. Duke Henry was also killed. His head became an ornament on the tip of the spear.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241. (Public Domain)

Battle of Sajo River (or Mohi) (1241)

The Battle of Liegnitz took place a mere few days before the battle of Sajo River.

On the day of the battle, many European men died in the fighting including Duke Henry of Silesia. Once word got out that the Mongols had defeated Duke Henry, King Bela of Hungary was left to confront the Mongols with roughly around 80,000 men.

King Bela’s army was very much similar to Duke Henry’s, which consisted of heavy cavalry, infantry, and a number of mercenaries consisting of nomadic light cavalry. Bela’s army was huge, and one that could, if applied tactically, go toe to toe with just about any fighting force thrown at it. However, this fighting force was Mongols: smart thinkers who looked ahead and planned methodically.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

The Mongols choose a site called Mohi, which was on a plain. The reason for this location choice was to better maneuver their cavalry force while having a forest protecting their flanks. The Mongols quickly crossed over the Sajo River and rode a few miles ahead to make camp at that location. King Bela arrived nearby and set up camp, sending a small unit ahead to guard the far side of the bridge.

The Mongols decided that it would be best to divide their forces, sending 30,000 up north under the command of Subutai. Subutai gave the order for a bridge to be built that crossed over the River Sajo to the Hungarian side.

Batu began his attack early at dawn on 11 April with 40,000 troops at his aid. They attacked the bridge, but this proved dangerous, unless the bridge could be flushed of the European forces stationed there.

Batu gave the order for the catapults to be brought up, which hurled bombs of various sorts and made raucous sounds, which were used against the European forces to cause a panic. Once the European forces fled from the bridge, Batu was able to cross and control the bridge and establish a foothold on Bela’s side.

Nevertheless, Bela gave the order for his cavalry to charge the Mongol cavalry, for the Mongol cavalry had the river to their back, thus walling themselves in somewhat, until Subutai arrived from the north to flank Bela’s army. In doing so, it freed up Batu forces to engage Bela’s forces. The Mongols in turn devastated Bela’s camp.

After several hours of fighting the Mongols allowed a gap in their lines big enough to allow European forces to escape by any means necessary.  It was a bad idea to attempt escape, for the men had become a flood of panic and confusion. Nevertheless, the fate of the men fleeing was a deadly one. The Mongols cut down 60,000 men in a 30-mile (48 km) stretch back to Pest. King Bela escaped the butchery, most likely a changed man.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols. (Public Domain)

Once Hungary was clear of any foe left to challenge them, the Mongols knew that it was time to complete the mission and conquer the rest of Hungary. However, although it seemed the fate was sealed for the Hungarians, chance saved the Hungarians: a significant death. The Mongol Khan Ogotai died in December 1241, and Batu was forced to leave in order to elect a new Khan, as was their custom.

The Nine Principles of War

The Mongols demonstrated the Nine Principles of War at both Liegnitz and Sajo by massing their forces on a concentrated position at the right time and place.

The Mongol objective was clear and decisive as to whom they would hit, like clockwork, in order to gain the advantage.

The Mongol offensive was a strike force that could now exploit the enemy and retain enemies to do their will—all by the use of psychological maneuver.

Surprise in the Mongol offensive was crucial in order to disrupt the enemy to thrown him off balance. This allowed the Mongol economy of force to concentrate all secondary units on primary targets, to achieve a much greater position than his enemy did. This allowed the Mongols to maneuver their enemy into a fixed position for the beating.

Mongol flexibility and cunningness was crucial to this endeavor. Unity of command under the Mongols was by one Batu Khan. However, Batu was flexible in his unity of command in order to gain the best out of his officers, such as with Subutai.

Because of the Mongol effectiveness in chaos and confusion, it allowed for a great sense of security on their behalf. The Mongol army could create an atmosphere of safety to ensure that their troops always had the advantage over the enemy. With security safely applied, the objective of simplicity was greatly understood in order to execute any order without asking twice.

The reason why both Duke Henry and King Bela lost the battles was due to a lack of combined arms or a lack of understanding how to utilize them in a time of war. However, this may be unfair to those who died. Nevertheless, from what we have read, we can see why they lost: a lack of good troops with experience, the feeling of over confidence and superiority, and most important, a lack of understanding of their enemy’s way of warfare.

Béla IV flees from Mohi

Béla IV flees from Mohi (Public Domain)

The End of the European Theater

The Mongol onslaught into Europe would halt when on 11 December 1241 when the great Mongol leader Ogedei Khan died.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong. (Public Domain)

With his death, it was mandatory that all Mongol military expeditions stop and the Mongol princes were required to return to the capital of Karakorum to elect a new Khan. It was during this event that Subutai had been drawing up plans for the invasion of the Holy Roman Empire, but the man in charge of the European theater, Batu Khan, had to rush back since he was a prince.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan. (Public Domain)

It took three years before a new khan was elected and the man elected was Guyuk, and Guyuk had no interest in Batu. With a feud now in the works, any further military operations into Europe had ceased for the time being. With Subutai’s ambitions to advance further into Europe dashed, he received new military operations to conduct, particularly at the Song Dynasty during 1246-47.

The Legacy of Subutai

In 1247, a Franciscan monk by the name of Plano Carpini visited the Mongol court. In his letters, he mentioned that Subutai was still alive and in his early seventies. Carpini also went on to state that Subutai was held in high regards among the court, and referred to him as “Subutai the Unfailing.”

Carpini wrote, “He was a soldier without weakness.” Carpini is just one of the few sources available that speak of the man’s personality. The Muslims, for instance, saw him as “silent, insatiable, and remorseless.” The Russians said he was “extremely disciplined.” The Chinese had a much more revealing description. They looked upon Subutai in high esteem, and he was a great warrior. When Subutai passed, the Chinese bestowed an honorary title on him, proclaiming Subutai King of Honan (Hunan Province). The reason for this title was that Subutai captured the province from the Chin. He was also awarded the title of “faithful and steady.”

In 1248, Subutai returned to Karkorum after a successful campaign and retired. After Subutai left court, he is said to have removed the badges of rank from his yurt and spent the remainder of his days tending to his herds and watching over his grandchildren, particularly his grandson, Achu, and he sharpened his warrior skills.

Some say he went home near the Tuul River, others say he died alone in a tent, while others say he moved further west near the Danube River to be near his son, Uriangkatai, who was in the service of Batu army, serving as an officer. If so, Subutai would spend the remainder of his days living within the territory of the Golden Horde.

