The Stalin-Putin Parallel: The War of Attrition as Strategy both Militarily and Politically

Putin’s approach to the Russo-Ukrainian War reflects both World War II and the Korean War—one shaped by industrial might, the other by political endurance. These strategies have proven effective in the past and remain just as formidable today.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is a 21st-century high-tech hybrid of second through fifth-generation warfare (2-5GW). Third-generation warfare (3GW) was the center of both forces in 2022-23, emphasizing rapid maneuvering in hopes of penetrating deep behind enemy lines and collapsing the enemy’s center of gravity. Russia’s initial invasion (2022) sought an AirLand Battle Blitzkrieg-style advance that failed to obtain air superiority, which led to its demise and pushback of its ground forces. The same could be said of Ukrainian forces in the following years.

The failure to establish maneuver ultimately led to an attritional, technology-driven conflict (2GW and elements of 4-5GW). For example, Russia’s shift toward entrenched defensive strategies, mass artillery fire, and drone warfare (2GW + 4GW), while Ukraine’s adaptation with precision strikes, asymmetric attacks using drones, and heavy reliance on Western intelligence (4GW + 5GW). However, the pendulum would swing the other way.

For 2024-2025, the war has shifted even further away from third-generation warfare (3GW) and is now dominated by second-generation (2GW) attrition and fourth-/fifth-generation (4GW/5GW) technological integration. Russia is winning due to several key factors.

The first of these many factors starts with the decline of 3GW and the rise of attrition (2GW). Russia’s fortified defensive lines made maneuver warfare almost impossible for Ukraine. Russia’s sheer firepower through massed artillery gave it an advantage due to outproducing the West in shell production and giving it an upper hand in grinding battles—along with the dwindling Ukrainian manpower, ammunition shortages, recruitment, and Western support.

However, shortly before the Ukrainian forces began to suffer the lack thereof, the Russian military began to integrate and amalgamate (4GW/5GW), giving their forces an edge. Drone warfare dominance has allowed the Russians to master loitering munitions, first-person view (FPV) drones, and swarm tactics, overwhelming Ukrainian positions. Not to forget electronic warfare (EW), which the Russian EW systems can now effectively jam Ukrainian communications, drones, and guided munitions and vice versa at times. AI and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) have improved the Russian forces’ real-time battlefield awareness through satellites, drones, and AI-assisted targeting. At this stage of the conflict, Russia is not winning through maneuver (3GW) but by a relentless combination of industrial capacity and attritional strategy (2GW), advanced technology (4GW/5GW), and Ukraine’s weakening strategic position. While a basic overview of the military aspect has been outlined, how does it connect with the political dimension, and in what ways do they correlate?

A nation’s military actions directly reflect its political strategy—at least in the short term. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approach to the war is similar to Stalin’s approach during the Korean War. Stalin, during the Korean War, sent Mao Zedong an interesting letter stating, “I also think, as do you, that the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of the Anglo-American troops.

Like Stalin in Korea, Putin seems content with a prolonged war, seeing it as a way to:

  1. Observe, Study, Train, and Improve his forces for the current war and potential future conflicts.
  2. Strain Western support for Ukraine by dragging the war out, banking on political fatigue.
  3. Erode the military and economic strength of NATO-backed Ukraine, just as Stalin hoped to weaken the US-led coalition in Korea using China and North Korea.

At the same time, Putin has applied the WWII-era industrial attrition model, mirroring how the Soviets countered German Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) by leveraging sheer production capacity and the advantage of time and space. The vast Ukrainian front allowed Russia to absorb enemy attacks, stretch Ukrainian supply lines, and gradually wear down its forces—just as the Soviets did against the Germans. As Ukraine’s army and NATO supplies diminish, the vastness of its territory becomes an increasing liability. With fewer troops to defend an expansive front, strategic overstretch sets in, making it harder to hold ground, reinforce weak points, and sustain prolonged resistance—playing directly into Russia’s war of attrition:

  1. Russia’s mass industrial mobilization ensures its army is never starved of munitions.
  2. Defensive depth + counteroffensive waves: Like in WWII, Russian forces absorbed early Ukrainian counterattacks (2023), only to grind them down through attritional battles and layered defenses (2024-present), similar to how the Soviets wore down the Germans.
  3. Manpower attrition: Ukraine, with a smaller population and struggling recruitment, shows signs of exhaustion, much like Germany’s overstretched forces in WWII.

Ukraine’s dilemma is a lack of industrial capacity, much like NATO, which gives aid to Ukraine but also lacks a coherent military industry to fund, fuel, equip, train, and support the Ukrainian army, let alone its coalition, if decided to join directly. It also does not help to have low morale among the troops and the populace, even those nations’ administrations who support the effort; the nation’s population finds it fleeting. Because of this, the ability to conduct organized, combined arms maneuver warfare ceases to exist, leaving the Ukrainian forces to the brutality of attritional warfare.