It is said he had grown tired of the court, and rightfully so. Subutai grew nauseous of the political squabbling of the Mongol princes, particularly that of Batu and Kuyuk that went on long after Ogedai’s death. By 1248, the once-great Mongol Empire established by Genghis Khan was still great, but fractures created after the death of Ogedei in 1241 continued to grow and further separate the empire from its foundation.

In the end, the historical records provide little information when it comes to the generalship of Subutai. Furthermore, this piece cannot relate the grand scope of all of the battles and wars he part took in, but instead provide a rare glimpse into the man called Subutai.

If one wants to know how accomplished this man was as a general on his Eurasian tour, then consider the words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, as he states that Subutai from China to the Danube “had conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles.” As military historian Richard Gabriel further comments, and rightfully speaks of Subutai’s achievements, they’re described as “a record of accomplishment literally unsurpassed by any of the great generals who had gone before him.”

Unfortunately, Subutai has long been overlooked, especially in military circles, but now his successes on the battlefield have become known for all to see and decipher.

After he retired, Subutai died two years later at the age of 72. Even though Subutai was dead, his sons and their descendants continued to serve one Khan after another for the next three decades.

Subutai is thus remembered in The Secret History of the Mongols:

“They are the Four Dogs of Temujin. They have foreheads of brass, their jaws are like scissors, their tongues like piercing awls, their heads are iron, their whipping tails swords . . . In the day of battle, they devour enemy flesh. Behold, they are now unleashed, and they slobber at the mouth with glee. These four dogs are Jebe, and Kublai, Jelme, and Subotai.”

Featured image: Deriv; A Mongolian Cavalry recreation, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition (CC BY-SA 2.0) , A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

(Read Part I: Subutai: Dog of War — Sophisticated Military Strategist Behind Genghis Khan’s Conquering Empire)

References

Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.

Carey, Brian Todd, Allfree, Joshua B and Cairns John. Warfare in the Medieval World. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2009.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2003.

Craughwell, Thomas J. The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in the World: How 88 Years of Mongol Domination Reshaped the World from the Pacific to the Mediterranean Sea. Gloucester, Maine: Fair Winds Press, 2010.

Crompton, Samuel Willard. 100 Military Leaders Who Shaped World History. San Mateo, CA: Bluewood Books, 1999.

Cummins, Joseph. History’s Great Untold Stories: The Larger Than Life Characters and Dramatic Events That Changed the World. Washington DC: National Geographic, 2007.

Curtin, Jeremiah. The Mongols A History. Boston: DA CAPO PRESS, 2003.

Dupuy, Trevor N. Johnson, Curt. Bongard, David L. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography.New York: Castle Books, 1995.

Edwards, Sean J. Swarming on the Battlefield” Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica: Rand Coporation, 2000.

Gabriel, Richard A. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Great Captains Unveiled. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Hartog, Leo De. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. London, New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004.

Kennedy, Hugh. Mongols, Huns & Vikings. London: Cassell, 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.

Tzu, Sun, Griffith, B. Samuel (translator). The Art Of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

The Forgotten Roman General

General Publius Ventidius is probably one of the most overlooked if not completely forgotten, generals in military history. Maybe it is because Ventidius grew up poor like most Romans… Or perhaps it was due to the reports that he sold mules and wagons before joining the Roman army.

Despite this, Ventidius would have a distinguished military career, accompanying Julius Caesar during his campaign against Gaul and partaking in the Roman Civil War. Then in 45 BCE, Ventidius took up Caesar’s offer and accepted the post of plebeian tribune when the senate was reorganized and expanded.

Finally, on top of everything else, it may have been this forgotten general, with whom we concern ourselves today, who was responsible for reversing the Parthian tide and changing the course of Roman History.

We will now look at the series of battles to amend the marginal position in the history books designated to poor Ventidus.

Mark Antony

It was in 39 BCE that Mark Antony assigned Ventidius Bassus the mission to retake Asia Minor. Reports had reached Antony while he was in Greece that the Parthians had finished their campaign in Asia Minor for the year. These intelligence reports most likely came from the province of Asia, which was, at the time, loyal to Rome. From this news, Antony was able to draw up his plans.

He probably knew that most of the Parthian army would retire for the winter and return home to their respected nobles. This would mean that those who remained were local militias with questionable loyalty to garrison the cities throughout Asia Minor. In addition, Antony understood the need to attack now to inhibit any further Parthian progress coming next spring.

Antony saw this as a perfect opportunity to surprise the enemy.

And so, once the coast was clear, Antony took a chance and placed a few legions under the command of our dear Ventidius, who subsequently set sail for the province of Asia. Vantidius’ mission was simple: establish a beachhead in the province of Asia and push inland.

Battle of the Cilician Gates

Ventidius’ landing was unexpected. This only shows the lack of intelligence gathering on the part of Labienus, head of the Roman-Parthian army. Once the Roman forces were accounted for, Ventidius began pushing eastward in a ‘search and destroy’ mission.

Word spread rapidly that the Romans had arrived. When the message reached Labienus, he was startled and terrified, for he “was without his Parthians.” The only troops available to him were the neighborhood militia.

Labienus quickly fled the province of Asia and headed east, seeking military support from his co-ruler, Pacorus, a Parthian prince and son of King Orodes II.

Meanwhile, Mark Antony’s man, Ventidius, took his own chance and abandoned his heavy troops. He pursued Labienus with his lightest forces.

Warrior

Eventually, Ventidius caught up with Labienus and cornered him near the Taurus range. He chose the high ground to look down upon Labienus’ encampment. But there was another, more important, reason why Ventidius took the high ground; he feared the Parthian archers.

It was a standoff as both generals encamped for several days, waiting for the arrival of their main forces. As the bulk of the armies finally arrived, the Romans and the Parthians hunkered down for the night.

Cataphract

At daybreak, the Parthians, over-confident with their numbers and past victories, decided to start the battle before joining forces with Labienus. Unfortunately, these were not the famous and deadly Parthian horse archers… but the heavy cavalry, or cataphract. Once they were at the length of the slope, the Romans charged down on top of them and repelled the enemy with ease, for the Romans had momentum.

While the Romans inflicted significant casualties, the cataphracts caused even more harm to themselves in the chaos.

The cataphracts were at the top of the slope, where all the fighting took place, but when they retreated, they ran into their men coming up the hill. Instead of descending to rally around Labienus, they bypassed their general and headed straight for Cilicia. It was absolute chaos.

Ventidius, seeing that the Parthians were scattering and fleeing, decided to bring his men down from the hill and march on Labienus’ camp.

Both armies were now face to face… But Ventidius decided to stay put.

Why would Ventidius do this? Well, he was informed by deserters that Labienus was going to flee the camp come nightfall. Therefore, Ventidius decided it was better to set up ambushes rather than have an all-out pitch battle, which would result in losing many men and resources during the process.

Once nightfall came, the ambushes set in place worked as planned, killing and capturing many… that is, except for Labienus. Labienus was able to escape by changing clothes… His destination was Cilicia.

However, Labienus was not able to hide for long. Demetrius, a former slave and then “freedman,” turned bounty hunter and arrested him. He was quickly executed after Demetrius turned Labienus over to the Roman authorities.

Battle of Amanus Pass

With Labienus dead, Ventidius was able to secure the province of Cilicia. This did not mean they won; the mission was far from finished. To complete it, Ventidius devised a plan to trick the Parthians.

Ventidius sent a cavalry, headed by the officer Pompaedius Silo, to scout out the Amanus Pass, a strategic mountain path connecting the province of Cilicia and Syria. Not far behind Silo would be Ventidius, along with a small contingent of troops to aid in the fight.

Horseman

Meanwhile, on the Parthian side, Pacorus understood that the Romans would march through and invade Syria if the same Amanus pass were not secured. Therefore, he felt the best method was to station a garrison there to bottle up the small mountain road.

So Pacorus stationed Pharnapates, a Parthian lieutenant considered the most capable general of Orodes, to wait for the Romans to come. Once Silo reached the pass, the two sides engaged in battle immediately.

But don’t forget – this was, in fact, an elaborate trick. Silo’s real mission was to lure the Parthians away from their strongest defensive position. In doing so, Ventidius would either attack at the flank or from the rear.

Arrows

The Romans were giving the Parthians a taste of their medicine by using the same tactic that worked so well against them at the Battle of Carrhae. With many of Pharnapates’ cataphract lured away, Ventidius fell upon the Parthians unexpectedly. Pharnapates, along with many of his men, perished during the engagement.

With the Amanus Pass now clear, the invasion of Syria was imminent.

With the Amanus Pass secured, Ventidius, head of the Roman forces, pushed south into Syria. Pacorus, the Parthian prince and co-leader of the Roman-Parthian army, was done fighting… at least for now.

He abandoned the province to the Romans in late 39 BCE. With the Parthians out of the way, Ventidius led his forces to the province of Judea.

Ventidius’ mission in Judea was simple and lucrative: to rid the province of any remaining Parthians. He was also there to remove the anti-Roman King, Antigonus, and to restore Herod to the throne.

But Ventidius did neither.

King Herod

Instead, he bypassed Herod’s royal family, besieged by the Antigonus troops on the top of Masada, and went straight for Jerusalem. Ventidius played psychological warfare with Antigonus, making him think he would take Jerusalem.

This, however, was just another ruse.

Ventidius promised not to attack Jerusalem… that is, unless he received vast wealth from the king. In his mind, Antigonus had no choice but to capitulate to Ventidius’ demands.

Make no mistake, Ventidius would still support Herod and place him on the throne. But while Herod was still far away and his brother besieged, Ventidius thought he might as well make some money while they waited.

After filling Ventidius’ coffers, he took the bulk of his forces. He headed back for Syria, leaving his second, officer Pompaedius Silo, in charge to deal with the ‘Jewish problem’.

The Ruse

However, King Antigonus would come up with a ploy of his own; he bribed Silo multiple times. Antigonus hoped to buy time so that the Parthians could assist while he kept the Romans at bay.

Unfortunately for King Antigonus, this would not happen.

Pacorus

When Ventidius returned to Syria, he sent the bulk of his forces beyond the Taurus Mountains to Cappadocia for winter quarters. During this time, the Parthian Prince, Pacorus, planned another invasion of Syria and began to mobilize a substantial number of cavalry from the nearby provinces.

Word of Pacorus’ intentions soon spread, reaching the ears of loyal Roman informants, who then relayed the information to Ventidius. Not only was this information crucial for preparation, it also informed Ventidius that a Syrian noble named Channaeus (also called Pharnaeus), who pretended to be a Roman ally, was, in fact, a spy and Parthian loyalist.

Ventidius likely invited Channaeus over for dinner. During their meeting, Ventidius made it clear that he feared the Parthian would abandon their normal route, “where they customarily crossed the Euphrates near the city of Zeugma.”

Ventidius acted concerned over the issue, making it clear that if Pacorus were to invade Syria much further to the south, he would have the advantage over the Romans for it “was plain and convenient for the enemy.”

Like the good spy he was, Channaeus returned to his home after the meeting and quickly sent messengers to inform Pacorus of Ventidius’ fears.

Come early spring 38 BCE, Pacorus, unwilling to let go of Syria, led his forces south along the Euphrates River based on Ventidius’ supposed fears of engaging the enemy on a plain.

Once they came to the point of crossing, Pacorus realized that they needed to construct a bridge due to the banks being widely separated. It took many men and materials, and the bridge was completed only after forty days.

This is exactly what Ventidius wanted. Ventidius’ disinformation bought him much-needed time, allowing his legions to assemble.

Once the Parthian forces were in Syrian territory, Pacorus likely expected an immediate attack during the bridge construction or the crossing, but neither materialized. With no sign of the enemy, Pacorus became overconfident and began to believe that the Romans were weak and cowardly. Eventually, however, Pacorus found Ventidius at the acropolis of Gindarus in the province of Cyrrhestica.

Ventidius had been at Gindarus for three days preparing his defenses when Pacorus showed up.

Repeated Mistakes

One would have thought that perhaps Pacorus carefully prepared a plan of action in such a situation…. but no. Instead, Pacorus and his officers tossed out the combined arms strategy of utilizing heavy cavalry and horse archers in unison. This had worked many times, so they thought they could take the high ground with little trouble.

Battle

Moreover, the arrogant and overconfident Pacorus and his nobles did not want the commoners and horse archers to steal the show, as they did at Carrhae. So they decided to sally up the slope, as they did at the battle of the Cilician Gates.