This comparison suggests Putin’s long-term strategy is not about breakthrough victories but about wearing Ukraine and NATO down through political and industrial attrition. The defensive pressure placed on the Ukrainian forces and NATO backers will eventually collapse into itself as the center never holds. In this case, Ukraine and NATO are the center of gravity as both creatures exist in a politically symbiotic union; if the Ukrainian forces collapse, NATO folds. If NATO is unable to fund and equip the Ukrainian forces, Ukraine folds. In the end, both fold.

Bewegungskrieg Doctrine: Success, Limitations, and Downfall

Blitzkrieg, the lightning-fast strategy and tactic that once seemed unstoppable on the battlefields of Europe—was it truly invincible, or did its fatal flaws doom it from the start? Germany’s rugged terrain, vast plains, and strategic borders played a crucial role in shaping the military doctrine of Bewegungskrieg, better known in the West as Blitzkrieg. This article delves into the core principles and philosophies behind Bewegungskrieg. We will examine how geographical factors influenced the development and implementation of Bewegungskrieg and analyze its successes and inherent limitations. Additionally, we will uncover why the term Bewegungskrieg is more fitting than Blitzkrieg in a linked video below. This brief exploration will shed light on the intricate military theories and practices that defined Germany’s approach to warfare and ultimately led to its defeat.

Bewegungskrieg over Blitzkrieg

Bewegungskrieg (Blitzkrieg) in a Nutshell

Bewegungskrieg (“war of movement”) is a military doctrine emphasizing rapid, surprise attacks to disrupt enemy forces and command structures. Redeveloped by Germany during the interwar period, it played a critical role in the early successes of World War II. Geography and technology significantly influenced both the redevelopment and execution of Bewegungskrieg, shaping its strategic and tactical elements.

John Delaney, head of the Second World War team at Imperial War Museums, states, “The main principle of Blitzkrieg is to win by not fighting. You identify the weak point in the enemy’s line, break through, and cause disruption in the enemy’s rear areas. So you defeat them by dislocation, not destruction on the battlefield.

In a Bewegungskrieg operation, the initial step involves careful reconnaissance to identify weak points in the enemy’s defenses, typically less fortified sections of the front line. Schwerpunkt, meaning “focal point” or “center of gravity,” is crucial here, focusing forces at critical points to achieve a breakthrough. Once identified, a concentrated attack utilizing fast-moving tanks and motorized and mechanized infantry, supported by close air support, created a breach. Central to this doctrine are the principles of speed and surprise, achieved through rapid movement and force concentration at decisive points. This requires integrating tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support into combined arms operations for a synergistic effect.

Once the front line is breached, the attacking forces swiftly advance into the enemy’s rear areas. The goal is to avoid prolonged engagements with the main enemy forces and instead focus on capturing command centers, supply depots, communication lines, and other essential infrastructure. The attackers seek to cause maximum disruption and disarray by targeting these crucial points. This strategy severely hampers the enemy’s ability to mount a coordinated defense as their command and control structures are disrupted, and their supply lines are cut off.

The enemy’s dispersion and disarray render them susceptible to further exploitation. Swift-moving units can encircle substantial enemy formations, resulting in their isolation and eventual capitulation. This approach diminishes the necessity for direct, large-scale confrontations.

The fundamental principle behind Bewegungskrieg is to triumph by inducing disarray rather than outright destruction. Through swift advancement and targeting of critical points, attackers aim to immobilize the enemy’s ability to respond, resulting in a strategic collapse. This compels the enemy to retreat or surrender without prolonged confrontations. The speed and surprise of Bewegungskrieg significantly impact the enemy psychologically, creating confusion and panic, further deteriorating organized resistance. By leveraging speed, surprise, and concentrated force, Bewegungskrieg disrupts and paralyzes the enemy, leading to a quick and decisive outcome. The strategy focuses on dislocating the enemy’s forces and infrastructure rather than their physical destruction, embodying the principle of “winning by not fighting.”

Geographic Considerations for Success and Limitations

The Bewegungskrieg doctrine, redeveloped by the Germans in the 1920s to avoid another war of attrition and fit modern military technological needs, was designed for the type of war they sought, whether defensively or offensively. This doctrine was used with great success from 1939 to 1941. However, this highlights a key issue: the problem of doctrine itself. The Bewegungskrieg doctrine represented the war the German command desired, but not necessarily the war they would face. Doctrines often evolve to fit specific scenarios or desires, and Bewegungskrieg was no different. It proved effective against smaller countries like Belgium and the Netherlands and countries nearly or roughly the same size as Germany, such as Poland and France. When the Germans first developed the concept in the late 19th century and later updated it with early 20th-century technology, they did so with the spatiotemporal context of their Western and Central European neighbors in mind.

Unlike the smaller and more accessible nations in Western and Central Europe, the limitations of the Bewegungskrieg doctrine became clear when roughly 3.8 million German soldiers, along with their allies, invaded the vast and logistically challenging expanse of the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front on 22 June 1941. The Soviet Union’s vast geographic scale and complex logistics revealed the inadequacies of a doctrine intended for swift, decisive victories in more confined and manageable areas.