Once the cataphracts were within five hundred paces of the Romans, Ventidius took advantage of their elitism and rushed his soldiers to the brim and over until both armies met at close quarters on the slope.

Ventidius’ strategy here was simple: by engaging the elite Parthian cavalry, he had cover from the infamous Parthian horse archers.

The Parthians would have learned from previous experiences what not to do. The result of their knee-jerk reaction was devastating. As the Parthian cataphract advanced up the slope, they were quickly repelled back… straight into those still coming up, inflicting great suffering to rider and mount.

This is not to mention those who did make it to the brim were met and repulsed by heavy infantry. And if the heavy infantry did not get them, the slingers would.

These slingers were likely on the left and right side of the Roman infantry, giving them a deadly arc of crossfire. This could be why we do not hear of the Parthian horse archers partaking in the engagement since any attempt to rush towards the front would put them in grave danger.

Battle

Even though the Parthian cataphracts put up a stiff fight at the foot of the hill, it was not enough.

The Roman infantry likely swarmed the cataphracts, forcing them into hand-to-hand combat. With the famous Parthian horse, archers neutralized from the fight due to the slingers, and nothing could be done to rescue the situation.

In the ensuing chaos, Pacorus likely tried to make one last push. He, along with some of his men, attempted to take Ventidius’ defenseless camp, only to be met by Roman reserves, in which he inevitably lost his life during the melee.

As news spread that Prince Pacorus lay dead, a scramble to recover his body was attempted. While those trying to retrieve his corpse met the same fate, most of Pacorus’ army quickly retreated. Some attempted to re-cross the bridge that was constructed over the Euphrates but were caught by the Romans and put to death. Meanwhile, others fled to King Antiochus of Commagene for safety.

Victorious Aftermath

This victory shocked Syria. To make sure the Syrians would never rebel against Rome, Ventidius took Pacorus’ corpse, severed the head, and ordered that it be sent throughout all the different cities of Syria.

It was a gruesome sight to behold, but the effect it had on the natives was anything other than negative. Instead, “they felt unusual affection for Pacorus on account of his justice and mildness, an affection as great as they had felt for the best kings that had ever ruled them.”

As for the Parthians who sought refuge in Commagene, Ventidius came after them.

Truth be told, Ventidius could care less about the Parthian refugees. Instead, he was more concerned with how much money he could confiscate from King Antiochus by besieging Samosata, the capital of Commagene, in the summer of 38 BCE.

Mark Antony

Antiochus offered Ventidius a thousand talents if he would just get up and go, but Ventidius refused and proposed that Antiochus send his offer to Antony.

Once Antony got word of the situation, he quickly returned to the action scene.

Ventidius was about to make peace and take the lucrative offer when Antony barred him from making such a deal. Instead, Antony removed him from his command and took over the operations from there.

Why? Well, Antony was jealous of Ventidius and wanted in on the glory.

Instead of achieving the desired fame, Antony inherits a protracted siege that goes nowhere and hurts him in the end. When Antiochus offered peace again, Antony had little choice but to accept the now lowered offer of three hundred talents.

After the extortion of Commagene, Antony ventured into Syria to take care of domestic issues before returning to Athens.

As for Ventidius, he went back to Rome, where he received honors and a triumph, for “he was the first of the Romans to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.”

The Next Generation

As Ventidius celebrated his triumph in Rome, Antony seethed in Athens.

Meanwhile, across the Euphrates in Parthia, King Orodes was grieving over losing his son and army. After several days, Orodes lost the will to speak and eat and began to talk to Pacorus as if he were alive.

It was also during this time that the many wives of Orodes began to make bids as to why Orodes should choose their son for next in line to the throne. Each mother understood that there was this nasty habit in Parthia… once a new king was elected, he would go out of his way to murder his brothers to secure the safety of his reign.

King Orodes

Orodes eventually chose and settled on his son Phraates to succeed him. Soon after Phraates was chosen heir to the throne, he began plotting against his father, Orodes.

Phraates’ first attempt at murdering his father was with a poison called aconite. This failed due to Orodes suffering from a disease called dropsy (edema), which absorbed the poison and had little effect. Therefore, Phraates took a much easier route and strangled his father to death. To make sure his throne was safe, he murdered his thirty brothers and any of the nobility that detested him or questioned his motives for his acts of cruelty. Phraates was here to stay.

But while Phraates went on a vicious campaign to secure his throne, Mark Antony, jealous of Ventidius’s success against Parthia, was prepping and planning an invasion of his own.

Antony’s turn was now to avenge Crassus to fulfill Caesar’s dream.

By Cam Rea

Reference

Leviathan vs. Behemoth: The Roman-Parthian Wars 66 BC-217 AD

Palms Over Baghdad: Hulagu’s Expedition to Oust the Abbasid Caliph – Part 2

By Cam Rea

[Read Part 1]

The Fall of Bagdad

Hulegu sent messages to his commanders informing them to muster their forces and move on Baghdad.

Baiju moved his forces from Rum via Mosul to cover the western side. Ked-Buka advanced from Luristan, a province of western Iran in the Zagros Mountains. Contingents from the Golden Horde under the command of Batu’s three nephews approached from Kurdistan from the north.

Tode Mongke Khan of the Golden Horde.

Tode Mongke Khan of the Golden Horde. (Public Domain)

Hulegu led the main force from Hulwan, located in Kermanshah Province in western Iran. In other words, the Mongol army was approaching the city in an arc from the north, which allowed them to converge from the east and west. The Mongols, due to the use of pontoon boats, overcame the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which once served as natural barriers against invading armies. As the Mongols advanced down both banks of the Tigris, the Caliph sent out 20,000 cavalries in an attempt to disperse and slow down the Mongol advance. Mongol scouts ahead of the main force found the Caliph’s cavalry and reported. Not long after, the Mongol engineers took advantage of the situation by breaking the dikes of the dams along the Tigris, which flooded the terrain behind the cavalry, downing many of them as they attempted to flee back to the city. With the only threat between Baghdad and the Mongol advance eliminated, Baiju’s forces marched down the west bank of the Tigris and took control of the commercial quarter, while Hulegu entered the Shiite suburbs to a rejoicing crowd beyond the eastern walls. Within twenty-four hours, the Mongols surrounded the city of Baghdad.

Mongols besieging Baghdad in 1258.

Mongols besieging Baghdad in 1258. (Public Domain)

On 30 January 1258, the Hulegu gave the order to commence the bombardment of the city walls. However, there was a problem. The Mongol siege crews had no rocks. The siege train carrying the needed stones was three days’ journey away. While the Mongols looked for suitable projectiles to throw at the city walls, Hulegu ordered his Mongol archers to fire arrows over the walls with messages attached, which informed the citizens that they would be treated with kindness if they surrendered. While Hulegu sought to end this siege peacefully, Mongol engineers, likely accompanied by a detachment of troops, came up empty handed when it came to finding quality rocks. However, not all was lost. Mongol engineers stripped foundation stones from the buildings in the suburbs and uprooted palm trees to batter the walls of Baghdad.

The Caliph quickly sent ambassadors to negotiate peace but Hulegu would not hear the pleas and detained them. Hulegu’s message was clear, surrender was not enough; it must be unconditional surrender. While the Caliph continued to send envoys to Hulegu, the Mongols bombarded the walls, particularly focusing on the Ajami tower, which was reduced to rubble by 1 February.

Persian painting (14th century) of Hulegu’s army besieging a city. Note use of the siege engine.

Persian painting (14th century) of Hulegu’s army besieging a city. Note use of the siege engine. (Public Domain)

The Mongols finally broke into the city the next day and seized a portion of the eastern wall. However, the battle was far from over and the negotiations continued for another four days. On the 6 February, the bombardment ended but the Mongols remained on the wall until the Caliph surrendered.

Hulegu sent another message, this one to the armies of Baghdad. The message told them to lay down their arms and leave their posts. Seeing the situation was unwinnable by use of arms, Izz al-Din and Mujahid al-Din advised the Caliph to flee the city. But one man by the name of Ibn Alqami proposed that the best way to end this was for the Caliph to go before Hulegu. Hulegu’s terms to the Caliph were simple. Hulegu desired that the Caliph turn over his daughter so that he could marry her and that the Caliph recognized Hulegu as the supreme authority. If these terms were accepted, Hulegu would end the siege. The Caliph agreed and his forces marched out thinking they were going to retire to Syria.

Medieval depiction of Hulegu (left) and Caliph Al-Musta'sim.

Medieval depiction of Hulegu (left) and Caliph Al-Musta’sim. (Public Domain)

According to the 13th century Aramean historian Kirakos of Gandzak, the “countless multitudes came through the city gates, climbing over each other to see who would reach him first (Hulegu) divided up among the soldiers those who came out and ordered (the soldiers) to take them far from the city and to kill them secretly so that the others would not known. They killed all of them.”

The Many Versions of the Caliph’s Death

Four days later, Al-Musta’sim, soon to be the last Caliph of Baghdad, surrendered. There are various accounts of his surrender.

Kirakos of Gandzak account:

Al-Musta’sim emerged with his two sons, with all the grandees and much gold, silver, and precious stones as fitting gifts to Hulegu and his nobles. At first (Hulegu) honored him, reproaching him for dallying and not coming to him quickly. But then he asked the caliph: “What are you, God or man?” And the caliph responded: “I am a man, and the servant of God.” Hulegu asked: “Well, did God tell you to insult me and to call me a dog and not to give me food and drink to God’s dog? Now in hunger the dog of God shall devour you.” And he killed him with his own hands. “That, “he said, “is an honor for you, because I killed you.”

The account of 13th century polymath and prolific writer Nasir al-Din al-Tusi:

“When they took the walls, the King commanded the people of the town to join in demolishing them. Envoys passed to and fro…. After this, the Caliph, seeing that all was over, sought leave to come out. He came out…and saw the king, being accompanied by his son and courtiers…. Then (Hulegu) ordered the town to be pillaged.”

He went to examine the Caliph’s residence and walked in every direction. The Caliph was fetched and ordered presents to be offered. Whatever he brought, the king at once distributed amongst his suite and emirs, military leaders and (all) those present. He set a golden try before the Caliph and said: ‘Eat.” “It is not edible,” said the Caliph. “The why didst thou not make these iron doors into arrowheads and come to the bank of the river so that I might not have been able to cross it?” “Such,” replied the Caliph, “was God’s will.” “What will befall thee,” said the King, “is also God’s will.”…

Then he ordered the Caliph to bring out the women who were attached to himself and his sons. They went to the Caliph’s palace: there were 700 women and 1500 eunuchs, and they shared out the rest…. On the 14th Safar (20 February), the king set out from the gates of the town and sent for the Caliph….On that day he met his end in that village (Waqaf) together with his middle son. The next day his eldest son and those accompanied him met their end at the Kalwadh Gate.

The account by 13th century historian Rashid al-Din:

Hulegu Khan… the next morning … ordered Su’unchaq to go into the city, confiscate the caliph’s possessions, and sent them out. The items that had been accumulated over six hundred years were all stacked in mountainous piles…. The caliph was summoned… At the end of the day on Wednesday the 14th of Safar 656 (20 February 1258, the caliph, his eldest son, and five of his attendants were executed in the village of Waqaf … and the reign of the House of Abbas came to an end.

The account of Mustawfi Qazvini based much of his work on the histories of Rashid al-Din:

At Hulegu’s order, the executioner prepared for the killing, and maliciously brought a sack. He bound the Caliph, head, hand and foot and put him in a sack, which became his habitation. He said, “See this descendent from stock that is unequal led, and how the world has placed him in this sack.”

“Then they broke his head as though it were a stone and he died quickly. Fate dealt him a grievous blow, and brought destruction on that beautiful king. When the renowned Musta’sim was killed, a great name tumbled to the dust.”

Besides the Caliph and his sons being put to death, the three thousand courtiers who accompanied the Caliph were also said to be put to the sword.

The Destruction of Baghdad

Kirakos of Gandzak account:

Hulegu then ordered the troops guarding the walls to descend and kill the inhabitants of the city, great and small. (The Mongols) organized as though harvesting a field and cut down countless, numberless multitudes of men, women, and children. For forty days they did not stop. Then they grew weary and stopped killing. Their hands grew tired; they took others for sale. They destroyed mercilessly.

However, Hulegu’s wife, the senior Khantun (lady), named Doquz Khatun was a Christian. She spared the Christians of Baghdad, Nestorians and other denominations and beseeched her husband not to kill them. And he spared them with their goods and property.

Hulegu ordered all his soldiers to take the goods and property of the city. They all loaded up with gold, silver, precious stones, pearls, and costly garments, for it was an extremely rich city, unequalled on earth.