Constant Need for Supplies

An army of 3.8 million needed food, fuel, equipment replacements, ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts to function, all of which were in short supply as the war progressed. The doctrinal nature of Bewegungskrieg required a constant and substantial supply, and so did all military doctrines. The consistent supply of essentials was disrupted, hampering German operations due to stretched supply lines and partisan interference. Moreover, it did not help that the Soviet Union’s underdeveloped infrastructure, including roads and railways, compounded the difficulty of transporting supplies to the front lines. Furthermore, the retreating Soviet forces resorted to scorched-earth tactics that exacerbated this lack of infrastructure, and the environment also affected the invaders as the severe Russian winter and the muddy conditions during the rasputitsa (season of impassable roads) significantly hindered German mobility and logistical support.

Doctrine to Bypass Certain Targets

Bewegungskrieg doctrine bypassed specific strong points to maintain momentum and find and crush the enemy’s center of gravity. While this tactic initially succeeded in causing disarray, it left pockets of enemy resistance that could regroup and counterattack. This is what can be considered missed strategic objectives. Bypassing key strategic targets sometimes meant missing opportunities to destroy vital Soviet infrastructure or command centers, which allowed the Soviets to regroup and mount effective counteroffensives. Because of this, Soviet partisans conducted guerrilla operations behind German lines, disrupting supply routes, communications, and railways. This further strained German logistics and hindered their operational capabilities. These were crucial for the German army to push forward, which led us to supplies.

Overstretched Combined Arms Operation

With 3.8 million German forces pressing deep into the Soviet Union, the need to supply grew more crucial daily. The rapid advances of Bewegungskrieg tactics extended supply lines over vast distances, making them vulnerable to disruption and overextension. The longer the supply lines, the more difficult it was to maintain a steady flow of necessary resources. Because of this, coordination issues arose. The complexity of coordinating armor, motorized units, and air support over such extended distances created logistical and operational challenges. Communication and coordination often broke down, reducing the effectiveness of combined arms operations. The threat of attrition, the antithesis of Bewegungskrieg, loomed large as stretched and poorly supplied units risked becoming bogged down in protracted battles, sapping their strength and momentum.

So What Defeated Bewegungskrieg?

As the Germans battled overstretched lines, dwindling supplies, and the harsh Russian seasons of winter and spring, the Soviets quickly adapted to German tactics, implementing deep defensive strategies and conducting effective counteroffensives. None of this would have been possible had the Soviets not relocated over 1,500 military-important plants to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia and received aid through the Lend-Lease Act (1941) from the U.S. Their ability to swiftly mobilize and produce war materials strained German resources, shifting the tide of the battle by 1943.

Remember, the Bewegungskrieg doctrine is about the war of movement. It must stay in motion, seeking the best avenues of attack and avoiding targets that would bog them down. Doing so allowed the means to keep pressing forward to fulfill their objective of destroying the enemy through dislocation. However, no matter how sound Bewegungskrieg was, it was still subject to unforeseen limitations, such as attrition.

Bewegungskrieg’s doctrine was designed to avoid attrition warfare and seek a quick victory, as it did in Poland and France. However, when the German army invaded the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front, the vast Soviet landscape swallowed the German army and its doctrine. The rapid advances that the Germans made deep into the Soviet Union slowly exposed Bewegungskrieg, in which the landmass stretched the manpower and material of the German army to its limits and beyond, causing overstretched combined arms operations, dwindling manpower, and the constant need for supplies coupled with the gradual development of fierce resistance and the deep Soviet landmass exposing the German forces, eventually revealed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg.

So, back to the question, what defeated Bewegungskrieg? There are two answers: fatal conceit and attrition. The term ‘fatal conceit’ comes from Friedrich A. Hayek, who describes the belief that “man is able to shape the world around him according to his wishes.” In the context of Bewegungskrieg, this overconfidence manifested as a belief that rapid and decisive maneuver warfare could overcome any challenge, including the vast and varied terrain of the Eastern Front.

The German military’s adherence to the doctrine reflected a conviction that their strategic innovations and technological superiority would ensure success regardless of the logistical and environmental hurdles. In other words, the German high command assumed that the Soviet Union would collapse as quickly as Poland and France had. This overconfidence led to critical underestimations of the Soviet Union’s capacity to adapt, resist, and endure prolonged conflict. However, attrition gradually took its toll, depleting German manpower and supplies. The prolonged engagements exposed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg, a doctrine not designed for extended conflict.

The tale of two attritions was the other killer of Bewegungskrieg. On one hand, the attrition of manpower and resources stretched the German army thin. On the other hand, industrial attrition, where the Allies outproduced the Germans in war materials, exposed Bewegungskrieg’s vulnerabilities and contributed to its ultimate failure.

In conclusion, Bewegungskrieg was a doctrine built on the principles of rapid movement to achieve decisive victories. However, the fatal conceit of believing it could universally overcome all challenges and the relentless grind of attrition revealed its limitations. The vast Soviet landscape and the Allies’ industrial might turned the tide against the German forces. The initial successes in Poland and France could not be replicated on the Eastern Front, where the realities of war demanded more than Bewegungskrieg could deliver. Ultimately, the interplay of fatal conceit and attrition led to the downfall of this once-dominant doctrine.

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