Hulegu himself took his share the caliph’s treasures—three thousand camel loads; and there was no counting the horses, mules and asses.

Grigor of Akanc’s account:

After this they convened a great assembly of old and young horsemen, including the Georgian and Armenian cavalry, and with countless multitudes they moved on the city of Baghdad. When they arrived on the spot they took at once the great and famous city of Baghdad, filled with many people and rare treasures, and countless gold and silver. When they took it they slaughtered mercilessly and made many prisoners.

While various Christian communities were spared the sword, the Muslim population suffered greatly. After the massacre ended, the Mongols and their allies torched the palaces and mosques. The wagon loads of treasure plundered from the city were sent to Mangku Khan in Karakorum or to Hulegu’s fort on the island of Shalia in Lake Urmiya.

Mongol siege.

Mongol siege. (Public Domain)

The number of dead is unknown. Martin Sicker in his book The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna estimates that 90,000 died. Ian Frazier in his article ‘Annals of history: Invaders: Destroying Baghdad’ published by The New Yorker, estimates (depending on the source) that “two hundred thousand, or eight hundred thousand, or more than a million” may have died. According to Andre Wink in his book Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, Vol.2, that perhaps 50,000 troops along with 200,000 to 800,000 civilians. A. Y. Al-Hassan in his book, The different aspects of Islamic culture: Science and technology in Islam, Vol.4, Ed. suggest that perhaps 2,000,000 may have perished.

The Destruction of Intellectual Wealth

The destruction of Baghdad was one of greatest disasters in human history. While one can elaborate on the great amount of wealth lost, one must not overlook the great amount of intellectual wealth lost, such as art, philosophy and science, all put to torch, along with the library, the learning centers, the hospitals and so forth. But even more precious was the amount of life lost that had no part in the conflict. Some may ask how a group of people could do such a thing. The answer is not simple.

But given what is known about the Mongols, they strongly despised farmers and cities. To them farming was a waste, which is understandable. Mongols had no use for growing crops. They needed lands for their horses and herds to graze. Cities were seen as centers of laziness. This also is understandable, for the Mongols were always on the move and had not time for leisure for their horses and herds needed constant attention. Life on the steppe had not the division of labor found in a city in order for it to function. Lastly, the Mongol record of sacking cities in China, Iran, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, always came with a tremendous loss of life and shows their disregard for human life. They treated people as if they were nothing more than animals, herding them before their great army and preparing them for the slaughter as the army slowly encircles them for the grand kill. While despicable, it is understandable in how the Mongols, such as Genghis Khan, Hulegu, or Tamerlane, treated civilians, like that of Baghdad, for such men saw outsiders as nothing more than vermin, unless that person or group of people had something to offer that could provide the Mongol administration or military machine an advantage.

The Battle of Blue Waters between the armies of Lithuania and the Golden Horde in 1362.

The Battle of Blue Waters between the armies of Lithuania and the Golden Horde in 1362. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

When looking at the Mongols from afar, a quote from the French historian René Grousset comes to mind when considering uncivilized and civilized:

“It has been noted that the Jenghiz-Khanite Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century was less cruel, for the Mongols were mere barbarians who killed simply because for centuries this had been the instinctive behavior of nomad herdsmen toward sedentary farmers. To this ferocity Tamerlane added a taste for religious murder. He killed from piety. He represents a synthesis, probably unprecedented in history, of Mongol barbarity and Muslim fanaticism, and symbolizes that advanced form of primitive slaughter which is murder committed for the sake of an abstract ideology, as a duty and a sacred mission.”

The outcome of Hulegu’s sacking of Bagdad was expected, especially coming from a man who grew up on the uncivilized steppe, while Turco-Mongol conqueror Tamerlane’s later sacking of Bagdad in 1401 was not expected, especially coming from a man who grew up surrounded by civilization.

Top Image: Mural of siege warfare, Genghis Khan Exhibit in San Jose, California, US (CC BY 2.0)

References

Bretschneider, E. Mediaeval Researchers from Eastern Asiatic Sources, Vol I. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. LTD, 1910.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. New York: Atheneum, 1979.

Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Gettleman Marvin E. and Stuart Schaar. The Middle East and Islamic World Reader. New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Grousset, René. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Secret Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizari Ismailis Against the Islamic World. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Jackson, Peter and Willem van Ruysbroeck. The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1955. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990.

Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance. London: Routledge, 2003.

Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2004.

Man, John. Kublai Khan: From Xanadu to Superpower. London: Bantam Press, 2006.

Marshall, Robert. Storm from the East: From Genghis Khan to Khubilai Khan London: Penguin, 1994.

May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War. Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007.

Mclynn, Frank. Genghis Khan: His Conquests, His Empire, His Legacy. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2015.

Nicolle, David and Richard Hook. The Mongol Warlords: Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan, Hülegü, Tamerlane. Poole, Dorset: Firebird Books, 1990.

Saunders, J.J. The History of the Mongol Conquests. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1971.

A History of Medieval Islam. London: Routledge, 2007.

Weatherford, J. McIver. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Crown, 2004.

Willey, Peter. The Eagle’s Nest: Ismaili Castles in Iran and Syria. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

Palms Over Baghdad: Hulagu’s Expedition to Oust the Abbasid Caliph – Part I

Palms-Over-Baghdad

By Cam Rea

In 1253 CE, a breeze began to blow into Baghdad from the east. Unbeknownst to Al-Musta’sim, the Abbasid Caliph, this breeze would soon turn into a violent shamal (wind). This shamal was gaining energy from Karakorum, the Mongol capital of the most powerful empire on earth. For in the same year, Mongke Khan, the Great Khan, held a khuriltai (a political and military council meeting) with siblings and close family. It was during this meeting that Mongke expressed his desire to launch a dual military campaign: one led by Khubilai against the Sung Dynasty in China, and another against the Arabs and Persians, this led by Hulegu, grandson of Genghis Khan.

Hulagu Khan, 14th century

Hulagu Khan, 14th century (Public Domain)

An artist’s depiction of ancient Karakorum.

An artist’s depiction of ancient Karakorum. (CC BY 2.0)

Hulegu’s mission was to conquer the Arabs and Persians and to expand further westward by subjugating Muslim nations, particularly bringing the Abbasid Caliphate under the Mongol yoke, and from there to proceed southwards through the Kingdom of Jerusalem to conquer the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. But there was another reason for Mongke’s decision to bring the Muslim nations under Mongol control:  riches and fear.

Riches and Fear

Thirty-six years earlier in 1217, the Mongols under the leadership of Genghis Khan invaded the Khwarazmian Empire, which ruled Persia at the time, and toppled it by 1221. However, the invasion of Persia was not completed. After Genghis Khan died in 1227, his son, Ogodei, inherited the throne. To complete this, Ogodei promoted Chormaqan to act as military governor of Persia with the sole mission to subjugate and control. Chormaqan reigned as military governor of Persia from 1231-1237.  Ogodei replaced Choraqan with Baiju in 1237. Baiju was tasked with the same mission: control the territory and expand the borders—which he did by conquering the Seljuks of Asia-Minor from 1242-1256. However, a Muslim delegation arrived at the court of Mongke in 1252, led by the religious leader, Qadi of Qazvin, which requested Mongke to replace Baiju with a royal Mongol prince.

O illustrious and magnanimous Qa’an we do not speak of a bridge made of stone, or brick, nor a bridge of chains. I want a bridge of justice over the river, for where there is justice, the world is prosperous. He who comes over the river Amu Darya (Oxus) finds the Qa’an’s justice, and on this side of the river there is justice and a path. On that side of the river, the world is evil, and some people become prosperous through injustice.

Audience with Möngke.

Audience with Möngke. (Public Domain)

This message to the Great Khan made it clear that if the Persian people were citizens of the Mongol Empire, then they should act like it and be given a representative from Genghis’ own bloodline. As to how bad the situation in Persia was under the Mongol military governors, it is unclear, but leaves one to speculate that it was not good, and enough to cause a delegation to travel to the Mongol capital of Karakorum to request a change in leadership. Mongke could have turned them away but he was no fool. The Mongols were long familiar with the influential Muslim merchants traversing throughout Asia.

Influential merchants traded goods across Asia.

Influential merchants traded goods across Asia. (Public Domain)

Besides the great flow of wealth, the Mongols also noticed the influential reputation of the renowned Persian scientists, astronomers, astrologers, mathematicians, technologist, painting, carpet making, music and poetry.

Jabir ibn Hayyan, "the father of Chemistry".

Jabir ibn Hayyan, “the father of Chemistry”. (Public Domain)

This level of sophistication was too lucrative for the Mongols not to control, especially if they could conquer southern China and combine their commerce and intellectuals with that of the Muslim world. Therefore, it was imperative to make the citizens of Persia feel equal if the Mongols wished to enjoy the lucrative commercial and intellectual benefits. Thus, the formation of the Ilkhanate was established with Hulegu as its head.

Ilkhanate, part of the Mongol Empire located primarily across modern Iran, as led by Hulegu.

Ilkhanate, part of the Mongol Empire located primarily across modern Iran, as led by Hulegu. (Public Domain)

Besides riches, there was fear. Mongke feared a small group called Assassins, who were a Shiite sect more properly known as the Nizari Ismailis. Mongke’s paranoia, while reasonable, affected those who entered his court. William Rubruck, who traveled to the Mongol court in 1253-1255, describes the atmosphere prior his admission into the court.

This interrogation was being conducted because Mangu Chan had been informed that four hundred Assassins, in various disguises, had made their way in with the aim of killing him.

Assassins had a notorious reputation. Illustration of an agent of the Ismailis (Order of Assassins) (left, in white turban) fatally stabs his target.

Assassins had a notorious reputation. Illustration of an agent of the Ismailis (Order of Assassins) (left, in white turban) fatally stabs his target. (Public Domain)

Preparation

The first Mongol contingents left Mongolia in the spring of 1253. Before the conquest of the Middle East was underway, Mongke and the Mongol princes threw a lavish party for Hulegu and showered him with gifts, such as jewelry, money, fine horses and robes for himself, his wives, and sons.

A Mongol horse archer in the 13th century.

A Mongol horse archer in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

Mongke’s biggest gift to his brother was issuing an order that two out of every ten Mongol armed forces would join the Hulegu army. After the feasting was ended and the hangovers cured, the beginning of what was to become a grand army left on 19 October 1253. Once on the move, the Mongol army lumbered through central Asia and swelled into an enormous force before coming to rest at the outskirts of Samarkand.

Samarkand, (Uzbekistan) is one of the oldest inhabited cities in Central Asia.

Samarkand, (Uzbekistan) is one of the oldest inhabited cities in Central Asia. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

While at Samarkand, Hulegu continued to increase the size of his forces. When Eastern Christian communities received news of Hulegu’s planned campaign, the vassal Kingdoms of Georgia and Armenia provided troops and were enthusiastic in recovering former Christian lands in Mesopotamia.

Further to the north, Batu Khan, Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde, division of the Mongol Empire, provided newly conscripted tumens (an army unit of 10,000 soldiers), mostly Turks and Alans, led by Balaghai, Khuli, and Tutar, Batu’s nephews. Furthermore, Hulegu brought in a “thousand engineers from China [who] had to get themselves ready to serve the catapults, and to be able to cast inflammable substances.”

Ancient Chinese mobile catapult cart.

Ancient Chinese mobile catapult cart. (CC BY 1.0)

The total size of Hulegu’s army was roughly between 100,000-150,000 men, probably closer 120,000 total. However, Hulegu probably gained additional forces along the way as he marched through Persia.

To prepare the way for such a large military force, Hulegu dispatched advanced troops across central Asia with the mission to sweep the path of livestock in order to ensure a good supply of pasture for his horses and pack animals when they passed through the area. Prior to pushing towards their objective, it was important to fatten the horses during the summer before moving out in the winter. While the collection of troops and supplies keep coming in, Hulegu sent his vanguard ahead of the main force to negotiate and procure potential allies before his massive army passed through their territories. Once his army pushed out, a vast army of non-combatants, such as Chinese engineering corps and European craftsmen, were tasked to pave the way by clearing the roads of obstacles, repair or building bridges, have boats ready for the rivers, and construct catapults besides other devices of war. However, this was no ordinary traveling army. In fact, this Mongol force was a traveling city accompanied by their families.

Hulagu Khan leading his army.

Hulagu Khan leading his army. (Public Domain)

Whether Hulegu’s army consisted of 120,000 or 150,000 men, each horseman would have extra horses for the journey. This would indicate that between 240,000 to 300,000 horses, if not more, accompanied the army along with perhaps 1.8 million sheep. To ensure that overgrazing would not occur, the vast amount of horses and sheep were widely dispersed. Besides ensuring the accompanying animals got pastures to feed, the army and their families also needed food. While sheep is one source of food, Hulegu’s agents were sent ahead, tasked to collect stores of flour, wine, and mares for kumiz (fermented horse milk). The big difference between Hulegu’s army when compared to Genghis Khan’s army, is that Genghis Khan’s forces moved like a storm, it was not a traveling city, whereas Hulegu’s army moved a few kilometers a day due to its sheer size.

Assassins

On 1 January 1256, Hulegu’s army crossed the river Amu Darya (Oxus). When Hulegu crossed the Amu Darya, he was met with rejoicing, unlike what took place some thirty-nine years earlier. As Hulegu’s army passed through, he and his forces were greeted with great enthusiasm by chiefs and dignitaries.

Amu Darya in Turkmenistan.

Amu Darya in Turkmenistan. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

“There came willingly to his service a large number of the princes and generals. People from every house and by roads to praise him. At every halting place where they stopped they received praise from those along the way.”

Map of the Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent, c. 850.

Map of the Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent, c. 850. (CC BY 3.0)

Before proceeding to the lands of the Abbasid Caliph, Hulegu had some business to conduct in the Elburz Mountains. When the leader of the Assassins, Rukn ad-Din received news that Hulegu was coming for him, he quickly sent letters and by a show of compliance, began to dismantle the castles by removing all battlements and towers. However, he took his time in doing so, which caused Hulegu to lose patience and on 8 November 1256, the Mongols encircled Maymundiz castle.

After four days of battle, the Mongols finally assembled their mangonels, a type of siege engine, and proceeded with bombarding the fortress causing Rukn ad-Din to surrender later that month.

Medieval Mangonel.

Medieval Mangonel. (Public Domain)

Once in Mongol custody, Hulegu ordered him to tell the remaining fortress to surrender and dismantle immediately. Not all surrendered of course. Many had to be taken by storm and in doing so, every man, woman, and child were put to the sword.

Alamut fortification in Iran and Ismailites Assassins stronghold.

Alamut fortification in Iran and Ismailites Assassins stronghold. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Muslim rejoicing over the destruction of the Assassins quickly turned cold. Many seemed unaware that Hulegu now turned his attention towards the grand city of Baghdad, which served as the seat and power of the Muslim faith.

Letters to the Caliph

With the Assassins a distant memory, Hulegu moved his forces to Tabriz in April 1257, and sent an emissary to the Caliph with a message. These messages are provided by Rashid al-Din.

“When the Heretics’ fortresses were conquered we sent emissaries to request assistance from you… In reply you said that you were in submission, but you did not send troops. Now, a token of submissiveness and allegiance is that you assist us with troops when we ride against foes. You have not done so, and you send excuses.

No matter how ancient and grand your family may be, and no matter how fortunate your dynasty has been … is the brightness of the moon such that it can eclipse the brilliance of the sun? Talk of what the Mongol army has done to the world and those in it from the time of Genghis Khan until today may have reached your hearing from common and elite, and you may have heard how, through God’s strength, they have brought low … dynasties … all of whom were families of might and majesty.

Previously we have given you advice, but now we say you should avoid our wrath and vengeance. Do not try to overreach yourself or accomplish the impossible, for you will only succeed in harming yourself. The past year is over. Destroy your ramparts, fill in your moats, turn the kingdom over to your son, and come to us…. If you command is obeyed, it will not be necessary for us to wreak vengeance, and you may retain your lands, army, subjects. If you do not heed our advice and dispute with us, line up your soldiers and get ready for the field of battle, for we have our loins girded for battle with you and are standing at the ready. When I lead my troops in wrath against Baghdad even if you hide in the sky or in the earth … I shall put your city and country to the torch. If you desire to have mercy on your ancient family’s head, heed my advice. If you do not let us see what God’s will is.”

After listening to Hulegu’s message, the Caliph replied:

“Young man, you have just come of age and have expectations of living forever. You have … passed prosperously and auspiciously in dominating the whole world. You think your command is absolute…. Since you are not going to get anything from me, why do you seek? You come with strategy, troops, and lasso, but how are you going to capture a star? Does the prince not know that from the east to the west, from king to beggar, from old to young, all who are God-fearing and God worshipping are servants of this court and soldiers in my army? When I motion for all those who are dispersed to come together, I will deal first with Iran and then turn my attention to Turan, and I will put everyone in his proper place. Of course, the face of the earth will be full of tumult, but I do not seek vengeance or to harm anyone. I do not desire that the tongues of my subjects should either congratulate or curse me because of the movement of armies, espcially since I am of one heart and one tongue with the Qa’an (Mongke) and Hulegu. If, like me, you were to sow seeds of friendship, do you think you would have to deal with my moats and ramparts and those of my servants? Adopt the path of friendship and go back to Khurasan (Central Asia).”

After hearing the Caliph’s response, Hulegu sent back a wrathful reply, stating, “God the eternal elevated Genghis Khan and his progeny and gave us all the face of the earth, from east to west. Anyone whose heart and tongue are straight with us in submission retains his kingdom, property, women, children, and life…. He who contemplates otherwise will not live to enjoy them.”

 

References

Bretschneider, E. Mediaeval Researchers from Eastern Asiatic Sources, Vol I. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. LTD, 1910.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. New York: Atheneum, 1979.

Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Gettleman Marvin E. and Stuart Schaar. The Middle East and Islamic World Reader. New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Grousset, René. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Secret Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizari Ismailis Against the Islamic World. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Jackson, Peter and Willem van Ruysbroeck. The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1955. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990.

Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance. London: Routledge, 2003.

Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2004.

Man, John. Kublai Khan: From Xanadu to Superpower. London: Bantam Press, 2006.

Marshall, Robert. Storm from the East: From Genghis Khan to Khubilai Khan London: Penguin, 1994.

May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War. Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007.

Mclynn, Frank. Genghis Khan: His Conquests, His Empire, His Legacy. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2015.

Nicolle, David and Richard Hook. The Mongol Warlords: Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan, Hülegü, Tamerlane. Poole, Dorset: Firebird Books, 1990.

Saunders, J.J. The History of the Mongol Conquests. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1971.

A History of Medieval Islam. London: Routledge, 2007.

Weatherford, J. McIver. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Crown, 2004.

Willey, Peter. The Eagle’s Nest: Ismaili Castles in Iran and Syria. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005.